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Bridging Utility Maximization and Regret Minimization
(2013-12-03)
We relate the strategies obtained by (1) utility maximizers who use regret to refine their set of undominated strategies, and (2) regret minimizers who use weak domination to refine their sets of regret-minimizing strategies.
An Autoimmune Mechanism for AIDS' T4 Lymphopenia
(1991-03)
We put forward a new model for the T4 lymphopenia occuring in AIDS by suggesting a mechanism whose net effect is blocking the generation of T4 cells during HIV infection.
Revenue in Truly Combinatorial Auctions and Adversarial Mechanism Design
(2007- 11-0)
Little is known about generating revenue in UNRESTRICTED combinatorial auctions. (In particular, the VCG mechanism has no revenue guarantees.) In this paper we determine how much revenue can be guaranteed in such auctions. ...
Knowledge Benchmarks in Adversarial Mechanism Design (Part I) and Implementation in Surviving Strategies (Part I)
(2008-07)
We put forward new benchmarks and solution concepts for Adversarial Mechanism Design, as defined by [MV07.a], and we exemplify them in the case of truly combinatorial auctions.We benchmark the combined performance (the sum ...
A Social-Welfare Optimal Probabilistic Mechanism for Knightian Single-Good Auctions
(2012-09-07)
We provide an optimal probabilistic mechanism for maximizing social welfare in single-good auctions when each player does not know his true valuation for the good, but only a set of valuations that is guaranteed to include ...
Optimal Parametric Auctions
(2012-05-08)
We study the problem of profit maximization in auctions of one good where the buyers' valuations are drawn from independent distributions. When these distributions are known to the seller, Myerson's optimal auction is a ...
Perfect and General Virtual Implementation For Perfectly Informed Players
(2009-12-04)
We show that, when the players are perfectly informed about each other, essentially all social-choice functions can be rationally robustly implemented via an extensive-form public-action mechanism that (1) is perfectly ...
Collusion-Resilient Revenue In Combinatorial Auctions
(2007-11-02)
In auctions of a single good, the second-price mechanism achieves, in dominantstrategies, a revenue benchmark that is naturally high and resilient to anypossible collusion.We show how to achieve, to the maximum extent ...
Perfect Implementation of Normal-Form Mechanisms
(2007-03)
Privacy and trust affect our strategic thinking, yet they have not been precisely modeled in mechanism design. In settings of incomplete information, traditional implementations of a normal-form mechanism ---by disregarding ...