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Tight revenue bounds with possibilistic beliefs and level-k rationality
(© The Econometric Society, 2015-07)
Mechanism design enables a social planner to obtain a desired outcome by leveraging the players’ rationality and their beliefs. It is thus a fundamental, but yet unproven, intuition that the higher the level of rationality ...
Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness
(© Elsevier B.V., 2012-01-17)
We show that collusion and wrong beliefs may cause a dramatic efficiency loss in the Vickrey mechanism for auctioning a single good in limited supply. We thus put forward a new mechanism guaranteeing efficiency in a very ...
Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions
(MDPI AG/© Jing Chen, & Silvio Micali, 2016-10-26)
In unrestricted combinatorial auctions, we put forward a mechanism that guarantees a meaningful revenue benchmark based on the possibilistic beliefs that the players have about each other’s valuations. In essence, the ...