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1 |
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Introduction to Game Theory [1 lecture] |
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2 |
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Payoffs in Games: Rational Choice Under Uncertainty [1 lecture]
- Expected Utility theory; risk aversion. Kreps, Chapters 3.1-3.3
- Applications; risk sharing, insurance, option value
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3 |
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A More Formal Introduction to Games [3 lectures]
- Extensive forms and normal forms. Gibbons, Chapters 1.1A and 2.1A
- Strategies, dominant strategies and iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Gibbons 1.1B
- Nash Equilibrium. Gibbons 1.1C
- Applications of Nash Equilibrium. Gibbons 1.2
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4 |
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Backward Induction, Subgame Perfection, and Forward Induction [3 lectures]
- Analysis of extensive-form games. Gibbons 2.1A
- Backward induction
- Subgame perfection. Gibbons 2.2A
- Applications. Gibbons 2.2B, C, D and 2.1B, C
- Bargaining and negotiations. Gibbons 2.1D
- Forward induction
- Applications
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5 |
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The First Midterm |
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6 |
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Repeated Games and Cooperation [2 lectures]. Gibbons 2.3 |
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7 |
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Incomplete Information [2 lectures]
- Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. Gibbons 3.1A, C
- Auctions
- Applications. Gibbons 3.2
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8 |
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Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information [2 lectures]
- Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. Gibbons 4.1
- Sequential bargaining under asymmetric information. Gibbons 4.3B
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9 |
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The Second Midterm |
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10 |
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Reputation [1 lecture]. Gibbons 4.3C |
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11 |
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Problems of Asymmetric Information in Economics [3 lectures]
- Signaling and the Intuitive Criterion. Gibbons 4.2A and 4.4
- Applications of signaling. Gibbons 4.2B, C
- The principal-agent problem. Kreps, Chapter 17
- Applications; lemons, efficiency wages, credit-rationing, price-discrimination
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12 |
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Final Exam |
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13 |
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Evolutionary foundations of equilibrium; evolutionarily stable strategies and replicator dynamics [2 lectures] |
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