Recitations
The following recitation notes are courtesy of Konrad Menzel and used with permission.
RECÂ # | TOPICS | CONTENTS |
---|---|---|
I. Labor Market Statistics: Data Sources and Historical Overview | ||
II. The Neoclassical Labor Supply Model | ||
1 | Measurement Error (PDF) |
Deriving the Slutsky EquationUsing Roy's Identity Measurement ErrorNotation Classical Measurement Error Group Means as Proxy Variables Classical Measurement Error in Panel Data Cures for Classical Measurement Error "Non-Classical" Measurement Error |
2 | Maximum Likelihood (PDF) |
Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE)MLE ExamplesBernoulli Distribution Normal Linear Regression The Probit Model |
3 | Panel Data (PDF) |
Estimation With Panel DataBasic Setup First Differences Fixed Effects Random Effects Measurement IssuesNon-Classical EIV: Division Bias Classical Measurement Error in Panel Data One Solution to EIV: Wald IV |
III. Labor Demand, Immigration, Minimum Wages, and Unions | ||
4 | Instrumental Variables (PDF) |
Grouped Data and Instrumental VariablesHow Does OLS Work? Group Means as Proxy Variables Main Types of Bias in OLS Grouped-Data IV Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) 2SLS as a Grouped Data IV Potential Problems: Weak Instruments, Many Instruments Discussion of the Replication of AngristOLS Regressions Fixed-Effects Regressions 2SLS Estimates The Card Critique |
5 | Instrumental Variables (cont.) (PDF) |
Instrumental Variables (continued)Omitted Variables and the Wald Estimator 2SLS as a Grouped Data IV Heterogeneous Treatment Effects A Few Hints About Calculations With Scalars in Stata |
6 | Random Coefficient Models (PDF) |
Random Coefficient ModelsMotivation Heterogeneous Treatment Effects Example: General Exam 2003, Question 1 |
IV. Human Capital, Education, and Training | ||
7 | Educational Choice (PDF) |
Educational ChoiceThe Discount Rate Bias Story A Simple Model for Signaling Bayesian Perfect Equilibrium in Signaling Games Separating Equilibrium Pooling Equilibrium |
8 | Bargaining and Hold-Up (PDF) |
MotivationBargainingThe Strategic Approach The Axiomatic Approach Interlude: Efficient Bargaining With Inefficient Outcomes? The Hold-Up Problem - Investment in Physical Capital |
V. Labor Demand and Related Topics | ||
9 | Labor Demand (PDF) |
Market Power and "Classical" Labor DemandEstimating Market PowerThe Conduct Parameter The Corts Critique |
VI. Turnover, Matching, Learning, and the Returns to Tenure | ||
10 | Normal Learning Model (PDF) |
Statistical LearningThe Normal Learning Model The Jovanovic Example The Holmström (1982) Career Concerns Model |
11 | Models of Turnover (PDF) |
Models of Turnover and Their Empirical PredictionsMotivation Matching and On-The-Job Search - Deconstructing Jovanovic IIDynamic Decisions, Convexity, and Option Values Option Values in Continuous Time |