This is an archived course. A more recent version may be available at ocw.mit.edu.

Microeconomic Theory III

As taught in: Spring 2009

An example of a Cournot duopoly. A graph of q2 versus q1 with two intersecting lines B1(q2) and B2(q1).

An example of a Cournot duopoly. After several rounds of elimination, the rationalizable outcome is approximated. (Image by Prof. Peter Eso.)

Instructors:

Prof. Peter Eso

MIT Course Number:

14.123

Level:

Graduate

Course Features

Course Description

This half-semester course discusses decision theory and topics in game theory. We present models of individual decision-making under certainty and uncertainty. Topics include preference orderings, expected utility, risk, stochastic dominance, supermodularity, monotone comparative statics, background risk, game theory, rationalizability, iterated strict dominance multi-stage games, sequential equilibrium, trembling-hand perfection, stability, signaling games, theory of auctions, global games, repeated games, and correlation.