Possibilistic Beliefs and Higher-Level Rationality
Author(s)
Chen, Jing; Micali, Silvio; Pass, Rafael![Thumbnail](/bitstream/handle/1721.1/87727/MIT-CSAIL-TR-2014-013.pdf.jpg?sequence=5&isAllowed=y)
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Other Contributors
Theory of Computation
Advisor
Silvio Micali
Metadata
Show full item recordAbstract
We consider rationality and rationalizability for normal-form games of incomplete information in which the players have possibilistic beliefs about their opponents. In this setting, we prove that the strategies compatible with the players being level-k rational coincide with the strategies surviving a natural k-step iterated elimination procedure. We view the latter strategies as the (level-k) rationalizable ones in our possibilistic setting.
Date issued
2014-06-09Series/Report no.
MIT-CSAIL-TR-2014-013