| dc.contributor.author | Snyder, James | |
| dc.coverage.temporal | Fall 2008 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2022-09-13T19:35:13Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2022-09-13T19:35:13Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2008-12 | |
| dc.identifier | 17.812J-Fall2008 | |
| dc.identifier.other | 17.812J | |
| dc.identifier.other | 14.296J | |
| dc.identifier.other | IMSCP-MD5-31b4c51bebbb572d87727e6af7315f99 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/145400 | |
| dc.description.abstract | This is an applied theory course covering topics in the political economy of democratic countries. This course examines political institutions from a rational choice perspective. The now burgeoning rational choice literature on legislatures, bureaucracies, courts, and elections constitutes the chief focus. Some focus will be placed on institutions from a comparative and/or international perspective. | en |
| dc.language.iso | en-US | |
| dc.relation.isbasedon | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/46344 | |
| dc.rights | This site (c) Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2022. Content within individual courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology is providing this Work (as defined below) under the terms of this Creative Commons public license ("CCPL" or "license") unless otherwise noted. The Work is protected by copyright and/or other applicable law. Any use of the work other than as authorized under this license is prohibited. By exercising any of the rights to the Work provided here, You (as defined below) accept and agree to be bound by the terms of this license. The Licensor, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, grants You the rights contained here in consideration of Your acceptance of such terms and conditions. | en |
| dc.rights | Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported | * |
| dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/ | * |
| dc.subject | political economy | en |
| dc.subject | rational choice | en |
| dc.subject | legislature | en |
| dc.subject | bureaucracy | en |
| dc.subject | court | en |
| dc.subject | and elections | en |
| dc.subject | electoral competition | en |
| dc.subject | comparative | en |
| dc.subject | international | en |
| dc.subject | public goods | en |
| dc.subject | government | en |
| dc.subject | taxation | en |
| dc.subject | income redistribution | en |
| dc.subject | macroeconomic policy | en |
| dc.subject | multiparty competition | en |
| dc.subject | electoral system | en |
| dc.subject | voter | en |
| dc.subject | agency models | en |
| dc.subject | models of political parties | en |
| dc.subject | point-valued solution | en |
| dc.subject | set-valued solution | en |
| dc.subject | probabilistic voting models | en |
| dc.subject | structure-induced equilibrium models | en |
| dc.subject | vote-buying | en |
| dc.subject | vote-trading | en |
| dc.subject | Colonel Blotto | en |
| dc.subject | minorities | en |
| dc.subject | interest groups | en |
| dc.subject | lobbying | en |
| dc.subject | bargaining | en |
| dc.subject | coalitions | en |
| dc.subject | government stability | en |
| dc.subject | informational theory | en |
| dc.subject | distributive theory | en |
| dc.subject | legislative-executive relations | en |
| dc.subject | representative democracy | en |
| dc.subject | direct democracy | en |
| dc.title | 17.812J / 14.296J Collective Choice I, Fall 2008 | en |
| dc.title.alternative | Collective Choice I | en |
| dc.audience.educationlevel | Graduate | |
| dc.subject.cip | 451003 | en |
| dc.subject.cip | Canadian Government and Politics | en |
| dc.subject.cip | 451002 | en |
| dc.subject.cip | American Government and Politics (United States) | en |
| dc.date.updated | 2022-09-13T19:35:19Z | |
