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dc.contributor.advisorJonathan Gruber and Jerry Hausman.en_US
dc.contributor.authorHall, Anne Elizabeth, 1971-en_US
dc.contributor.otherMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-03-29T18:42:15Z
dc.date.available2006-03-29T18:42:15Z
dc.date.copyright2005en_US
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/32411
dc.descriptionThesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2005.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references.en_US
dc.description.abstractIn this thesis, I estimate a structural demand model for prescription drug benefits by Medicare beneficiaries using data from the Medicare HMO program. I then use the utility parameter estimates to explore other questions of interest relating to the elderly's demand for prescription drug benefits. In Chapter 1, I study the question of how much Medicare beneficiaries value prescription drug benefits. Using data from the Medicare HMO program, I find that Medicare beneficiaries are willing to pay $33 to increase their brand-name coverage limit by $100. I also estimate marginal cost for each HMO and regress it on prescription drug benefits. I find that raising brand-name coverage by $100 costs $30. These estimates suggest that Medicare HMO enrollees are less than average prescription drug users and the results give a lower bound for the welfare derived by the elderly from prescription drug benefits. Chapter 2 addresses the question of how Medicare HMOs' choices of premiums and benefits affect selection. Changes in demographic factors (a measure of risk based on beneficiaries' characteristics) and risk scores (a measure based on beneficiaries' inpatient diagnoses) in the fee-for-service sector are regressed on changes in premiums and benefits in the HMO sector. The results show that increasing premiums and lowering benefits raise the demographic factor but have no effect on the risk score, suggesting that beneficiaries in more expensive demographic categories switch out of HMOs when premiums rise and benefits fall but these beneficiaries are healthy for their demographic category.en_US
dc.description.abstract(cont.) Chapter 3 measures the welfare loss from the withdrawals from the HMO program following the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, using the utility parameter estimates from Chapter 1. The changes to the Medicare HMO program in the Balanced Budget Act triggered many plan withdrawals from the program. The welfare and costs are calculated under two counterfactual scenarios. The results show that the Medicare HMO program generates more welfare than costs and that the withdrawals resulted in a net loss for society. The estimates of the loss range from $4.3 billion to $16.6 billion.en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby Anne Elizabeth Hall.en_US
dc.format.extent118 p.en_US
dc.format.extent5626064 bytes
dc.format.extent5633268 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMassachusetts Institute of Technologyen_US
dc.rightsM.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
dc.subjectEconomics.en_US
dc.titleEssays on prescription drug benefits in Medicare managed careen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.description.degreePh.D.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
dc.identifier.oclc61696863en_US


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