14.581 MIT PhD International Trade
— Lecture 22: International Organization of Production (Theory part II) —

Dave Donaldson

Spring 2011

- **Contractual theories of MNEs**
  - **Antras (2003)**
  - Antras and Helpman (2004)
- Fragmentation of production
  - Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008)

Why Do Multinational Firms Exist?

- Answer so far: "Technological" theories of the multinational firm.

    - According to these theories, MNEs will emerge whenever concentrating production in a unique location is *not* profit-maximizing.

    - Horizontal vs. Vertical FDI

- In developing global sourcing strategies, firms not only decide on where to **locate** different stages of value chain, but also on extent of **control**:

    - Why is fragmentation occurring within or across firm boundaries?

    - This is nothing more than the classical **"make-or-buy"** decision in IO.

What Determines (Multinational) Firms' Boundaries?

- Over the last 10 years, trade economists have incorporated various theories of the firm into general equilibrium models:

  1. Williamson's transaction-cost approach [Grossman and Helpman 2002].

  2. Grossman-Hart-Moore's property-rights approach [Antras 2003, Antras and Helpman 2004].

  3. Aghion-Tirole's approach [Marin Verdier 2008, Puga Trefler 2007].

- We will focus on the **property-rights approach**:

  - Integration means acquisition of assets. When contracts are incomplete, if the parties encounter contingencies that were not foreseen in the initial contract, the owner of the asset has residual rights of control. These residual rights of control affect the outside options and therefore how the surplus from the relationship is divided ex-post (ownership = power).

  - In the presence of relationship-specific investments, these considerations lead to a theory of the boundaries of the firm in which both the benefits and the costs of integration are endogenous.

- **Fact 1:** *In a cross-section of industries, the share of intra-firm imports in total US imports increases with the industry's capital intensity.*

- **Fact 2:** *In a cross-section of countries, the share of intra-firm imports in total US imports increases with the capital labor ratio of exporting country.*

- In order to explain facts 1 and 2, Antras (2003) proposes to combine Grossman-Hart with Helpman and Krugman (1985):

  - If final good producers always need an intermediate producer for labor decision, these producers should keep property rights when their decision matters more, i.e. in the labor-intensive sectors.

  - Since capital abundant countries produce capital intensive goods, and these goods are produced within the boundary of the firm, their share of intra-firm trade will be higher.

- Consumer preferences are such that F faces a demand given by

$$y = A p^{-1/(1-\alpha)}, \quad 0 < \alpha < 1. \tag{1}$$

- Production of good y requires the development of **two** specialized intermediate inputs h and m. Output is Cobb-Douglas:

$$y = \left(\frac{h}{\eta}\right)^{\eta} \left(\frac{m}{1-\eta}\right)^{1-\eta}, \quad 0 < \eta < 1, \tag{2}$$

where a higher η is associated with a more intensive use of h in production.

- There are two agents engaged in production:

    - A final-good producer (denoted by F) who supplies the input h and produces the final good y,

    - And, an operator of a manufacturing plant (denoted by S) who supplies the input m.

- F can produce h at a constant marginal cost c_h; S can produce m at $MC = c_m$. In addition, production requires fixed cost $f \cdot g\left(c_h, c_m\right)$.

- Inputs are tailored specifically to other party and useless to anybody else.

    - This is often referred to as a 'relationship specific investment'.

- **Contractual structure:** before investments h and m are made, the only contractibles are the allocation of residual rights (i.e., the ownership structure) and a lump-sum transfer between the two parties.
- Ex-post determination of price follows from generalized Nash bargaining.
- *Ex-ante*, F faces a perfectly elastic supply of potential S agents so that, in equilibrium, the initial transfer will be such that it secures the participation of S in the relationship at minimum cost to F.
- Key features:
    - Ex-post bargaining takes place both under outsourcing and under integration;
    - The distribution of surplus, however, is sensitive to the mode of organization because the outside option of F is naturally higher when it owns S than when it does not.
- Outside options are as follows:
    - Under outsourcing, contractual breach gives 0 to both agents;
    - Under integration, F can selectively fire S and seize input m (at a productivity cost δ) – because of property rights over input.

- In light of equations (1) and (2), the potential revenue from the sale of y is

$$R\left(h, m\right) = \lambda^{1-\alpha} \left(\frac{h}{\eta}\right)^{\alpha\eta} \left(\frac{m}{1-\eta}\right)^{\alpha(1-\eta)}. \tag{3}$$

- Given the specification of the ex-post bargaining, F obtains share $\beta_O = \beta$ of sale revenue under outsourcing and share $\beta_V = \delta^{\alpha} + \beta\left(1 - \delta^{\alpha}\right) > \beta_O$ under integration.

- Optimal ownership structure k^* is thus the solution to:

$$\max_{k \in \{V, O\}} \quad \pi_k = R\left(h_k, m_k\right) - c_h \cdot h_k - c_m \cdot m_k - f \cdot g\left(c_h, c_m\right) - \overline{U}$$

$$s.t. \quad h_k = \arg\max_h \left\{\beta_k R\left(h, m_k\right) - c_h \cdot h\right\}$$

$$m_k = \arg\max_m \left\{\left(1 - \beta_k\right) R\left(h_k, m\right) - c_m \cdot m\right\}$$

$$\tag{P1}$$

where $R\left(\cdot\right)$ is given in (3) and $\overline{U}$ is the outside option of the operator S

- First-best level of investments would simply maximize π_k

- The solution to the constrained program (P1) delivers the following result (see Antràs, 2003 for details):

Proposition

There exists a unique threshold $\widehat{\eta} \in (0, 1)$ such that for all $\eta > \widehat{\eta}$, integration dominates outsourcing ($k^* = V$), while for all $\eta < \widehat{\eta}$, outsourcing dominates integration ($k^* = O$).

- As in Grossman and Hart (1986), in a world of incomplete contracts, ex-ante efficiency dictates that residual rights should be controlled by the party undertaking a relatively more important investment:
  - if production is very intensive in the m input, then choose **outsourcing** to alleviate the underinvestment in the provision of the m input,
  - when production is intensive in the h input, F will optimally choose to tilt the bargaining power in its favor by obtaining these residual rights, thus giving rise to **vertical integration**.
- Convenient Feature: threshold k^* is independent of factor prices (Cobb-Douglas assumption important).

- Antràs (2003) embeds this structure in a Helpman-Krugman model of trade.

- J countries produce differentiated varieties in two sectors (Y, Z) using two factors (K, L).

- K and L are inelastically supplied and freely mobile across sectors.

- Preferences of the representative consumer in each country are of the form:

$$U = \left(\int_0^{n_Y} y(i)^\alpha di \right)^{\frac{\mu}{\alpha}} \left(\int_0^{n_Z} z(i)^\alpha di \right)^{\frac{1-\mu}{\alpha}}, \quad \mu, \alpha \in (0, 1).$$

- Demands are then $y(i) = A_Y p_Y(i)^{-1/(1-\alpha)}$ and $z(i) = A_Z p_Z(i)^{-1/(1-\alpha)}$.

- Free entry $\Rightarrow$ zero expected profits for a potential entrant.

- Production is as described before with the following new features:

- h and m are *nontradable*, but combined yield a tradable composite input.

- h is capital-intensive relative to m (cost-sharing in capital expenditures).
  Extreme factor intensity: $c_h^\ell = r^\ell$ and $c_m^\ell = w^\ell$.

    - see Table 1 in paper for a supportive evidence

- Tradable composite input can be produced in any country according to
  Cobb-Douglas technology as in (2) with $\eta_Y > \eta_Z$.

- Homothetic cost functions: $g_j^\ell \left(r^\ell, w^\ell \right) = \left(r^\ell \right)^{\eta_j} \left(w^\ell \right)^{1-\eta_j}$ and $f_k^\ell = f$.

- Final goods are nontradable, but can be produced one-to-one with inputs
  (helps pin down world trade flows).

- The same β and δ apply to both sectors and $\overline{U} = 0$.

Antràs (2003)
Firms, Contracts and Trade Structure

- Under these assumptions the ownership structure and locational decisions in (P2) can be analyzed separately.
  - Optimal ownership structure in sector $j \in \{Y, Z\}$ solves (P1) – Proposition 1 applies.
  - Optimal location decision solves $\min_{\ell} \left\{ \left(r^{\ell} \right)^{\eta_j} \left(w^{\ell} \right)^{1-\eta_j} \right\}$.
- Pattern of specialization of intermediate inputs responds to Heckscher-Ohlin forces as well as Helpman-Krugman forces:
  - Because of IRS and product differentiation, countries specialize in certain intermediate input varieties and export them worldwide.
  - But capital-abundant countries tend to produce a larger share of capital-intensive varieties than labor-abundant countries.
- Intermediate inputs can be traded at zero cost, while final goods are nontradable so that each F (costlessly) sets J plants to service the J markets.
- It can then be shown that, with FPE, for any country $j \in J$:
  - The "probability" of imports being intrafirm is increasing in capital-intensity of the industry.
  - The share of capital-intensive (and *thus* intrafirm) imports in total imports is an increasing function of the capital-labor ratio of the exporting country.

- **Contractual theories of MNEs**
  - Antras (2003)
  - **Antras and Helpman (2004)**
- Fragmentation of production
  - Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008)

- Technological theories of MNEs emphasize the location decision.

- Antras (2003) emphasizes the boundary decision.

- Antras and Helpman (2004) offer a model in which final good producers will simultaneously decide:

  - Where to source their inputs, North or South.

  - Whether to make or buy these inputs.

- As in Melitz (2003) and HMY (2004), they introduce firm-level heterogeneity.

  - Global sourcing decisions will depend both on firm- and industry-characteristics.

- **Environment and Preferences:** Consider a world with two countries (North and South) and a unique factor of production, labor. There is a representative consumer in each country with quasi-linear preferences:

$$U = x_0 + \frac{1}{\mu} \sum_{j=1}^{J} X_j^{\mu}, \ 0 < \mu < 1.$$

  where x_0 is consumption of a homogeneous good, X_j is an index of aggregate consumption in sector j, and μ is a parameter.

- Aggregate consumption in sector j is a CES function

$$X_j = \left[\int x_j(i)^{\alpha} di \right]^{1/\alpha}, \ 0 < \alpha < 1,$$

  of the consumption of different varieties $x_j(i)$, where the range of i will be endogenously determined.

- This specification leads to the following inverse demand function for each variety i in sector j:

$$p_j(i) = X_j^{\mu - \alpha} x_j(i)^{\alpha - 1}.$$

- **Technology:** Producers of differentiated goods face a perfectly elastic supply of labor. Let the wage in the North be strictly higher than that in the South ($w^N > w^S$). The market structure is one of monopolistic competition.
  - As in Melitz (2003), producers needs to incur sunk entry costs $w^N f_E$, after which they learn their productivity $\theta \sim G(\theta)$.
  - As in Antràs (2003), final-good production combines two specialized inputs according to the technology:

$$x_j(i) = \theta \left(\frac{h_j(i)}{\eta_j} \right)^{\eta_j} \left(\frac{m_j(i)}{1 - \eta_j} \right)^{1 - \eta_j}, \quad 0 < \eta_j < 1.$$

  - h is controlled by a final-good producer (agent F), m is controlled by an operator of the production facility (agent S).
  - Sectors vary in their intensity of headquarter services η_j. Furthermore, within sectors, firms differ in productivity θ.
  - Intermediates are produced using labor with a fixed coefficient.
  - $h_j(i)$ is produced only in the North, which implies that the headquarters H are always located in the North.
  - Productivity in the production of $m_j(i)$ is assumed identical in both countries.

- After observing θ, H decides whether to exit the market or start producing.
- In the latter case additional fixed cost of organizing production need to be incurred.
  - It is assumed that these additional fixed cost are a function of the structure of ownership and the location of production.
  - In particular, if an *organizational form* is $k \in \{V, O\}$ and $\ell \in \{N, S\}$, these fixed costs are $w^N f_k^\ell$ and satisfy

$$f_V^S > f_O^S > f_V^N > f_O^N. \tag{4}$$

- Contracting is as in the previous models, but we let $\delta^N \geq \delta^S$.
- Following Antràs (2003), the ex-post division of surplus is as follows:

	North	South
Non-Integ.	$\beta_O^N = \beta$	$\beta_O^S = \beta$
Integration	$\beta_V^N = \left(\delta^N\right)^\alpha + \beta\left[1 - \left(\delta^N\right)^\alpha\right]$	$\beta_V^S = \left(\delta^S\right)^\alpha + \beta\left[1 - \left(\delta^S\right)^\alpha\right]$

- Notice that

$$\beta_V^N \geq \beta_V^S > \beta_O^N = \beta_O^S = \beta.$$

- Can show that after solving for investment levels (in the constraints), the general program in (P2) reduces to

$$\max_{\beta_k^\ell \in \left\{ \beta_V^N, \beta_V^S, \beta_O^N, \beta_O^S \right\}} \pi_k^\ell \left(\theta, X, \eta \right) = X^{(\mu-\alpha)/(1-\alpha)} \theta^{\alpha/(1-\alpha)} \psi_k^\ell \left(\eta \right) - w^N f_k^\ell \quad (5)$$

where

$$\psi_k^\ell \left(\eta \right) = \frac{1 - \alpha \left[\beta_k^\ell \eta + \left(1 - \beta_k^\ell \right) (1 - \eta) \right]}{\left[\frac{1}{\alpha} \left(\frac{w^N}{\beta_k^\ell} \right)^\eta \left(\frac{w^\ell}{1 - \beta_k^\ell} \right)^{1-\eta} \right]^{\alpha/(1-\alpha)}}.$$

- By choosing k and ℓ, H is effectively choosing a triplet $\left(\beta_k^\ell, w^\ell, f_k^\ell \right)$. And:
  - π_k^ℓ is decreasing in w^ℓ and f_k^ℓ.
  - π_k^ℓ is largest when $\beta_k^\ell = \beta^* \left(\eta \right)$, with $\beta^{*\prime} \left(\eta \right) > 0$, $\beta^* \left(0 \right) = 0$ and $\beta^* \left(1 \right) = 1$. Intuitively, H wants to allocate relatively more power to the party undertaking a relatively more important investment in production.
- One can solve for industry equilibrium as in Melitz (2003) or HMY (2004).

- The choice of an organizational form faces two types of tensions:
  - Location decision: variable costs are lower in the South, but fixed costs are higher there – a firm's productivity θ will turn out to affect crucially its participation in international trade.
  - Integration decision: integration improves efficiency of variable production when the η is high, but involves higher fixed costs. This decision will thus crucially depend on η but also on θ.

- To simplify the discussion, we focus on two types of sectors:
  - ① A **Component-intensive sector** ($\eta < \beta^{*^{-1}}(\beta)$ and $w^N/w^S < \left(f_O^S/f_O^N\right)^{(1-\alpha)/\alpha(1-\eta)}$):
    - This implies $\psi_O^\ell(\eta) > \psi_V^\ell(\eta)$ for $\ell = N, S$, which together with (4), implies that any form of integration is dominated in equilibrium (see Figure).
  - ① A **Heaquarter-intensive sector** with $\eta > \beta^{*^{-1}}\left(\beta_V^N\right)$, and $\left(w^N/w^S\right)^{1-\eta}$ "high enough"
    - This implies the ranking of slopes
    $$\psi_V^S(\eta) > \psi_O^S(\eta) > \psi_V^N(\eta) > \psi_O^N(\eta). \tag{6}$$
   which together with (4) leads to the second Figure below.

Antràs and Helpman (2004)

Prevalence of various organizations

- Last part of the paper quantifies the relative prevalence of different organizational forms
- This requires parameterizing the distribution of θ. Following HMY (2004), AH choose $G(\theta)$ to be a Pareto distribution with shape z, i.e.,

$$G(\theta) = 1 - \left(\frac{b}{\theta}\right)^z \text{ for } \theta \geq b > 0. \tag{7}$$

  - Recall that z is inversely related to the variance of the distribution.
- In the component-intensive sector, foreign outsourcing is more prevalent:
  - The higher is w^N/w^S (or the lower are transport costs τ).
  - The lower are z and η.
- In the headquarter-intensive sector:
  - The share of intrafirm imports in total imports should be higher in industries with higher η, but also in industries with higher productivity dispersion (lower z) and higher transport costs (τ).
  - A higher w^N/w^S (or lower τ) increase the amount of international sourcing, but also increase the share of foreign outsourcing in total foreign sourcing.

- Antràs and Helpman (2004) offer a rich set of *positive* predictions concerning:
    - The share of intra-firm trade
    - The prevalence of offshoring
- We know much less about the *normative* and *policy* implications of contractual theories of MNEs.
- Antràs and Staiger (2010) offer a first look at the implications of contractual theories of MNEs for the design of trade agreements

- Contractual theories of MNEs

  - Antras (2003)

  - Antras and Helpman (2004)

- **Fragmentation of production**
  - **Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008)**

Fragmentation of production
Overview

- In recent years, a lot of attention has been given to "fragmentation of production" a.k.a. "slicing of the value chain" or "trade in tasks."
  - Baldwin (2006) has referred to this period as "the great unbundling."
- Fragmentation is related to activities of MNEs, though less than perfectly.
  - Intuitively, if a US firm outsources services in India, we would like to say that there is "fragmentation."
  - But this may not show up in the data (in U.S. statistics, a U.S. company needs to hold 10% or more of the stock of a foreign company in order to be considered a MNE).
- **Question:**
  Is "fragmentation" just a fancy name for "trade in intermediate goods"?
- **Answer(s):**
  1. It is about trade in intermediate goods, but new models emphasize differences in trade costs across goods (e.g. how routine a particular "task" may be), which previous models abstract from.
  2. It is *not just* about trade in intermediate goods, since "fragmentation" also usually includes a transfer of technology from one country to another.

- As in Heckscher-Ohlin model:
  - There are two countries, Home and Foreign.
  - There are two tradeable goods, $i = 1, 2$.
  - There are two factors of production, L and H.

- In contrast with Heckscher-Ohlin model:
  - Production process involves a large number of *tasks* $j \in [0, 1]$.

- Tasks are of two types:
  - L-tasks which require 1 units of low-skilled labor.
  - H-tasks which require 1 units high-skilled labor.

- Tasks vary in their offshoring costs:
  - Because some tasks are easier to codify.
  - Because some services must be delivered personally, while others can be performed at a distance with little loss in quality.
- To capture this idea, GRH assume that:
  - H-tasks cannot be offshored.
  - L-tasks can be offshored, but amount of low-skilled labor necessary to perform task j abroad is given by $\beta t(j) > 1$.
- Under this assumption,
  - β reflects overall feasibility of offshoring at a point in time (e.g. communication technology).
  - $t(j)$ is an increasing function which captures differences in offshoring costs across tasks (e.g. cleaning an office vs. speaking to a customer from a call center).

- Suppose that wages for low-skilled labor are higher at Home

$$w_L > w_L^*$$

- Then benefit of offshoring$\equiv$ lower wages abroad.

- But cost of offshoring$\equiv$ loss in productivity captured by $\beta t(j)$.

- In a competitive equilibrium, firm will offshore tasks if and only if:

$$\beta t(j) w_L^* < w_L$$

- Let $J \in [0, 1]$ denote the marginal task that is being offshored

$$\beta t(J) w_L^* = w_L \qquad (8)$$

- The cost of producing one unit of some good is given by

$$c_i = a_{Li} \left[w_L (1-J) + w_L^* \beta T(J) \right] + a_{Hi} w_H \tag{9}$$

  with $T(J) \equiv \int_0^J t(j) dj$, $w_H \equiv$ wage of high-skilled workers at Home.

- Substituting (1) into (2), we obtain

$$c_i = a_{Li} w_L \Omega + a_{Hi} w_H$$

  where $\Omega = (1-J) + \frac{T(J)}{t(J)} < 1$.

- This looks just like the cost equation of a firm that employs low-skilled workers whose productivity is (inversely) measured by Ω

  - Hence, offshoring is economically equivalent to labor-augmenting technological progress

- **Proposition** *If Home is a small open economy, a decrease in β increases w_L.*

- **Proof:**
  - Zero profits requires:
    $$p_i = a_{Li} w_L \Omega + a_{Hi} w_H, \ i = 1, 2$$
  - Since Home a small open economy, p_i does not depend on β.
  - This implies that $w_L \Omega$ (and w_H) do not depend on β either.
  - Since Ω is decreasing in β, we get w_L increasing in β.

- **Productivity effect** implies that workers whose jobs are being offshored actually benefit from decrease in offshoring costs.

- In general, a decrease in offshoring costs would also have:

  - **Relative-price effect**. If country is not small compared to the rest of the world, changes in β will also affect p_2/p_1. This would then generate Stolper-Samuelson like effects.
  - **Labor-supply effect**. If there are more goods than factors, changes in β will also affect $w_L\Omega$ and w_H at constant prices.

- Simplest way to illustrate labor-supply effect is to consider case where Home is completely specialized in one good.

  - This is the effect that has probably received the most attention in popular discussions.

  - Empirically, is it more or less important than the other two?

- Most models of fragmentation of production are "North-South":
  - Rationale for offshoring $\equiv$ factor price differences.

- In practice, fragmentation often takes place between countries with similar income levels.

- GRH (2009) hence develop a "North-North" theory of offshoring.

- **Basic Idea:**
  Rationale for offshoring $\equiv$ external economies of scale (at the task level).

- **Technical issue:**
  How to deal with multiplicity of equilibria with external economies of scale?

- **Main prediction:**
  In equilibrium, country with higher wages and output performs the tasks—among those concentrated in one country—that are more difficult to offshore.

14.581 International Economics I
Spring 2011