Rousseau's Freedom as Recognition

Abstract

To yearn for freedom is to want to be seen by others as someone. Rousseau, I believe, held such a conception of freedom, alongside his intricate theory of human passions. This essay examines how freedom relates to such passions, and in particular, to the Rousseauian notion of amour-propre. Importantly, the aim here is both interpretive and positive. The essay seeks to locate Rousseau within the old republican tradition in a manner that parts ways with most contemporary readings of Rousseau. But, in doing so, it argues that republican freedom essentially involves a particular status and the recognition of such status by others. On this Rousseauian view, one is free to the extent that others see one as a limit to their arbitrary interference and as entitled to interfere with them non-arbitrarily. Finally, republican freedom, so understood, is shown to be essential to meeting the demands of healthy amour-propre, thereby bringing Rousseau's political and psychological theories closer together.