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OF TECHNOLOGY
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**

PROJECT WORKING PAPER

WAR AVOIDANCE THROUGH COLLECTIVE SECURITY-

SEEKING PRACTICES SINCE 1945

by

HAYWARD R. ALKER, JR. AND FRANK L. SHERMAN*

REFLECTIVE LOGICS FOR RESOLVING INSECURITY DILEMMAS

WAR AVOIDANCE THROUGH COLLECTIVE SECURITY-

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Prepared for Delivery at an International
Roundtable on Recent Scientific Contributions
to War Avoidance, Bucharest, September 1-3, 1980
Cosponsored by the Academy of Romania and the
Research Committee on Quantitative and
Mathematical Approaches to the International
Political Science Association

I   Introduction and Overview

Determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, the
leaders of the victorious states in World War II set up a system for the
avoidance or speedy termination of future wars.   Centered in the Security
Council of the new United Nations Organization, this system had two often
contradictory bases: 1)   Wilsonian universal moral obligations "to provide
[collective] security _for_ all states, _by_ the action of all states, _against_
all states which might challenge the existing order by the arbitrary [aggressive]
unleashing of their power"; and 2)   the even older primary reliance on the
"Concert of the Great Powers" for the effective management of such a system.

The new version of a collective security system actualized its contradictory
bases when major differences among the Great Powers themselves arose.[1]   Not
only was the reality of "collective security of the Great Powers, for the
Small Powers, when the Great Powers could agree" less glowing a path to
world peace than many had hitherto supposed; collective security as a world
order concept "halfway...between the terminal points of international anarchy
and world government" became a rationale for Cold War "collective self-defense"
organizations like NATO and the Warsaw Pact, in part legitimated in such
purposes by the United Nations' ambiguous Charter language endorsing these and
other "Regional arrangements."[2] Since the smaller, ex-colonial and often non-
aligned powers themselves have taken increasing control over their own destinies,
a process in which UN decolonialization efforts and the Great Powers played a
significant role, the Secretary General and the General Assembly have enhanced
and qualitatively changed their security-seeking efforts. Preventive diplomacy
designed to keep Great Powers out of Third World conflicts coincided with the
"balancing" role of nonaligned states on Cold War issues and the growth in
importance of regional organizations among Arab, African and American States

performing both dispute settlement, collective security and collective

defense functions. Great Power security concerns have led to greater

reliance on unilateral actions, buttressed by alliance relationships, and

moderated by changing patterns of mutual recognition, détente and competitive

coexistence. Recently we can detect the partial reappearance of a multipolar

power balancing process associated with both recognized and contested spheres

of influence, and controversial regional doctrines of assymetric collective

security responsibilities.

Ironically, the "new and more wholesome diplomacy" of Wilsonian "collective"

security system has led to the incomplete but real return of competitive, loosely

bihegemonial, power balancing practices rather like those that it was designed

to supplant. Pessimistic political Realists could easily attribute such a

return to eternal, dismal truths of human nature; Marxian global systems theorists

to "self-help security politics

might see the continued reproduction, as well as the self-contradictory develop-

ment of world capitalism through the adaptive restructuring of its global

economic markets and its multipolar political parts. While interested in such

larger issues, as peace researchers of operational collective security systems --

those both politically real and scientifically analyzable -- we wish primarily

in the program of research outlined here to find practical lessons about war

avoidance.

This research program --named in the title of this paper and illustrated

throughout it -- relies heavily on historical reanalysis of the successes and

failures of recent more or less collective efforts to achieve international

peace and security in a rapidly changing world. As opposed to Security Council

centered studies of a few collective security successes and many more substantial

failures, our broadened range of concern explicitly encompasses the operation

of regional collective-defense and dispute settlement organizations, super power

efforts to establish mutual limits on arms races in strategic and conventional

weapons, community building, dispute resolution and conflict management efforts outside of regular collective security-seeking organizations, and the operations of power-balancing systems that do limit the frequency or severity of war. An important consequence of this broader conception is the need to study, in a less state-centric way, the agenda processes whereby some institutionalized, collectively organized security-seeking practices handle certain kinds of conflicts, while others ignore them; these agenda processes may reveal important reasons for, and causes of, the successes and failures of inter-state war-avoidance efforts.

Our reasons for this wider focus of attention are several, and should become more fully apparent below. Briefly here we note the evident fact that collective efforts to overcome driving national insecurities have taken such a variety of forms that a flexible multi-arena focus is appropriate in order to comprehend the most important responses to these insecurities. Our larger universe of concern contains a much greater fraction of security-relevant policy behavior, although its actual measurement is much more difficult than merely noting the large fraction of serious international disputes that does in some respect eventually get on the agenda of <u>some</u> collective conflict management organization.[3] Also, our concern is to catch and help clarify fascinating, theory-relevant, rapid international system transformations, some of which have just been tentatively summarized. It is our belief that a focus on concrete security-seeking practices will allow us both empirically to ascertain (rather than assume) the existence of less than globally shared, systemic features of these practices, and avoid the trap of an overly static empiricism that misses significant systemic restructuration processes.[4] The plethora of recent empirical studies, almost entirely by North American scholars, of the collective conflict management practices of post-war

international organizations (Butterworth, 1978a, 1978b; Ruggie, 1974; Holsti, 1966 and 1972; Bloomfield and Leiss, 1969; James, 1969; Alker and Greenberg, 1971), makes us worry whether significant new knowledge can be gained and widely shared on this important subject. We do not want such studies to enter an era of diminishing returns, associated with mechanical replications using the same research designs extended to a few new cases by North American graduate students.

We wish to reinvigorate the scientific study of collective security systems by redirecting its focus toward _more_ _or_ _less_ _collective_ security-_seeking_ systems, by trying to conceptualize these phenomena of concern in a more dialectical fashion, and by furthering the more universal participation of peace researchers in such investigations. We wish to do this without giving up the hard insights gained, and regularities ascertained, by those working in primarily positivistic, North American empirical traditions. Because for us Istvan Kende's episodically organized _empirical_ studies of international conflicts represent exemplary (but rare) contributions from an East European, Marxist peace research perspective (Kende, 1971, 1978), we shall depend heavily on them, even though they only indirectly address collective efforts to avoid or resolve such conflicts.[5]

We shall rely on previous epistemological discussions of dialectical-hermeneutical and Marxist-Leninist social science research, especially as they are sympathetically understood in Western Europe and North America (Alker, 1979, 1980), in order to correct certain limitations we see (and have in part already indicated) in the empirical literature we have cited. Our hope, stated technically in the language of the (Alker, 1979) study, is that there is enough common ground politically, epistemologically and substantively to define one or several cross-paradigm, empirically oriented research programs oriented toward convergent practical learning about war avoidance. Our concern

to be explicit about the need for, and components of, an internationally sharable conception of scientific knowledge accumulation derives from the realistic concern that such standards be communicable to national political leaders who decisively influence war and peace processes and research thereon, as well as national citizenry bearing the primary financial burdens of such activities.

A reasonable breakdown of the topics of subsequent discussion in this paper can now be given. Our next concern will be to contribute to the operational reconceptualization of key terms in the collective security seeking, war avoidance literature: "order," "security," "collective," "aggression," "peace" and "war." Then we shall discuss operational ways in which richer, less state-centric, contextually sensitive, yet still scientifically operational characterizations of international disputes might be undertaken. After this follows some remarks on the fuller characterization of conflict and management practices. Our concern to be more dialectically sensitive about security seeking practices goes beyond the need to be sensitive to the narrowing effects and the different boundaries of relevant experience associated with different research paradigms; it leads us to a more general interest in ways in which more or less collective security seeking practices themselves should be studied and understood. Some important comparative case studies not focused on the UN collective security system suggest numerous insights about war avoidance. In particular we have some specific ideas how collective security seeking agenda processes might be better studied. Finally, our concern to develop and analyze less static and less episodic "natural histories" of security seeking practices brings us to some rather dialectical ideas about the transformative development and decay of collective security seeking systems.

II On the 'Collectivization' of Relevant Research Concepts

Within the "pure" Wilsonian Collective Security system, it is assumed that the world is essentially made up of sovereign, territorially integrated nation states widely recognized by each other as legitimate international system members. (Historically, colonial territories had something of an anomalous status, but were assumed eventually in the League system to become self-determining, at least those that had belonged to the states defeated in World War I; World War II led to a similar provision in the UN Charter.) Moreover, a democratically enforced, consensually legitimated normative world "order" exists which has as its key deterrent component, the illegitimacy of inter-state "aggression." A state's "international peace and security" means at least that it is not faced with the immanent threat, or actuality, of cross-border military intervention from another state. If deterrence fails, all such substantial, recognizable and nonaccidental inter-state interventions are to be considered "aggressive," requiring an appropriate punitive collective response.

Politically, the Wilsonian Collective Security ideal failed, at least in large part. The popular democratic forces that were necessary to energize such a system turned (or were turned) sufficiently against its normative universalism so that the United States never joined the League. Wilson himself was at least partially competing in his liberal-internationalist world order design with Lenin's own stirring (and for many frightening) revolutionary pronouncements about the birth of a socialist world order (Levin, 1970). The universalism of the League system to which an isolated, cautious Soviet state was eventually admitted, suffered mortal blows from Japanese, Italian, German and Soviet "aggressions," against which League members were unable or unwilling effectively to retaliate. Only World War II and its decisive but

costly victory over the Axis powers could be said sufficiently to have "collectivized" or "concerted" political wills so a revised collective security system was reborn.

A. Wars, Just Wars, and Aggressor States

We add this brief account of the League system to our equally brief overview of the UN system in order to highlight key political and conceptual issues in the scientific study of collective security seeking systems. For it is our belief that the major problems in developing a more universal, more valid empirical research program on this topic are at least in part derivative from the recent political past. Do not League history and the failure of UN diplomats (until a few years ago) to define in general and apply in particular such a pejorative label as "the aggressor" (before or during the Cold War) give us pause? Even nowadays, Americans believing the American-Vietnamese war was a "noble cause" would not consider the United States as the "aggressor" pictured in either contemporary NLF, Soviet or Chinese statements or new Vietnamese history books; neither will many Soviet scholars allow the current Soviet military intervention into Afghanistan to be labeled "aggressive," as most Americans now think.

Can scholars who maintain their political allegiances, hopefully with some critical detachment, do significantly better?[6] Kende and Zacher take rather different, but not completely opposed positions. Zacher takes what we would characterize as a Liberal/Wilsonian positivist position. He does not debate the justifications people give for wars; rather (1979, p. 6f) he takes an objectivist, empirically operational stance defining "aggression" descriptively, but in a way that corresponds quite clearly to the pure Wilson/ liberal world order conception sketched above. An "aggressor is a state

that threatens to employ or does employ military personnel against the citizens of another country."

Kende thinks, at least concerning internal political wars fought with foreign participation (1971, pl. 6f and note 9), that "who the immediate initiator is, who fires the first shot... seems besides the point, and in addition, can often not be determined." He takes an explicit Marxian position, arguing in terms of a preferred distinction between just and unjust wars, roughly as follows. Most, but not all, internal wars since 1945 have been anti-regime wars, either of anti-colonial or class war sort. The Marxian position is much less ambiguous about anti-colonialsim than Wilsonian liberalism. In both such cases and class wars an aggressor and an oppressed party can be identified, and revolt is, in general, justified. Whether the oppressed (in revolt) or the oppressor (as a deterrent) initiates the conflict may vary. But the difference between the 1946 Indo-China war (initiated by the French in a recolonialization effort) and the Algerian initiated anti-colonial war of 1954 is not very important because even the latter "initiative was brought about by colonialist oppression. It would be hard to dispute that these two wars were very similar in character even if the circumstances of their beginning were dissimilar."

Are we at a point of scholarly deadlock when Zacher and Kende must talk completely past each other? Surely the justifiability of anti-colonial wars, at least in some extreme cases, has wider legitimacy than the universe of recently independent, ex-colonial states; which wars have been class wars, and which parties deserve the label of certified "oppressor" are questions requiring a much longer debate.

But Kende takes an important tack that preserves a meaningful universe of scientific argument and analysis. From a definite political point of view

(his own, or that of different parties to a conflict), he admits it
is frequently difficult (as in the Biafran war) to decide whether the war is
just or unjust. When such differences are the case, "no reliable results
can be achieved in a scientific survey," so he shifts to a causally and
historically sensitive substantive classification. Although pre-1945 studies
of wars (like Quincy Wright's and L.F. Richardson's) emphasized (like Zacher's
and Wilson's views already noted) the prevalence of inter-state "frontier wars"
often without the participation of nonbordering parties, times have changed.
Internal wars fought on the territory of one country are much more frequent;
internally-oriented tribal, religious and related border adjustment disputes,
as well as anti-regime wars, should be distinguished both from classical cross-
frontier wars. His resulting typology (for which reasonably clear operational
definitions are suggested) distinguishes six types of war by determining
whether the two internal and one international (frontier) wars occur with or
without the actual largescale participation of foreign military personnel in
advisory and/or combat roles. Delivery of arms and other lesser forms of
support are not deemed sufficient grounds for the positive "foreign participation"
label.

Although Zacher sticks to an elaboration of an aggressor/victim and
alignment-non-alignment classifications for his basic analyses, and does not
address the decolonialization issue very directly, he does recognize in a
deviant case analysis (p. 211 note) that the "response to the Rhodesian
interventions into Mozambique in 1976 and 1977 actually indicates a consensual
element in the global system -- opposition to the White-dominated regimes of
southern Africa and their attempts to retaliate against nationalist rebels
operating from outside their borders." Furthermore, in his elaboration of his
definition of an aggressor he looks beyond what Kende would call an international/

frontier war perspective to include anti-regime rebellions. He labels as an
aggressor any foreign government militarily supporting (or opposing) an
incumbent regime. Thus:

> While an aggressing state will generally use its forces
> against the official forces of another country, it may
> alternatively use its forces to fight on behalf of
> another official government against a rebel group seeking
> to overthrow or secede from it. Such participation in a
> civil war is often not viewed as aggression, but it is very
> included in this study's definition of the term. (Zacher,
> 1979, p. 6f)

Thus we find a real basis for further discussion, and the likelihood of
significant (but not total) convergence between Zacher's "aggressors" and
"unjust" parties, were Kende to elaborate upon his judgments in these
matters and Zacher to entertain the reasonable possibility that in some
internal wars (dare we ask about the American civil war?) the aggressor/
victim distinction is difficult to defend in a deep, meaningful way.

Cross-paradigm communication is a form of dialectical hermeneutics with
empirical consequences. At least three types of empirical studies are opened
up by the above remarks. First, taking definitional issues into account,
do the different, empirically-oriented perspectives see and agree on the same
universe of wars, crises or disputes threatening international peace and
security? Secondly, how much agreement exists concerning substantive typologies
of types of wars, like Kende's sixfold distinction mentioned above; are
differences arguably reconcilable? Thirdly, if we can get enough agreement
on a common universe of relevant cases to justify the testing of competing
hypotheses, what might we ascertain about conflict causes, or about the
effectiveness of collective security "managers" of such conflicts? Are the
"lessons" to be derived from their record of successes and failures?

Briefly, Table 1 and 2 give us some clues to the first kind of
inquiry which might take place. Despite some slight definitional

Table 1:   A Comparison of Crisis, War and Dispute Universes in Published
           Kende, Zacher and Butterworth-Scranton Studies.

	Crises*	Wars**	Disputes***	Total
Kende List ('45-'70)	Not Applicable	121	Not Applicable	$\Sigma = 121$
Zacher List ('46-'77)	23	93 (70 Wars; 23 Military Interventions)	Not Applicable	$\Sigma = 116$
Butter- worth/ Scranton List ('45-'74)	61	158	32	$\Sigma = 251$

* Crises have been defined in two ways: (1) those cases listed
   by Zacher as having been coded as crises, and (2) those
   cases in the Butterworth/Scranton MIC study that entered
   Phase II but did not intensify into Phase III (Hostilities).

** Wars were defined as (1) Kende coding category; (2) Zacher's
   coding categories of wars and military interventions; and,
   (3) a Butterworth/Scranton MIC case that intensified into
   Phase III (Hostilities).

*** A Dispute was defined as a Butterworth/Scranton case that
    did not intensify past Phase I (Dispute).

† To Kende's list we have added (for comparative purposes) the 1977/8 Zaire
   invasion by Katangan exiles, Cubans, etc., which is outside his time
   range, but mentioned in his text in B/1 terms.
   Butterworth and Scranton list 247 separate cases; 4 additional cases were
   added in our revisions, due to the splitting off of Indian independence,
   Mongolian UN membership, Chinese UN representation and Naga Uprisings
   from other Butterworth-Scranton cases.

Table 2: A Comparison of Zacher, Kende and Updated Butterworth/Scranton* Case Lists

Butterworth/Scranton Issue Categories

	Interstate Non-Cold War	Internal Non-Cold War	Internal Cold War	Interstate Cold War	Colonial

Kende:

		Interstate Non-Cold War	Internal Non-Cold War	Internal Cold War	Interstate Cold War	Colonial
(52)	A/1: Anti-Regime with Foreign Participation	3 (3%) ✗ †	10 (9%) ?	10 (9%)	4 (4%)]	25 (22%)]
(15)	A/2: Anti-Regime without Foreign Participation	3 (3%) ✗	5 (4%)]	5 (4%)]	1 (1%) ✗	1 (1%) ✓
(13)	B/1: Tribal Wars with Foreign Participation	1 (1%)]	6 (5%)]	0 (0%) ✓	2 (2%) ?	4 (4%)]
(16)	B/2: Tribal Wars without Foreign Participation	2 (2%)]	12 (11%)]	0 (0%) ✓	1 (1%) ✗	1 (1%) ✗
(5)	C/1: Frontier Wars with Foreign Participation	1 (1%)]	0 (0%) ✓	0 (0%) ✓	2 (2%)]	2 (2%) ✗
(12)	C/2: Frontier Wars without Foreign Participation	7 (6%)]	5 (4%) ✓	0 (0%) ✓	0 (0%)]	0 (0%) ✓
(113)	Total	17 (15%)	38 (34%)	15 (13%)	10 (9%)	33 (29%)

Butterworth/Scranton:

		Interstate Non-Cold War	Internal Non-Cold War	Internal Cold War	Interstate Cold War	Colonial
(308)	All Cases	119 (39%)	66 (21%)	15 (5%)	41 (13%)	67 (21%)

* The updated Butterworth/Scranton list includes 57 newer informally omitted cases, plus our own 4 split off cases.

+ Our own expectations concerning how Kende's categories should fit into Butterworth/Scranton categories are as follows: "]" means "cases expected;" "✓" means "cases not expected and not found;" "✗" means "cases found contrary to expectations;" "?" means "deviations possibly due to differences in definitions."

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differences, there is quite high an overlap between the "war universes" of
Zacher's and Kende's studies (keeping the time period of each comparable.)
Moreover, an additional comparison with a recent augmented version of the
published Butterworth-Scranton data set shows   for comparable definitions
and time periods,even higher agreement. except usually for some relatively
low level hostilities that various authors might genuinely have missed. (One
problem accounting for some discrepancies in their estimations concerning
the universe of relevant cases, comes from different practices in different
research groups as to how to cluster different episodes of the same, or
closely related conflicts.) Preliminary comparisons from both tables suggest
overlaps are high, with Butterworth's being the more inclusive data set.

Turning to Table 2, we see a matched comparison concerning Kende's six
categories of war and the augmented Butterworth classification, where both data
sets include a particular conflict. In general, a fairly high correspondence
exists across studies. This means more work can and should be done in
checking Kende's very provocative generalizations about postwar trends in wars --
in particular his claims that U.S-, France; UK and Portugal-involved anti-regime
wars (mostly class wars or wars of independence) have dominated the post-1945
era, rising in frequency and length until about 1967 (later in Asia) and then
significantly diminishing during an era (1967-76) of real detente. Treating "internal
cold war" issued differently, with Butterworth's DARPA funded data set,
we may or may not   sustain such historical accounts.

More ambitiously, we believe that   a variant of Kende's
claims that internal anti-regime wars with foreign participation are the most
prevalent of wars since 1945 ought to be more thoroughly investigated. To put
it more graphically, is not the anti-colonial or anti-dependency "revolt against
the West" (in Barraclough's terms) a key alternative explanation of conflict

managers' involvement records? Could it not do as well as Zacher's alignment

categories of states in explaining management involvements, non- involvements,

successes and failures? Alker and Greenberg (1971) and (Ruggie, 1974) have

found multivariate explanations to account for significantly more variance in

manager involvement and success than any single variable explanation. Kende's

views   cry for a serious reanalysis of Zacher's or Butterworth's data sets

in a way that seeks to root conflicts in a relevant historical past. Conclusions

about the fundamental explanatory power of colonial past, or politico-

economic dependency require some stiff competitive research testing, which

we are looking forward to in the near future.

B. <u>Are Insecurity Dilemmas Resolvable through the Provision</u>

<u>of Imperfect Collective Goods?</u>

Our programmatic concern with the "collective" aspect of security-seeking

practices is neither naive internationalism nor a call to collectivize the

defense industries of the world. It is grounded in a conceptual analysis of

the way important international conflicts have arisen and been peacefully

or nonpeacefully resolved. This understanding of war/peace decisions sees them

typically (but not always) as emerging from shared (or collective in this

sense) insecurity dilemmas.

> By collective insecurity dilemmas, we mean multiparty
> situations characterizable in terms of conflicting security-
> seeking rationales; typically these rationales evidence social
> contradictions [in the sense of (Elster, 1978)] between the
> (short run) security concerns or interests of individual actors
> and the (shorter or longer run) security concerns or interests
> of larger collectivities of which these actors are a part...
> Security dilemmas may be said either to reside in the
> reflective consciousness of a particular actor, or to challenge
> existing or potentially emergent collective social unities
> (in particular, the identities, loyalties, organizing
> principles or collective capacities of groups, communities,
> nations or cross-national systems).
>
> (Alker, Bennett, Mefford, 1980)

An important structural feature of security dilemmas is the inter-
dependence of their action-outcome alternatives. What one party achieves
with its actions depends on the responses of the other to the same situation.
Put more technically, security dilemmas arise because of the "public" or
"collective" nature of "security" or "public order" (usually considered a
"collective good") and "insecurity" (a public bad). A large literature
exists (see especially (Ruggie, 1972) and the critical summary by Oppenheim
(1978)) studying the provision of security goods by alliances and other public
goods by international organizations. We treat this literature as providing
concepts relevant to collective security-seeking practices, but concepts
needing a degree of "collectivization" before they can be used in a cross-
paradigm research program.

Despite our admiration for Samuelson-Olson public goods theory, we see
a certain liberal bias in its concepts. The contradiction public goods
theory seeks to overcome derives from theorems showing that even idealized
competitive markets which achieve Pareto efficient production-allocation
outcomes in the case of private goods, do not do so for "public goods."

Private goods are described not in terms of who owns or controls them,
but in terms of their consumption patterns: when A consumes/drives his
Chevrolet car, B cannot consume/drive it at the same time. Alternatively,
when B uses the ocean for a swim or breathes some clean air, A can do the
same: she enjoys such public goods in a way (subject to imperfections of
crowding, proximity, etc.) that does not deprive A of his access to them.
Now beach entrance may be restricted, but forbidding breathing is much
harder to do: liberal political economy sometimes adds to the "consumption-
externality" aspect of public goods the "nonexcludability" aspect. Typically,

as with a long, open, unfenced beach that costs taxpayers significant money
to preserve in good shape, interlopers from another town would be called
"free riders" who enjoy a public consumption good from which it is hard to
exclude them. Into this peculiarly capitalist dilemma, a liberal, inter-
ventionist state must come along and coercively require taxes of all beach users
so that a fairly paid for, sufficiently clean beach is maintained.

Does this notion extend to international security as a collective good?
Yes and No. The large literature on mixed interest conflict games like
Prisoner's Dilemma and Chicken can be thought of as discussing the insecurity
dilemmas, the social contradictions arising from trying to achieve security
or prestige through unilateral action. (See especially Snyder and Diesing, 1977)
Like disarmament or a deterrence stalemate, "security," in such idealized
situations is "shared" or nondestructively consumed by all participants.
Some third party not paying its costs might consume or "free ride" in enjoying
its benefits. Smaller alliance members, it has been argued, "free ride" on
the exceptional contributions of the superpower. As a result Pareto optimal
levels of security collective defense are not provided for (this argument is
sure to appeal in both Washington and Moscow but perhaps not elsewhere.)

At least four important, research generating conceptual revisions are
called for before such literatures can become an important part of a cross-
paradigm research program on collective security-seeking practices. First,
when we look at the "security" provided by defense expenditures, we must
distinguish between "defense goods" (those used for protection in case of
attack) and "deterrent goods" (those used for the avoidance of attack).
Early warning systems and inaccurate, second-strike, submarine-launched,
nuclear ballistic missiles would be fairly clear examples of the former and
the latter. Using earlier work by Sandler and Cauley, Oppenheim (1978, p. 402)

argues that only deterrence goods are to be considered (within an alliance) pure collective goods in the classic sense. "Since deterrence provides benefits (or costs) that each resident of an alliance can share without diminution of benefits, irrespective of location or the number of residents involved."

The empirical questions this distinction gives rise to include the determination of the types of functions military forces primarily provide (e.g., are they defense or deterrence goods), plus an investigation of whether collective deterrence goods are underprovided because of the sovereign tenacity or free-riding irresponsibility of the smaller members . But clearly the recognition that "defense" is not a pure (widely shared) public good suggests a closer, comparative look at what are the real, driving insecurities facing contemporary nation-states. Kende's results suggest internal regime preservation/transformation politics is a primary factor, and a much more private good (vis a vis dominated groups or classes) than is usually supposed. Just as Mushakoji and others have argued that "peace" must be mutually and plurally defined, so "security" itself, and what states do to try and achieve it, deserves a careful look in terms of the degree of "publicness" actually generated.[8]

This point leads to our second comment with research implications. Clearly the definition of insecurity perceptions and resolutional practices must be dynamically investigated. Here is an example of what might be called a liberal bias in game theory, both more generally and as applied to insecurity dilemmas. Preferences, alternatives and outcome evaluations are assumed fixed in the relevant mathematical statements, in a way consonant with the liberal ideal of consumer sovereignty. Taste shaping or distorting processes are left to advertisers, and not modeled in elegant

economic theorems because the mathematics is seen as too difficult or "intractible."

But just as Sandler and Oppenheim, from within a liberal political economy perspective, have enlivened the defense/security as a public good literature, so Snyder and Diesing (1977) have helped transform conventional game theory, making it far more relevant to the collective security-seeking program. Combining strategic and peace research perspectives, they have introduced the beginning of a truly dynamic understanding of ways in which collective insecurity dilemmas have developed and been resolved (in peaceful or warlike ways).

As a single example of an insecurity dilemma with profound relevance for detente, we review Snyder and Diesing's discussion of the 1958-1962 Berlin Crisis. Its 1958 phase is represented as a Prisoner's Dilemma game in Figure 1 (R stands for "reward" payoff, S for "sucker" payoff, T for "temptation" payoff, P for "penalty" payoff; ranks and verbal descriptions are shown in the payoff triangles for the Soviet Union and the United States).

In November, 1958, Khrushchev challenged the West by proposing a general peace settlement with each of the two Germanies separately that would make West Berlin a "free," neutral city with no security ties to the West, threatening otherwise to end 4 power responsibility for Berlin through a unilateral settlement with the Ulbricht regime. Snyder and Diesing estimate that Khrushchev feared for the subversion and collapse of a pro-Soviet Eastern Germany, expected negotiations, with the possibility of a brief but intensive military engagement and subsequent negotiations in case a deadlock (P,P) situation developed. From the Soviet viewpoint, "[T]his was a Prisoner's Dilemma structure, with T, a settlement on Soviet terms, $>$ R,

Figure 1   The 1958 Phase of the   Berlin Crisis
          as a Prisoner's Dilemma Game*

UNITED STATES

Concede   Firm

SOVIET UNION

Concede / Firm

Status quo stabilized by compromise settlement of other disputes concerning West Berlin and access to it.   3 R

Self-assertion against Soviet Union, stabilization of status quo.   1 S

Compromise peace settlement in Germany, some modification of status of West Berlin.   R 3

Humiliation, demoralization of the G.D.R., political trouble in East Europe.   T 4

United States humiliation, demoralization of West Berlin and West Germany, loss of hope for reunification of Germany on Western terms.   4 T

Soviet Union peace treaty with G.D.R.; probable East Germany blockade of access routes, possible local or general war.   2 1

Peace settlement in Germany; stabilized status quo with Western Powers out of West Berlin.   S 1

Soviet Union peace treaty with G.D.R. Limited fighting, cease-fire, negotiations.   P 2

*Source, Figure 2-27 in (Snyder and Diesing, 1977, p. 92).

a compromise settlement, $> P$, some fighting and a compromise settlement

$> S$, demoralization and retreat." (p. 93) The demoralization of NATO, the

neutralization and harassment of West Berlin by the East Germans represented

a very intolerable S payoff for the U.S., worse than the risk of war ($S < P$).

"A highly preferable outcome would be R, a compromise settlement that would

satisfy legitimate Soviet grievance and...stabilize the status quo; and best

of all would be a firm rebuff to the 'aggressor' with no concessions." (ie.

$T > R > P > S$; Snyder and Diesing, 1977, p. 93).

From an examination of both the two successful and the one unsuccessful

historical cases (Morocco, Berlin and August, 1914, respectively), Snyder

and Diesing develop a general model of PD play. It expresses a view of

collective security dilemmas more optimistic than liberal political economy's

demand for a coercive state to reachieve Pareto efficiency. Initial

misperceptions are typical within at least the challenger state (Austria-Germany,

France in Morocco and the Soviet Union in Berlin), which thinks that its

opponent lacks resolve, and is bluffing in its coercive gestures. Thus,

the other is seen as a chicken situation $(T > R > S > P)$ in which it would

prefer to back down (S) rather than go to war (P,P). Successful bargaining

out of a (P,P) deadlock involves roughly symmetrical and sequential clarifica-

tions of war-willingness (P), then T and S aspects of the bargaining situation

(moderated Ts and mutual realization that $T > R > S > P$ for each), followed

by the clarification of the accommodative (R values) aspect.

In the Berlin case, mutual recognition of essential goals: -- basic

Western rights in Berlin and Eastern prevention of regime-undermining move-

ments (the Wall) -- defused a war prone crisis in 1961 and 1962. Accommoda-

tive bargaining did not resolve the major issues until 1971 treaty arrangements

were made. World War I resulted, however, because it never became clear

(through diminished Ts and moderation of the opponent's S) that the Austrian-German side, with its _fait accompli_ strategy, was not aggressively bent on conquest and humiliation, because ample bargaining time was not available, and because of "the virulent simultaneous-move Prisoner's Dilemma...inherent in military plans and technology." (_Ibid_, pp. 88-106, especially p. 105) At this point we shall not assess the merits of these modelled interpretations; rather we sketch them to show that for Snyder and Diesing, P, T, S, and R are bargaining subprocesses, no longer precalculated utility payoffs!

Looking at the Snyder-Diesing interpretations, one sees quite a considerable departure from the original public goods production dilemma of standard liberal political economy. The "learning to be rational" theme takes on new meaning. A whole theory of sequential bargaining subprocesses within a particular payoff situation is suggested, involving the correction of misperceptions and a more fundamental dynamic modification of possible outcomes and their payoff values. Mistrust and suspicion, mixed motives and changing strategies, bluff, betrayal and reflective reconsideration abound in such historical accounts.

A third respecification in the collective goods literature is truly a collectivization -- the enlarging of public goods calculations to include the benefits or losses to opposed alliance members and the nonaligned. True, the "pureness" of public deterrent goods becomes much less clear. Great superiority in deterrence goods (like inaccurate SLBMs) does not always increase the security of a country with missile armed submarines ringing its shores. But these real imperfections, and the arms race dynamics they help engender, suggest heavy discounting of future "security benefits/dollar or rouble" is necessary. Surely a wide range of research possibilities exist here for economic specialists in strategic studies.

Finally, we note an important liberal bias in public goods theory.
The collectivization of production (e.g., a national defense department)
is only an incidental feature of the theory. But we feel that the public-
ness or "collective" nature of security has an essential political feature
understated by liberal economic theory (which does not have a good term for
the distinction we want to make):[9] the communal nature of security, legitimacy
and other political public good production processes. One altruist can
produce public goods like an unpolluted beach, public goods that many
collectively or jointly consume. But disarmament by one side in a conflict
does not maximize the public security of both sides when suspicion exists
about the likely misuse of dominant power. International security, like any
genuine political order, must be communally co-produced.

We are reminded of Rousseau's oft-cited parable of the stag and the
hare, taken by some as an analogue to contemporary security dilemmas. (e.g.,
Jervis, 1978) We note, and think it worth studying in much greater detail,
that it is not that the stag being chased by a group of _primitive hunters_ is big enough so
that each can eat his fill without diminishing the enjoyment of the others
that is important. Rather it is the jointness, or communal nature of _any successful_
stag-catching effort that deserves our further reflection.

If "collective" security-seeking practices are now seen as those in-
volving the concerting of wills and understanding by two or more internationally
relevant actors in the pursuit of their security goals, and these goals are
recognized as imperfectly involving both "public" and "communal" aspects
necessarily or sufficiently associated with their full realization, our
program of work has an important, widely shareable basis for future scientific
research. And the "collectivist" bias of our studies can be grounded in

the mathematically provable theorem that in a variety of circumstances
unilateral or unipolar efforts to achieve security will necessarily lead
to individually and/or collectively sub-optimal results.

III Beyond Ahistorical, State-Centric Positivism in Coding Security-Seeking Practices

What our discussion has least adequately addressed to date however, is the
meaning of individual and collective security-seeking practices. These include
the actions of participants in a dispute and the activities of what are now usually
called dispute managers, which of course include collective security organizations
of which participants may be members. We include within the practices of such
actors (participants or parties and agents) the actions they take, their inter-
pretive perspectives, the phasing or sequencing of actions cum perspectives,
the historical/institutional contexts or arenas in which they occur, the outcomes
of these actions for relevant participants and their longer run
systems-maintaining or -transforming effects.

A. Actors

In situations involving threats to international peace and security,
it is false to locate all responsible actions in the hands of the govern-
ments of nation states. Even traditionally, governments have been able on
occasion to disown responsibility for actions from their territories or by
their nationals when these actions were undertaken without governmental
knowledge and approval. In the post-1945 era anti-colonial actions, new
state-building conflicts and the existence of important transnational, trans-
governmental, international and supranational actors all suggest broader
definitions of both dispute participants and management agents. Thus our

own recent research practice has been to go beyond Kende, Zacher, Haas,
Alker-Greenberg and Butterworth to include in our data gathering efforts a
phase-specific list of both direct and indirect parties to international
peace-threatening disputes. Briefly, conventional practices (and Kende-
Zacher 'war' coding) look primarily at legal recognized parties to disputes,
plus those taking sizeable military actions in them: these we call direct
or primary parties, allowing as well that they may include non-state actors,
if such actors have considerable influence and political antonomy. Secondary
parties are those states or other actors significantly assisting primary parties --
beyond the mere giving of diplomatic support.

Also, in an effort to go beyond a state-centric empirical positivism,
we extend our list of management agents beyond the lists of organizations
constitutionally charged with collective security functions (according to
either Haas-Butterworth-Nye or Zacher's interpretations) to get at the
dynamic reality of both individual state and non-state actors, collective
defense organizations and non-Security-Council UN agencies assuming such
functions. Details of such distincitions are presented in the (Farris et al,
1979) codebook, which we are continually updating as new variables or cases
are added.

B. <u>Actions, Interpretive Perspectives and Conflict Phases</u>

Typically the universe of studies we have been reviewing and reformulating
has rather statically examined the collective actions of inter-state collective
security organizations, only indirectly acknowledging that national, trans-
national, transgovernmental and alliance-linked supranational actions[11] have
often been the primary modes of security-seeking behavior. More realistically,
but sometimes with an anti-collectivist bias, a much larger effort has been

made primarily in the United States, to collect data on serious conflict-events (like Kende has done) without special attention (or any attention) to the action of third party or collective management agents.[12] Since the phases in which, and the extent to which, parties to a dispute get involved with conflict-managing practices varies considerably, with significant impacts on outcomes, we strongly believe both kinds of data are relevant to the study of more or less collective security-seeking practices.

At a considerable expenditure of effort, then, we have recoded all of the Butterworth-Scranton narrative conflict accounts for phase-specific information on the actions of the primary and secondary parties themselves, as well as those of the management agents. Following along lines suggested by the work of Azar and Sloan (1975) , we have separately coded both initiation and cessation of conflictful and cooperative actions. Variables that characterize such actors unilaterally (e.g., subversion of a government; issuance of a diplomatic protest; expressing a willingness to talk; providing economic, technical assistance to an opposing party) are distinguished from variables (like existence of infrequent border skirmishes or military confrontations; the reduction of the level of hostilities and the coordination of policies) that refer simultaneously to the interactions of parties on both sides of a dispute. Although the data sources involved could be multiplied, and our two-sides only aggregations loose significant historical detail, they nonetheless move within the limits of our capacities in a desirable research-facilitating direction.

As for the historical sequencing of conflict episodes, we have further tried to reduce the arbitrariness of "statistically independent" events data collections by linking together separately described "phases" of particular conflicts and recoding more expansively Butterworth-Scranton information on

preceding or subsequent disputes deemed "relevant" for the understanding

of party and agent actions. Our phase structuring (summarized in the

Appended list of disputes) derives basically from Bloomfield and Leiss'

earlier (1970) study : dispute phase I notes the beginning of a quarrel or

disagreement claimed by at least one party to be an issue of substantive

international political significance; conflict phase II indicates that at

least one party has demonstrated willingness to use military force to

resolve the dispute; hostilities phase III involves the systematic and

objective-specific use of military force, causing casualties and/or

property loss; etc. Although a dispute must reach phase II, the conflict

phase, for it to be considered a crisis, knowledge of when it first was

considered an international issue is very helpful in assessing the extent

to which "preventive diplomacy" or relevance-denying agenda decisions have

occurred. Hence our phase I dates, although often imprecise, are theoretically

useful information.

As to the perspectives of conflict parties and management agents, their

goals, demands, expectations, strategies and legitimating rationales, we have

not gone much beyond previous studies, except for an intensive, related study

of Chinese foreign policy operational codes conducted by Akihiko Tanaka (1980)

on the basis of a modest recoding of Mahoney's DARPA-funded CACI studies. It

is worth noting, however, that Zacher's suggestive study of changing aggression-

related norms in the OAU, OAS, and Arab League fits quite compatibly with the

Alker-Christensen-Greenberg series of papers on changing and alternative

operational UN charters. The more intensive "reason analysis" of convergent

rationales for UN Congo intervention (see our Table 3, below)

remains an important model of what more hermeneutically/interpretively sensitive

data analysis would look like in more historically detailed phase-specific

TABLE 3 An accounting scheme for UNOC Security Council votes
(Hypothetical positions of the United States, the USSR, France, and black African countries are on the left.)

Veto weighted acceptability	Hypothetical positions	I. *Interests of the actors*
		A. General interests
−	(+,−,?,−)	1. Interest in solidarity with Free World bloc leader
−	(−,+,−,?)	2. Interest in solidarity with anti-imperialist cause
?	(+,?,+,?)	3. Interest in saving (white) lives, preventing bloodshed
?	(?,+,−,+)	4. Interest in Third World independence, self-determination
−	(+,?,−,+)	5. Interest in enhanced UN capabilities
		B. Specific objectives
−	(+,−,+,+)	1. Interest in preventing Soviet foothold in the Congo
−−	(+,−,+,−)	2. Interest in supporting colonial governments and settlers in Africa
−	(+,−,+,−)	3. Interest in transnational economic investments in Katanga
?	(?,?,−,+)	4. Concern for enlarging UN role in other decolonization postcolonial disputes
+	(+,+,?,+)	5. Concern that Soviet-American conflict might devastate the Congo and spread elsewhere
+	(?,+,+,+)	6. Concern that a precedent for new boundaries not be created by successful Katangese succession
		II. *Nature of the conflict situation*
		A. Inside the Congo
−	(−,+,+,+)	1. The conflict is seen as basically anti-imperial.
?	(+,?,+,−)	2. The dispute is between Belgium and the Congo.
−	(+,−,+,−)	3. The primary conflicts are due to a breakdown in public order, as evidenced by mutinies.
+	(?,+,+,+)	4. The government of the Congo wants UN help vis-à-vis the Belgian troops (and their support of the Katangese).
?	(+,?,+,?)	5. The Congolese request really involves an admission of civil incapacity to govern.

Veto weighted acceptability	Hypothetical positions	II. *Nature of the conflict situation (cont.)*
		B. Outside of the Congo
		1. The conflict is pivotal in the emergence and maintenance of
?	(?,+,+,?)	a) anti-imperialist coalitions.
?	(?,+,+,?)	b) neutral states friendly to the West.
?	(?,?,+,+)	c) independent Africa.
		2. The conflict is pivotally important for the definition of the UN's role in
?	(?,?,?,+)	a) containing the Cold War.
+	(?,+,+,+)	b) speeding decolonization.
+	(+,+,+,?)	c) peacekeeping questions where veto powers may not all completely agree.
		III. *Expectations about UN actions and alternatives*
		A. Historical-legal justifiability of UN peacekeeping role
?	(+,?,−,+)	1. Willingness to see UN involvement as binding Security Council action
−	(+,+,−,+)	2. Validity of Suez peacekeeping precedent
?	(?,?,+,+)	3. Domestic interventions only valid when host state agrees.
		B. The UN can mobilize sufficient
+	(+,+,?,+)	1. troops
+	(+,?,+,+)	2. logistics
?	(+,?,−,+)	3. administrative personnel
?	(+,?,−,?)	4. financing
		to be quickly effective.
		C. Considerations regarding alternate influence actions
+	(+,+,+,?)	1. Awareness of vulnerabilities of their own large-scale direct intervention attempt
		2. Awareness of some options for continued
+	(+,+,+,?)	a) United States influence
+	(+,+,?,?)	b) Soviet influence
+	(+,+,?,?,)	c) European influence
+	(?,+,+,+)	d) Afro-Asian influence within the confines of a UN operation.

−27−

disaggregations of relevant historical experience. We have, however, coded

a modest amount of nation-specific actions within conflict-managing agents

as a way of seeing which states try to shape discussions and outcomes on

which disputes, in which arenas. Haas, Butterworth, Nye variables on the

kind   and extent of consensus mobilization efforts within their organizations

are   a different, also helpful way of disaggregating the ways organizations

act on different disputes.

C. Historical Contexts, Dispute Outcomes and Systemic Effects

For large scale historical studies, detailed information on the perspectives

of all major actors is either unavailable or prohibitively expensive to obtain.

Disputes about the intentionality, the larger purposes, the unintended functions

or planned consequences of particular action sequences go to the heart of

many protracted conflicts. In such situations, like Kende, we have had to

retreat to what relatively objective behavioral information is available. By

collecting outcome judgments specific to the different sides of a dispute,

we may inductively be able to sort out some of the more controversial arguments

about collective security-seeking practices, going beyond the sizeable amount

of judgmental assessments by Zacher, Haas and Butterworth in particular. But

codings from various European, Asian, Latin and African judges are needed if a

more universal scientific version of the "multiple reality assessments" in

Table 3 is to be achieved. Like claims that certain acts are "aggressive "

or that certain disputes are "threats to international peace and security,"

judgments that certain management actions   serve

"patching-up," "prophylactic" or "proselytizing" functions (James) or realize

"hostility-stopping" or "dispute limiting" outcomes are essentially contested.

Outside of the obvious divergent interpretations of Cold War crises, one need

only look at current UN or US or Egyptian Middle East moves. Rather than dictate "objective" codings of such disputes, it is better to see if comparative empirical assessments of outcomes and effects sustain one or another such assessments of a particular case. Less controversial, more interesting, system-relevant Haas-inspired codes of Third World "balancing" practices or "preventive diplomacy" designed to limit the spread and involvement of major parties might also be attempted in a similar fashion.

For such purposes, we have disaggregated and amplified the outcome and success variables of the earlier Haas-Butterworth-Nye and Butterworth-Scranton studies, basing them on objective behavioral evidence where possible. For management agent specific variables, we have coded, or are in the process of coding, judgments as to the likely intensity, continuance, spread or settlement of our disputes without management intervention. Our issue-relevant outcome judgments have also not been too holistic. Side-specific statements of satisfaction, when found, are coded (nation-specific judgements can be indirectly assessed using lists of parties on either side of a dispute.) We have added, more judgmentally, codes whether one, both or neither side was advantaged by management actions. Systemic effects -- such as new patterns of action in not referring new disputes to collective management agents, or referrals to, or out of, regional organizational arenas -- can help check the validity of such judgments.

In addition to Dwain Mefford's current efforts to study historical contexts of specific Great Power actions, perhaps the most interesting enrichening of an understanding of ways to represent the historical context of particular conflict episodes has come from Aki Tanaka's previously mentioned study (1980). He distinguishes precedential from narrative contexts of particular episodes.

FIGURE 2 : Precedential Chains & Narrative Contexts
behind Sino-Vietnamese Border Incident in late December, 1978 *

Narrative Contexts | Precedents

Initial Operational code system

16 (1950) UK COMMITS BORDER, AIRSPACE VIOLATION FROM HONG KONG (116003)

341 (1974) VN STARTS ANTI-PRC CAMPAIGN

INDIA CONT'S TO INTERFERE, AID TIBETAN REBELS

365 (1977)

368 (1977)

USSR INVOLVED SUBVERSION IN INNER MONGOLIA

376 (1978) VN ACCUSES PRC OF AIRSPACE VIOLATION

331 (1974) SVN ENCROACHES ON HSISHA, OTHER IS. (116004)

379 (1978) VN TROOPS VIOLATE PRC BORDER

349 (1975) PRC REJECTS INDIAN CLAIM OF PATROL AMBUSH (116004)

381 (1978) VN TROOPS AMBUSH, FIRE ON PRC TROOPS

382 (1978)

383 (1978) VN SHIPS ATTACK PRC TRAWLERS

3RD VN INVASION-CABBODIA: PHNON PENH TAKEN

384 (1978) MORE BORDER INCURSION

385 (1978) VN PATROL ENTERS PRC (116004)

—30—

* A :::::> B means A is the precedent of B

A ——> B means A is the previous episode in the same story.

A ~~~> means A is present when the current case occurs

The numbers in the parentheses are the values of the six variables specified. For example, '116004' means PRC was an original party, substantially capable, in a border dispute/incident in a nonambivalent friend/enemy situation, without the possibility of a strategic (nuclear) confrontation, involving large vs small powers

* Source: Tanaka. 1980.

Precedential contexts are defined in the same way that Alker, Christensen and
Greenberg found "similar" conflicts in their practically oriented simulations
of UN peace-making efforts. In   Figure 2 on the right are a series of
antecedent disputes exactly like or similar enough on key characteristics
to be considered policy-relevant precedents to the Sino-Vietnamese border
incident of December, 1970. On the left of the figure, a "narrative context"
is constructed by looking for recent conflict episodes with at least one of the
parties on each side the same as those on the current case being studied. An
analogous presentation could be made for disputes in our modified and updated
Butterworth data set. One can thus better see, and hopefully better analyze,
specific events against the background of co-occurring as well as relevant
past events.

IV Agenda Processes, Epigenetic Systems Change and

    Reflective Learning About War Avoidance

As a preliminary illustrative discussion of ways in which precedentially
sensitive "reflective political learning about war avoidance" has had an
effect on subsequent agenda processes and system change, we shall now
discuss brief narrative accounts of UN involvement and noninvolvement in two
different "breaches of peace:" the Chinese invasion of Tibet, 1950-51,
and the North Korean invasion of South Korea, 1950-53, a war which also saw
Chinese intervention, but at a later point. From a comparative perspective
on the UN's effectiveness these two cases nicely contrast the extremes of
the UN's relatively effective coercive involvement and   its powerlessness.
As noted by many observers in the advanced capitalist countries, a similar
contrast fits the UN's unprecedentedly ambitious UNEF operation in the Suez
crisis of 1956 and its inability to stop or even ameliorate the Soviet

invasion of Hungary at about the same time. After discussing these (and
some other related examples) we shall make some concluding, more systematic
remarks about research possibilities and reflective learning concerning
agenda processes and systems change in collective security seeking practices.

A. Tibet and Korea as Parallel Challenges to Collective Security
    Seeking Practices

Recall that Tanaka's figure, reproduced above, contained cases other
than those connected by historical trees of either narrative-based or
precedentially-linked continuities. His reason for doing so was the
expectation that a careful examination of "parallel cases" (those that are
co-occurring and strategically interdependent from the point of view of certain
actors) would sometimes reveal more about the generative principles or
operational codes of such actors.

The Tibet invasion and the Korean war are doubly interesting in this regard.
Not only do both cases involve nearly simultaneous invasions by Chinese
troops (into Tibet on 26 October 1950, and by Chinese volunteers into North
Korea at about the same time), they are both precedentially linked by the
role of India as a management agent, inside or outside of the United Nations.
Leaving to Tanaka the discussion of his own figure and the importance of
Chinese double involvement decision, we focus here on the later "parallelism."

Attempting to forestall the re-establishment of Chinese control over Tibet,
Tibetan authorities sought the aid of India (a local balancing operation)
to offset expected advances by the People's Republic of China (the PRC)
following the Communists' victory in the Chinese Civil War (a major "anti-
regime" conflict or "internal cold war" that the UN never had on its agenda).

Prior to the Chinese invasion, Tibetan-PRC talks were held in New Delhi
under the auspices of Prime Minister Nehru. After the Chinese invasion caused an
outcry in the West, India successfully blocked the inclusion of the Tibet
question onto the UN agenda. Why, with what arguments? Referring to the
nonmembership of the PRC in the UN (an issue fraught with significances for
UN collective security practices for more than 20 years), India perhaps also
appealed to the already heavy UN involvement in the Korean War. It's stated
rationale involved the argument (which to many Westerners looked more like
a _fait_ _accompli_ position than an advocacy of a truce and subsequent
negotiations) that the situation could be resolved peacefully without resort
to UN debate. India's position and Chinese moderation did facilitate the
termination or resolution of this initial round of Tibet-PRC conflict, and
the signing of the "Seventeen Article Agreement of 23 May 1951." (See
Butterworth-Scranton, 1976, pp. 145-150 and James, 1969, p. 197f for
relevant details) Consequently India's role as a "facilitator" of the PRC's
interests in UN related matters was given a certain precedential validity
on the part of both the PRC and the United Nations.

The story of UN involvement in Korea is better known. A UN commission
had for sometime been in the country, trying to work for the peaceful
reunification and post-war rehabilitation of Korea. It reported a massive,
well planned North Korean invasion of South Korea, a move associated with
Acheson's prior disavowal of US vital interests in Korea,   the possibility
of certain Southern provocations and considerable unrest in South Korea
related to a domestic electoralprocess of dubious democratic validity. UN
coercive involvement on the side of the South Koreans was helped decisively
by US leadership on the provision of forces, and a from-this-case-perspective
"accidental" absence of the Soviet Union from the Security Council. After

the Soviet's return and successive vetoes attempting to delegitimate and
stop UN coercive involvement, the US led a constitutionally significant
effort (which in another form had earlier been unsuccessful) to bring such
issues to the General Assembly. The Uniting for Peace resolution, a
precedent now invoked at least tacitly by all parties, passed on the
grounds that it was a procedural question not susceptible to Great Power
veto, allowed the Assembly to take up and make recommendations concerning
security questions on which the Council had reached a veto-based deadlock.
In order to gain wide support outside of the Soviet Bloc (which it did),
the resolution also contained language suggesting the desirability of
increased Third World development aid in a subsequent period of diminished
Cold War tensions.

After United Nations forces had reached the Yalu, China had intervened,
and a military stalemate had occurred near the former North-South Korea
demarcation line, dispute mediation efforts by the Indians and their non-
aligned states were given more attention by the Chinese and United States
allies. (Eisenhower's election and his secret threat to use atomic weapons
against the PRC are given an important role in Realist commentaries on
the subject as well). In any case, India had early expressed reluctance about
the permissive engagement or proselytizing activities (to use Haas' and
Jones' terms) of UN forces in an Asian context, on an issue where the Great
Powers and their allies seriously disagreed. India was used to transmit
"proposals" from the Chinese concerning an armistice and prisoner repatriation
practices, proposals which eventually became a basis for the termination of
hostilities. Given her exclusion from UN membership, surely Chinese willingness
to use Indian "good offices" in UN related matters was furthered by her
relatively satisfactory role as a management agent in the Tibetan dispute.

Stepping back from these brief narratives, one may draw some heuristically suggestive inferences. First note the importance of agenda processes, as they are affected by the relative power of different actors vis a vis particular arenas. Thus the PRC's nonmembership in the UN in 1950 encouraged a rare, explicit, negative agenda decision concerning the Tibetan case; similarly, the capturing of "collective security" symbols by a US-led "collective self-defense effort" against communist "aggressions," an anomalous result when compared with either the Tibetan or Hungarian cases, can be laid to the accidental absence of the Soviet Union from the Security Council. Relatively decisive action, the Uniting for Peace resolution and Indian mediation efforts are associated with subtle but important endogenous change in UN security seeking practices.

In particular, the legitimating basis and functional character of UN collective security actions became less the Wilsonian Collective Security ideal (one unrealistic in a Cold War era anyway, and flawed from the point of the nonaligned countries) and more the "balancing" of Cold War antagonists by nonaligned parties playing newly legitimate universalistic roles directed toward the "peaceful settlement of disputes" rather than collective defense or collective security operations. Thus the beginnings of the nonalignment movement in the 50s (usually associated with the Bandung Conference of 1955 and the shift in World politics to a "loose bipolar system" with the UN playing a significant mediating role) are seen in our study as well. And the increasing role of both local or regional conflict managers and the UN system is prefigured, as is the post Bandung UN emphasis on "preventive diplomacy" directed against Third World Great Power involvement (turning, great Power Concert principles upside down until some later date).

A further suggestive inference is that agenda politics, the dynamics

of which disputes get addressed by which management agents (if any), holds

a key to the better understanding of the evolution, decay and transformation

of collective security seeking practices. Thus the very uneven involvement

and success patterns of regional and universal collective security organiza-

tions can be seen realistically as part of a global political process in

which neither "power politics" nor collective peaceful settlement practices

are absent from the scene.

B. **Collective Security-Seeking Agenda Processes**

One of the serious mistakes of an unreflective logical empiricism

studying collective security-seeking practices is a preoccupation only with

the UN system and a taking for granted that only the issues discussed there

are wanting of study (Alger has shown such tendencies to exist in the earlier

American literature). Reducing the study of power politics to the study of

participation of various actors in the making of decisions avoids recognition

of what are now called "nondecisions" in American political science. Such

a practice confuses 1) the <u>overt power arena</u>, where issues are
actively and publically contested;

2) the <u>veiled power arena</u>, where rarely visible
negative agenda decisions ("non decisions")
take place; and

3) the realm of <u>averted structural</u> power which
determines or limits actions even without
overt agenda discussions or conscious
recognition that choices are being made
(see Lukes, 1974, for the best review of
these distinctions, drawn originally from Dahl's
work on community power)

We think it highly desireable to analyze collective security-seeking

practices in these terms. Thus the recognition that a controversial issue

is a peace and security dispute appropriately discussed in a multilateral way

corresponds to the move from the averted structural power arena to the veiled

power arena. Agenda processes in the veiled power arena are typically associated

with expectations of the "mobilization of bias" inherent in a particular

institutional arena. This bias has a lot to do with the reluctance or

enthusiasm of parties to a dispute to bring it into such an arena for

management efforts (assuming unilateral self-help motives have begun to

shift at least toward collective defense concerns). The jurisdictional scope,

the normative consensus, the distribution of membership and divisional

powers among friends and enemies in different management arenas all come

Why else have the major alliances taken on internal collective security functions?

into play at this stage. \ Agenda decisions that are positive lead to overt

discussion and, possibly, action; *negative decisions lead to non-managed conflicts,*
or management "non decisions."

The communal nature of positive collective security-seeking actions (the

avoidance of a veto, achieving 2/3 majorities, etc.) means that nondecisions

on the merits of an issue are often the result of management efforts through

collective security organizations. These nondecisions (in a different

sense from above) are painfully obvious to various interested observers, who

nonetheless frequently do not understand the reasons for nondecisions of

either sort; dispute parties are likely to size up such prospects more accurate-

ly, relying on multiple security-promoting instruments, self-help and certain

collective efforts in a calculated manner open to scientific investigation.

Does this general sketch conform to the views of Zacher, Kende, Butter-

worth, Haas and other students of our subject? Yes, at least partly, we

believe. Haas, Butterworth and Zacher have all pioneered multi-arena

comparative studies of collective security practices, although the agenda

process has not been given sufficient attention in their studies. Zacher

makes a further valuable contribution to our understanding of the frequent

failures by internation collective security organizations to stop overt

aggressions (e.g. the Chinese going into Tibet or U.S. assitance in the

overthrow of a Marxist government in Guatemala) by demonstrating the
statistical unlikelihood of discussion and/or condemnatory actions in
most disputes involving intra-or inter-bloc actions. He recognizes that
attacks by bloc members on nonaligned states (like Egypt in 1956 or Tibet
in 1950) are most likely to evoke positive deterrent action, if the addition-
al requirement of membership of most relevant parties in a collective
security organization can be met. Moreoever, Zacher is quite suggestive
in estimating the likelihood of bias (pro-West or not) in the different
organizations he studies. We hope to extend his work, explicitly model-
ing the trajectory of issues into or out of management practices on similar
grounds, thus making amends for previous studies, e.g. (Alker-Greenberg, 1976),
which only mentioned agenda processes without empirically studying them.

As a first step in such activities, Figures 3 & 4 derived basically from
a revised Butterworth-Scranton data set, give gross trends in agenda
attention to the universe of disputes we are working with (listed in the
Appendix). One can see that multiplication of management agents has indeed
occurred. And a significant number of pure "nondecisions" vis a vis the
stated charters of relevant organizations are also obvious.[13] But what is
surprising is the post-1965 decline in early UN (Security Council _and_ general
Assembly) involvement in serious disputes, although many more disputes than
before are being managed, perhaps by the newer organizations. Surprisingly,
the 1960s saw the Security Council busier with hostility dispute phases than in
the 1950s!

Kende claim of post-65 detente is consistent with this perspective, but
his articles deserve further comment. A weakness is his limited universe of
wars. In our view he is right to focus on both "internal" and "foreign" wars
(despite Charter provisions against UN intervention into "domestic" jurisdic-
tion issues); he is right to look for breaches of the peace associated

FIGURE 3: TRENDS IN THE NUMBER OF DISPUTES (CONFLICT PHASE I) HANDLED BY DIFFERENT TYPES OF MANAGEMENT AGENTS 1945-75. REVISED BUTTERWORTH/SCRANTON DATA RECODED INTO PHASES.

CASES

FIGURE 4 : TRENDS IN THE NUMBER OF HOSTILITES (CONFLICT PHASE 3) HANDLED BY DIFFERENT TYPES OF MANAGEMENT AGENTS, 1945-'75. REVISED BUTTERWORTH/SCRANTON DATA RECODED INTO PHASES.

TOTAL # OF PHASES

NON-MANAGED PHASES

U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL

U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY + ICJ.

INDIVID., AD HOC, CONCERT + U.N. FUNC'L AGENCIES

REGIONAL ORGS.

PRE-1950   AVG. PRE-50   1950   AVG. 50-55   1955   AVG. 55-60   1960   AVG. 60-65   1965   AVG. 65-70   1970   AVG. 70-75   1975

with regular, collectively organized military violence. But he is wrong
to leave out military interventions that are nonmassively resisted (e.g.,
Soviet intervention into Czechoslovakia) and he is limited in scope (as
we all must be at times) in not focussing on the role of threats that
coercively produce compliance (phase II actions) without an overt resort to
force. The hegemonical role of both the U.S. and the USSR in their parts
of the world has   kept numerous disputes in the nondecisions category,
e.g., the issue of U.S. colonialism in Puerto Rico. Structurally averted
power exercise according to the rule of anticipated reactions is real,
even if difficult behaviorally to observe.

As a Marxist, Kende takes seriously the role of structural determination
or the influence of systemic dispute contexts. Thus he argues:

> We do not believe that either of these [recent]
> important political phenomena - assertion of peaceful
> coexistence or the decrease of wars [post 1967] - was the
> consequence of some kind of suddenly arising personal good
> will, or of essential changes in any system. We are more
> inclined to the view that significant changes in the
> international balance of power ["the main line of develop-
> ment of international politics"] have led to these results,
> have compellingly brought about these new phenomena
> (Kende, 1978, note 6, p. 238).

It puzzles us that he attributes changes in war frequency and intensity to
changes in a structural variable, the distribution ("balance") of power,
but without seeing this distribution as an "essential change," as many
Realists would have it.

Additionally, we feel, there is a need in the realm of averted issues
to acknowledge and investigate the changing recognition of systemic deter-
minants of at least some specific dispute management outcomes, such as arms
races, unrecognized demographic-technological pressures for expansion, and
asymetric economic or political relationships. In the middle 1940s bloody

colonial riots and even explicit guerilla activity were sometimes not seen
as threats to international peace and security by any major power; this
has changed, resistance to genocide and other basic human rights have also slowly
emerged. Classically, fights over overseas resource monopolies were causes
of wars; now guaranteed market access complicates such issues. Arms race
politics and the success or failure of arms limitation efforts cause previous
nonissues (Soviet troops in Cuba) to become crises and help rationalize other
interventions (e.g., the Soviet Union in Afghanistan). The study of collective
security seeking practices cannot close its determinative loops until
structural and political factors shaping security objectives are endogenously
explained.

C. Genetic and Epigenetic Systems Change

Discussions about systems change are often rather unproductive. We
started this paper, for example, with a summary of post 1945 developments
in collective security seeking practices that to us indicates many such
transformations, yet Haas and Zacher in some respects see few such changes
within the United Nations, at least few that are not reflective of the
external environment, world politics. Kende's remarks above also seem hard
to interpret.

Without structurally reifying systems concepts, and without assuming
the reproduction of such systems to be mechanically automatic, how can we
study the systemic aspects of collective security-seeking practices? Our
first response is to ground systems thinking in unilateral and collective
practices (the Congo example of the Figure/Table above indicates how and
organizational action can be rationalized as a collective political
practice). Thus we may essentially or aggregatively find regularities
in practices that deserve a "systems" label. Significant transformations
in the number or distribution of major autonomous <u>actors</u>, in their action-

linked _perspectives_, in their support mobilization or security-seeking
strategic action sequences, in the differently biased _arenas_ characteristi-
cally appealed to for management practices, in issue-specific success or
failure _outcome_ patterns, and in the _consequences_ of the above for future
systemic patterning have _all_ been used to describe system changes.

Additionally we may distinguish essentialist and aggregative systems
views. The former looks for deep structuring, generative, organizing
principles (contained within the perspectives of different practices). The
later looks for statistical trends or aggregations, like Figures 3 and 4 above
on trends in management/nonmanagement practices. Liberal or conservative
positivists in the 20th century tend to take nominalist, aggregative
positions on system issues, while Marxists   like Kende's tend to
make essentialist (i.e., capitalism-linked) interpretations. This polariza-
tion, however, is not complete. It is our view that the most productive
approach is to look for indirectly observable, changing essences   socio-
political practices. If there are deep, generative structures within
security seeking practices, we want to find them. Advanced techniques
within the Artificial Intelligence tradition -- frames, scripts or schemas --
suggest ways of empirically modeling the charter norms, balancing or align-
ment rules, characteristic dispute management procedures or class conflicts
that may be the constant or changing essence underlying such practices. (Alker,
Bennett, Mefford, 1980)

One further distinction within an empirical essentialist way of thinking
should be made: that between genetic and epigenetic processes of system
reproduction and transformation. A geneticist views living systems as
realizations of DNA-embedded, pre-formed genetic potential, possibly triggered
off in different maturational stages. Analogously an epigentic perspective
emphasizes unprogramed, creative accretions in an organism's functioning.

Being careful with the limits of the analogy when applied to organized international systems, one can still meaningfully distinguish preformed and novel functional patterns. For example, we suspect the internalization of an insecurity-driven, power-balancing logic in the life experiences of most current political leaders makes the recurrence of such a systemic phenomenon highly likely, mistakenly giving the impression that this program of behavior had been "wired into" these statesmen and women at birth. Epigenetic accretions in function, like collective defense organizations that serve collective security functions also occur. The apparently temporary turning upside down of classical concert of power practices to give preventive diplomacy practices also strikes us as epigenetically describable. Combining these two kind of processes of systems change with adaptive, bias-sensitive security-seeking agenda processes helps explain our sense that lots of important systemic transformations have occurred in the 1945-1980 period, while at the same time allowing us and others like Zacher and Haas or Kende to account for the nearly "eternal return" of power balancing, bihegemonial systemic practices.

It is not our intention further to review here alternative systemic patterns possibly recognizeable within collective security seeking practices. But we do pause to provide a two dimensional alternative to the anarchy-collective security-world government continuum with which we opened this paper. From the writings of communitarian peace researchers like Ernst Haas and Karl Deutsch, we recognize that a unipolar poser system may be legitimate or not, a tyranny or world commonwealth; further we see the possibility of pluralistic security communities existing, systems of nominally sovereign states that manages the conflicts among them without recourse to threats of war. Figure 5 shows how many of the alternatives discussed in this paper can be characterized, (approximately to be sure) in terms of a power

Figure 5 :   <u>An Aprroximate Classification of Collective Security-Seeking Systems</u>

Scope and Depth of Insecurity Relevant Normative Integration

| Low | | | | High |

Hobbesian
Anarchy

Multipolar Balance
of Power

Multipolar
Balance of
Terror

Pluralistic
security
community

Bihegemonial
collective defense
system

Bipolar
Balance of
Terror

World
confederation

Collective Security
system

World
government

Global
Tyranny

Unified
Hegemonial
System

Degree of centrality of power in world system

High

Collective Security-Seeking
Systems

centralization and insecurity   consensus axes. We wish the larger realm
of transitions among such alternatives would more constantly be in the
view of specialists on unilateral and collective security seeking practices.

D. Reflective Learning About War Avoidance

Ours has been, we hope, a sustained exercise of critical reason, under-
taken in a realistic search for practical knowledge about how just peace may
more readily be achieved. It has been a rational effort in the sense that
all the views definable within such a framework of concern may be openly
addressed and reasonably argued. It has been realistic in that we have tried
to ground most discussions of alternative practices or systems in constraints
and possibilities of the appropriate historical contexts. Not peace at any
price, but peace likely to endure because of a sharable normative/legal basis
has been our goal.

We have been critical both of our own work   and that of others. We have
tried to learn from the contributions of other scholars in our field and be
reflective about the influence of paradigmatic differences in research train-
ing and national divergences in political loyalties on scientific arguments.
This has meant an explicit attempt to recognize, transcend or side-step differ-
ences we associate with liberal or conservative positivist conceptions of
scientific practice; at the same time, in an empathetic response to dialectical
and socialist thought, we have illustratively supported, we hope, a reason-
able committment to mathematical and empirical work on security-seeking practices.
Such norm-sensitive, but critical reflections we think to be characteristic of
individual maturity, progressive science and sophisticated political practices.
Having "collectivized" many relevant concepts, and dialectically overcome much
of the static, ahistorical bias inherent in previous relevant empirical work,

we think it is now intellectually possible to continue a research program of empirical scientific studies of collective security seeking practices on a wider primary basis than North American peace research.

NOTES

1. Our brief summary on these points (including the Wilson quote taken from Ruggie's first page) derives basically from (Haas 1955), (Claude 1964), (Larus, 1965) and (Ruggie, 1974).

2. The first long quote is recalled by one of us from a talk by Stanley Hoffmann, the second comes from (Claude, 1964, p. 224); the remaining quoted phrases refer of course to Article 51, Chapter VII, and Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter.

3. In a study of the UN, the Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization for African Unity, the Arab League, and the Council of Europe, Haas, Butterworth and Nye (1972, p. 5f) estimated that of the 104 disputes between 1946 and 1970 involving fatalities (excluding purely civil wars and armed raids across borders not supported by governments) 69 (or 66%) were referred at some time to one of these organizations; the percentage of referrals is slightly higher (75%) for what they term high or very high intensity disputes.

4. A principle conclusion of the Haas, Butterworth, Nye study (1972, p. 60) is that "there has been no organizational learning in the past [1960-70] decade - although probably some 'unlearning'". Haas earlier (1962) described UN experience of the 50s as "Dynamic Environment and Static System", implying that if there was a real change taking place, it was not within the UN system. Given our own perception of rapid transformations in collective security seeking practices, we are trying to capture the real phenomena, wherever they occur.

   In an important new study, Zacher (1979, p. 215) repeats the Haas, Butterworth, Nye view of collective security organizations as little more than standing diplomatic conferences with no power, personality or learning capacity beyond those of individual governments. His whole book gives a rather static, but detailed view of the efforts of inter-, intra- and cross-bloc alignments on prospects for collective conflict handling success. But he concludes, in a way that resonates with our concerns, that a future, multivariate theory of collective security efforts "will likely assign a central place to coalition configurations and the affiliation of conflicting parties with particular political - security groupings." (p. 207)

5. In our attempt to get serious further discussions going about empirical scientific work on collective security seeking practices we shall have to impute views to East European scholars that some or all of them, including Dr. Kende, may not hold. We do so, with apologies beforehand, in the hope of having our statements corrected through serious, empirically informed scientific discussions. The only other systematic, empirically oriented study of major post-war conflict episodes and conflict management practices of which we are aware is by Professor Gantman and

his associates in Moscow. A full English or French language account
of these studies is not to our knowledge available.

6. We have not carefully reviewed the relevant histories, but see as
   relevant to present concerns Goldmann's depressing account of the
   great variety of rationalizations post-war states have used to
   justify (post-hoc?) war initiation decisions (Goldmann, 1970).
   Similarly Ference's (1975) recent study of eventual definitional success
   needs to be correlated with the political realities of its construction
   period. The interested, operationally inclined research might further
   wish to read (Rivera, 1973).

7. So does the issue of what constitutes a genuine "threat to the peace."
   In the late 1940s and early 1950s, colonial allegiances clearly had
   an effect on whether certain individuals or states would recognize
   issues of decolonialization as more than "domestic," or "trusteeship"
   concerns. In arenas where dissensus exists on whether human rights,
   cultural identities or oppressed classes are being suppressed, we
   agree with Mushakoji (1978) that there are many meanings to "peace"
   or its denial **that all** deserve further study.

8. A classic argument for the role of projective mechanisms in
   insecurity definition processes is Harold Lasswell's <u>World Politics
   and Personal Insecurity</u> (originally 1935). Brown's new book on Q
   Methodology allows introspective alternatives to be scientifically
   studied as well. Robert Harkevy at Penn. State is helping to coordinate
   a relevant series of comparative studies of how national (in)security
   is actually defined.

9. When one of us tried to use the phrase the "jointness of production,"
   he was told it referred technically to the fact that hamburger meat
   generation inevitably, i.e., jointly had associated with it the
   production of leather.

10. Taylor, 1974 has an interesting review of the mathematical arguments
    for state intervention for collective goods provision, one that
    tends to minimize its necessity. Although written from a rather
    anarchical perspective, it might have considerable appeal to state-
    centric realist thinkers who depend on the "terribleness" of interna-
    tional anarchy for their own legitimization, but do not want to give
    up national self-help strategies of security pursuit. See also
    Alker and Hurwitz, 1980, and Nurmi, 1977 for relevant literature reviews.

11. Together with inter-state focussed perspectives, these we call
    "cross-state" interactions building on work by Keohane and Nye.

12. Most similar to ours in format have been McClelland's WEIS project,
    Azar's COPDAB studies, Bleckmann and Kaplan's studies of the use of
    force, Singer-Bremer force confrontation studies and Mahoney's major
    efforts for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency to study
    Chinese, American and Soviet Crisis Management behavior.

13. We like to think that the weakness of the UN is a virtue from the
    point of view of nondecisions research. Whereas conservative behavioral
    critics of the nondecisions argument have been known to say, "Show me
    a nondecision," which by their nature is difficult to do, the world
    of collective security seeking practices is <u>full</u> of nondecisions in
    either of the two textual senses used above. Perhaps, then, agenda
    process research has found here its <u>Drosophila</u>, a naturally occurring
    species whose "veiled" genetic codes are much easier to discover
    with microscopic investigation, than the veiled or averted power
    processes also thought to influence domestic politics.

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Appendix: FACS Case/Phase/Issue List

Case Number and Name	Phase Structure	Type of Issue	Historical Relationship
1 Peruvian Border #1, 1953-1960	(I,II)	Interstate	Borders
3 India-Pakistan Partition, 1942-47	(I,II,III,IV)	Internal	General
4 Moroccan Independence, 1944-56	(I,II,III,IV, III,IV,V,VI)	Colonial	General
5 Status of Mongolia, 1945-50	(I,II,VI)	Interstate	General
6 Status of Austria, 1945-55	(I,VI)	CW Interstate	General
7 Soviet Claims on Turkey, 1945-47	(I,II)	CW Interstate	Irredentist
8 German Unification, 1945-72	(I,VI)	CW Interstate	General
9 Chinese Civil War, 1945-49	(I,II,III,IV)	CW Internal	General
10 Indonesian Independence, 1945-49	(I,II,III,IV,III, IV,III,V,VI)	Colonial	None
11 Indochinese Recolonization, 1945-56	(I,II,III,IV)	Colonial	General
12 Kurdistan, 1946-47	(II,III,IV)	Internal	General
13 Azerbaijan, 1946	(II,III,IV,III,IV)	CW Interstate	General
14 French in Levant, 1946	(I,VI)	Colonial	General
15 Israeli Independence, 1946-49	(I,II,III,IV)	Colonial	General
16 Status of Eritrea, 1946-52	(I,II,III,IV,V,VI)	Colonial	General
17 Corfu Channel, 1946-49	(II,III,IV,V)	CW Interstate	General
19 South African Race Policies, 1946-59	(II)	Internal	General
20 Future Status of Sudan, 1946-53	(I,II,I,VI)	Colonial	General
21 Greek Civil War, 1946-51	(III,V)	CW Internal	General
22 Namibia, 1946-	(I,II)	Colonial	General
24 Trieste, 1947-54	(I,II,I,VI)	CW Interstate	Borders
25 Dominican Invasion Attempts, 1947-49	(II,III,IV)	Interstate	General

26	Malagasy Independence, 1947-60	(I,II,III,IV,V,VI)	Colonial	General
27	Gadaduma Wells, 1947-63	(I,VI)	Interstate	Borders
28	Togo Independence, 1947-57	(I,VI)	Colonial	None
29	Kashmir Accession, 1947-48	(I,II,III,IV)	Interstate	General
30	Pakhtunistan, 1947-63	(I,II,III,IV,III,V)	Colonial	Borders
32	Korean Unification, 1947-50	(I,II)	CW Internal	General
33	Berlin Blockade, 1948-49	(II,VI)	CW Interstate	General
34	Sino-Burmese Border, 1948-60	(II,VI)	Interstate	Borders
35	Czech Coup, 1948	(I,II)	CW Internal	General
36	Indus Canal Waters Dispute, 1948-60	(II,VI)	Interstate	General
37	Costa Rican Exiles #1, 1948-49	(II,III,IV,VI)	Interstate	General
38	Russian Wives, 1948-49	(I)	Interstate	None
39	Soviet-Yugoslav Rift, 1949-51	(II)	CW Interstate	General
40	Torre Asylum, 1948-54	(I,VI)	Interstate	General
42	Malayan Independence, 1948-60	(I,II,III,IV,V)	Colonial	General
43	Hyderabad, 1948	(I,II,III,IV)	Interstate	General
44	Fr. Territories in India, 1948-62	(II,III,VI)	Colonial	General
45	Adeni-Yemeni Border, 1948-63	(II,III)	Colonial	General
46	Dominican Moral Aggression, 1949	(II)	Interstate	General
47	Kashmir Negotiations, 1949-64	(II)	Internal	General
49	Bolivian Exiles, 1949-52	(III,V)	Internal	General
50	East European Human Rights, 1949-50	(I)	CW Interstate	General
52	Arab-Israeli Truce, 1949-56	(III)	Interstate	Borders
53	Chinese Troops in Burma, 1949-61	(II,III,IV)	Interstate	No Information
54	Eastern Arabian Boundaries, 1949-75	(I,II,I,VI)	Interstate	Borders
57	Syrian-Lebanese Tensions, 1949	(II)	Interstate	General
58	Anglo-Norwegian Fishing Dispute, 1949-51	(I,VI)	Interstate	None

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59	Egyptian Capitulations, 1949-50	(I)	Colonial	General
60	Future Status of Cyrenaica, 1949-51	(I,VI)	Colonial	None
61	Caribbean Plots, 1949-50	(II)	Interstate	General
62	Tunisian Independence, 1950-56	(II,III,IV,V,VI)	Colonial	General
63	Indonesian Post-Indep. Conflicts, 1950-62	(III,V)	Colonial	General
64	Jordanian Expansion, 1950	(I)	Interstate	General
65	Somali-Ethiopian Border Demarcation, 1950-61	(I,II)	Interstate	Borders
66	Status of the Saar, 1950-57	(I,VI)	Interstate	General
67	Korean Invasion, 1950-53	(III)	CW Interstate	Irredentist
68	Chinese Aggression in Tibet, 1950-51	(II,III,IV)	Interstate	Irredentist
69	Status of Puerto Rico, 1950-52	(II,III,V)	Colonial	None
70	West Irian #1, 1950-60	(I,II)	Colonial	General
71	Iranian Oil Nationalization, 1951-53	(I,II,VI)	Colonial	General
74	Cuban Sailors, 1951	(II,VI)	Interstate	General
75	British in Suez, 1951-54	(II,III,IV)	Colonial	General
76	Minquiers Islands, 1951-53	(I,VI)	Interstate	General
77	C-47 Shootdown, 1951-54	(III,V)	CW Interstate	General
78	Iceland Fisheries #1, 1952-56	(I)	Interstate	None
79	US Interference in Eastern Europe, 1952-53	(I)	CW Interstate	General
80	Threat to Thailand, 1953-54	(II)	CW Interstate	General
81	US-Czech Air Incident, 1953	(III,V)	CW Interstate	General
82	Sudanese Independence, 1953-55	(I,II,III,IV)	Colonial	General
83	Guatemalan Intervention, 1953-54	(I,II,III,IV,VI)	CW Internal	General
85	East German Uprising, 1953	(II,III,V)	CW Internal	General
86	Guyanese Independence, 1953-66	(II,III,V)	Colonial	General
87	Temple of Preah Viher, 1953-75	(II,III,IV,III,IV, III,IV,III,IV)	Interstate	General
89	Korean Negotiations, 1953-	(IV)	CW Interstate	General

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90	Syrian Coup, 1954	(II,III,IV)	Internal	General
91	Sino-Indian Border, 1954-62	(I,II)	Interstate	Borders
92	Cypriot Independence, 1954-58	(II,III,IV)	Colonial	General
94	Siberian Air Incident, 1954	(III,V)	CW Interstate	General
95	Chinese Offshore Islands, 1954-55	(II,III,IV)	CW Interstate	General
96	Omani Rebellion, 1954-71	(I,II,III,V,VI)	Internal	General
97	Algerian Independence, 1954-62	(I,II,III,IV,VI)	Colonial	General
98	China Seas Piracy, 1954	(II)	CW Interstate	General
99	Costa Rican Exiles #2, 1955	(III,IV,V)	Interstate	General
100	Camerouni Independence, 1955-61	(II,III,V,VI)	Colonial	General
101	Naga Uprisings, 1955-72	(II,III,VI,VI)	Internal	General
102	Baghdad Pact, 1955-56	(II,VI)	Interstate	General
103	Goa, 1955-61	(I,II,III,IV,III,V,VI)	Colonial	General
105	British Cameroons Independence, 1955-63	(I)	Colonial	General
106	Cuban Revolution, 1955-59	(I,II,III,VI)	Internal	None
107	El Al Air Incident, 1955	(III,VI)	CW Interstate	General
108	Turkish-Syrian Frontier, 1955-57	(I,II)	CW Interstate	General
109	Cuban-Dominican Tenions, 1956	(II)	Interstate	General
110	Cambodian Border, 1956-70	(II,III)	Interstate	General
111	Antarctic Islands, 1956-58	(II)	Interstate	General
112	US Forces in Iceland, 1956	(I,VI)	Interstate	None
113	Tibetan Autonomy #1, 1956-58	(II,III)	Internal	General
114	British Practices in Cyprus, 1956-59	(III,V)	Colonial	General
115	Rann of Kutch #1, 1956-64	(I,II)	Interstate	Borders
116	Jordanian Security, 1956-57	(II,III)	Internal	General
117	Polish October, 1956	(II,III,VI)	Internal	General
118	Hungarian Intervention, 1956	(I,II,III,IV,VI)	CW Interstate	General

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119	Suez War, 1956-57	(I,II,III,IV,VI)	Colonial	General
120	Moroccan Post-Independence Tensions, 1956-58	(I,II,III,IV)	Colonial	General
122	Mauritanian Independence, 1957-61	(I)	Colonial	General
124	Dutch-Belgian Border, 1957-59	(I,VI)	Interstate	Borders
125	Honduran Border, 1957-61	(I,II,III,IV,VI)	Interstate	Borders
127	Tunisian Arms, 1957	(I)	Interstate	General
128	Israeli Borders, 1957-67	(II)	Interstate	Borders
129	Spanish Southern Protectorate, 1957-588	(II,III,IV)	Colonial	General
130	Lebanese/Jordanian Civil Wars, 1958	(I,II,III,IV)	Internal	General
132	Sakiet, 1958	(II,III,V)	Colonial	General
134	Chilean-Argentine Border, 1958-	(II,III,IV,V)	Interstate	Border
135	Wadi Halfa, 1958-59	(I,II,VI)	Interstate	Irredentist
138	Soviet Airspace, 1958	(II,I)	CW Interstate	General
139	Laotian Civil War #1, 1958-62	(I,II,III,IV)	CW Internal	General
142	Liberian Boundaries, 1958	(I)	Colonial	Borders
143	Rwandan-Burundian Independence, 1958-62	(II,III,IV)	Colonial	General
144	Icelandic Fisheries #2, 1958-61	(II,I)	Interstate	General
145	Quemoy-Matsu, 1958	(II,III,IV)	CW Interstate	General
146	Ben Youssef Asylum, 1958-61	(I,VI)	Interstate	None
147	Berlin Status, 1958-59	(I)	CW Interstate	General
148	Mosul Revolt, 1958-59	(II,III,V)	Interstate	General
149	Mexican Shrimp Boats, 1958-59	(II,III,V)	Interstate	None
150	Malawian Independence, 1959-64	(II,III,V,VI)	Colonial	General
151	Haitian Exiles, 1959	(II,III,IV)	Internal	None
152	Revolutionaries in Panama, 1959	(II,III)	Internal	None
153	Paraguayan Exiles, 1959-61	(II,III)	Internal	None
154	Tibetan Autonomy #2, 1959-65	(II,III,V)	Internal	General

156	Sino-Nepalese Border, 1959-61	(III,IV,III,VI)	Interstate	None
157	Dominican Tyranny, 1959-62	(III,IV)	Internal	General
158	Nicaraguan Exiles, 1959	(III,IV)	Internal	General
159	UAR-Jordanian Tensions, 1959-65	(II,I)	Interstate	General
161	Repressions in South Africa, 1960-76	(II,III)	Internal	General
162	Vietnamese Civil War, 1960-61	(II,III)	CW Internal	General
163	U-2 Incident, 1960	(III,V)	CW Interstate	General
164	Eichmann Abduction, 1960	(I,VI)	Interstate	None
165	Cuban-American Relations, 1960-61	(II)	CW Interstate	None
167	Zaire Independence, 1960-64	(I,II,III,1V,V)	Colonial	General
168	Mali-Mauritanian Border, 1960-63	(III,IV,V)	Interstate	General
169	Botswana/Lesotho/Swaziland Independence, 1960-68	(II,VI)	Colonial	General
170	Sino-Soviet Rift, 1960-	(I,II,III,IV)	Interstate	General
171	South Tyrol, 1960-71	(I,II,VI)	Internal	Irredentist
173	RB-47 Shootdown, 1960	(III,V)	CW Interstate	General
174	Soviet-Albanian Rift, 1960-	(I)	Internal	None
175	West Irian #2, 1961-69	(III,IV,V,VI)	Colonial	General
176	Nepalese Exiles, 1961-62	(II,III,IV)	Interstate	General
177	Thai-Cambodian Border, 1961-	(II,III,IV,III,IV)	Interstate	General
178	Bay of Pigs, 1961	(I,II,III,V)	CW Interstate	General
179	Portuguese Territories in Africa, 1961-74	(I,II,III,IV,V,VI)	Colonial	General
180	Complaint Against Mexico, 1961	(II)	Interstate	None
181	Berlin Wall, 1961-62	(I,II,I)	CW Interstate	General
182	Kuwaiti Independence, 1961-62	(I,II,VI)	Colonial	None
184	Moroccan-Mauritanian Border, 1961-70	(I,II,I,VI)	Interstate	Irredentist
187	Algerian Sahara, 1961-70	(I,VI)	Interstate	None
188	Iraqi Kurdish Revolt, 1961-70	(I,II,III,IV,III,	Internal	General

IV,V)

189	Danish Fisheries, 1961-64	(I,II)	Interstate	None
190	Bizerte, 1961-63	(I,II,III,IV,VI)	Colonial	General
191	UAR Breakup, 1961	(I,II,III,V,VI)	Interstate	General
192	Relations with Cuba, 1961-	(I,II,I)	CW Interstate	General
193	Nam Tha Crisis, 1962	(II,III,IV)	CW Interstate	General
194	American-Vietnamese War, 1962-73	(III,IV)	CW Internal	General
196	Somali Borders, 1962-73	(II,III,IV)	Interstate	Irredentist
197	Guyanese Border, 1962-70	(I,II,VI)	Interstate	Borders
198	Guatemalan Army Revolt, 1962	(II,III,IV)	Internal	General
199	Sino-Indian War, 1962-78	(II,III,IV,III,V)	Interstate	Borders
200	Lauca River, 1962-64	(II)	Interstate	General
201	Peruvian Military Coup, 1962	(I)	Internal	None
202	Algerian-Moroccan Border, 1962-70	(II,III,IV,V,IV, V,VI)	Interstate	None
205	Soccer Riots, 1962	(I,III,V)	Interstate	General
206	Missiles in Cuba, 1962	(I,II,I)	CW Interstate	General
207	Yemeni Civil War, 1962-70	(I,II,III,IV,III,IV)	Internal	General
210	Brunei Revolts, 1962	(II,III,V)	Colonial	General
211	Laotian Civil War #2, 1962-75	(III,IV)	CW Internal	General
212	Sarawak/Sabah, 1963	(I,II,III,IV,VI)	Interstate	General
213	Malaysian Confrontation, 1963-66	(I,II,III,IV,V,VI)	Interstate	General
216	South Yemeni Independence, 1963-67	(I,II,III,IV,VI)	Colonial	Irredentist
217	Portuguese Guinean Border Security, 1963-74	(II,III,V)	Colonial	General
218	Sudanese Civil War, 1963-72	(II,III,V)	Internal	General
220	Vietnamese Buddhists, 1963	(I,II,III,V)	Internal	General
221	Intervention in Haiti, 1963	(II,III,IV)	Internal	General
223	Angolan Border Security, 1963-74	(II,III,V)	Colonial	General

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224	Territoire Francaise des Afars et des Issas, 1963-67	(II,III,IV)	Colonial	General
226	Nigerien-Dahomean Border, 1963-65	(II,III,IV,V,VI)	Interstate	Borders
227	Dhofari Insurgency, 1963-76	(III,IV)	Internal	General
228	Southern Rhodesia, 1963-80	(I,II,III,IV,V,VI)	Colonial	General
229	Venezuelan Terrorism, 1963-67	(II,III,IV)	CW Internal	General
230	Tutsi Restoration Attempt, 1963-64	(II,III,IV)	Internal	General
231	Cypriot Civil War, 1963-74	(I,II,III,IV,III,IV)	Internal	General
233	Soviet-Romanian Rift, 1964-68	(I)	Interstate	General
234	Panama Canal #1, 1964-67	(I,II,III,IV)	Colonial	General
236	Persecution of Greeks, 1964-65	(II)	Interstate	General
237	Ghanaian Border, 1964-66	(I,II,VI)	Interstate	None
238	Gibraltar, 1964-	(I,II)	Colonial	General
239	Zaire Civil War, 1964-65	(III,IV)	Internal	General
240	Ifni, 1964-69	(I,II,VI)	Colonial	General
241	Stanleyville Air Rescue, 1964	(II,III,IV)	Internal	General
242	Spanish Sahara, 1964-76	(I,II,III,IV,III)	Colonial	General
243	Rann of Kutch #2, 1965-69	(II,III,IV,V,VI)	Interstate	Borders
244	Chadian Insurgency, 1965-66	(II,III,IV)	Internal	General
245	Kashmir War, 1965-70	(III,IV)	Interstate	General
247	Plots Against French Africam 1965-66	(II)	Interstate	General
248	Thai Communist Insurgency, 1965-	(II,III)	CW Internal	General
249	Plots Against Toure, 1965-69	(I,II)	Internal	General
250	Dominican Intervention, 1965-66	(I,II,III,IV)	CW Internal	General
253	Zambian Borders, 1965-	(I,II,III,IV,III,VI)	Interstate	General
254	Falkland Islands, 1965-	(I,II,I,II)	Interstate	General
255	Ghanaian Refugees, 1966	(II,VI)	Interstate	General
257	Mozambican Border Security, 1966-74	(II,III,IV,VI)	Colonial	General

258	Katangan Exiles, 1966-67	(II,III,IV)	Interstate	General
259	Tutsi Terrorism, 1966-67	(III,IV)	Internal	General
260	Eritrean Civil War, 1967-	(I,II,III,IV,III)	Internal	Irredentist
261	Battle of Hostages, 1967	(II,VI)	Interstate	General
263	Bolivian Guerrilla Insurgency, 1967-68	(II,III,IV)	CW Internal	General
264	June '67 War, 1967	(II,III,IV)	Interstate	Irredentist
265	Biafran Secession, 1967-70	(I,II,III,VI)	Internal	General
268	Tanzanian Boundary, 1967	(I,II)	Interstate	Borders
269	Arab-Israeli Confrontation, 1967-73	(II,III,IV)	Interstate	Irredentist
271	Pueblo Seizure, 1968	(II,III,IV)	CW Interstate	General
272	Greek Tyranny, 1968-74	(I,II)	Internal	None
273	Exiles in Haiti, 1968	(II,III,IV)	Internal	General
274	Czech Invasion, 1968	(I,II,III,IV,V)	CW Internal	None
276	Rio de la Plata Demarcation, 1969-73	(I,II,VI)	Interstate	General
277	Equatorial Guinean Post-Independence Tensions, 1969-1978	(I,II,III,IV,V, III,IV)	Colonial	None
279	American Tuna Boats, 1969-74	(I,II,I)	Interstate	General
280	Southern Yemeni Borders, 1969-1973	(II,III,IV)	Internal	General
281	Iranian Borders, 1969-75	(I,II,III,IV,V, IV,V,VI)	Interstate	Borders
282	Football War, 1969-	(I,II,III,IV,III,IV)	Interstate	None
283	Northern Ireland, 1969-	(II,III)	Internal	General
284	Bahreini Independence, 1970-71	(I,VI)	Colonial	Irredentist
285	Jordanian Civil War, 1970-71	(II,III,IV)	Internal	General
287	Cambodian Civil War, 1970-75	(I,II,III,IV)	CW Internal	General
288	Panama Canal #2, 1970-79	(I,II,I,VI)	Interstate	Irredentist
289	Guinean Security, 1970-78	(I,II,III,IV,V,IV,V)	Internal	General
291	Bangladesh, 1970-74	(I,II,I,II,III,IV, V,VI)	Internal	General

Appendix: Case List

292	Ugandan Coup, 1971–73	(II,II,IV)	Internal	None
295	Cod War, 1971–73	(II,III,IV,V)	Interstate	Borders
298	Burundian Genocide, 1972–73	(III)	Internal	General
300	Corisco Bay Islands, 1972–74	(I,III,IV,V)	Interstate	General
301	Vietnamese Truce, 1973–76	(III,V,VI)	Internal	General
302	Iraqi-Kuwaiti Border, 1973–77	(III,V,VI)	Interstate	General
304	Yom Kippur War, 1973–74	(II,III,IV,III,V)	Interstate	General
306	Baluchistan, 1973–	(II,III,IV)	Internal	General
307	Kurdish War, 1974–75	(III,IV)	Internal	General
308	Cypriot Coup and Invasion, 1974–	(II,III,IV)	Interstate	General
310	Angolan Independence, 1975–76	(II,III)	Colonial	General
367	Indian Independence, 1935–47	(I,II,III,VI)	Colonial	General
368	Mongolian UN Membership Dispute, 1949–61	(I,VI)	CW Interstate	General
369	PRC UN Representation Dispute, 1949–71	(I,VI)	CW Interstate	General
370	Mizo Uprisings, 1964–77	(II,III,IV)	Internal	General

Appendix: Case List

Appendix: FACS Case/Phase/Issue List

Phase Structure Definitions:[*]

Phase -- one of five levels of disagreement and conflict; a given dispute[**] may pass (repeatedly) through one or more of the phases.

Phase I -- (Dispute Phase) -- a quarrel or disagreement claimed by at least one party to be an issue of substantive international political significance.

Phase II -- (Conflict Phase) -- a dispute in which at least one of the parties has demonstrated willingness to use military force to resolve the dispute but as yet has not actually done so.

Phase III -- (Hostilities Phase) -- a dispute involving systematic use of military force, over a specific military objective(s), causing casulties and/or destruction of property.

Phase IV -- (Post-Hostilities Conflict Phase) -- fighting no longer occurs as in Phase III, but at least one party continues to view the quarrel in military terms. Sporadic violence may still occur, but evidence concerning the cessation of hostilities should suggest something more fundamental than just a temporary lull in intermittent hostilities.

Phase V -- (Post-Hostilities Dispute Phase) -- a dispute is no longer viewed in military terms. However, the issues in the dispute remain, although negotiations for resolution may be taking place.

Phase VI -- (Settlement Phase) -- the final phase, commencing with a settlement or agreement resolving the underlying dispute.

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[*] Lee Farris, Hayward R. Alker, Jr., Kathleen Carley and Frank L. Sherman, "Phase/Actor Disaggregated Butterworth-Scranton Codebook," Reflective Logics for Resolving Insecurity Dilemmas, Project Working Paper, (Massachusetts Institute of Technology: Center for International Studies, 1980).

[**] Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Amelia C. Leiss, Controlling Small Wars (N.Y.: Alfred Knopf, 1970).