| dc.contributor.author | Manea, Mihai | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | Yildiz, Muhamet | en_US |
| dc.coverage.temporal | Spring 2010 | en_US |
| dc.date.issued | 2010-06 | |
| dc.identifier | 14.126-Spring2010 | |
| dc.identifier | local: 14.126 | |
| dc.identifier | local: IMSCP-MD5-24fdcb65bcc6d17593cc3b9d6a3e3024 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/106995 | |
| dc.description.abstract | This course is a rigorous investigation of the evolutionary and epistemic foundations of solution concepts, such as rationalizability and Nash equilibrium. It covers classical topics, such as repeated games, bargaining, and supermodular games as well as new topics such as global games, heterogeneous priors, psychological games, and games without expected utility maximization. Applications are provided when available. | en_US |
| dc.language | en-US | en_US |
| dc.relation | | en_US |
| dc.rights.uri | Usage Restrictions: This site (c) Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2017. Content within individual courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology is providing this Work (as defined below) under the terms of this Creative Commons public license ("CCPL" or "license") unless otherwise noted. The Work is protected by copyright and/or other applicable law. Any use of the work other than as authorized under this license is prohibited. By exercising any of the rights to the Work provided here, You (as defined below) accept and agree to be bound by the terms of this license. The Licensor, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, grants You the rights contained here in consideration of Your acceptance of such terms and conditions. | en_US |
| dc.rights.uri | Usage Restrictions: Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported | en_US |
| dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/ | en_US |
| dc.subject | extensive-form games | en_US |
| dc.subject | Nash equilibria | en_US |
| dc.subject | evolutionary equilibria | en_US |
| dc.subject | bargaining with incomplete information | en_US |
| dc.subject | rationalizability | en_US |
| dc.subject | non-cooperative games | en_US |
| dc.subject | 110401 | en_US |
| dc.title | 14.126 Game Theory, Spring 2010 | en_US |
| dc.title.alternative | Game Theory | en_US |
