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TOPIC # |
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# OF LECTURES |
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TOPICS |
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READINGS |
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1 |
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1 |
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Choice Theory |
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Yildiz, M. Lecture notes on Choice Theory (PDF).
Savage, L. The Foundations of Statistics.
Kreps, D. Notes on the Theory of Choice.
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2 |
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2 |
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Introduction, Definitions (Nash, Perfect, Sequential Equilibrium, Rationalizability, Correlated Equilibrium, Backward Induction, Forward Induction, Sequential Rationality, Self confirming equilibria)
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Fudenberg, D., and J. Tirole. Chaps. 1, 2, and 3.
Osborne, M. J., and A. Rubinstein. Chaps. 2, 3, 4, and 6.
Aumann, R. "Backward Induction and Common Knowledge of Rationality."
Ben-Porath, E. "Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backward Induction in Perfect Information Games."
Brandenburger, A. "The Power of Paradox".
Aumann, R., and A. Brandenburger. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium."
Bernheim, D. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior."
Pearce, D. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection."
Aumann, R. "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expresssion of Bayesian Rationality."
Kreps, D., and R. Wilson. "Sequential Equilibria."
Dekel, E., D. Fudenberg, and D. Levine. Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium. Working paper. http://levine.sscnet.ucla.edu/papers/ack32rc.pdf
Fudenberg, D., and D. Kreps. "Learning in Extensive Games, I: Self-Confirming Equilibrium."
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3 |
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2 |
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Repeated Games |
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Fudenberg and Tirole. Chap. 5.
Osborne and Rubinstein. Chap. 8.
Abreu, D., P. K. Dutta, and L. Smith. "Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition."
Fudenberg, D., and E. Maskin. "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting and Incomplete Information."
Fudenberg, D., D. Levine, and E. Maskin. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Information."
Fudenberg, D., D. M. Kreps, and E. Maskin. "Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players."
Kandori, M. "Social Norms and Community Enforcement."
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4 |
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1 |
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Review |
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5 |
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1 |
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Cheap Talk
(Guest Lecture by Marco Battaglini) |
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Crawford, V., and J. Sobel. "Strategic Information Transmission."
Myerson, R. "Multi-Stage Games with Communication."
Battaglini, M. "Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk."
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6 |
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2 |
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Bargaining Theory |
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Osborne and Rubinstein. Chaps. 7, 15.
Yildiz, M. "Bargaining without a common prior - An immediate agreement theorem."
Fudenberg and Tirole. Chap. 10
Rubinstein, A. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model."
Nash, J. "The bargaining problem."
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7 |
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1 |
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Signaling, Reputation |
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Fudenberg and Tirole. Chap. 9.
Cho, I.-K., and D. Kreps. "Signalling Games and Stable Equilibria."
Kreps, D., and R. Wilson. "Reputation and Imperfect Information."
Milgrom, and Roberts. "Predation, reputation and entry deterrence."
Kreps, D., P. Milgrom, J. Roberts, and R. Wilson. "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma."
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8 |
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4 |
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Epistemic Foundations |
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Fudenberg and Tirole. Chaps 2-14.
Yildiz. Lecture Notes.
Aumann. "Interactive Epistemology."
Dekel, E., and F. Gul. "Rationality and Knowledge in Game Theory." In Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications.
Milgrom, P., and N. Stokey. "Information, Trade and Common Knowledge."
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9 |
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1 |
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Review |
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10 |
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4 |
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Learning and Evolution |
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Weibull. Chap. 2-3.
Fudenberg and Levine. Chapters TBA.
Erev, I., and A. Roth. "On the Need for Low-Rationality Game Theory." http://www.economics.harvard.edu/~aroth/
Noldeke, G., and L. Samuelson. "An Evolutionary Analysis of Forward and Backward Induction."
Kandori, M., G. Mailath, and R. Rob. "Learning, Mutation, and Long-run Equilibria in Games."
Young, P. "The Evolution of Conventions."
Ellison, G. "Learning, Local Interaction and Coordination."
Fudenberg, D., and D. Kreps. "Learning in Extensive Games, I: Self-Confirming Equilibria."
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11 |
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1 |
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Review |
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12 |
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1 |
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Supermodular Games |
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Milgrom, P., and J. Roberts. "Rationalizability and Learning in Games with Strategic Complementarities."
Milgrom, P., and J. Roberts. "The LeChatelier Principle."
Vives, X. "Nash Equilibrium with Strategic Complementarities."
Topkis, D. M. Supermodularity and Complementarity.
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13 |
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3 |
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Auctions |
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Krishna, V. Chaps. 2, 3, 5-7, 10 and 17.
Myerson, R. "Optimal Auction Design."
Milgrom, P., and R. Weber. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding."
Che, Y -K., and I. Gale. "Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders."
Vickrey, W. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders."
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14 |
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1 |
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Review |
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