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dc.contributor.authorHoffman, Moshe
dc.contributor.authorYoeli, Erez
dc.coverage.temporalFall 2013
dc.date.accessioned2023-10-03T18:14:22Z
dc.date.available2023-10-03T18:14:22Z
dc.date.issued2013-12
dc.identifier14.11-Fall2013
dc.identifier.other14.11
dc.identifier.otherIMSCP-MD5-f34899d68b17b96f63f38e3213025e6e
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/152354
dc.description.abstractWe will apply insights from game theory to explain human social behavior, focusing on novel applications which have heretofore been the realm of psychologists and philosophers—for example, why people speak indirectly, in what sense beauty is socially constructed, and where our moral intuitions come from—and eschewing traditional economic applications such as industrial organization or auctions. We will employ standard games such as the prisoners dilemma, coordination, hawk-dove, and costly signaling, and use standard game theory tools such as Nash Equilibria, Subgame Perfection, and Perfect Bayesian Equilibria. These tools will be taught from scratch and no existing knowledge of game theory, economics, or mathematics is required. At the same time, students familiar with these games and tools will not find the course redundant because of the focus on non-orthodox applications.en
dc.language.isoen-US
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dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/*
dc.subjectgame theoryen
dc.subjectsocial behavioren
dc.subjectprisoners' dilemmaen
dc.subjecthawk-doveen
dc.subjectcostly signalingen
dc.subjectNash Equilibriaen
dc.subjectSubgame Perfectionen
dc.subjectPefect Bayesian Equilibriaen
dc.title14.11 Insights from Game Theory into Social Behavior, Fall 2013en
dc.title.alternativeInsights from Game Theory into Social Behavioren
dc.audience.educationlevelUndergraduate
dc.subject.cip270103en
dc.date.updated2023-10-03T18:14:31Z


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