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dc.contributor.advisorSilvio Micali
dc.contributor.authorChen, Jingen_US
dc.contributor.authorMicali, Silvioen_US
dc.contributor.authorPass, Rafaelen_US
dc.contributor.otherTheory of Computationen
dc.date.accessioned2014-06-10T21:00:02Z
dc.date.available2014-06-10T21:00:02Z
dc.date.issued2014-06-09
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/87727
dc.description.abstractWe consider rationality and rationalizability for normal-form games of incomplete information in which the players have possibilistic beliefs about their opponents. In this setting, we prove that the strategies compatible with the players being level-k rational coincide with the strategies surviving a natural k-step iterated elimination procedure. We view the latter strategies as the (level-k) rationalizable ones in our possibilistic setting.en_US
dc.format.extent10 p.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesMIT-CSAIL-TR-2014-013en_US
dc.titlePossibilistic Beliefs and Higher-Level Rationalityen_US
dc.date.updated2014-06-10T21:00:03Z


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