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SCANDINAVIAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

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## SCANDINAVIAN VIEWS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

by

Norman J. Padelford

### I

#### General Attitudes Toward the United Nations

The deliberate traveller searching for clues to public opinion and official thinking on the emergent issues of foreign affairs cannot fail to be impressed in Scandinavia with the liveliness of interest in the United Nations and the depth of support which it enjoys.

Interest in and support of the U.N. is, as a former Foreign Minister of one of the countries put it, "a positive matter" throughout the four states comprising the Scandinavian area. There is general support of the U.N. among all political parties in Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland. Shadings and nuances of enthusiasm exist, to be sure. But at no time in the course of interviews with over fifty political and business leaders in the four countries did I hear a negative attitude expressed toward participation in or enhancement of the effectiveness of the United Nations.

People in the Northern countries take pride that Scandinavian citizens have twice been picked to be Secretary-General of the world organization. They are proud of the constructive efforts made by the late Count Bernadotte as mediator in Palestine before

his untimely death and of Gunnar Myrdal as Secretary of the Economic Commission for Europe. They also take pride in their active participation in the U.N. Emergency Force at Suez and in the Gaza Strip and in volunteers they supplied for the Observer Corps for Lebanon, to mention but a few of the places where Scandinavians have taken a prominent part in the cause of the U.N. outside of the Council chambers and the General Assembly.

Scandinavians also take pride in their financial contributions to the U.N. They feel these are substantial for their size and populations and for the relative power which they hold in world affairs. Some take umbrage at the brash manners displayed by some of the smaller, newer members of the U.N. and at their attempts to wield large influence within the organization or to achieve positions of prestige when their sacrifices for the U.N. and their contributions to it are fractional by comparison. But few Scandinavians would have the U.N. anything other than what it has become: a club with well-nigh universal membership of all independent states.

One can find criticism of certain aspects of the U.N., as of U.S. policy in the U.N. Many do not like the "big show" atmosphere engendered in New York. Others object to the amount of propaganda that pervades proceedings. Others will remonstrate against the frequent lack of a spirit of calm deliberation or the difficulty of holding and maintaining confidential negotiations. Still others object to the high costs associated with U.N. operations.

Notwithstanding a fairly wide span of criticisms on detailed

points, a broad feeling exists throughout influential political and business circles in Scandinavia that, if anything, more matters should be referred to the world body and that it should broaden its scope of activities in response to changing world conditions and new developments in science and technology. There is almost universal feeling that nations, large and small, should put more faith in the U.N.

In so far as can be gauged from a brief, though intensive, exploration, there is little of the lassitude one finds in fairly sizable segments of British public opinion among the people of the Northern states. Each, for quite different reasons, has a stake in the preservation and vitality of the U.N. and is aware of this. And even among the rural populations, as well as within organized labor, one finds interest in and a modicum of knowledge about the world organization that makes for the "positive" public sentiment mentioned previously. One could wish that as much were known or appreciated by all who live within sight or television of the U.N. headquarters in New York. United Nations affairs receive fairly extensive coverage in the Scandinavian press. The political parties carry on a considerable measure of public education, especially among the young people. And, in addition, Scandinavians are among the world's best read people.

## II.

### Attitudes Toward the United States and the United Nations

General Tone of Attitudes. Scandinavians as a rule speak favorably of the part the United States has played and is today playing

in the United Nations. Many still refer appreciatively to the initiative taken by the United States in drafting the Charter and giving a strong lead to other nations to join and participate wholeheartedly in the U.N. The large share borne by the United States in erecting the U.N. headquarters, in contributing to the annual budget, and in subscribing to special funds, is spoken of warmly and frequently. And admiration is voiced of the strong support the United States has thrown behind the U.N. at certain vital moments.

The over-all net impression United States policy toward the U.N. has made upon Scandinavians -- whether allied with us or not -- is a favorable one. Not all Scandinavians agree with every detail of U.S. policy at the U.N. Nor do they hesitate to express criticisms of some aspects of it or suggest alternate courses of action. But they are warm in praising the sustained leadership America has taken and they look to us to continue exercising this role.

Criticisms. What criticisms are made of United States policy and action with respect to the U.N.? We shall go into specific issues and problems shortly, such as membership, technical assistance and the like, where there are differences of viewpoint. Suffice it here to speak of the more general aspects.

There is a good deal of criticism of certain behavioristic tendencies Scandinavians profess to see in U.S. actions and attitudes manifested at New York. The most frequently voiced criticisms are directed at what they feel is an inclination by American delegates to engage in "moral preachment." Being less actively church-going people

on the whole than many Americans, Scandinavians are disposed to look for the pragmatic aspects of a problem and devote relatively less thought to questions of morality that may be involved with it. Hence, they do not altogether sympathize with moves on our part to stress what we may feel are the moral aspects, or the moral rectitude of our stands versus those of others.

Criticisms are voiced of what is felt to be a disposition on our part to over-dramatize proceedings and sometimes our own proposals, although they appreciate the importance of keeping the public interested and of lining up support at home and abroad. There is some feeling that we have at times overly stressed East-West issues, or focused upon this aspect at the expense of other angles.

There is cautious but rather widespread criticism of certain "manners" some American delegates are felt to display in the U.N. -- haughtiness, preachment, know-it-all and want-to-run-the-show attitudes, appealing to the gallery and seizing-the-center-of-the-stage tactics. Judgments on matters of this kind are of course personal affairs, subjective, and affected by images and stereotypes. They are usually not expressed in a carping manner, but in a spirit of regret and a feeling that such actions tend to injure America's own cause in the U.N.

Some criticisms are made that U.S. delegations to the General Assembly have contained some ill-informed delegates. The reasons lying behind the composition of our delegations are understood. Indeed, delegations from the Scandinavian states contain representatives of various political parties and interests for purposes of education, insuring multi-partisan support in parliaments, or paying



off political obligations. But feelings were voiced to me on a number of occasions by persons who had been on delegations to New York that sometimes some American delegates seemed to have inadequate briefing for their assignments or did not appreciate all that was taking place. But this is, of course, a matter of subjective judgment.

On the other hand, wide praise was expressed for the conduct of most members of American delegations, the professional people sent with delegations, and the permanent staff. Repeated remarks were heard to the effect that these are among the best prepared, hardest working, most conscientious and attentive people at U.N. meetings. They are said to convey the feeling of knowing their jobs, being interested in them, and trying not only to accomplish U.S. policy objectives but to help make the U.N. succeed in serving its purposes.

### III.

#### Major Policy Concerns of the Scandinavian States for the Next 3 - 6 Years.

##### U.N. Usefulness in Connection with These.

What do Scandinavian governments and party leaders see as their major foreign policy concerns over the next three to six or seven years? And what relevance or usefulness do they feel the United Nations is likely to be in dealing with these situations?

Although the Scandinavian states have gone farther in some respects than any other group of states in developing attitudes, instrumentalities and methods of regional cooperation,<sup>1</sup> each one

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<sup>1</sup>See Norman J. Padelford, "Regional Cooperation in Scandinavia," International Organization, Fall 1957, pp. 597-614.

nevertheless looks at the world situation somewhat differently from the others. And while certain issues are of concern in all of them, they are felt in varying degrees of intensity in the several capitals and approached from distinct national points of view.

Four broad concerns can be singled out for mention here: The German problem, fear of the U.S.S.R. and of what may happen as a consequence of its policies in Eastern Europe, concern over world trade, and progress in Northern cooperations.

#### 1. The German Problem

Germany is a prime concern to her Danish and Norwegian neighbors. Her future is of lively interest to Swedes. And Finns are very conscious of the place their country occupied in the struggle between Germany and Russia during World War II. Hence, the status of the two Germanies and the policies they may pursue toward one another and other nations come quickly to the fore in practically any discussion with Scandinavians about the problems they see lying ahead in foreign affairs.

Of the four states, Denmark and Norway are most deeply concerned about the future of Germany -- particularly Germany after Adenauer, and as she becomes a rearmed nation in the full sense. Both are still suspicious of German motives as a consequence of their wartime experiences, although a visit by Economic Minister Erhard this spring created considerable good will and thawed some ices. Danes have another reason for interest. This is that now over 50 per cent of their trade in

agricultural commodities is going to Germany. Since the war, Western Germany has become a heavy purchaser of Danish meat, milk, butter and other products that formerly were supplied by the lands of Eastern Germany. The British market for Danish trade, long a key factor both in Danish economy and its foreign policy, has been declining steadily since the war as British home agricultural production and Commonwealth preference have risen.

Norwegians are still far from forgetting the bitter experiences they went through during and at the close of the war at the hands of the Germans. Of all the Scandinavian people they are most deeply apprehensive of what the Germans may do once they get modern weapons in their hands and have an army and air force. There are strong feelings that a mistake was made to place missiles and atomic war heads (even tactical) in Germany and to provide training to German personnel in such arms, even though they recognize that Germans should bear a large part of the burden of defending their land against Russia. Nevertheless, Norwegians foresee a day, coming all too soon, when Germans will once more have military capabilities and military-technical skills outstripping that of their neighbors. And then they fear that once more the old will-to-power will reassert itself in German political circles with consequential threats to the smaller, weaker, less industrialized states. Many also are of the opinion that with modern arms in their possession Western Germany will sooner or later feel impelled for internal political reasons to risk bolder policies against both the East and the West in an effort to create situations which they can manipulate

in such a manner as to confront Europe with the alternative of war or major concessions to a reuniting Reich. Both possibilities are gruesome thoughts to Norwegians, even though they acknowledge the naturalness of the German desire for reunification.

For many Swedes the future of Germany is chiefly of interest for the bearing this may have upon Swedish-German trade. Whatever will increase this traditionally profitable trade will find wide acceptance and rationalization. And having escaped the fury of Germany destructiveness or occupation in two world wars, Swedish labor and socialists still profess to think others worry too much over the possible consequences of German rearmament and strength. Some Liberals, Conservatives and professional students of foreign affairs do not hesitate to express concern, however, over the potential dangers for Sweden of any German use of force to hasten or effect reunification. Apprehensions are voiced that this would precipitate a conflict in which their neutrality policy would not suffice and into which they might be drawn or find it to their interests to take sides.

Finnish people also watch the German situation with close attention knowing that this may have a bearing upon Soviet policy toward themselves. Having been defeated by Russia in the Winter War of 1939-40, then occupied by German forces from 1941-45, and finally forced by the U.S.S.R. to use their own manpower to expel the Germans only to find themselves re-occupied in part by Soviet forces, non-communist Finns have forebodings. They fear any development likely to produce German-Soviet conflict to the point where either side would put new pressures upon Finland or move to occupy any or all of its territory once more.

At the same time, many Finns admire German progress. They would like to see increased trade with Germany, along with that of the West generally. And inwardly they are thankful for whatever balances Soviet power, so long as it does not attempt or frighten the Kremlin into untoward action against Finland. Finns know that the sword of Damocles hanging above their heads can be diverted only by delicate measures and that, unhappily, it will never be but moments away, whatever transpires.

However, the emergent German situation presents itself to the Northern peoples, they feel there is little the U.N. can do about it to their advantage. The problems of unification and rearmament are felt to lie primarily in the hands of the Great Powers rather than in the United Nations. For protection against possible military threats to their own security, Danes and Norwegians place chief reliance upon NATO rather than the U.N. Finns, as a rule, count little upon the U.N. doing anything really effective to protect them against Soviet pressures and actions. And even in Sweden, where there is a large body of opinion behind the United Nations, government spokesmen continue to stress non-alignment, neutrality, and home-produced armaments as the main means of averting possible dangers of Sweden stemming from renewed German military power. At the same time, they voice hopes from their isolated position that the U.N. will act vigorously in any situation where international peace or security are endangered. And universally Swedes vow their own best efforts to make the U.N. "work" in this as in other realms, although their emotions at moments can transfix their judgments, as when Foreign Minister Undén in July 1958

precipitously sought to have all U.N. Observers withdrawn from Lebanon when the U.S. forces intervened at President Chamoun's request.

## 2. Fears of the U.S.S.R.

From one end of Scandinavia to the other, fears of the Soviet Union and of what it may one day do in the area are encountered. It is difficult to say where these are felt the most. They are voiced in all countries and in all quarters save among some doctrinaire socialists and pacifists, and of course the communists.

Swedes are much preoccupied with the future of Russian actions and are devoting relatively large efforts to their defense preparations and military plans for the next 6 years. They are deeply suspicious, in varying degrees of outward expression, of Soviet motives in the Baltic and toward themselves. They know their own past history of wars with Russia. They know she wants and aims to get out to the Atlantic, and she is trying desperately to break up the Atlantic Alliance which many recognize is their ultimate source of security if war actually comes. They feel Russia would not hesitate to violate their territory and air space if she decided to act against the West. They believe she would endeavor to seal off the Baltic and turn it into a closed Russian lake, as the southern half of it now is, if she thought her interests required this. And they are apprehensive of a Soviet move into Finland on slight provocation or pretext. Most Swedes are not taken in by Soviet posturing for "peace." They resent the use that was made of Stockholm at the so-called World Peace Congress with its resultant Stockholm Peace Manifesto, and say they will not permit that to happen again.

Norwegians are likewise deeply worried over Soviet motives concerning (1) Lappland and (2) Svalbard. They are concentrating the bulk of their Army in the Lappland area of the far North and with NATO assistance are building defences there as rapidly and as best they can. In this the Swedes and the Finns quietly take a good bit of interest. It is possible that off-the-record cooperation is taking place between the three countries, for this area has certain common features and unity from a defense point of view and each knows it may benefit from what Norway is doing. References were made in Stockholm to a road connecting Kirkenes with Narvik, on which Norway, Sweden and Finland were collaborating, to provide trans-Lappland communications and an alternate to the tortuous all-Norwegian coastal road between the two cities. Norwegians appreciate the possibilities of a Russian seizure of Svalbard, a combined air-land thrust from the Murmansk-Petsama sector across northern Norway together with Soviet naval action against Kirkenes, Narvik, etc. as well as the danger of air attack across Sweden directed at Oslo, Bergen, and their other industrial locations. Norwegians with whom I talked took no fatalistic view of Russian intentions. On the contrary, their view was that when the Russians were presented with strength they respected this and would probably not resort to use of force against foreign territory unless general hostilities were impending or fighting had actually broken out.

Notwithstanding the tremendous struggle Norwegians have had to wage to recover from the toll the last war laid upon their country, particularly in the ruthless devastation the retreating Nazis wreaked upon

the far North, they are prepared to do all in their power to defend their land. At the same time, Norwegians with one voice make it clear that they must have assistance and that they rely heavily upon Britain, the United States, and NATO for this. NATO has a vital place in their scale of values. Their fidelity to it is unquestionable both for close-in defense and also for keeping open the sea lanes which are their source of economic life and independent existence. But they also look to the United Nations, as do the Swedes and Danes, and the Finns to a somewhat more restricted degree, to afford moral support if trouble with the U.S.S.R. should develop.

The Danes being next to Germany, as well as being astride the Straits, are concerned both about Germany and the U.S.S.R. Some of them feel anew the frustrations that have figured heavily in Danish foreign policy ever since 1866: wishing to pursue an independent policy, yet knowing they can no longer do so. They know that they are powerless before both Germany and Russia. They are fully aware that their island of Bornholm could be grabbed, or desolated, by Russia; that Russian submarines and planes swarming in the Baltic could play hob with Danish shipping, coastal cities and towns; and that Copenhagen could be struck with ease by a massive Soviet air attack or emplaced missiles. They know NATO is their chief protection. Yet some Danes, particularly the members of the Radical (i.e. Venestre) Socialist Party, are reluctant to go all-out for it and are pressing to limit Denmark's collaboration to the minimum. Some would prefer a Scandinavian defense pact to NATO. But all tend to lean toward the U.N. both as a



counterpoise to sole reliance on NATO, and as a larger platform of appeal in case of need.

Finns feel some of the same sense of frustration that the Danes have as a result of their own exposed position and their weakness in the face of the Russians. They know they must "watch their step", and that, however, much they fear, dislike, or hate the Russians, the U.S.S.R. is more powerful than they. In view of the terrible losses suffered in 1939-40, they know they could not stop Soviet armed forces for long if the U.S.S.R. attacked them. Dissident Socialists, some highly placed Agrarians including President Kekkonen, and some pacifists are disposed to pursue a pro-Russian policy -- of varying degrees. Some were inclined, before the July 1958 elections gave the largest bloc of seats in Parliament to the Communists, to collaborate with the latter. But the large majority of the Finnish people, including Social Democrats, Conservatives, many Agrarians, and Swedish People's Party members, are determined to resist Soviet pressures and to stand up to Moscow for their own independent course of action in foreign affairs. They wish no kowtowing to Moscow. And many would fight to defend their land, whatever the odds, if there were anything at hand with which to do so and anyone like General Mannerheim to lead them, should the Soviets attack. At the moment, the most they could do beyond a token resistance would be to conduct guerrilla operations.

Notwithstanding their nation's position, most Finns, other than Communists, wish to pursue a positive policy toward the West, both for its own sake and as an anchor to windward against Soviet pressures.

Scandinavians are firm believers in using the processes of pacific settlement. They would certainly do their part to utilize and exhaust all avenues of peaceful settlement if a dispute or threatening situation should arise with the U.S.S.R. But many persons indicate that in their mind the Hungarian episode showed that the U.N. is powerless in the face of a Soviet use of force involving commitment of the Red Army, and that this would be equally true if an intervention or act of aggression should occur in the Northern area.

But then again, Scandinavians repeatedly come back to the proposition: "Well, it all depends upon what the other great powers will do." More specifically, they add: "It depends upon what the United States will do." By this token they give vent to a feeling that their fate lies actually in our hands and that whatever the U.N. can do will hinge upon the decisions of Washington and London, first and last. To the end of insuring our support and backing, they will bend all their diplomatic acumen both outside and within the U.N.

### 3. Concern Over World Trade

A third major problem in the foreign relations of the Scandinavian states over the next five years is foreign trade. Economists, foreign office personnel, and party leaders in all four countries expressed concern, bordering upon apprehension in some instances, about the state and course of world trade.

Looking at economic questions broadly, Scandinavians often stress to an American the need for continual attention being given to the maintenance of a prosperous world economy. This is, of course,

understandable in the light of the heavy dependence of each of the countries upon foreign commerce and the full-time employment of their large merchant marines.

In the summer of 1958 unemployment of shipping was an active topic of conversation in Norway. Ten per cent of their ships were reported to be idle with further cancellations of charter contracts in prospect. Although there were no surface manifestations of serious economic dislocation in Norway, concern was expressed by numerous members of the Storting and businessmen. At one Swedish shipyard numbers of completed vessels lay anchored idly and work was proceeding slowly on hulls on the ways. In Finland unemployment, chiefly in the woodcutting and lumber field, became an important factor in the Communist election victory in July 1958.

#### Hopes and Fears Regarding European Trade Situation

The formation and launching of the European Common Market by France, Germany, the Benelux countries and Italy, coupled with other trends, has given rise to added preoccupations regarding the future state of Scandinavian foreign commerce. Notwithstanding a desire to see the relations between Germany and her neighbors put upon a new footing of amity and cooperation, and European integration speeded, many Scandinavians have forebodings about the ultimate consequences of policies the EEC (European Economic Community) members may pursue toward the Northern states and trade in general. They foresee the possibility of EEC becoming a powerful bloc, using its resources, tariff wall, trade and fiscal legislation to extort one-sided concessions

from Northern traders as the price of avoiding cut-throat competition, possible curtailment of trade, or discriminatory treatment.

The British-proposed European Free Trade Area plan has won many supporters in Scandinavia. It is felt to be a practicable means of allowing the Six to have their "Community," but geared into a wider economy that will promote rather than endanger or stifle European trade. Active study is being given to this by the governments of each country. The tide of opinion is for the conclusion of some such arrangement if at all reasonably possible.

Deep apprehension was expressed to the writer in the summer of 1958 by the then Danish Minister of External Economic Relations, J. O. Krag, now Foreign Minister of Denmark, and by members of corresponding ministries in Norway and Sweden over the economic and political consequences of failure in these negotiations. It is believed that trade reverses would follow from such failure, that free Europe would become divided into conflicting economic blocs, and that high tariffs, discriminatory legislation and other barriers to trade would soon be raised. From such a situation political differences would almost surely ensue that would spell an end to all present efforts to integrate and unite the European states. This could jeopardize NATO. And it could lead to serious divisions among the Western nations benefitting only the communist forces. For the Finns in particular, with their uneasy economic situation, such a dénouement would likely spell renewed subordination to the U.S.S.R. This they passionately wish to avoid.

### Nordic Common Market Plan

Paralleling the negotiations concerning a European free trade area plan, discussions are also proceeding among the Northern states on a proposed Nordic Common Market. If adopted, this would create a single customs area of the Northern states thereby carrying regional cooperation there one step further.

At the present time 80 percent of Scandinavian trade moves freely among the states. The remaining 20 percent involves items in which there is either direct competition or pressure for protection of national industries.

There is strong opposition to the Nordic Common Market among Norwegian industrialists and the opposition Parties in that country. This is so pronounced that the Government -- which is in favor of the plan -- has given a pledge that it will not commit the nation to joining such a plan until or unless there is larger measure of support for it than at present. Leaders of the mechanical and textiles industries fear they would be put out of business by the more heavily capitalized and larger Swedish industries. Adverse effects on agriculture are anticipated if free importation of Danish agricultural products is allowed.

The Government, industry, and the opposition Parties are all in favor of Norwegian adherence to a European free trade area. They profess to have fewer fears in competing within a larger market. Whether they will actually be as ready to go into this if a plan can be agreed upon will remain to be seen. But for the moment this appeals

to large numbers of Norwegians as holding the better promise for their economic well-being and employment.

There is general support of the Nordic Common Market Plan in Denmark and Sweden. Both agriculture and industry are for the most part in favor of it and believe they will stand to gain even though concessions have to be made to Norway, and, in the case of Danish agriculture, virtual agreement not to press into the Norwegian market. Finns, other than Communists and pro-Russians, attach even more importance to the plan. They see this as another means of keeping a door open toward the West and of increasing their trade in that direction. They believe that sooner or later the Nordic Market would become linked with either a European free trade area or with O.E.E.C., or both, thereby enabling them to gain benefits indirectly where the Soviet government is now opposed to their joining either O.E.E.C. or the proposed European free trade arrangement for political reasons.

If the negotiations for the European free trade area fail to produce agreement between France, or the E.E.C. bloc, and the other Western European nations, Norway certainly, and probably Sweden also, will be strongly tempted to enter into special economic arrangements with Britain and possibly others to offset economic squeeze by the Six. In this event Denmark and also Finland will be put in very difficult positions, and the future of Nordic cooperation as well.

#### Future of ECE and GATT

It is generally felt that the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe has done a good job at Geneva in facilitating conditions of trade in

Europe and in reducing some of the barriers to trade across the Iron Curtain. But statesmen in Scandinavia do not see much more this Commission can do along either of these lines. They feel that the real problems of tariffs must be negotiated either bilaterally (and hence directly), or regionally (as in the European Free Trade Area proposal and the Nordic Common Market plan), or multilaterally. In this last respect the GATT mechanism and O.E.E.C. are still felt to be useful devices.

On the business of trade promotion within Western Europe and with the U.S., Scandinavians see little role for the U.N. With regard to the underdeveloped lands, they take quite a different view, as we shall see shortly.

#### Importance of U.S. Commercial Policy

Time and again persons being interviewed come to some such statement as: "Well, you know, the state of world trade depends largely upon what you people in the United States do. None of us can be prosperous if your government puts up barriers to trade and high tariffs, no matter what loans or assistance we receive. If we are to prosper we must sell in your market and be able to buy your manufactures." And they almost invariably add: "This is why we hope so much that your Congress will take a liberal view of long-run continuation of the reciprocal trade agreements policy."

Because foreign commerce plays an important part in the employment and well-being of each of the Scandinavian states, they are most concerned that the United States not only preserve its Reciprocal Trade

Agreements program and remain in GATT, but also that it take a lead wherever possible within the U.N. to help keep the barriers to trade as low as possible and to facilitate conditions of advancing trade in all parts of the world.

#### 4. Importance of Nordic Regional Cooperation

A fourth area of vital interest to the Scandinavian states in the next 5-10 years is the future of their regional cooperation. The continued growth of Scandinavian regional cooperation, both within and outside of the Nordic Council, in formal and informal ways, is regarded by leaders of virtually all parties as a primary objective in the coming years.

There are varying degrees of enthusiasm for further institutionalizing Northern cooperation. Norwegians are reluctant to commit themselves to steps which could pave the way for political controls or unified rule in any form. Many of them remain suspicious of Swedish motives in Nordic cooperation whenever any move appearing to open the door to either of these possibilities is foreseen or sensed. Swedish governments have disavowed such motives or goals. But it is a fact that some Swedes who have been closely identified with the Nordic movement will say in private it is their hope that in the long run the Nordic movement will lead in the direction of some greater unity in the North. They are reluctant to go much further than this, however. But it is apparent that some would ultimately like to see some form of confederation or federation of the Northern states.

Regionalism and the U.N. Asked if regional questions should be



handled by the U.N. instead of by regional diplomacy, Scandinavians profess to see no reason for bringing the U.N. into regional affairs. No one with whom I talked saw any incompatibility between Scandinavian regionalism and the U.N. up to this point. It is believed that the Nordic arrangements in no wise impinge upon the legitimate sphere of the U.N. or are rendering its work more difficult. It is commonly felt that if left alone the Northern states can compose amicably any differences that may arise among them. There are no serious disputes at this time, unless some may arise over fisheries and maritime jurisdiction. There are no territorial problems among the Northern states as in the case of the Aaland Islands or the jurisdictional rights in Eastern Greenland after World War I. In fact, the only potentially dangerous territorial questions in the area are those involving Russian intentions and actions or remaining as a legacy from the Soviet seizure of Eastern Karelia and the Petsamo region of Finland. On all questions arising among the Scandinavian states in recent years, direct negotiations and the efforts of the Nordic Council have sufficed to reconcile differences and to promote peaceful regional collaboration to a high point.

#### IV

##### Views on the United Nations and Some Issues Before It

In keeping with the generally positive attitude found in the Northern countries toward the United Nations, pronounced opinions are held on many of the questions relating to the structure, membership, and functioning of the U.N. that concern American policy makers.

There is by no means unanimity among all political parties and

leaders on these matters, even though the Scandinavian states, especially Denmark, Norway and Sweden, regularly confer together before and during United Nations meetings and endeavor to present a united front at sessions. This was graphically illustrated in the sharp divergence of views held in the summer of 1958 with respect to the retention of the U.N. Observer Corps in Lebanon following the landing of American forces in that country in response to the request of President Chamoun. By and large, there is a good deal of common outlook, however. And there is no hesitation in affirming positions at considerable variance with those taken by American foreign policy on certain issues.

#### 1. United Nations Membership

Universal Versus Restricted Membership. The principle of universal membership in the United Nations is widely endorsed among Scandinavian leaders. With few exceptions it is felt that all states fulfilling the criteria of membership laid down in the Charter should be admitted to the U.N. when they make application and have demonstrated their stability and peaceful disposition.

One retired political leader, Dr. Carl Hambro, formerly Foreign Minister of Norway and President of the Odeltingets, expressed violent dissent from the generally held attitude. In his opinion the United Nations suffers from "an excess" of political entities that have neither power, responsibility in foreign affairs, or stability at home, and are continually making demands upon the organization, complaining loudly, and striving for prestige. This doughty Norwegian Conservative would,

if it were possible, drop numerous Arab and Asian political entities from the world organization and be most chary about admitting other small states. In his opinion the League was a "better device" for it did not admit a lot of "little principalities" from the colonial world hardly "ready for self-government" that could outvote, as they do in the U.N., the states that in fact carry the burdens and responsibilities of maintaining international peace and security, and furnish international administrators, trained manpower, and development capital.

Colorful as these views may be, they are not shared -- at least they are not openly professed -- by the majority of political leaders in the Northern countries or by the younger generation of Conservatives in Norway. Quite at the opposite extreme of thinking was a view expressed by Ole Kraft, former Chairman of the Conservative Party of Denmark, former Foreign Minister of his country and presently member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Danish Parliament, that the West has in fact erred rather badly in allowing the Soviet Government to place itself in the vanguard of welcoming and upholding Arab nationalism while the Western Powers seem generally to be opposing it. In his opinion, and reportedly in the opinion of the Danish Government, United States and Western policy needs early "reconsideration" on this score.

Admission of Red China. Some variations of view are held on the question of seating Red China in the U.N., but these are mostly on the point of how much longer to stay with the United States when it

demands formal votes at U.N. meetings on this issue.

Of nine political leaders in Denmark, Norway and Sweden questioned specifically on the issue of seating Red China, every one responded without hesitation that in his view Peiping should be seated. In the minds of most of them continued support of the United States on this question ceased to make sense in terms of the U.N. Some said their party people were getting quite resitive over the matter and insisting that their government take a stand.

These views are shared among Social Democrats, Liberals, Agrarians and Conservatives. They are also held among Labor leaders who have placed themselves at the forefront of opposition to communism. Arne Geijer, President of the Swedish Labor Organization and also President of the International Federation of Free Trade Unions, one of the free world's leading fighters against the communists, said that Labor in his country was for admission and "cannot see why the United States is so slow or adamant" on the matter. At the other end of the political spectrum, Professor Erling Petersen, leading spokesman for the Conservative Party in the Norwegian Parliament on foreign affairs, put the point in this way: the Peiping Government is now well established, there is no substantial organized faction rising against it, it has given tokens of moderation in its foreign policy and has not made attacks with armed force in the Formosa Strait or against Taiwan. How can the issue be "ducked" much longer? When Nils Langhelle, President of the Norwegian Storting, was asked about the attitudes prevailing within the Parliament on this question, he replied that he

thought that sentiment was pretty general that Peiping should be seated. But he thought that same sentiment was divided on what to do about Taiwan. Many members of the Storting saw the reasons that lay behind the U.S. policy and would be slow to go against us. But as Norwegians they are inclined to accept Peiping and to do all that can be done to protect Taiwan.

What to do about Taiwan. There are considerable variations in judgment on what ought to be done about Taiwan in connection with admitting Red China. The most extreme view heard by this writer was expressed by an eminent Norwegian Socialist, Finn Moe, who has been his country's Permanent Representative to the United Nations and is now Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Storting. He said it would be "useless" to attempt to attach any conditions to the admission of Peiping such as guarantees to respect the independence of Taiwan. Mr. Moe visited Red China last year. From his own remarks he was impressed with what he had seen there. And he stated that he knew from personal talks with Chou En Lai that the latter will not accept such conditions. Peiping would refuse membership rather than tie its hands on retrieving what it believes is rightfully "Chinese" territory.

The most that this particular climate of opinion would be prepared to insist upon or propose would be some form of U.N. trusteeship for Taiwan for a 2-4 year transition period while those Chinese who do not want to accept Communist rule leave Taiwan. Those who take this position are not greatly concerned where these freedom-loving Chinese would find a home or living. They have no suggestions to make when

confronted with the proposition that neither the Philippines, Malays, Indonesia, Burma, Australia, America or Canada would be in a position to accept many of those who would want to live in freedom. Their attitude seems to be that this is either the people's own personal problem -- or America's -- to find a solution.

The trusteeship and no-conditions approach is, I believe, a minority viewpoint. This at least is what my interviewing pointed to. The head of the influential Swedish Labor Organization, for instance, takes the view that Taiwan's integrity as a separate state should be guaranteed as part of a package deal in admitting Peiping. But it is clear that the Socialist parties in control of the governments in the three countries are as a rule prepared to go farther and faster than others in admitting Peiping.

The attitude most generally expressed by non-Socialists, and privately by some Socialists, is that there "must be some solution or assurance" for Taiwan. This implies acceptability to the Chiang Government. It is apparent, however, that some would be disposed to insist upon acceptance even though some aspects of a compromise arrangement were not wholly to the liking of the Taipei Government.

Persons belonging to Centrist, Liberal and Conservative Parties feel more strongly than do those to the left of center that there should be guarantees to Taiwan. On the whole, but with exceptions, the further to the right one moves, the firmer it is thought the guarantees should be. Contrary to the Socialist or Laborite view, the Conservative Party in Norway, according to Professor Petersen, would not agree to the seating of Red China at the price of abolition of Formosa

as an independent state. And members of this party do not think highly of the trusteeship idea as a practical proposition. The same view was expressed to the writer by Erling Wikborg, Chairman of the Christian Peoples Party of Norway.

The belief was expressed by a number of persons that there should be multilateral treaty guaranteeing the territorial integrity and political independence of Taiwan. A few were of the view that the guarantee should encompass the former but not the latter. Some took the position, on the other hand, that territorial integrity is already assured by Article 2, Paragraph 7, of the Charter and that all that would be needed would be an Assembly or Council resolution, or both, reaffirming this specifically in the case of Taiwan and the adjacent islands.

The nearest approximation to a consensus of responsible opinion in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden probably is that Taiwan should be kept as a separate state -- "not called China" -- that the U.N. should assure it full-fledged membership in the U.N. but without right to a permanent seat on the Security Council which should go to Red China, and that there should be a multilateral security treaty for Taiwan in which the United States would be a key party. I heard no suggestion that the U.S.S.R. should be a party to such a treaty. And Scandinavians hope they would not be called upon to be parties.

In brief, sentiment at the moment favors what has been called the "Two Chinas" policy with Taiwan a U.N. member, but with Communist China occupying the permanent seat on the Security Council.

## 2. Increasing the Membership of the Security Council

Many Scandinavians are inclined to believe the time is approaching when it may become desirable to approve an increase in the size and membership of the Security Council as a step in the direction of keeping this organ attuned to the increased membership of the U.N. and to provide a more broadly representative composition of the Council.

There is quite general belief that India is entitled to a permanent seat. And it is felt that an increase in the number of elective seats would benefit both Europeans and Asians. Presumably the Asians would receive one more seat than they are now being given in practice. If this were the case, existing pressures would be alleviated for the remaining seats, thereby allowing Europeans more possibility of winning an additional seat over and above what is customarily held by them now.

There is no agreement on the number of seats that should be added. More are in favor of increasing the total to 13 than to any number in excess of this.

Those who were asked to express opinions on the size of the Security Council were on the whole skeptical that an enlargement would improve or facilitate action in the Security Council. A few recalled that the Council of the League of Nations had gone through a similar evolution, increasing in numbers from 11 to 13 then 15, but that this had not strengthened the fortitude of that Council when it was confronted with Japanese, Italian, or German aggression, or with the Spanish Civil War.



Increasing the total size of the Council will not, of course, eliminate the veto or its consequences. It would satisfy some of the striving after prestige. And it would introduce a somewhat wider circle of viewpoints into Council deliberations. But considering the ease with which a matter may now be transferred to the General Assembly and the frequency with which this is being done, increasing the size is not felt to be as vital as if the Council were the only body dealing with questions of international peace and security.

Scandinavians will not take the initiative for a larger Council as things now stand. They are satisfied, for the most part, with their own share of representation upon the Council. On the other hand, they will not oppose an increase in size if this will improve cooperation within the U.N. and hold any promise of enabling the Security Council to function more nearly in accord with the spirit intended by the framers of the Charter. The manner in which an enlargement of seats is accomplished is to them a secondary consideration that can be worked out when the time of an increase becomes imperative.

### 3. Maintenance of Peace and Security

Scandinavians feel that the most important questions relating to the United Nations are whether everything possible is being done that could be done to make the world organization succeed in its primary mission of maintaining and furthering international peace and security.

There is widespread deploring of the breakdown of the Security Council in fulfilling its assigned role in this connection, and frequently-voiced criticism of the Soviets in most political circles

outside of Finland for the excessive Russian use of the veto. Finns are reluctant to express sentiments on this, having come into the U.N. only lately and still being under the watchful eye of the Russians.

Renewed Effort to Make Security Council and Collective Security Work. Notwithstanding the slim chances of improving the situation much so long as the Cold War and the deep-seated differences between East and West persist, there is some apprehension lest the Western states slacken in their efforts to get the Security Council to function as it was intended and to make collective security through the U.N. work.

Those who make this point recognize, as a member of the Danish Parliament said, that "it takes many to make the Security Council function properly." But they feel that the stake of all in peace is so great the Western Powers must leave no effort unexplored and that failure to try in every conceivable way to get the Security Council to act can only deepen the Cold War even though the responsibility for a breakdown lies with the other side. A leading member of the Norwegian Storting in expressing the same sentiment added that continued efforts by the West to make the Council and the U.N. collective security system succeed are a sure way of demonstrating to the uncommitted and suspicious Asians and Africans that the West is sincere, and that it wants peace as much or more than the Soviets do. In this way it can give the lie to Soviet propaganda designed for impressionable minds that only the U.S.S.R. is standing for peace.

Periodic Top Level Security Council Meetings. One suggestion offered by a Norwegian who was for four years his country's permanent delegate at the U.N. and who has sat on the Security Council is that

there should be one or two Security Council meetings a year expressly intended for Foreign Ministers. This would bring the key Foreign Ministers together regularly within the Security Council. These men often attend General Assembly sessions, adding importance to these meetings whenever they do. But they seldom go to the Security Council save in times of major crisis when they want to press a position urgently or defend their nation's policy, as when Secretary Byrnes went to the Council in the spring of 1946 to press evacuation of Iran by Soviet troops, or Foreign Minister Gromyko rushed to New York in the summer of 1958 to flail the landing of United States forces in Beirut.

Some regularized plan of meeting by the Foreign Ministers under Security Council auspices would accentuate the "primary" role of this organ in the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security. And if the meetings were held in private, without fixed agenda, the Ministers could engage in a less formal exploration of broad basic issues than is possible in the public meetings of either the Council or the General Assembly. Such meetings could be kept distinct from the routine sessions of the Council and be designed to focus primarily upon questions that go to the roots of tensions and differences.

It is possible that the addition of such a phase would contribute little more to the furtherance of peace or collective security so long as the conflicts and divisions between the powers remain as they are now. But it is the task of diplomacy to explore all possible avenues

to peace and security. And it is conceivable that such a use of the Council regularly, informally, and in camera, under the neutral canopy of the U.N., could produce some beneficial results.

Abolition of Veto. Abolition of the veto in the Security Council, particularly on peaceful settlement matters, would be supported by many Scandinavian leaders if this were a feasible proposition. Recognizing that the amendment of the Charter in such a way as to accomplish this is out of the question at this time, however, most persons have largely dismissed thoughts of attempting to do this, while searching for ways of enhancing the effectiveness of the U.N.

Use of Peace Observation Commission. One eminent parliamentarian, Nils Langhelle, President of the Norwegian Storting, told the writer he thought the Peace Observation Commission provided for in the United Nations Resolution in 1950 had not been used as originally contemplated and that efforts should be made to turn it into an active instrumentality. Secretary-General Hammarskjold has displayed admirable initiative in going to scenes of disturbance to gather information and exercise good offices for peace where possible. But he felt more could be done if the Peace Observation Commission, which is still formally in existence, were really activated and were either to go as a body or depute teams of its members to scenes where trouble develops. Such a group could bring an added measure of international concern into the picture at an early stage of developments. Having numerous members, it could gather considerable intelligence in a given amount of time, and its reports to the General Assembly would carry considerable weight in view of the delegation status of its members.

Moreover, a rapidly-moving Commission team, being on the spot, would tend to deter parties from using armed force. Although the Commission would remain an agency of the General Assembly, there is no reason why it should not work in cooperation with the Secretary-General so that the two organs might supplement one another further in the maintenance of international peace and security.

It is recognized, of course, that the Commission, or a team of its members, could not enter a troubled area without the consent of the member states concerned. And it is also appreciated that the fact that Commission members are themselves delegates of states would introduce an element of politics into an observation mission which is not present in the same manner when the Secretary-General undertakes an information-gathering or exploratory mission. Still, it is felt that an alert, active Peace Observation Commission could render useful service if it had the force of U.N. opinion behind it.

U.N. Observer Corps in Lebanon. At the time the Security Council decided in June 1958 to adopt the Swedish proposal that a U.N. observation corps be sent to Lebanon to watch over attempts to infiltrate arms and forces into that country from surrounding states with a view to overthrowing the established Government, there was widespread support for this move among Scandinavian leaders. It was generally felt that this adaptation of the principle underlying both the creation of the Peace Observation Commission and the United Nations Emergency Force for the Gaza Strip was a step in the right direction of maintaining international peace and security.

When the United States intervened in Lebanon in July 1958 in

response to President Chamoun's appeal for help, sharp differences of opinion developed in Scandinavia about keeping the Observers there further. Members of the Swedish Government, in particular Mr. Undén, the Foreign Minister who had had a prominent part in launching the Observers plan in first instance, reacted strongly against U.S. unilateral action. They felt Washington had "betrayed the U.N." by not going to it before sending the Marines to Lebanon. And in view of the fact that United States forces had thus assumed power to help maintain the integrity of the country pending election of a new government and restoration of calm, Mr. Undén and others believed the U.N. Observers should forthwith be withdrawn. At an emergency meeting of Party leaders in Stockholm, pressure was brought to bear upon the heads of the other parties to support his stand. Although the Government was assured sufficient support to warrant pressing its point diplomatically, it is said the Liberal and Conservative leaders voiced skepticism of the wisdom or value of doing this.

In Norway and Denmark the Governments, after similar caucuses, refused to agree to a united front with Sweden on withdrawing the U.N. Observers. Spokesmen of various parties attacked the Swedish position as being against the interests of the U.N. and the furtherance of peace and security, though the Socialist press in Norway joined its counterpart in Sweden in bitterly assailing the United States actions. In Denmark the Government at first took a more or less legalistic stand on the question of the landing of U.S. forces. But as a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Danish Parliament observed to the writer, many Danish leaders thought the Swedish position

foolish and short-sighted. And so they decided to stand for keeping the Observer Corps in Lebanon.

Ability to hold honest differences of opinion and outlook while working together practically along lines on which they can find common accord, whether within the Northern region or in world affairs, is a characteristic of Nordic cooperation.

A Permanent U.N. Emergency Force. There is broad approval in Denmark, Norway and Sweden of the establishment of a permanent U.N. Emergency Force along the lines of the UNEF organized in 1956-57.

It is felt that UNEF has made an important contribution to peace in the Palestine area by being interposed between the Israeli and Egyptian forces. It is questioned whether there are likely to be many instances in which contending parties would agree to the stationing of such a force in a disputed or border land area, or in which it would be feasible or desirable to dispatch an international force. Nevertheless, all leaders of both government and opposition parties in Norway, Sweden and Denmark asked to express an opinion on the establishment of a permanent force stated that in their view this would be a desirable move and that they were prepared to support it.

Party leaders and foreign ministry officers alike take a restrained view on what should be expected from such a force. But its availability for rapid action, either as an integrated unit or as national contingents specifically earmarked for call and dispatch by the Secretary-General or his deputy for this purpose, could be helpful, it is believed, in maintaining peaceful, stable conditions in some places. Being heavily dependent upon a prosperous world trade and

having merchant fleets calling in many parts of the world. Scandinavians feel it to be in their interest to see the U.N. strengthened as a positive force for peace.

Without exception, party leaders in Denmark, Norway and Sweden stated to the writer that their governments would not only vote for a permanent UNEF, but were prepared to add to their annual financial contributions to the U.N. to underwrite the cost of such a force and would contribute members or contingents of their armed forces for such a corps. In numerous instances it was stated that their parties were "strongly behind" the idea and that approval in the parliaments would be almost unanimous. The Chief of the Office on U.N. Affairs in the Danish Foreign Office expressed the attitude of his countrymen in these words: "The Danes are ready to pull their oar in the U.N. to the best of their capacity." In a similar vein the head of the Swedish Labor Organization, declared that Swedish labor was for a permanent UNEF "even if this meant more cost." At the other side of the political spectrum, Professor Gunnar Heckscher, leading figure in the Swedish Conservative Party, said his party would undoubtedly vote to support a Force with men and money, for "Swedes feel a sense of duty to uphold and strengthen the U.N. and would always be found ready to volunteer for peaceful missions such as this, as they had done in Suez and Lebanon."

People in Denmark, Norway and Sweden point with pride to the contributions their countries have made to the UNEF in the Gaza strip. They furthermore call attention to the fact that their three units are



operating under alternating command. This "took a little doing" at the outset, as some said; not so much between Norway and Denmark, which were already accustomed to joint command operations in NATO, as with the Swedish authorities. But it has been working happily and the contingents seem to have no objection to being under commanding officers of another nationality.

Although it is not clear in precisely what situations such a force would and would not be used, an attitude voiced by Professor Erling Petersen of the Conservative Party in the Norwegian Storting is widely shared that if such a force were in existence, situations might be found where it could be used to advantage that might not be so readily apparent if it had to be constituted anew in each instance. Asked to visualize concrete situations in which a permanent UNEF might be used, most persons would usually mention North Africa or Lebanon, both areas being in disturbed condition in the early summer of 1958. A few had doubts whether sending a U.N. force into either of these situations, as they then existed, would not amount to intervention in essentially domestic affairs, and be precluded under Article 1, Paragraph 7. It is realized that at times the Assembly or Council might face difficult decisions when such questions were raised, as they almost surely would be by some side or member state. It is also doubted whether the Soviet Union would ever consent to a U.N. force being sent into any territory under its control or influence. And a U.N. force is not regarded as a substitute for Four-Power forces in Berlin. Still it is believed situations may arise from time to time

in which the "presence" of an available force would be advantageous and in which the parties would consent to its stationing in a disturbed or disputed area. One thing is clear; Scandinavian political leaders do not contemplate using the idea of a UNEF as a vehicle for turning the U.N. into a super-state or world government. They wish safeguards to be built into any arrangement that will preserve the rights and integrity of all member states. And they will be among the first to insist that no force should be dispatched save with the full consent of the party or parties on whose territory the force would be stationed and only upon conditions acceptable to them.

Following the Moscow line, or what appears to be the line, Communists are opposed to a permanent UNEF. In so doing they reveal the transparent insincerity of their loud professions for peace. But their opposition is not serious save in the case of Finland where their deputies now comprise the largest party bloc in the Parliament.

As in other aspects of U.N. affairs, the government of Finland may deem it politic to abstain or even vote "No" on the establishment of a force if the U.S.S.R. remains strongly opposed to it. In this instance economic factors could exert an influence upon Helsinki's decision, for a substantial increase in financial contributions would have to be weighed with care under present economic conditions. Apart from whatever may happen in the composition of the Finnish Government in the next few years as a result of the 1958 elections, it is hardly likely to be politic for the government to come out strongly in favor of a U.N. Force that might some day be called or sent to stand watch on its own frontier facing the U.S.S.R. But the hearts of most Finns will

lie in the same direction as those of the majority of people in the other Nordic countries.

Scandinavians will be willing to entrust direction of a permanent force to the Secretary-General on authorization from either the General Assembly or the Security Council. And they believe that despatch of the force should be contingent upon either a request from a state or consent of the party or parties directly concerned whenever the Assembly or Council may call for sending a force.

Substitution of General Assembly for Security Council in Peaceful Settlement and Security Matters. Divided opinions are found in Scandinavia on augmenting the role of the General Assembly in peaceful settlement questions. There is a feeling that the agendas of the Assembly are already crowded to capacity and that a large body such as the present Assembly cannot be a cure-all for all problems besetting international relations. There is no lack of desire to further peaceful settlement of disputes. But doubts are entertained among some thoughtful observers and supporters of the U.N. as to (1) the desirability of always rushing to leave the Security Council for the Assembly as soon as a veto has been cast, and (2) propagation of the idea that the Assembly should take over in practice, to a large extent, the functions of the Security Council with respect to peaceful settlement and the maintenance of peace and security.

Numerous proponents can be found for the view that (1) more persistent diplomacy is needed in the Security Council with less haste in abandoning efforts there the moment an adverse vote is cast; (2) emotionalism tends to rise toward fever pitch whenever matters are rushed

to Assembly meetings and thereby dramatized, making settlement more rather than less difficult; and (3) the membership of the Assembly has become so large, with so many cross-currents of views represented in it and so much politics practised within it, that it is not suited to patient discharge of the laborious task of furthering peaceful settlement of disputes.

Those who give expression to these views not infrequently refer to the fact that the Assembly now contains many small states unwilling to assume serious responsibilities for the U.N. and unable to contribute significantly to the maintenance of international peace and security if it is threatened or ruptured. Some bemoan the fact that the states of Europe, which they equate with maturity and responsibility, do not today control the destinies of the General Assembly. And for these reasons they incline to shy away from augmenting the role of the Assembly, preferring instead to try further in the more intimate circle of the Security Council or in the quieter cloisters of traditional diplomacy.

On the other hand, one frequently hears it said that "the more people talk to one another the more chance there is of their resolving their differences." Those who hold this viewpoint, and they are numerous in the Northern countries, favor turning to the Assembly when the Security Council becomes blocked in order that no time may be lost in keeping conversations going. Holders of this view also often take the position that in the Assembly the small and middle powers have a larger opportunity to play an influential part in furthering pacific settlement. And they argue that the more delegations that concern

themselves with a dispute or threatening situation, the more likelihood there is of finding ideas that will contribute to a workable procedure or solution. Adherents of this position also stress the desirability of keeping world opinion focused on critical situations when they arise and insist that the General Assembly affords the best instrumentality for doing this and should therefore be turned to without delay.

It is difficult to say which school of thought carries the greater weight. Both sides contain firm advocates of the U.N. And both points of view cut across party lines, although members of the Socialist parties are somewhat more outspoken than those of the Liberal and Conservative parties against what they regard as U.S. "haste" in rushing from the Council table to the Assembly when a Soviet veto has been registered against a Western-sponsored proposal. Conservative and Liberal elements are on the whole more sympathetic with U.S. policy in general than are Socialists, but many, regardless of party lines, harbor skepticism about the behavior of the Afro-Asian nations that now exercise such a large vote in the Assembly and are increasingly inclined to side with Soviet positions.

Regardless of domestic political complexions, the present Governments of Denmark and Norway will not normally part company with the U.S. on any fundamental decision on this question. And the Swedish Government will not be found far removed in most instances, though it will not hesitate to take an independent stand if it deems this politically or tactically wise. So far as Finland is concerned, its position vis à vis the U.S.S.R. is such it must not be counted upon to

take a stand likely to cause serious offense to its Great Power neighbor on any issue on which the latter takes an outspoken position. Should a Communist-dominated government become established in Helsinki, this country's delegations can be expected to take a more or less typical posture. Otherwise, they will pursue a line fairly close to that of Sweden but with numerous sinuosities.

Weighted Voting in General Assembly. One distinguished Norwegian Conservative advocates pressing for a system of weighted voting in the General Assembly. Only in this way, he argues, can responsibility and power be fairly equated in the Assembly and a situation be brought about where votes taken in the Assembly carry real influence with parties disturbing or threatening peace and security.

However meritorious the argument, there are few persons in the Northern countries who think it at all practicable to propose an amendment to the Charter for such a system in place of the present voting provision. Nor do they see any likelihood that the membership would adopt such a system by a less formal procedure. Opinion in the North accepts the present voting arrangement as a fact to be lived with and believes it hardly worthwhile to spend much time upon visionary schemes that stand little chance of application or success.

Propaganda versus Quiet Diplomacy. A complaint occasionally heard in circles acquainted with the U.N. is that Assembly and Council sessions, and to a lesser extent meetings of other organs, are subjected to an objectionable amount of propagandizing by certain powers. The country most often mentioned as "overdoing it" is the Soviet Union.

But second to this they place the United States, the United Arab Republic, and some of the ex-colonial countries when issues touching their sensibilities on "colonialism" are present.

Scandinavians recognize that the "floor" in U.N. meetings offers valuable opportunities not only to present a nation's point of view to a world audience and to refute the allegations and criticisms of others, but also to arouse world opinion in its own favor and against the actions and policies of others. The temptation to engage in propaganda is understood. And no Scandinavian would want the floor barred to a delegate promoting or defending the legitimate interests of his country or criticizing the wrongful actions of others. But many who have represented their countries at the U.N. feel that meetings are turned into propaganda contests more often than it is desirable. It is their view that these contests are usually fruitless -- although this is a matter of judgment -- and tend to stultify the effective functioning of the world organization.

A high official of the Danish Foreign Ministry expressed this view in these words: "There should be more real discussion and attempted negotiation in the U.N. and less propaganda and stress upon position statements."

Career diplomats can be expected to favor the quieter paths of traditional diplomacy. But it is cause for thought when an eminent parliamentarian-statesman declares that the U.N. in New York is "the worst place in the world" in which to try to carry on confidential talks because of the pressures for public "stands" and the relentless search of the press for information and exciting stories. On the

other hand, there are abundant opportunities in New York for confidential discussions and serious negotiations if the principals are disposed to take advantage of them.

#### 4. Limitation of Armaments

There is some opinion that "a fresh start" needs to be made on the whole matter of limitation of armaments at the General Assembly. A few people take the view that so much depends upon what the Great Powers can agree upon that the issue should be "dumped in their laps" until they can get together on something. But most of those asked for an opinion upon this issue took the position that it was the obligation of all U.N. members to work upon this question, to explore every feasible avenue, and to exhaust all possibilities, because the dangers are so great if something is not done, and the cost of sustaining the armaments is becoming so high. This latter is felt especially keenly by Socialist governments eager to proceed with their schemes of socialized economy.

The Rapacki Plan for Regional Limitation. A few left-flank Socialists in Norway and Sweden feel that the U.N. should consider the Rapacki proposal for zonal atomic disarmament. But there is little enthusiasm for this among most nationally-minded leaders, especially in the liberal, centrist, and conservative circles, for this would exclude both atomic weapons of their own as well as NATO defense instruments that might be stationed in the area or used for its defense. And Scandinavians are keenly aware of the ability of the Soviets to threaten or attack their lands with missiles or planes based deeply



in the U.S.S.R. Application of the Rapacki plan would deprive the Scandinavian states of the right to protect their own lands by means of atomic weapons. It would also deprive them of a deterrent against attack by the U.S.S.R. even though their stockpiles would be small by comparison. Still, the possibility that nuclear bombs could be zeroed in on Soviet centers from hidden sites in Scandinavia might compel Soviet policy-makers to hesitate before taking precipitous action against the Scandinavian countries, as they would not have to if the entire area were "de-nuclearized."

Swedish Nuclear Bomb Progress. The Rapacki plan, if adopted, would forbid the Swedes from building their own nuclear bombs, upon which they have already made considerable scientific progress and toward which funds have now been earmarked to build new industrial facilities for substantially increasing production of enriched uranium and plutonium. These, according to trustworthy sources, can be in full production before 1961. Members of Parliament in Stockholm from four parties told the author that Sweden was determined to have its own nuclear weapons if powers other than the Big Three are to have them. This means that if France, Japan, Germany, Italy, Egypt, India or any other states are free to make atomic weapons, and proceed to do so, Sweden will go ahead too. In view of the expressed intentions of France, the quiet approval of funds for construction of "extra facilities," reliably indicated to the author as having been included in the 1959 budget, points to preparation for action.

Speaking at the General Assembly in October 1958 on the seventeen-power

draft resolution on disarmament calling for "a general prohibition of nuclear weapons tests." Foreign Minister Oesten Undén informed the world of Sweden's position. "In Sweden our technicians believe," he said, "that within a certain number of years they will be able to manufacture smaller so-called technical atomic weapons. Up to the present, however, they have not been permitted to go in for production of that kind."<sup>1</sup> Concurrently the Swedish press reported that the Chief of Staff of the Army was calling upon the Government to authorize at once the acquisition of defensive nuclear weapons.

Swedish technology being as highly efficient as it is in the electro-mechanical-metallurgical fields, it can hardly be doubted that its scientists can make nuclear weapons of various kinds and stockpile them in quantity once the means are at hand.

All things being equal, the Government and possibly a large part of the population would prefer not to have to arm themselves with these terrible engines of death. They long for a world of peace and are strongly in favor of a general armaments treaty that will curb the use of such weapons by all powers. But organized labor, industry, Socialists, Conservatives, Liberals and Agrarians are all determined that their nation shall not lie defenseless in the face of menace that confronts them from across the Baltic and through space.

It is not without significance that Sweden today has the most advanced and largest atomic bomb shelters in being of any free nation. Any American who has been taken, as I was, into some of Sweden's deep

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<sup>1</sup>New York Times, October 17, 1958.

underground installations cannot but be impressed with the seriousness with which Swedes are now taking the possibilities of nuclear war. In Stockholm there are atomic shelters, 60 meters or more in depth hewn out of solid rock, capable of accommodating at least 50,000 persons. The factory building the Swedish Air Force's jets is located underground. Much of the high octane gasoline storage is similarly located. Even the nation's -- and incidentally Europe's -- largest hospital has duplicate facilities, both in bedspace and operating rooms, below ground. Research institutions and other parts of the nation's indispensable agencies are being comparably prepared. Whether the policy of non-alignment saves or fails the nation, Sweden is preparing in the most practical manner known to meet a dire contingency if it should occur. And its leaders are determined to have the most efficient defenses their means can afford consonant with maintaining one of Europe's highest standards of living.

Notwithstanding their exposed position, all of the Northern countries will give support, in so far as is reasonable, to limitation of armament proposals that are practicable, and acceptable to the larger powers. And they can be counted upon to press continually for further efforts along these lines both within and outside of the United Nations.

Attitudes Toward Inspection and Control Proposals. Opinions are held in several quarters that the United States has tended to lay too much stress upon the inspection feature of limitation plans. Scandinavians are not eager to see "foreign inspectors" -- whom they immediately visualize as including Russians -- snooping about their industries, mines,

and research institutions or countryside. And they think that when the chips are down Americans will take the same stand. They are not desirous of throwing their lands any wider open than they now are to espionage. And many feel that Soviet officers allocated to U.N. inspection teams would utilize these positions to engage in spying on their industries and installations chiefly for the purpose of slipping intelligence back to Moscow. Some believe that so long as the sovereignty of states lasts, the U.N. must rely upon the powers doing their own policing in good faith. One "doubting Thomas" on the subject of inspection said that the important thing was to get agreement on freedom of travel. If this could be obtained, experts travelling from one country to another could, on the whole, acquire knowledge of any violations taking place of limitation agreements. As a general proposition, if the U.S., Britain, and Russia can agree upon a fair and reasonable inspection plan, Scandinavians say their governments will not be found blocking it.

There is a good bit of practical questioning of the realities of a control system. Enforcement of a control system upon small states may be accomplishable in some instances although a large fuss might be forthcoming over the invasion of states' rights and national independence. But practical-minded Norwegians and Swedes fail to see how the U.N. or any international institution can really control the armaments of the U.S.S.R., China, or the United States without the creation of a great supranational power or world government. Minds go back to the Hungarian episode, to the abortive efforts of the U.S. to insist on Four-Power controls in the former Axis satellites ruled by the Red

Army after V-E Day, and to the failure of the U.S., Britain, and France to secure reinstatement of free navigation and the historic regime of the Danube River after 1945 when Moscow was determined to have its own Commission and apply its own rules of the game excluding Western shipping. Scandinavians "are from Missouri" when it comes to proposals for workable U.N. controls upon the disarmament or the reduction of armaments of the Great Powers. The question raised again and again is: Is America ready to accept such controls for itself?

Notwithstanding doubts, Scandinavian leaders believe the members of the U.N. must push ahead on the disarmament talks, exploring more alternatives, and trying to devise practical solutions. They believe world opinion wants and expects this, and that it is vital if peace and political sanity are to prevail.

#### 5. Enlarged Technical Assistance Program

There is wide belief in Scandinavia that one of the most constructive steps for the United Nations would be a further enlarged U.N. Technical Assistance Program. Scandinavians do not belittle the good done by United States foreign aid. They are cordial in their praise of what it has done for Europe and for themselves, and what it is doing for the backward lands.

Channelling More Foreign Aid Through U.N. Political leaders from right to left are of the view that a larger measure of assistance should now be channelled through the U.N. They believe such a course would (1) avoid the controversies that arise in some lands over foreign aid being a form of "colonialism," thereby making it easier for these

countries to accept assistance where this could spell the difference between remaining free or going communist; (2) enable Western countries having various resources to collaborate on multi-purpose aid programs where they now compete or fail to utilize potentially available capital, resources, or technically trained personnel. Scandinavian leaders also believe that a much-expanded technical assistance program would build further confidence in the U.N. and, by diversifying its activities, strengthen its substantive contribution to peace, security, and conditions of economic and social stability and peaceful growth.

Socialists inherently believe in extending the role of economic planning and state action in the economic and social sphere and find no difficulty in supporting international planning and action. But support of the principle is also shared in this instance by non-socialists of many shades. In fact, a larger U.N. technical assistance program is the most common answer that is given to the query: "What could be done to strengthen the U.N. and its influence for international peace?"

Problem of Suitable Controls. Most Scandinavians are inclined to minimize the danger of the U.N. Technical Assistance Program falling under the influence of international communism or being manipulated to serve its ends. They reject the notion that the Soviets would gain more from this than the Western nations, even though the U.S.S.R. should make substantial contributions to UNETAP and have representatives on its missions. They are confident the Western states and their friends can have a sufficient voice and influence in the program, and can assume that adequate controls will be built into it, so that it can be

guided along constructive lines that will strengthen the forces of democracy and freedom.

Awareness of Political Problems Involved. The problems involved in persuading the United States Congress to appropriate large and continuing funds for disbursement through the U.N. are appreciated. Scandinavians believe that the program must be sustained on a fairly long-term basis, just as it took decades of capital in-flow into the United States during the 19th century to change our economy from an agricultural to an industrialized one. Some difficulties in persuading their own parliaments to appropriate larger funds for UNETAP are anticipated in Norway and Sweden. But supporters of the U.N. are ready to make a try if the U.S. will do likewise. One prominent Norwegian pleaded for a Marshall Plan for the underdeveloped countries which would harness enthusiasm and resources for this task as Secretary Marshall's proposal had appealed both to European and American sentiment.

Opposition to SUNFED. On the other hand, there is considerable opposition to a large capital grant fund along the lines of the much discussed Special U.N. Fund for Economic Development, or at least skepticism of it. Scandinavians value capital and what can be done with it, whether it be farm machinery, ships, buildings, or investment money. And there is perhaps a taint of the Scotch in their desire to have more in their own lands.

Like Americans, Scandinavians question the ability of governments in many underdeveloped countries to use large funds efficiently or wisely. They are fearful that funds cannot be used to full advantage

until there are more trained administrators and technical personnel and adequate public debt procedures to insure proper funding. Some question whether the U.N. is equipped to play the role of a world investment banker and can resist political pressures when applied to allocation of large capital funds, given its present composition. There is, furthermore, questioning whether communist elements might not benefit from the operations of SUNFED as it has been conceived up to now. In this respect there is somewhat more apprehension of this as an accompaniment of a large SUNFED than of an expanded technical assistance program.

At the same time, it appears fairly certain that the general sentiment in favor of strengthening the role of the U.N. wherever possible will in the end incline the governments of Sweden, Denmark and Norway to vote for some form of a U.N. development fund.

#### 6. Trusteeship and Colonial Questions

Although the Scandinavian states are far removed from the colonial world, there is concern for the future of these areas. Informed persons will usually list colonial issues as one of the categories of questions that will require serious decisions in the foreign policy field in the next few years.

The typical opinion is that the U.N. may be able to play a constructive role in helping effect a peaceful transition from colonialism to independence in Africa and remaining parts of Asia. Professor Bertil Ohlin, leader of the Liberal Party in Sweden, postulates that this may be possible if there is bold leadership and if this is



accompanied by a disposition on the part of metropolitan states and emerging nationalist elements to permit the U.N. to act as an intermediary where direct negotiations for peaceful change fail.

Among the Socialist parties in Sweden and Norway there is a view that the colonial powers should be making faster progress in preparing some of their non-self-governing territories for self-rule and independence. Their observation of the international scene leads these parties to think that some of the powers are moving much too slowly, considering the political forces at work in the world. Ideological reasoning has something to do with this viewpoint. But they are genuinely concerned lest such struggles as those in Algeria or Kenya give Communism opportunities for expansion that could be averted. And they are apprehensive lest the struggles will align much of the Afro-Asian world against the Western nations in such a way as to impair trade possibilities and friendly relations.

There is sympathy at the same time with American feelings that certain countries have taken irresponsible positions on colonial and trusteeship questions. While it is thought that some of these stands could have been avoided by faster progress on the part of the administering powers, it is recognized that this is a political matter and that delegates from ex-colonial and Soviet-held lands are under political compulsion to take an outspoken position on such issues. Being moderate and practical-minded in their own approach to international affairs, Scandinavians are conscious of the hazards of prematurely cutting loose colonial lands from those administering them. The

finding of a median way is urged as the sanest course and, generally speaking, there is approval of United States policy toward trusteeship and non-self-governing territory affairs.

With respect to the Trusteeship Council itself there are few suggestions for change.

### 7. Charter Review

Many Scandinavians, in the view of the President of the Norwegian Parliament would have been in favor of reviewing and revising the United Nations Charter at the end of the initial ten-year period, as authorized in the Charter itself, if this had been practicable. They would be in favor of doing so in the future if the outlook becomes sufficiently auspicious to afford reasonable hope that something constructive would result. But for the present they regard the business as "water over the dam," in the words of a Danish M.P. who has been on his country's delegations to the U.N.

Scandinavians are now concentrating their thoughts in other directions. Topics of current interest are the issues immediately before the U.N., the need to adapt policies and actions to the changed composition of the General Assembly and the maneuverings of the Afro-Asian members, the changing dimensions of the security problem, coping with the European trade situation, and Nordic regional collaboration.

### 8. Lebanon Crisis

The United States landing of troops in Lebanon brought forth bitter

condemnations of U.S. foreign policy in the Socialist and leftist press. Headlines or allegations such as "The United States Sells the U.N. Short," "American Disregard of the U.N.," and "The U. S. Ignores the U.N." were common. But before the situation was far along, most, save the extremists, acknowledged that there were justifiable grounds, and not a few were saying the U.S. should have stepped in earlier. As nearly as could be gauged on the spot at the time, American action produced no added disillusionment with the U.N. so much as it did regrets that the U.S. did not try to get the force sent in in response to a U.N. resolution or with its approval. Those with full appreciation of the impossibility of getting this passed in the Security Council, and the delays and uncertainties of a substantial vote in the General Assembly, had no difficulty in understanding why Washington did not go to the U.N. as it did at the time of Korea.

The fact that the United States Government would in fact redeem its pledge to send in force, if asked to do so by the lawful government in spite of whatever fury might come forth from Moscow or Cairo, was by no means overlooked by those in official positions in the NATO countries nor by others deeply concerned with defending freedom and democracy. The pledge to withdraw as soon as possible was recognized to be an honest one. And the alacrity with which the United States not only welcomed but took steps to initiate a special session of the General Assembly and then, through President Eisenhower's personal appearance, sought to galvanize the efforts of all nations into constructive steps in the Middle East, went far to restore friendliness in both private and official circles in Scandinavia.

## V

Particular Interests in the United Nations

Although the United Nations is widely approved and supported in Scandinavia, it is seen in a somewhat different light in each of the countries, and felt to be important in varying ways and degrees.

Norway and the United Nations. To most Norwegians the first concern in foreign affairs is the state of world commerce. No less than 40 per cent of Norwegian consumption consists of imported commodities, while 35 per cent of gross production is sent into the export trade. Depending in as large a measure as they do upon foreign trade and the earnings of their merchant fleet, Norwegians look to the U.N., to help maintain and "strengthen universal peace" and to aid nations, in the words of paragraph 3 of Article I of the Charter, "to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character."

For security against a repetition, from whatever quarter, of the devastation, terror, and hardships suffered during the four years of Nazi occupation, which are still a very living thing in Norwegian consciousness, first reliance is pinned upon Britain and the United States. When the United Nations was founded Norwegians placed high hopes in the world organization as a means of affording security to small nations. The Government tried conscientiously during the 1945-48 period to apply a policy of "bridge-building" between East and West in an effort to enable the U.N. to fulfill this aim. When incontestable proof was afforded by the events of 1947-48 that the U.N. was not

strong enough to function effectively, that communism was bent upon overthrowing one after another of the free governments in Europe, and that nothing the small powers could do would lessen or remove the mounting international tension, the government in Oslo turned to the principle of collective security on a regional basis, and joined NATO with overwhelming public sentiment behind it. America has no firmer ally anywhere than Norway, and Norwegian loyalty to NATO stands solid like the rocks of its mountain-girt land.

From a security point of view, the U.N. is regarded as a secondary defense, for Norwegians know that it cannot be counted upon in time of crisis to bring them immediately the military and economic aid needed to defend their homeland. But this is not to say Norwegians will not make every effort to see the U.N. succeed in fulfilling its purposes to whatever extent is possible; they will do so to the best of their ability. And they will be found at all times actively searching for solutions to differences between powers that may jeopardize peace or tie the hands of their closest allies and friends upon whom their safety so largely depends.

Denmark and the United Nations. Present-day Danes are no less conscious than Norwegians of their dependence upon a prosperous world market, access to free seas, and the presence of strong friends able to come to their defense. With a population "bulge" burgeoning up through the mid-school age that will begin to reach the labor market before many years (the birth rate in 1945, 1946, and 1947 was nearly 50 per cent above what it had been in the '30's; it has since dropped off

steeply), there is rising concern in Denmark about international trade and also about freedom of movement for workers. It is for these, among other reasons, that Danes are much exercised over Nordic economic cooperation, European trading arrangements, and also the extension of GATT.

The chief value of the U.N. lies, to practical-minded Danes, in its keeping avenues of communication and negotiation open between disputing or conflicting parties and in the concerting of views that can be registered through the various organs.

To the considerable number of Danes who belong to or vote for the Venestre or Moderate Liberal Party, which in 1957 polled the second largest number of votes (one-quarter of the total vote cast) and holds the largest block of seats in the Parliament after the Social Democrats, support of the U.N. holds a high priority. These people are opposed to doing anything more than the Government has already done to implement membership in NATO. Although they do not call for leaving NATO, they are pseudo-neutralist in their thinking, believing that Denmark's chances of involvement in war can be minimized by keeping U.S. air bases and atomic missiles out of Danish territory. To these people, as also to an increasing number of agriculturalists whose products now are finding their largest market in Germany, the U.N. is seen to be an alternate way, and, to an extent, an escape from the logic of dependence upon NATO. Only the communists object to the Government taking affirmative stands in the U.N. in favor of collective security.

Sweden and the United Nations. The stereotype of the Swedish

people as fair-haired pacifists waxing rich on the wars of others while being too self-centered and neutrality-conscious to stand up and be counted among the defenders of freedom is, like some other political images, an exaggeration in caricature. As usual, the image springs from certain behavioral patterns which become cut in bold-face while other facts or attitudes are overlooked, minimized or etched in fine-line.

Swedish labor and Social Democratic politicians are still strongly wedded to the belief that the policy of neutrality saved them in two world wars and that their nation should therefore continue to pursue a policy of "non-alignment." At moments the official expressions of policy remind one of Dr. Stockmann's "discovery" in Henrik Ibsen's play An Enemy of the People that "the strongest man in the world is he who stands most alone." And yet the more one exchanges thoughts with them the more blurred the official stance becomes. Expressions of conviction are ventured that Swedes are "in this struggle for the minds and allegiance of man too," that their sympathies and interests lie on the side of the West, and that "if they are attacked" they will turn to the alliance of the Atlantic powers -- hoping that we will jump to their defense while overlooking their separation in peace. The more the strength and potential menace of the U.S.S.R. across the Baltic and beyond insecure Finland grows, the more conscious does the well-read Swede become of the importance of attachment to the rest of the Western world.

One may postulate that the more severe the Cold War becomes and as

Soviet power accelerates in the next decade, the more inclination there will be in Sweden to draw politically and militarily closer to the Western powers. It is hardly inadvertant that a team of high-ranking American defense personnel was invited to visit Sweden this past summer and was shown the deep-sheltered command headquarters of the Swedish forces, the underground factory where their jets are built, and other installations. One may venture the prophecy that there will be more of this; that while "non-alignment" will continue to be proclaimed by the Social Democrats and labor for some time to come, it will not be carried so far as to invite a comparable deputation from across the Baltic for a similar inspection.

Though Swedes do not like to remember all the territories he lost to them, they admire the statue of King Charles XII standing in the Royal Gardens of downtown Stockholm with arm upraised and unsheathed sword pointing to the East. For thence, now as then, they instinctively feel, and say, there lies the enemy if there be one.

Though the people have yet a long way to go in withdrawing from notions that have underlain the policies of neutrality and non-alignment, the visitor does detect changes in mood over a nine-year interval. And what one may see of scientific, military, air, or civil defense preparations bears testimony that while the body politic moves slowly to alter the ideology of foreign policy, it is moving with remarkable speed to give the nation modern defenses and weapons.

As in other Northern countries, support of the United Nations has multi-partisan backing in Sweden. If anything, there is an even warmer



measure of accord on this phase of foreign policy in Sweden because there is a full meeting of the minds here. To Social Democrats this has the added merit of affording an alternative to military alliance and of avoiding isolation.

It should not be thought that government-party people and others regard a positive policy toward the U.N. as a mere escapism. The Swede is no starry-eyed idealist. He is essentially a pragmatist asking himself in business or profession: "Will it work?" Swedes sincerely believe, as they did in the days of the League of Nations, that their national interests are served by active participation in international organization and by lending positive efforts to make it work to the maximum of its ability. Many of their civil servants, educational and political leaders, and nobility are dedicated to this cause. There is more Swedish devotion to peace than the mere awarding of Nobel Peace Prizes. An eminent line of Swedish noblemen, educators, and civil servants have given their services to the world organization in vital places and moments -- Count Folke Bernadotte, Gunnar Myrdal, and Dag Hammarskjold, to mention but the most outstanding.

Swedes, like their Norwegian and Danish compatriots, are also largely dependent upon foreign commerce and attach large importance to what the U.N. and its specialized agencies can do to further it. They feel that their enviably high standard of living requires that every effort be made through the U.N., as well as other channels, to promote economic cooperation and the conditions of peace and security which foster and support this.

There is one more angle to Swedish policy thinking about the U.N. Through a positive policy toward the world organization they can exercise the role of a middle power and enjoy the prestige and advantages which this brings to a nation in international politics. This is particularly valued at a time when Sweden is partially isolated from Denmark and Norway and the Western powers by refusing to become a member of NATO.

Finland and the United Nations. The 240 miles that separate Helsinki from Stockholm are more telling in terms of international relationships than the hour and a half it takes to fly between the two capitals in a DC-6B or the comfortable overnight journey by sea. For in crossing the Gulf of Bothnia one moves into a land that is at all times under the shadow of another dimension of the global political struggle.

The people of Finland have many ties of language, culture, and historical association with Sweden. One is always conscious of this not only in Helsinki but also in other Finnish communities where Swedish is extensively spoken, where street signs and place names are in the two languages, and where schools and churches employ both Finnish and Swedish.

Finland prizes its membership in the Nordic Council and other Scandinavian regional arrangements. These mean a great deal for they are a link not only with cultural kinfolk but also with the free world.

The same is true of Finland's membership in the United Nations to which the Soviet Government finally consented in 1955, at which

time it evacuated the Porkkala Peninsula 15 miles south of the city of Helsinki.

Finland's membership in the United Nations is an invaluable doorway for communication and association with the rest of the world. But politically-minded Finns have few if any illusions about the U.N. They know it commands no military forces of its own that could be sent to its defense if the Soviet Union should again invade its territory. They have pondered the lessons of Hungary. And while they believe there would be a difference in world eyes between Soviet use of armed force against one of its satellites and against a free nation such as Finland, they appreciate that the Western powers are not likely to lead the U.N. into taking forceful action against the U.S.S.R. at points where free world forces could not operate to relative advantage to save the peoples most immediately involved unless they are ready to accept the gauge of a third world war with all that this implies.

So long as Finland has a non-Communist Government the nation will take a loyal stance toward the U.N. It will vote for proposals before U.N. organs on the merits as it sees them where East-West issues are not directly involved or sharp lines drawn between Russia and the other powers. But Finnish delegations must not be expected always to vote as the conscience or expressed wishes of the people may incline them to do on sharply controversial matters involving the U.S.S.R., where Moscow takes a vehement or antagonistic stand. For the Finns are realists and know better than others how close they lie under the threat of Soviet bombers and missiles.

The degree to which Finnish delegations will exercise free judgment and vote accordingly in opposition to the U.S.S.R. will depend in considerable measure upon the momentary status of the domestic balance of power. If a coalition is in office having a large measure of Social Democrat-Conservative-Swedish Peoples Party leadership, and has strong direction in the cabinet, the delegation can be expected to take the maximum independent line. If a coalition is in office heavily weighted with certain Agrarian Party leadership and disposed to follow the leanings of President Kekkonen, the delegation can be expected to take a much more pro-Soviet position whenever the Soviets exercise pressure to follow its stand. If the present broad anti-communist party collaboration breaks down, as it may do over the unemployment situation or the trade negotiations with Russia, and a care-taker government is the best that can be agreed upon, the delegation in New York will, in all probability, become noted for abstentions and even absences. If the worst happens and a coup is engineered by the Communists, which the democratic party leaders are aware may be attempted but which they now vow will not be allowed to succeed, Finnish delegations would at least move into the neutralist camp, but much more likely directly into the Soviet line-up, perhaps with the slight measure of distinctiveness that sometimes marks the position of the Polish delegations.

To a person living in Helsinki, the U.N. sitting in New York seems a long way off. This is ever more true as one goes into the forested hinterland of the country. To be sure, one can leave Helsinki

in mid-afternoon and be in New York for breakfast the next morning, or vice versa. And it takes but six hours longer over the pole to Los Angeles. But the imperious fact of life, twenty-four hours a day, three hundred sixty-five days a year, is the terrible closeness of Soviet power. From Helsinki to the Soviet border is only 100 air miles. Even more ingrained in the minds of those who reside in this courageous capital is the fact that large Soviet air bases lie directly across the Gulf of Finland at Tallin, a bare 55 miles away. And even for those who live far in the interior, a glance at the map shows that the distance across the waist of Finland at Rovaniemi, where Soviet forces might attempt to strike across the country toward Lulea and the Swedish iron mines, is only 155 miles and traversed both by road and rail.

Hence the Finns, though they will do all in their power to be loyal members of the United Nations, and will be ready to stand up and be counted on many questions, may at times find themselves in a position where difficult choices must be made and the totality of their national interests consulted. What we do, or are prepared to do, will always take a high place in their thinking. And in so far as they can see their way clear to doing so, they will join hands with the free nations.

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Two principles stand high in Scandinavian thought. Freedom and independence on the one hand, and belief in cooperation among nations on the other.

A couplet written some centuries ago by Bishop Tomas of Sweden

is apt in this connection:

"Freedom is of all things best  
For man to seek in global quest."

Words could hardly express better the Scandinavian's virile love of freedom and his relationship of this heritage to the larger scene of effort to establish world peace and order. Faith in international organization and cooperation is an undergirding principle of foreign policy in each of the Northern lands.