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LEWIN ON DISARMAMENT

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Charges from Peking that Moscow no longer follows the true Leninist position on disarmament are probably among the reasons why Moscow is now publishing new documentary and interpretive material concerning Lenin's views on disarmament and other issues of war and peace. The new materials coupled with other documents long available make this an opportune time to review the development of Lenin's views on disarmament and their effect on Soviet policy during his lifetime.<sup>1</sup>

Lenin's views on disarmament seem to fall into two distinct and contradictory phases, the first lasting from as early as 1905 until 1920; the second from 1921 until Lenin's death in 1924. This paper, however, will attempt to show that Lenin's position on disarmament during these two periods was entirely consonant with a standard he laid down in 1916, when he said:

Every "peace program" is a deception of the people and a piece of hypocrisy unless its principal object is to explain to the masses the need for a revolution, and to support, aid, and develop the revolutionary struggle of the masses....<sup>2</sup>

Although Lenin's tactical position on disarmament shifted sharply in 1921, his strategy remained the same. Lenin, like Clausewitz, saw that

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<sup>1</sup>The scope of the present essay necessarily excludes any attempt to penetrate the meaning of the Sino-Soviet dialogue or, more generally, the influence which Lenin's teachings on disarmament exert on Soviet or Chinese actions.

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<sup>2</sup>V. I. Lenin, Sochinenia (2d ed.; 30 vols. Moscow: Gospolitdat, 1926-1932), XIX, 30; XVII, 197, 206. All references to Lenin's Sochinenia in this paper are to the second edition, unless otherwise noted.

policy could be continued by many means. The Bolshevik leader viewed armaments and disarmament--like war and peace--as possible methods for pursuing the grand strategy of proletarian revolution.<sup>3</sup>

### I. THE FIRST PHASE

For several years before and after the Bolsheviks took power, Lenin condemned all endorsements of "disarmament" as counter-revolutionary. Disarmament, like the idea of a United States of Europe, was regarded as a pacifist illusion nurtured by the bourgeoisie in order to stave off mass discontent with capitalism.

Lenin's most articulate denunciations of the slogan of disarmament came during revolutionary upheavals which he feared might become enscathed if the masses were told that "peace and "disarmament" were possible without the overthrow of the ancien régime.

His article "Army and Revolution"<sup>4</sup> appeared in November, 1905, just after the suppression of the Kronstadt uprising, but during the time when Lieutenant Schmidt's mutineers still held out in Sevastapol. Whether or not the sailors and soldiers were put down in Sevastapol, Lenin declared, the old military order had ended. Russian troops could no longer be counted

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<sup>3</sup>Ibid. See XII, 318; XII, 314-22; XX, 67; XIII, 505-08.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., VIII, 395-97.

on to serve as the gendarmes of counter-revolution. Political consciousness within the ranks was still at a low level, but common military men all over Russia were beginning to demand civil rights as well as better living conditions. The demands made at Sevastopol were symptomatic of a nation-wide movement. Lenin averred it was becoming well known that:

The army cannot and should not be neutral. "Don't draw the army into politics" is a slogan of the hypocritical servants of the bourgeoisie and of Tsarism, who in practice have always drawn the army into reactionary politics, transformed Russian soldiers into the underlings of the Black Hundreds, into the auxiliaries of the police.

"The demands of the soldier-citizens," Lenin went on, "are the essence of the demands of Social-Democracy...of all revolutionary parties... of all [class] conscious workers."

To realize any of these demands, however, Lenin insisted that one more condition had to be achieved: the elimination of standing armies and their replacement by the armed militia of the people as a whole.

"Military science," Lenin maintained,

has demonstrated the complete feasibility of the popular militia, which can stand at the summit of military tasks in defensive and in offensive war. Let the hypocritical or sentimental bourgeoisie dream about disarmament. While there is still oppression and exploitation on earth, we must strive not for disarmament, but for universal, popular armament. Only it can entirely assure freedom. Only it can completely overthrow reaction.<sup>5</sup>

Much of the language of 1905 was repeated in the most extensive exposition of Lenin's views on disarmament, his "On the Slogan of 'Disarmament'" and "The Military Program of the Proletarian Revolution," both

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<sup>5</sup>Ibid. [Emphasis added, W. C.]

written in 1916.<sup>6</sup> The slogan of disarmament, Lenin noted, was being urged in many countries as a substitute for one of the traditional planks of the social-democratic program, namely, the demand for "the people in arms," a popular militia to replace the standing armies used to repress the masses.

To call for disarmament, or, more accurately, to dream about it, Lenin declared, was to express utter hopelessness about the prospect of revolution. By militarizing the people for the world war, Lenin argued, the bourgeoisie was preparing the way for the "only just and revolutionary war, namely, a civil war of the proletariat against the imperialist bourgeoisie."

"The arming of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie," Lenin wrote in 1916, "is one of the...most important facts of modern capitalist society." In the presence of such a fact, asserted Lenin, to demand "disarmament [razoruzhenie]" would be to renounce any thought of revolution. "Our slogan," he affirmed, "must be: arming the proletariat in order to defeat, expropriate, and disarm [obzoruzhit] the bourgeoisie." Lenin affirmed that "only after the proletariat has disarmed the bourgeoisie will it be able, without betraying its world-historical mission, to throw all armaments on the scrap heap; the proletariat will undoubtedly do this, but only after

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<sup>6</sup>Ibid., XX, 314-32. An extensive list of references to Lenin's criticisms of "disarmament" as a slogan of the "Lefts" and Centralists, 1914 to 1917, may be found in the index to the fourth edition of Lenin's collected works (Spravochnyi tom k 4 izdaniiu sochinenii V. I. Lenina /Moscow: Gospolizdat, 1955/, Part I, p. 499).

this condition has been fulfilled, and under no circumstances before then."<sup>7</sup>

Lenin's basic objection to the slogan of disarmament was tactical rather than philosophical. It was that the slogan would impede progress toward a Communist revolution. In August, 1916, Lenin recalled that revolutionary as well as counter-revolutionary wars had been engendered by the French Revolution. He concluded that the failure to understand the way in which one kind of war can be transformed into another can be "very harmful in a tactical political sense, for it gives rise to stupid propaganda about 'disarmament' as if no other wars but reactionary wars are possible."<sup>8</sup> "It is not the defensive or the offensive character of a war," Lenin explained as early as 1908, "but the interests of the international proletarian movement," which determine whether or not a war is just.<sup>9</sup> Thus, while Lenin condemned pacifism, because it taught that peace was possible without a Communist revolution,<sup>10</sup> Lenin saw utility in militarism. He agreed with Friedrich Engels<sup>11</sup> that the growth of militarism would accelerate the death of capitalism. The faster the bourgeoisie militarized the people--including

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., XIX, 314 passim. [Emphasis in the original.]

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., XIX, 181, 184.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., XII, 318.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., XIX, 314-22; XXI, 365 passim; XXV, 281.

<sup>11</sup>See Friedrich Engels, Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science (Anti-Dühring) (New York: International Publishers, 1939), p. 189. See also below, Footnote 47.

young people and women, the better, Lenin argued, because that process brought nearer the "armed uprising against capitalism."<sup>12</sup>

## II. THE SECOND PHASE

The Bolsheviks' accession to power in 1917 naturally brought about many modifications of the theories which they advocated when seeking a revolution and before taking on the responsibilities of ruling a large and troubled land. As Adolf Ioffe pointed out in his work A Peaceful Offensive, published in 1921, Soviet negotiators from 1917 to 1921 sought what might be called "guarantees for peaceful coexistence" in the treaties Russia signed with her neighbors.<sup>13</sup> These included demilitarized frontier zones and other measures of arms control.<sup>14</sup> But many of the Soviet proposals were designed primarily for their propaganda appeal. Such propaganda, Ioffe explained, was the only way available for attacking the bourgeois order, "because an armed offensive was not possible, while the coexistence of a Soviet government with the imperialist ones appeared unthinkable." The imperialists, however, were not overthrown by a world revolution, which

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<sup>12</sup> Lenin, op. cit., XIX, 314 ff.

<sup>13</sup> Cited in Soviet Russia and the West, 1917-1927, ed. Kenia J. Budin and Harold H. Fisher (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1957) pp. 49-51. For a Soviet discussion of the origins of the principle of "peaceful coexistence," see G. A. Deborin, "Leninskiĭ printsip mirnogo souchestvovaniia gosudarstv razlichnykh sotsial'nykh sistem," Voprosy ekonomiki (April, 1956), p. 17.

<sup>14</sup> A survey of Soviet Russia's peace treaties signed in the first years of the Bolshevik regime and culminating in the very detailed provisions of

was delayed, and the Soviet peace offensive became "a means of self-defense."<sup>15</sup>

The last record of Lenin's explicitly attacking the principle of disarmament was in 1920 in one of the twenty-one conditions he drew up for membership in the Communist International. Each member-party had to obligate itself to campaign actively against "'social pacifism,' against the belief in the League of Nations, disarmament, and arbitration as a means of averting war."<sup>16</sup>

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the Russo-Finnish Treaty of June 1, 1922, indicates that the following principles were incorporated, to varying degrees, in many of the treaties between the Soviet Government and the Central Powers, Japan, the "succession states," and Russia's neighbors such as Rumania and Poland: (1) suspension of hostilities during the peace negotiations; (2) cessation of hostilities after signing the peace, including a cessation of economic warfare, and of propaganda and other interference in the internal affairs of either Party; (3) establishment of neutral zones along territorial and water frontiers, within which the number of soldiers and the quantity and quality of equipment would be limited; (4) evacuation and demobilization in certain areas, including the surrender of property and equipment to one side or the other (e.g., to Germany and Estonia from Russia, and to Russia from Georgia); (5) prohibition on either Party's soil of irregular or regular forces, or their recruitment, supply, or transit, the purpose of which was to incite violence or social change in the territory of the other Party; (6) a similar prohibition regarding political organizations or pretender governments; (7) pledges to support international agreements to neutralize Estonia, the Gulf of Finland, the Baltic Sea, Holland, and Lake Ladoga, if such agreements were worked out; (8) pledges to establish a most-favored-nation trade agreement between the Parties; (9) respect for the right of national self-determination. Details of the treaties are readily available, albeit with some serious inaccuracies, in Leonard Shapiro, (ed.), Soviet Treaty Series (Washington, D. C.: The Georgetown University Press, 1950), I, passim; see his bibliography for original sources.

<sup>15</sup>Soviet Russia and the West, 1917-1927, pp. 49-51.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., XXV, 261.



Beginning in mid-1921 the Soviet Government adopted the posture it has assumed until the present day, claiming to be the leading and probably the only sincere supporter (excepting the Soviet bloc) of disarmament. The manner in which this new attitude was expressed during Lenin's lifetime will now be considered, followed by a discussion of the reasons behind the shift in Soviet policy toward disarmament.

While the Soviet regime did not itself make suggestions for disarmament until 1922, its Foreign Commissar used the occasion in July, 1921, of protesting Russia's exclusion from the Washington Naval Conference to declare that the Soviet Government "could only give a warm welcome to disarmament of any kind or to the reduction of military expenditure, under which the workers of the world" were prostrated. Chicherin doubted, however, that "guarantees" could be found at that time to ensure that disarmament would be carried out. Further, Chicherin warned that Russia would not be bound by a treaty in whose creation she took no part.<sup>17</sup>

Chicherin's reservations about the Conference were couched in the language of diplomacy, but the Communist International and Soviet publicists freely denounced the Washington Conference--before and after it met--calling it a hypocritical sham to deceive the masses yearning for peace. The Conference was described by them as the product of ulterior motives of an economic and technical military character. They argued that the failure of the Conference to achieve more meaningful disarmament demonstrated the

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<sup>17</sup>Sovetskii soiuz v bor'be za mir: sobranie dokumentov i vospoimaniia stat'ia (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1929), pp. 131-32.

necessity of a proletarian revolution to disarm the capitalist class.<sup>18</sup>

Until recently, there has been little direct evidence that Lenin took any part in the formation of the new Soviet policy toward disarmament which began in 1921-1922. True, one might reasonably suppose that the Soviet Government would not adopt such a radical shift in foreign policy without at least the consent of Lenin. To buttress such a supposition there was testimony by Foreign Commissar Chicherin that Lenin had indeed outlined the general nature and main directions of Soviet diplomacy at the Genoa, Moscow, and Lausanne Conferences in 1922, the three major occasions on which the Soviet Government campaigned for disarmament during Lenin's lifetime.<sup>19</sup>

The most recent volume of Lenin Miscellany, which appeared in 1959, and archival material published in 1962 offer still deeper insights into Lenin's role in the determination of the new Soviet approach to disarmament.

According to an article in the Soviet publication New Times, which is published weekly in many languages and has a wide foreign circulation, the Central Party Archives contain a number of messages concerning the Genoa

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<sup>18</sup>See the "Theses on the Forthcoming Washington Conference" drawn up by the Executive Committee of the Communist International on August 15, 1921, in Jane Degras (ed.), The Communist International, 1919-1943: Documents (2 vols.; London: Oxford University Press, 1956-1960), I, 285 ff.; see the collection of articles, Ot Washingtona do Genoi (Moscow: Vysshi Voennyi Redaktsionnyi Sovet, 1922); see Zinoviev's remarks on the Washington Conference to the Congress of the Toilers of the Far East, given in Soviet Russia and the East, 1920-1927: A Documentary Survey, ed. Xenia J. Eudin and Robert C. North (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957), p. 222.

<sup>19</sup>G. V. Chicherin, "Lenin i vnesniaia politika," Vospominaniia o Vladimire Il'iche Lenine (2 vols.; Moscow: Gosizdat, 1957), II, 162-72. See also Louis Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs, 1917-1929 (2 vols.; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), I, 461-64.

Conference which were sent from and to Lenin during his convalescence at Gorki, on the outskirts of Moscow. From January 16 to March 22, 1922, Lenin is said to have sent nine such messages either to the Politburo or to Chicherin. One note urged the Politburo to take the Genoa Conference under its "close and direct observation." Another outlined a program which Chicherin should present at Genoa, emphasizing that no concessions should be made which might impair Russia's sovereignty. Further, after Chicherin's delegation was already in Berlin on March 22, while en route to Genoa, Lenin called the delegation's attention to a survey drawn up by a member of the Supreme Economic Council Presidium, on the ground that the survey had an important bearing on the activities of the Soviet delegates.<sup>20</sup>

Thus, the archival materials cited so far shed no light on Lenin's attitude toward disarmament per se, although they do indicate that the Bolshevik leader took a relatively active part in the preparations for the Genoa Conference. Already, however, earlier publications of Lenin's Collected Works testified to his interest and participation in the preparations for both the Genoa and the Lausanne Conferences, and in particular to his concern (discussed below in more detail) to exploit the propaganda possibilities of these conferences.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>20</sup>Central Party Archives, Collection, File 1, Docs. 22638 and 22991, cited in L. Bezymensky and N. Mtkovskiy, "The Coexistence Policy--Early Beginnings," New Times [English language edition], No. 11 (March 14, 1962), p. 9.

<sup>21</sup>Lenin, op. cit., XXVII, 169-77, 225-26, 290, 312-14; and V. I. Lenin, Sochinenia (4th ed.; 38 vols.; Moscow: Gospolitdat, 1941-1958), XXXIII, 319-20, 354. All references in this paper to Lenin, Sochinenia are to the second edition unless the fourth edition is specified.

A volume of Lenin Miscellany published in 1930 also quoted Lenin as noting, while he prepared his speech for the Eleventh Party Congress, that the Soviet Government's plans for the Genoa Conference "were carefully discussed time and again [ne raz i ne dva]" For the Conference, he affirmed "we are ready."<sup>22</sup>

The most recent volume of the Miscellany,<sup>23</sup> however, contains material preparatory to Genoa which is specifically concerned with disarmament. First, there is a letter from Chicherin to Lenin, followed by Lenin's reply. These letters, according to the New Times article mentioned before, are also in the Central Party Archives. The New Times article includes explanatory comments about the letters, although the authority for these comments is not clear.

According to New Times, Chicherin's letter was written in pursuance of Lenin's instructions. But the New Times omits the first two paragraphs of the letter, which show the wide responsibilities Chicherin was assuming:

I urgently request you to read the following proposals and give your remarks. We must come out with the "very broadest [shirochaishel] pacifist program"; that is one of the main elements of the positions to be presented; however we have no such program. There are only separate and disjointed references [otryvochnye momenty] in the first directives of the Central Committee. I here for the first time attempt to approach this task.

The main difficulty consists in the fact that the international ~~the~~ political forms of the present times serve as permanent fig leaves for the pillaging of the imperialists and, in particular, as a weapon against us. The League of Nations is simply an instrument of the Entente, an instrument which has already been used against us. You

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<sup>22</sup>Leninskii sbornik (Moscow: Institut Lenina pre TsK VKP (b), 1930), XIII, 15.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid. (Moscow: Gospolizdat, 1959), XXXVI.

yourself have already indicated that arbitration is impossible between bourgeois and Soviet states; however arbitration is an indispensable part of the pacifist arsenal [sic].

A subsequent paragraph of Chicherin's letter is the first reproduced in the New Times article.<sup>24</sup> In it, Chicherin urged that the Soviet Government should "introduce new elements into the present customary patterns of international relations, so as to prevent their being used as an instrument of imperialism." The "new elements" the Soviet Foreign Commissar proposed were those which he finally brought forward in his initial address at Genoa, such as the plan for world congresses of peoples based on full equality.<sup>25</sup>

The part of Chicherin's letter which dealt directly with disarmament stated:

Simultaneously we shall propose a general reduction of armaments in conformity with the theses we have evolved in conjunction with the RSFR /Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic/; extending further the tradition of the Hague and Geneva Conventions, we shall propose amplifying the laws of warfare with various additional bans: abolition of submarines, poison gas, mine throwers, flame throwers, and aerial warfare.<sup>26</sup>

The letter was read by Lenin, who broke it down into thirteen points, the sixth and seventh of which were the plan for a reduction of armaments

<sup>24</sup>This translation is slightly altered from that used in New Times.

<sup>25</sup>One item in Chicherin's letter which he did not propose at Genoa was that the world congress "might take over the Hague Tribunal with its optional arbitration and other functions. We shall accept [Chicherin stated] arbitration between a capitalist country and the Soviet state only if the court is composed of an equal number of members from each side, so that half of the members will be imperialists and the other half Communists." For the verbatim report and associated materials of the Genoa Conference, see Materialy genuevskoi konferentsii (Moscow: NKID, 1922).

<sup>26</sup>The underlines are those which Lenin made, according to Leninskiĭ sbornik. The Chicherin-Lenin exchange is in volume XLVII, pp. 451-54.

and the ban on certain weapons. Lenin underlined Chicherin's proposals in the manner suggested in the above text. Lenin replied on March 10, 1922, as follows:

Comrade Chicherin:

I have read your letter of March 10. It seems to me you have yourself set out the pacifist program most admirably in your letter.

The whole point [islavstvo] is to proclaim it, together with our merchant proposals, clearly and loudly before the break-up [of the Genoa Conference] (if "they" bring on a speedy break-up).

You and your delegation have the skill [islavstvo] for that.

I think you already have about 13 points (see my notations on your letter); and very good ones.

We will intrigue everyone by declaring: "We have a very broad and full program." If they don't let us announce it, we shall print it with a protest.

A "small" reservation throughout: we, Communists, have our own Communist program (Third International); but we nevertheless consider it our duty as merchants to support (even if [just] there is only a 1/10,000 chance) the pacifists in the other, i. e., the bourgeois camp (in which we include the Second and the Two-and-<sup>one</sup>/<sub>half</sub> Internationals).

It will be both biting [ledvito] and "righteous" [po-dobromu] and will help the disintegration [razlozheniye] of the enemy.

With such tactics we will win even if Genoa fails. Any deal that places us at a disadvantage we won't accept.

With Communist greetings, Lenin.

There was a postscript to Lenin's letter, not printed in New Times, to the effect that Chicherin might also place in question at Genoa the validity of all debts, including those created by the Versailles Treaty.

Soviet spokesmen welcomed the fact that, whereas Russia was excluded from the Washington proceedings, she was invited to the Genoa Conference of April, 1922.<sup>27</sup> Russia preferred not to be isolated, however,

<sup>27</sup>M. Zelikman, "Ot Vashingtona k Genue," Ot Vashingtona do Genui, pp. 37-72, especially pp. 69-72; see Chicherin's speech to the Central Executive Committee on January 27, 1922, Materiely genuevskoi konferentsii, pp. 15-20; see also Lenin, Sochineniia, XXIV, 169-77.

and, en route to Genoa, the Soviet Delegation stopped at Riga and obtained the signatures of Estonia, Latvia, and Poland to a protocol whereby these states and Russia pledged their full support at the Genoa Conference to the principle of arms limitation in all countries and in frontier zones between countries.<sup>28</sup>

Chicherin's opening speech at Genoa appealed for universal disarmament as a measure to reduce the threat of war and to aid the world's economy. Lloyd George responded warmly to the Soviet initiative, but Poincaré, represented by Barthou, refused to discuss disarmament at Genoa, and the Conference turned to other matters.<sup>29</sup>

The Genoa Conference finally reached a complete impasse on almost all questions, the most important by-product of the meeting being the Rapallo Treaty between the two outcast nations at Genoa, Soviet Russia and Germany. The problems disputed at Genoa were to be carried over to another meeting to take place at The Hague.

Prior to the Hague Conference, according to the Lenin Miscellany, the Central Committee Secretariat of the Russian Communist Party was deliberating whether to raise the possibility of a reduction of the Red Army at the forthcoming session of the All-Russian Central Committee. In this connection, on May 20, 1922, Lenin telephoned from Gorki:

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<sup>28</sup>The Riga Protocol is given in Materialy genuevskoi konferentsii, pp. 52-53.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., pp. 73-87.

I think we should raise it, calling for a one-fourth reduction, on the grounds that Genoa produced a measure of tangible even if slight and none-too-reliable progress toward a truce.<sup>30</sup>

In the course of the Hague Conference, which collapsed in the manner of its predecessor at Genoa, Chicherin issued invitations on June 12, 1922, to Estonia, Finland, Latvia, and Poland to attend a disarmament conference, the time and place of which were eventually specified as December in Moscow.<sup>31</sup> The reason for the meeting, Chicherin stated, was that the problem of armaments was not dealt with at Genoa, and that a partial step on a regional basis could contribute to a general solution of the problem.

The Central Party Archives are said to contain documents indicating that the Party Central Committee discussed several times the program put forward by the Soviet Delegation at the Moscow Conference.<sup>32</sup> Litvinov, who headed the Soviet Delegation, began by proposing reciprocal reductions of 75 per cent in the armed forces of the conferees. When this rather all-out solution to the problem of armaments was rejected, Russia substituted in its place a proposal for a 25 per cent reduction, in exchange for which Russia agreed to sign with the conferees a non-aggression pact involving

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<sup>30</sup>Leninskiĭ sbornik, XXXVI, 488. A footnote to the document states that the Central Executive Committee decided, on May 24, that since the Genoa Conference put off the resolution of important questions until the Hague Conference, the Soviet Government and War Commissariat should consider a reduction of the Red Army only after the results of the Hague Conference were known.

<sup>31</sup>Conférence de Moscou pour la Limitation des armements (Moscow: Commissariat du Peuple aux Affaires Étrangères, 1923), p. 5.

<sup>32</sup>Central Party Archives, Collection 17, File 3, Docs. 323, 325, cited in Bazymensky, loc. cit., pp. 16-17.



compulsory arbitration by third-parties, one of the few times the Soviet regime has expressed willingness to accept such a principle.<sup>33</sup>

The reasons for the collapse of the Moscow Disarmament Conference are complex and cannot be treated here in detail. The immediate cause was Poland's refusal to explain the discrepancy between the figures on the size of the army which she submitted at Moscow and those she gave on June 22, 1922, to the League of Nations. The resulting impasse prevented an agreement on arms reduction and, consequently, ascant Russia would not sign the proposed non-aggression pact.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>33</sup>Conférence de Moscou, pp. 46-51, 101-03, 155-58.

<sup>34</sup>For the debate over the conflicting sets of figures, see *ibid.*, pp. 188 ff. For fuller treatment of the causes for the failure of the conference, see Walter C. Clemens, Jr., "Origins of the Soviet Campaign for Disarmament: The Soviet Position on Peace, Security, and Revolution at the Genoa, Moscow, and Lausanne Conferences, 1922-1923," Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1961, pp. 170-240. Among the reasons for the collapse of the conference were: (1) the basic distrust which caused the conferees to be armed in the first place. Russia's good faith was questioned by Prince Radziwill who pointed out that a 25 per cent reduction in the Red Army was planned regardless of the outcome of the Moscow Conference. (It had been predicted by Franze as early as March, 1922.) Hence, such a reduction would not constitute a concession; (2) a possible restraint upon Poland by France not to conclude a disarmament treaty outside the League of Nations framework; (3) the fact that an across-the-board cut of 25 per cent would probably have harmed the military posture of the Baltic states and Poland more than that of the Soviet regime. In this connection, Professor Karol Laptar of the Polish Institute of International Affairs has indicated to the author that Polish archives include instructions to the Polish delegation to avoid any reciprocal reduction of forces which would leave the combined Polish-Finnish-Baltic forces numerically smaller than the Red Army. A reduction of the Red Army by 25 per cent would still have left it somewhat larger than the Polish-Finnish-Baltic armies, but smaller if the Rumanian army were added to this combination (see Clemens, *op. cit.*, p. 213).

In the same month that Litvinov conducted the Moscow Conference, Chicherin began his verbal duel with Lord Curzon at the Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs. The Soviet Delegation championed the closing of the Black Sea Straits to the warships of all powers, but Britain succeeded in obtaining a treaty which allowed a generous number of non-littoral men-of-war to enter and sail the Black Sea.<sup>35</sup>

The Lausanne Conference extended into 1923. The next international meeting on disarmament attended by the Soviet Government was the 1924 Rome Naval Conference, held after Lenin's death. Subsequent meetings, both at the League of Nations and at the United Nations, saw the Soviet Union follow many of the patterns established in 1922. There is not space to document these patterns here, but they are familiar to all newspaper readers today, for example: the Soviet penchant for all-out solution to disarmament rather than "mere" arms control; Soviet suspicion of inspection by an international body over which Russia has no veto; and Soviet skill and concern for achieving a propaganda impact upon liberal and mass opinion.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> See Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, 1922-1923: Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace (Cmd. 1814. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1923).

<sup>36</sup> For documented Western studies of Soviet disarmament diplomacy since 1923, see, e.g., Maria Salvin, "Soviet Policy Toward Disarmament," International Conciliation, No. 428 (Feb., 1947), pp. 42-111; John W. Spanier and Joseph I. Noguee, The Politics of Disarmament: A Study in Soviet-American Gamesmanship (New York: Praeger, 1962); Walter C. Clemens, Jr., "Ideology and Soviet Disarmament Policy" to be published in Journal of Conflict Resolution in 1964. Both Soviet and Western sources are included in Walter C. Clemens, Jr., "Soviet Policy Toward Disarmament," in Thomas T. Hammond (ed.), Soviet Foreign Relations and World Communism: A Selected, Annotated Bibliography of 6,000 Books in 25 Languages (Princeton: N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963).

### III. REASONS FOR THE SHIFT

What factors accounted for the Soviet Government's decision in 1921-1922 to campaign actively for disarmament instead of condemning even the principle of disarmament negotiations? The new attitude toward disarmament seems to have been part of a larger trend in Soviet foreign policy, a trend born in the transition to the New Economic Policy adopted in 1921. As early as October, 1920, the leitmotif of Lenin's speeches became the necessity of understanding that the revolutionary tide had subsided in Europe; that it would inevitably rise again but that, before revolution swept the world, the Soviet state could and must stand alone in an encirclement of capitalist states. Soviet diplomacy would seek recognition, trade, and concessions, while the Comintern would continue to cultivate the soil for revolution.<sup>37</sup>

The Soviet Government needed a breathing space, foreign aid, and trade in order to rebuild the country's war-torn economy. Soviet leaders and newspapers spoke of the need to transfer the men and resources employed in the Red Army to productive pursuits.<sup>38</sup> Mikhail Frunze wrote in March, 1922, that the regular Red Army would soon be reduced by 25

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<sup>37</sup>Such documentation is in Edward H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923 (3 vols.; London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1951-1953), III, 271 passim. See also Walter C. Clemens, Jr., "Bolshevik Expectations of a German Revolution During War Communism," Essay for Certificate of the Russian Institute, Columbia University, 1957.

<sup>38</sup>See Rossiiskaia Kommunisticheskaia Partia (bol'shevikov), XI S'ezd: Stenograficheskiĭ Otchet (Moscow: 1922), pp. 252-56; see also articles cited in V. M. Khaitsman, SSSR i problema razoruheniia (mezhdū pervoi i vtoroi mirovymi voynami) (Moscow: Akademiia Nauk SSSR, 1959), pp. 53-54.

per cent, and that the men discharged would work in industry but remain combat-ready through training in a home militia.<sup>39</sup> This reduction was planned prior to the Genoa Conference, not to mention the Moscow Conference. One wonders whether, had Chicherin been allowed to discuss disarmament in more detail at Genoa, he would not have proposed the same 25 per cent reduction that Litvinov put before the Moscow Conference. Immediately following the collapse of the Moscow Conference the Soviet Government announced it would carry out the reduction Frunze had predicted in March, 1922.<sup>40</sup> By February, 1923, Frunze's plan had become a reality.<sup>41</sup>

The Kremlin apparently hoped to induce other powers to reduce their forces in the same measure already planned for the Red Army. Although the Bolsheviks failed in this objective, they succeeded in another: they had impressed some, such as Walter Duranty of The New York Times with their disarmament propaganda.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>39</sup>Article by Frunze on March 25, 1922, in Armiia i Revoliutsiia, reprinted in M. V. Frunze, Izbrannye Proizvedeniia (Moscow: Partizdat, 1934, pp. 85-87.

<sup>40</sup>See "Appeal to All Peoples of the World" by Tenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets on December 27, 1922, in Lu. V. Kliuchnikov and A. V. Sebarin (eds.), Mezhdunarodnaia Politika Noveishego Vremeni v Dogovorakh, Notakh, i Deklaratsiakh (In three parts, the second of which has two sections; Moscow: Litizdat NKID, 1925-1928), III, 1, 224-25.

<sup>41</sup>Vladimir A. Antonov-Ovseenko, "The Red Army," Communist International (London), No. 24 (1923), p. 35.

<sup>42</sup>See The New York Times, December, 1922, for the following days and pages: 4th-p. 3; 7th-p. 2; 8th-p. 3; 10th-p. 2; 12th-p. 2; 13th-p. 13; see also the article by Herbert Sidebotham, loc. cit., April 12, 1922, p. 2.

Soviet disarmament propaganda, however, was designed not merely to cultivate an image abroad of a peace-loving regime in Russia. The Soviet appeal for disarmament at Genoa, for example, was aimed--at least in part--at economic objectives. The Soviet delegates to Genoa, Lenin stated in March, 1922, planned to take advantage of the split within the ranks of the bourgeoisie so as to obtain the establishment of favorable trade relations between Russia and the capitalist states. Lenin believed the "bourgeois camp" was divided into a group which sought to break up the Genoa Conference and a "pacifist group" which wanted the Conference to take place and which included in its ranks the Second International and the Two-and-a-half International.<sup>43</sup> Clearly, the Riga Protocol and Chicherin's disarmament proposal at Genoa could only exacerbate the differences within and among the non-Communist states.

There are strong indications, however, that the Bolsheviks did not expect the capitalist states to aid Russia economically<sup>44</sup> or to agree voluntarily to a meaningful disarmament treaty.<sup>45</sup> It appears rather that the primary motive of Soviet disarmament propaganda was political: to keep the capitalist world divided and off balance, while demonstrating to the masses the impossibility of disarmament under capitalism and, consequently, the need for a Communist revolution.

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<sup>43</sup> Lenin, Sochinenia, XCVII, 225-26.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> See, e.g., texts referred to in footnotes 17 and 18 above; see also Pravda and Izvestia, December 2 to 15, 1922; see also Clemens, "Origins of the Soviet Campaign for Disarmament," pp. 223 ff.

Since 1960, another dimension of Lenin's attitude toward peace has been referred to in a number of Soviet publications which cite a reminiscence by Lenin's wife in 1931. She recalled in that year how her husband loved to dream about the future and talked, on at least two occasions, about the possibility of an end to war. Krupskaya referred to one conversation early in 1918 in Leningrad, when Lenin said that "contemporary technology is now more and more increasing the destructive character of war. But the time will come when war will become so destructive that it will in general become impossible." Again in 1920-1921 Lenin talked to Krupskaya about a talk he had with an engineer who said that the next thing would be an invention capable of long-distance destruction of whole armies. This, the engineer thought, would rule out the very possibility of war. Lenin "spoke of this with keen interest," Krupskaya stated. "It was evident how passionately he wanted war to become impossible."<sup>46</sup>

The significance of these remarks is difficult to assess. It would be particularly difficult to show how Lenin's interest in eliminating war, allegedly expressed in 1918-1921, differed from his earlier position that disarmament is an ideal of socialism, but must be achieved through revolution--not pacifist slogans.

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<sup>46</sup>N. K. Krupskaya, O Lenine: shornyk statei (Moscow: Gospolizdat, 1960), p. 41.

#### IV. LONG-RANGE SOVIET OBJECTIVES

The question arises: Did the Soviet Government even want its proposals for disarmament to be accepted by the "capitalist" governments? Here one must distinguish between the long- and the short-term interests of the Soviet Government--as seen by the Bolshevik leaders. They believed that in the long run their revolution would never be secure until it had spread to the most highly industrialized nations of Europe. War, they held, could never be eliminated from the face of the earth until a classless, conflictless society had been achieved. The long-term goal of world or at least European revolution would be served by the Soviet disarmament offensive in that it gave the Soviet state an opportunity to develop its forces for the final conflict and to sow the seeds of revolution abroad by exposing the capitalist governments.

The short-term interests of the Soviet state were not wholly contradictory to its long-term interests. Both required that the breathing space be protracted and used to increase Soviet power. The short-term security requirements of the Soviet state would have been well served if Soviet disarmament proposals helped to forestall war with the capitalist states or induced them to reduce their armed forces. It is implicit in Communist doctrine, however, that if the Soviet disarmament proposals were agreed to by the capitalist governments, there would be (1) no "exposure" of capitalist refusal to disarm; and (2) no growth of the militarism which--according to Engels, Lenin, and Soviet spokesmen at

least as late as 1929--was an inevitable and desirable preliminary to the war and civil war which led to revolution and lasting peace.<sup>47</sup>

Thus, although Soviet security might benefit in the short run from international disarmament, the cause of world revolution could be expected to suffer. This, in turn, meant that the long-term interests of Soviet security would also be harmed, for, the Bolsheviks held, their revolution would never be entirely secure until victory on a world-wide scale. This distant goal, however, would in any case be advanced by the increment in overall Soviet power, made possible by protracting and exploiting the breathing space by means of the peace and disarmament offensive, whether Soviet disarmament proposals were or were not adopted by the capitalist states.

The contradiction between the short- and long-term goals which would have profited or suffered, depending on whether the Soviet disarmament proposals were accepted by other states, may not have represented any real problem to the Russian Communists. One possible reason for this

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<sup>47</sup>See Lenin, Sochinenia, VIII, 397; XIX, 314-32. For many quotes from Marx, Engels, and Lenin predicting the above pattern of events, see N. I. Bukharin, Mezhdunarodnoe polozhenie i zadachi Komintern [Two speeches to the Sixth Congress of the Communist International] (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1928). This pattern of development is foreseen and approved in the 1919 Program of the Russian Communist Party, given in English in Bukharin and Preobrazhenskii, The ABC of Communism, pp. 113-39.

The pattern of development predicted by Engels long before 1917, a Soviet writer on disarmament, F. I. Motovich, declared in a book published in 1929, was completely confirmed by the Russian Revolution. No other road than that foreseen by Engels and actually taken by the Russian Revolution, Motovich argued, "exists for the other countries." For the quote of Engels referred to by Motovich, see Friedrich Engels, Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science (Anti-Dühring), p. 189, and F. I. Motovich, Razoruzhenie imperialistov, Liga Natsii i SSSR (Moscow: Moskovskii Rabochii, 1929), pp. 165-66. This last work was recommended to the present author in February, 1959, by several members of the Faculty of History, Moscow State University.



is that their profound skepticism about the chances of the capitalists' disarming voluntarily may have kept the Bolsheviks from regarding the acceptance of their proposals by the capitalist governments as a realistic possibility. Since they were so hypothetical in nature, the consequences which would follow acceptance of the Soviet proposals could not weigh heavily among the considerations which moved the architects of the proposals.

A second possible reason is that the Kremlin leadership may have assumed that its gains would be greater, whether or not its disarmament proposals were accepted by the capitalist governments, than if it made no proposals. By attending international conferences and championing disarmament, the Soviet regime hoped to enhance its prestige, divide its enemies, and win friends among the opponents of war and (for example, in Turkey) of European imperialism. If its proposals were adopted, the Soviet Government's power position would improve by virtue of the increased importance that purely military disarmament would give to Soviet manpower, resources, organization, and propaganda as elements of strength. If, however, the other governments turned down the Soviet disarmament proposals, this fact could be played up as "proof" that peace and disarmament were impossible to realize within the framework of capitalist society.

The model for the Soviet disarmament campaign in 1922 may perhaps be found in Lenin's Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder, written in April - May, 1920, which prescribes the proper tactics for a non-revolutionary situation. Lenin analyzed the experience of the Bolshevik Party's

struggle for power in Russia and described the indicators of a revolutionary situation. These, Lenin said, were:

(1) All the class forces hostile to us have become sufficiently confused, are sufficiently at loggerheads with each other, have sufficiently weakened themselves in a struggle beyond their capacities; (2) all the vacillating, wavering, unstable, intermediate elements--the petty bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeois democracy as distinct from the bourgeoisie--have sufficiently exposed themselves before the people and have sufficiently disgraced themselves through their practical bankruptcy; and (3) among the proletariat a mass mood in favor of supporting the most determined, unreservedly bold, revolutionary action against the bourgeoisie has arisen and begins to grow powerfully.<sup>48</sup>

Lenin's words were meant primarily for the direction of German and English Communists who were reluctant to take part in "opportunist" or "legal" parliamentary campaigning, but they could apply equally well as a Bolshevik rationale for the Soviet disarmament diplomacy of 1922.

Lenin emphasized the importance--in politics no less than in military conflict--of mastering all forms of warfare. If the Communists did this, he predicted, they would triumph, even if circumstances did not permit the use of the weapons that were "most quickly death-dealing" to the enemy. Only "inexperienced" revolutionaries would think that legal methods of struggle, such as parliamentarianism, were opportunist. The real opportunism, Lenin affirmed, was to refrain from illegal struggle when the time for it was ripe, as during the World War. When conditions for mass, open revolutionary struggle have not yet matured, he stated,

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<sup>48</sup> Lenin, op. cit., XXV, 229 ff.

a revolutionary should be able

to defend the interests of the revolution (by propaganda, agitation and organization) in non-revolutionary circumstances, among the masses who are incapable of immediately appreciating the necessity for revolutionary methods of action. The main task of contemporary Communism in Western Europe and America is to acquire the ability to seek, to find, to determine correctly the concrete path, or the particular turn of events that will bring the masses right up to the real, decisive, last and great revolutionary struggle.<sup>49</sup>

The tactics put forward by Lenin in 1920 for the Communists in England to arouse the masses there involved: (1) unification of the existing groups into "a single Communist Party on the basis of the principles of the Third International and obligatory participation in Parliament"; and (2) a proposal by the English Communist Party to the English Laborites and Liberals that "they all enter into a 'compromise [quotes supplied by Lenin]' election agreement" to work together against the Conservatives and later divide the seats which they won in Parliament by a special (not a parliamentary) ballot--with the reservation that the Communists would retain "complete liberty to carry on agitation, propaganda, and political activity."

Whether or not the Laborites and Liberals accepted the proposition, Lenin maintained, the Communists would gain. If the offer of collaboration were agreed to, the Communists would benefit, because they could then carry on their propaganda against the Laborites in a more direct manner. If, on the other hand, the proposed bloc were rejected, the Communists would gain still more, because they could use the rejection to "demonstrate" to the masses that the Labor and Liberal Parties did not really want to

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., XXV, 231-32.

win power, but preferred "their closeness with the capitalists to the unity of all the workers.<sup>50</sup>

Soviet vacillation between a conciliatory and an antagonistic approach towards disarmament at the international conferences studied here suggests that the Kremlin leadership may itself have been of two minds. Should all concessions possible be made by Soviet negotiators in order to obtain a disarmament agreement with the capitalist states? Or should the capitalists be prodded into a well-publicized rejection of Bolshevik disarmament proposals in order to gain a Soviet propaganda victory? Although Moscow may have hesitated between these two alternatives, it is a matter of history that whatever apparent concessions the Soviet diplomats offered the capitalists have often served as grist for Communist propaganda.

In fact, what casts most doubt on the view that the Kremlin leadership hoped for acceptance of its disarmament program was the tone and content of the Soviet proposals, which almost guaranteed their rejection by the other powers.

Prior to July, 1921, the Soviet leadership took a strictly revolutionary approach to international disarmament. After that time, the Foreign Commissariat and other bodies subject to the Bolshevik hierarchy proposed and discussed disarmament as something which--although the odds were heavily against it--might possibly be realized by diplomatic

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<sup>50</sup>Ibid., XXV, 223 ff.

negotiations. But beneath these pronouncements sounded another chord, with a motif closer to the revolutionary traditions of Leninism.

If the Kremlin leaders thought at all about the conflict between the long- and short-term interests of their regime which might be served by international acceptance of their disarmament proposals, the Bolsheviks' ideological position at a number of Communist and non-Communist meetings in 1922 (and later) suggested that the Soviet disarmament campaign was meant to serve the long-term interests of the Bolshevik revolution by helping to extend it to other countries.

This interpretation is borne out by the statements Lenin suggested for issuance by the Soviet Government and the Comintern in connection with the Genoa Conference. As noted earlier, Lenin drafted the main points in Chicherin's speeches at Genoa. Instructions from Lenin also set the main lines of the Theses "On the Fight Against the Danger of War" which the ECCI (Executive Committee of the Communist International) issued shortly before Genoa. The Theses affirmed that Communists should divide the bourgeoisie by playing upon pacifist sentiments. The proletariat was warned, nonetheless, that violent revolution--not reason and love of peace--was the only way to abolish militarism. Only an experienced revolutionary party with a "good illegal apparatus" and nuclei in the armies could successfully struggle against war, the Theses declared.<sup>51</sup>

A draft by Lenin was the basis for a resolution in May, 1922, by the Central Executive Committee which approved as correct and opportune

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<sup>51</sup>Degras, op. cit., I, 331-33.

the Soviet disarmament proposal at Genoa, but which reminded the workers of the world that they could not "relax in their struggle to ensure peace....at whatever cost."<sup>52</sup>

The Central Executive Committee, the ECCI, and Soviet diplomats issued statements enumerating in detail the contradictions in the capitalist camp which came to light as a result of skillful Soviet diplomacy at Genoa.<sup>53</sup> The ECCI added that the only conclusion the workers of the world could draw from Genoa was: "Disarmament is impossible without the victory of the proletarian revolution."<sup>54</sup>

At other times throughout 1922 Soviet Government and Comintern spokesmen repeated the notion advanced by Lenin and the ECCI before the Genoa Conference: that the only means for combating war was "the maintenance and formation of illegal organization made up of all the revolutionaries [drawn into] the war, for the purpose of carrying on a prolonged struggle against war....."<sup>55</sup> Lenin emphasized this message in his instructions to the Comintern Delegation to the April, 1922, Berlin Conference of the Second and the Two and one-half Internationals,

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<sup>52</sup>Kliuchnikov and Sabanin, *op. cit.*, III, 1, 190-92. Lenin's draft, however, did not speak of "disarmament," but said only that the "danger of war" persisted after the Genoa Conference (Lenin, *op. cit.* [4th ed.], XXIII, 319-20).

<sup>53</sup>*Ibid.*; Boris E. Shtein, *Genuevskaya konferentsiya* (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1922), pp. 28-30, 119-26; Degras, *op. cit.*, I, 345-46.

<sup>54</sup>Degras, *op. cit.*, I, 345-46.

<sup>55</sup>*Ibid.*, I, 307, 316, 320, 329, 333, 337-40, 349, 374 ff., 416-33; Lenin, *op. cit.*, XXVII, 372-73.

and to the Soviet "Trade Union" Delegation to the December, 1922, Hague Peace Congress.<sup>56</sup> The Soviet Government and its newspapers affirmed that the Moscow Disarmament Conference showed the workers of the world that the Soviet state was peace-loving and that the burden for the continuation of armaments fell upon the other governments.<sup>57</sup> The Fourth Comintern Congress, meanwhile, which also met in December, 1922, appealed to the international proletariat to "devote all its energy to the world revolution!"<sup>58</sup>

Similarly, the Comintern Congress called on the toilers of the Eastern countries to ally with the "proletarian republic of soviets" in opposing the imperialists.<sup>59</sup> This appeal was concurrent with the opening of the Law of the Sea Conference, where Soviet support for the principle of "closed straits" guarded by an armed Turkey was designed to protect Russia's exposed Black Sea coast. In addition, the Soviet position permitted Chicherin to claim afterwards that the many Eastern nations attending the Conference saw in the Soviet Republics their one true friend.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>56</sup>For documentation, see Clemens, op. cit., pp. 233-35.

<sup>57</sup>Mezhdunarodnaya Politika RSFSR v 1922 g. Otchet Narodnogo Komissariata po Inostrannym Delam (Moscow: NKID 1923), p. 52; Pravda, December 14, 1922; Izvestia, December 5, 1922.

<sup>58</sup>Lenin, op. cit., XXVII, 489. For similar statement by the Profintern, see Izvestia, December 1, 1922, p. 2.

<sup>59</sup>Kommunisticheskiy Internatsional v dokumentakh: resheniya, teziy i vozvaniya kongressov Kominterna i plenimov VKKI, 1919-1932, ed. Bela Kun (Moscow: Partizdat, 1933), pp. 322-23.

<sup>60</sup>Soviet Russia and the West, 1917-1927, ed. Xenia J. Fudin and Harold E. Fisher (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957), p. 199.

The extent to which Comintern and Narkomindel leaders differed over revolutionary aspects of foreign relations has been discussed extensively elsewhere.<sup>61</sup> The nature of the problem and the evidence probably precludes definitive answers. Suffice it to say here that with regard to disarmament, no disagreement has been found among the Bolshevik leaders. Trotsky and Frunze differed on some military matters. Radek and Chicherin disagreed on the relative hostility of French and British policy toward Soviet Russia. Opposition to Lenin's views on disarmament in 1922 may have existed among "Left" Communists, just as they opposed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk; but there is as yet no evidence of such opposition.<sup>62</sup>

Rather than working against one another, the NKID and ECCI seem to have complemented each other's work perfectly. The former provided grist for the latter's propaganda, while the latter expressed itself in terms which exceeded the diplomatic conventions to which Chicherin's office

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<sup>61</sup> See, e.g., Theodore H. von Laue, "Soviet Diplomacy: G. V. Chicherin, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, 1918-1930," The Diplomats, 1919-1939, ed. Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1953), pp. 234-81.

<sup>62</sup> For discussion of Trotsky's and Frunze's differences, see Dimitri Daniel Fedotoff White, The Growth of the Red Army (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1944), pp. 165 ff. For the disagreement between Chicherin and Radek, compare Chicherin's report to the Central Executive Committee in Materialy gemezskoi konferentsii, ed. G. B. Sandomirskii (Moscow: NKID, 1922), pp. 15-20, with Karl Radek, Genus: die Einheitsfront des Proletariates und die Kommunistische Internationale (Hamburg: Verlag der Kommunistischen Internationale, 1922), pp. 17-28, 36-39. For an analysis of "Left" and other resistance to Lenin's regime, see Leonard Schapiro, The Origin of the Communist Autocracy: Political Opposition to the Soviet State, First Phase, 1917-1922 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1955).



conformed, and addressed an audience not easily reached by foreign ministries.

Clearly, considerations of power politics and of revolution, of defense and of offense, were intermeshed among the reasons for the Soviet campaign for disarmament. Lenin and his colleagues, whether they served in the Soviet Government or in the Comintern or in both, were anxious to divide the capitalist states vertically and horizontally. They would pit one government against another, such as Lloyd George against Poincaré; one bloc against another, such as Eastern Europe against Western Europe or the defeated against the victorious powers in the world war; they would split the pacifist elements from the rest of the bourgeoisie; and they would turn the proletariat of Europe and the masses of the East against the whole capitalistic-imperialistic structure, thus paving the way for world revolution at a later date, a revolution which Soviet Russia could aid, provided she could regroup her forces in the interim.