| dc.contributor.author | Byrne, Alexander | en_US |
| dc.coverage.temporal | Spring 2003 | en_US |
| dc.date.issued | 2003-06 | |
| dc.identifier | 24.119-Spring2003 | |
| dc.identifier | local: 24.119 | |
| dc.identifier | local: IMSCP-MD5-5611034e3d23e08a072100e5d3ff0190 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/35907 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Examination of problems in the intersection of artificial intelligence, psychology, and philosophy. Issues discussed: whether people are Turing Machines, whether computers can be conscious, limitations on what computers can do, computation and neurophysiology, the Turing test, the analog/digital distinction, the Chinese Room argument, the causal efficacy of content, the inverted spectrum, mental representation, procedural semantics, connectionism, the relation between simulation and explanation, and whether some aspects of mentality are more resistant to programming than others. | en_US |
| dc.language | en-US | en_US |
| dc.rights.uri | Usage Restrictions: This site (c) Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2003. Content within individual courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology is providing this Work (as defined below) under the terms of this Creative Commons public license ("CCPL" or "license"). The Work is protected by copyright and/or other applicable law. Any use of the work other than as authorized under this license is prohibited. By exercising any of the rights to the Work provided here, You (as defined below) accept and agree to be bound by the terms of this license. The Licensor, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, grants You the rights contained here in consideration of Your acceptance of such terms and conditions. | en_US |
| dc.subject | artificial intelligence | en_US |
| dc.subject | psychology | en_US |
| dc.subject | philosophy | en_US |
| dc.subject | turning machines | en_US |
| dc.subject | consciousness | en_US |
| dc.subject | computer limitations | en_US |
| dc.subject | computations | en_US |
| dc.subject | neurophysiology | en_US |
| dc.subject | Turing test | en_US |
| dc.subject | the analog/digital distinction | en_US |
| dc.subject | Chinese Room argument | en_US |
| dc.subject | causal efficacy of content | en_US |
| dc.subject | inverted spectrum | en_US |
| dc.subject | mental representation | en_US |
| dc.subject | procedural semantics | en_US |
| dc.subject | connectionism | en_US |
| dc.subject | Philosophy of mind | en_US |
| dc.title | 24.119 Mind and Machines, Spring 2003 | en_US |
| dc.title.alternative | Mind and Machines | en_US |
