Mechanism Design With Approximate Player Types
dc.contributor.advisor | Silvio Micali | |
dc.contributor.author | Chiesa, Alessandro | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Micali, Silvio | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Zhu, Zeyuan Allen | en_US |
dc.contributor.other | Theory of Computation | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-02-22T21:30:08Z | |
dc.date.available | 2011-02-22T21:30:08Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2011-02-16 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/61008 | |
dc.description.abstract | We investigate mechanism design when the players do not exactly know their types, but have instead only partial information about them. | en_US |
dc.format.extent | 18 p. | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | MIT-CSAIL-TR-2011-009 | |
dc.relation.isreplacedby | MIT-CSAIL-TR-2011-024 | |
dc.relation.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/62296 | |
dc.subject | Type uncertainty | en_US |
dc.subject | Mechanism Design | en_US |
dc.subject | Auctions | en_US |
dc.subject | Social Welfare | en_US |
dc.title | Mechanism Design With Approximate Player Types | en_US |