This is an archived course. A more recent version may be available at ocw.mit.edu.

Recitations

The following recitation notes are courtesy of Konrad Menzel and used with permission.

REC # TOPICS CONTENTS
I. Labor Market Statistics: Data Sources and Historical Overview
II. The Neoclassical Labor Supply Model
1 Measurement Error (PDF)

Deriving the Slutsky Equation

Using Roy's Identity

Measurement Error

Notation

Classical Measurement Error

Group Means as Proxy Variables

Classical Measurement Error in Panel Data

Cures for Classical Measurement Error

"Non-Classical" Measurement Error

2 Maximum Likelihood (PDF)

Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE)

MLE Examples

Bernoulli Distribution

Normal Linear Regression

The Probit Model

3 Panel Data (PDF)

Estimation With Panel Data

Basic Setup

First Differences

Fixed Effects

Random Effects

Measurement Issues

Non-Classical EIV: Division Bias

Classical Measurement Error in Panel Data

One Solution to EIV: Wald IV

III. Labor Demand, Immigration, Minimum Wages, and Unions
4 Instrumental Variables (PDF)

Grouped Data and Instrumental Variables

How Does OLS Work?

Group Means as Proxy Variables

Main Types of Bias in OLS

Grouped-Data IV

Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS)

2SLS as a Grouped Data IV

Potential Problems: Weak Instruments, Many Instruments

Discussion of the Replication of Angrist

OLS Regressions

Fixed-Effects Regressions

2SLS Estimates

The Card Critique

5 Instrumental Variables (cont.) (PDF)

Instrumental Variables (continued)

Omitted Variables and the Wald Estimator

2SLS as a Grouped Data IV

Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

A Few Hints About Calculations With Scalars in Stata

6 Random Coefficient Models (PDF)

Random Coefficient Models

Motivation

Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

Example: General Exam 2003, Question 1

IV. Human Capital, Education, and Training
7 Educational Choice (PDF)

Educational Choice

The Discount Rate Bias Story

A Simple Model for Signaling

Bayesian Perfect Equilibrium in Signaling Games

Separating Equilibrium

Pooling Equilibrium

8 Bargaining and Hold-Up (PDF)

Motivation

Bargaining

The Strategic Approach

The Axiomatic Approach

Interlude: Efficient Bargaining With Inefficient Outcomes?

The Hold-Up Problem - Investment in Physical Capital

V. Labor Demand and Related Topics
9 Labor Demand (PDF)

Market Power and "Classical" Labor Demand

Estimating Market Power

The Conduct Parameter

The Corts Critique

VI. Turnover, Matching, Learning, and the Returns to Tenure
10 Normal Learning Model (PDF)

Statistical Learning

The Normal Learning Model

The Jovanovic Example

The Holmström (1982) Career Concerns Model

11 Models of Turnover (PDF)

Models of Turnover and Their Empirical Predictions

Motivation

Matching and On-The-Job Search - Deconstructing Jovanovic II

Dynamic Decisions, Convexity, and Option Values

Option Values in Continuous Time