

Involuntary Resettlement in Urban Development Projects:
Project Experiences from the Philippines

by

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Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning in
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Abstract

While the predominant effects of urban renewal are indisputably positive, the compulsory relocation that it generates in parallel can have serious adverse effects. The loss of dwelling and assets, and the uprooting from an existing pattern of livelihood carry high impoverishment risks for those affected directly. Much suffering is caused because most of the relocations reviewed involved displacement over large distances. The loss of jobs are often compensated by alternative sources of income in or near the relocation site.

In addition to the tangible economic losses, there are social and cultural disruptions in neighborhood ties and kinship networks. These non-quantifiable social and economic costs include the loss of access to mutual help, child care arrangements, exchange and borrowing opportunities, and other informal support mechanisms. As the communities relocated tend to be from the lower income segments of the society, the social and economic costs of relocation are also most severely felt by these communities.

Two case studies in the Philippines indicates that residents have not yet recovered the standard of living that they enjoyed prior to relocation. Although this "transitional stage" is generally assumed to last only up to 2~3 years after relocation, residents at the one of the case sites are still at this stage three years after the relocation. The major reason is that compensation mechanisms, particularly livelihood programs, have been dismal. The outcome is not surprising in view of the fact that the projects were implemented from the perspective of concerned government relocation authority and not based on the real needs of the affected communities. The participation of the relocatees in the planning and implementation was very limited or non-existent.

Thesis Supervisor: Paul Smoke

Title: Associate Professor of Political Economy and Planning

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This is to my parents.

List of Acronyms

BOI:	Board of Investment
DA:	Department of Agriculture
DANIDA:	Danish International Development Agency
DBB:	Dasmariñas Bagong Bayan
DENR:	Department of Environment and Natural Resources
DOLE:	Department of Labor and Employment
DPWH:	Department of Public Works and Highways
DSWD:	Department of Social Welfare and Development
FVR:	Family Village Resources
GMA:	General Mariano Alvarez
GMACCO:	General Mariano Alvarez Credit Cooperative
GSIS:	Government Service Insurance System
HIGC:	Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation
HUDCC:	Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council
LGU:	Local Government Units
MRBs:	Medium Rise Buildings
NAIA:	Ninoy Aquino International Airport
NCR:	National Capital Region
NEDA:	National Economic and Development Authority
NGO:	Non-governmental Organization
NHA:	National Housing Authority
NHMFC:	National Home Mortgage and Finance Corporation
NSO:	National Statistics Office
OECF:	Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, Japan
PRRP:	Pasig River Rehabilitation Project
SSS:	Social Security System
UDHA:	Urban Development and Housing Law (RA 7279)
UPA:	Urban Poor Associate
USAID:	United States Agency of International Development

(US\$1=26 pesos)

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Chapter 1. Introduction

Dramatic population increases are forecasted to take place in the world's urban areas in general, and in the mega-cities of the Third World in particular. The urban population of the Third World is projected to increase from 675 million in 1970 to 1.9 billion in the year 2000 and 4 billion in the year 2025. Such urban growth requires the reordering of city spaces, improvements in transportation networks, development of new industrial estates, expansion in new water and sewage systems, and substantial growth in environmental services. The dramatic increase in investments in basic urban infrastructure and equipment will have significant impact on land use and settlement patterns. One of the most important forces of change in these third world cities will be the process of compulsory relocation of urban population within cities and to the urban fringe.

Relocation of urban population is not a new phenomenon. However, it is likely that the involuntary displacement of urban population will become more significant than it has ever been in the Philippines. The obligation to improve resettlement practices is becoming even more imperative in the Philippine's urban agenda.

Urban relocation raises many important issues. The literature on resettlement has sought to draw attention to the trauma and disruption associated with displacement, such as loss of livelihood, destruction of home, dissolution of social and economic networks, increased stress and higher mortality rates. However, governments' compensation and assistance to people subjected to involuntary resettlement has been unsatisfactory in many instances, and they

have been unable to restore the social and economic well-being of the displaced population (Cernea, 1988).

Besides these inherent adverse impacts of resettlement, the literature suggests that there are common management problems. Cernea (1990) pointed out that the issue of resettlement exists in a 'policy vacuum,' which results in ad-hoc treatment of the problems, insufficient resource allocation, under-planning and poor execution. Although resettlement is a complex operation that requires authority and institutional strength (V. Q. Adu-Aryee, 1933 quoted by Hiroko Tanaka), many agencies are low-level bureaucracies and are not well equipped to consider a wide range of economic and socio-cultural variables in planning resettlement projects.

Public agencies in the Philippines, particularly the National Housing Authority, seem to have difficulties in directly tackling these widely recognized problems associated with involuntary resettlement issues. Thus, 50 ~ 60% of these projects end up abandoned. The increasing significance and frequency of resettlement projects makes it essential to understand more thoroughly the workable and unworkable elements of these projects. This would help public agencies to formulate effective policy and to search for improved practical solutions to the problems of resettlement.

1-1. Objectives of the Study

The objectives of this thesis are three-fold. Firstly, I want to understand the factors and traits that underlie successful relocation projects. Secondly, I hope to understand how the relocation process affects the population and the duration of these effects. With this information, policy makers and government officials

could improve their support and assistance to relocation projects. Thirdly, I want to identify relevant patterns of behavior and to suggest the policy and program actions that could counter the risks. This assumes that the people and socio-cultural systems respond to involuntary relocation in predictable ways and their adverse effects on population are not inevitable.

This thesis is primarily intended for the policy makers, project officers and concerned non-governmental organizations (NGO) workers of the Philippines and also for development practitioners in Japan. Japan has been the leading aid donor in the Philippines, and the majority of the projects funded by Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) have resulted in population resettlement. The OECF and the Government of Japan have started to recognize their responsibilities as donors and have made some serious efforts to ensure an appropriate resettlement process. However, there are many issues left untackled. It is my hope that this study can promote improved understanding of the issues surrounding population displacement and relocation and could be used for the betterment of project planning.

1-2. Structure of the Study

In Chapter Two, I will outline a brief history of urban displacement and relocation in the Philippines and highlighted their causal factors. Chapter Three analyses the two case study projects in the Philippines and describes the problems commonly encountered in urban relocation projects. Special attention is paid to the socio-economic consequences of relocation, particularly relocatees' economic and employment opportunities and housing issues. Finally, Chapter Four summarizes my evaluation of the two cases. I also present recommendations for the concerned agencies in the Philippines based on the analysis of the two resettlement projects.

1-3. Methodology and Limitations of the Study

Relocation literature points out that both forced and voluntary low-income migrants to government-sponsored settlements are more apt to lose control over their new physical and social environments. In contrast, the high-income and the self-relocated have a better chance to exert control over their new environments. This indicates that the rich and poor react differently to relocation and that those who have a choice about where and when and how to relocate may fare best. While the predominant effects of urban renewal are positive for many urban inhabitants, the compulsory relocation that it generates in parallel has serious adverse effects. As the re-located communities tend to be some of the poorest segments of the city population, the social and economic costs of relocation are also likely be most severely felt by these communities. There is a high risk that these low-income groups will be further impoverished in the process. In this paper, I will focus on only a certain segment of affected population: low income households. For those households, a central location with access to income-generating opportunities is crucial.

They also have little control over the options for resettlement. It is noted, however, those who could benefit from relocation programs and much better off than non-beneficiaries who are sharers and renters of a housing unit.

For the purpose of this study, I examined two relocation projects designed and implemented by national government agencies in the Philippines. One is developed by the National Housing Authority (NHA) in Area D, Bagong Barrio - Bautista, Dasmariñas, Cavite (Bautista). The other is Family Village Resources (FVR) at *Barangay*¹ Kabilang Baybay, Town of General Mariano Alvarez (GMA), Cavite, developed by the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) in 1992. There are three major reasons I have decided to choose these two specific project sites;

- (1) One of the objectives of this study is to understand how relocation affects population and the duration of the effects. Some relocation researchers believe that people and socio-cultural systems respond to forced relocation in predictable ways. They argue that predictability is possible because of the extremely stressful nature of relocation. This limits the range of available responses to cope with the situation immediately following relocation. Also, they tend to believe that it would generally take two to three years for relocatees to get adjusted in a new environment and replicate their previous standard of living. By making a comparison between the FVR, which was developed four years ago with the relatively new Bautista, I hope to be able to determine the different coping strategies and resulting needs that are dependent on the stage of resettlement scheme.

¹ It is the basic political unit. Every citizen is a member of a barangay assembly that meets to discuss national and local issues, a system that encourage grassroots participation.

(2) The people affected by the Pasig River Rehabilitation Project (PRRP)² were mainly relocated to Bautista. However, some of the affected people were relocated to FVR. I thought I could examine how the people relocated from the same area would be affected by the different resettlement strategies of the implementing agencies. With this information, I could then make some comparative assessments of the two concerned agencies, NHA and DPWH.

(3) Cavite is considered to be the fastest growth area in Central Luzon³. As I believe that a key to a successful relocation project is to provide livelihood to the relocatees, I was interested to examine how this economic growth could facilitate the integration of the relocatees into the local political economy by providing employment in the neighboring communities.

I conducted interviews in the Philippines with government officials at the NHA, the DPWH, NGOs, consultants, researchers and residents in the two resettlement sites in January 1996. In addition to the information obtained through these field interviews, I have also drawn insights from the resettlement literature. However, although the literature on resettlement in rural areas has grown considerably in recent decades, the question of what happens when people living in cities are displaced by development projects remains a relatively unstudied topic (Bartolome, 1993).

² PRRP was set up in December 1989 and has a 10-year timetable. The lead agency is the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) with the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA). The Program has two overall objectives: improvement in water quality and improvement in general environmental conditions. The PRRP is a pet project of the First Lady, Mrs. Amelita M. Ramos.

³ The Province of Cavite is a part of the CALABARZON provinces. The project CALABARZON is a large-scale, multi-sectoral project complex planned for Region IV, specifically covering the provinces of Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Rizal, and Quezon, assisted by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). It is designed to transform agro-based rural economies through high industrialization led by foreign export-processing type industries.

There are a number of limitations of this study. The first one arises from this scarcity of research on urban relocation. Secondly, this study is limited by the quality of material accessible as full cases. There is no available comprehensive explanation by the concerned agencies of the context of the relocation, the relocation process itself, its management, and follow-up actions over a number of years. Therefore, this paper is based on my personal observations and experiences of the living conditions in the two resettlement sites in Cavite.

Chapter 2. Urban Population Displacement and Relocation

2-1. The Causes of Urban Displacement and Relocation

Urban population displacement is a subset of a broader spectrum of population displacement. According to Cernea (1993), one important initial conceptual distinction regarding population movements is between gradual migration, on the one hand, and sudden and involuntary displacement, on the other.

Among processes of sudden displacement, the literature distinguishes three main types, corresponding to the following three types of events: (1) natural causes (earthquakes, floods); (2) political events (wars, revolutions and other forms of political turmoil); and (3) planned development programs (particularly infrastructural equipment). The types of population displacement triggered by these events have many similar consequences. However, despite certain common features, there is a basic difference between these displacements depending on their causality. In cases of types (1) and (2), displaced people are usually torn abruptly from their accustomed life. Their attempts to return and reestablish themselves in familiar surroundings also differ. On the other hand, type (3) displacements are planned and deliberate. Realization of the goals of such development programs requires the removal of those who are in the way. The point here is that, being known in advance, such displacement can and must be subject to mitigatory planning. This includes design and land use provisions likely to reduce the need to displace in the first place. Thus, the explicit purpose of this paper is to deal with compulsory resettlement caused specifically by planned development.

Within this category, displacement can result from several distinct factors. The types of deliberate displacements can be conceptually captured in a taxonomy of the key causes of planned urban displacement. This takes into account current and emerging trends in urbanization, social research carried out on city growth and city roles (Kassarda and Rondinelli, 1990). The four major causes of urban displacement identified by Cernea (1993) are;

- Urban Economic Growth: Relocation is used to make room for new industrial estates, transportation corridors, economic ancillary activities, or for other infrastructural equipment required for economic growth and population agglomeration;
- Environmental Improvements: Relocation is caused by the need to make room for structural and infrastructural equipment for environmental services, health facilities, water supply systems, and others, and to place them into already densely inhabited downtown or residential areas;
- Slum Upgrading: Social policies aimed at poverty alleviation and quality of life improvement arrive at a point when they must address slum conditions and change them. Sometimes slum upgrading cannot be carried out without some population relocation; and
- Non-Urban Programs: Certain non-urban development projects infringe upon existing urban settlements, requiring their full or partial relocation.

Actual relocation operations may result from a combination of two or more of the above causes. These causes are often intertwined, even if one or the other

remains the main trigger of a specific displacement. The upgrading of old squatter areas will certainly continue and will entail a significant share of total urban population relocation. Yet, it is predictable that the main causal factors accounting for planned urban displacements will be related to the process of urban economic growth and the need for urban environmental improvement. I will thus examine resettlement operations resulting from these two sets of processes -- urban growth and environmental improvement.

2-2. What Makes the Urban Relocation Different?


There are clearly problems inherent in urban relocation arising primarily from the specific characteristics and patterns of city growth and city roles. These, in practice, could make the planning problems associated with urban resettlement differ substantially from those involved in most rural displacement; the distance between place of residence and place of work, the role of cash in the domestic economy, the political sophistication and access to decision making of the urban poor, and the structure of urban versus rural communities, among others.

2-2-1. Urbanization in Metro Manila⁴

The Philippines has a population of 70.2 million people (NSO, 1995). Metro Manila has a population of 10 million people and is projected to have 12.6 million by the year 2000 (PHIILSSA, 1994). It's overall annual growth rate in the 1980s was 3.5%, down from 5.2% in the 1970s (Murphy, 1993). It is expected to decline to 3.3% in the 1990's. However, some observers believe that the hard economic times over the last 10 years, the civil war in the countryside, a high

⁴ Eight cities and nine municipalities of the National Capital Region (NCR) is generally termed as Metro Manila.

Figure 1. Cities and Municipalities of Metro Manila



Source: ESCAP, Human Settlements Atlas, 1986

national population growth rate of 2.4-2.6%, the failure to develop industry in the rural areas, and natural disasters, such as the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo, have swollen the streams of the poor coming to the urban centers. These events have possibly resulted in a much higher rate of growth in the squatter areas. The most striking feature in Metro Manila's urban scope is thus the presence of these squatters and slum dwellers, which amount to some 4 million⁵ (NEDA, 1992), about 39% of the metropolis' total population, and occupying only 5.3% of the total land area of the metropolis (PHIILSSA, 1994).

The process of urbanization in Metro Manila has occurred in a chaotic, unplanned manner, and urban infrastructural facilities, as well as social services, have lagged far behind population expansion. This has created a bottleneck to further economic growth, lowered living standards and caused major health, sanitation, and transportation problems (Cernea, 1989). In order to address these metropolitan growth problems, the purpose of urban projects that cause population displacement and relocation has shifted towards reducing congestion in these areas and for providing space for the construction of urban infrastructure.

2-2-2. History of Urban Relocation

The basic problem is that urban growth causes considerable increase in the competition for scarce land in inner-city areas. This is reflected in high and rising land values. All predictions indicate that the third-world cities will continue to grow rapidly for the foreseeable future, suggesting a considerable increase in this phenomenon. The urban poor, in particular, find great

⁵ The last accurate count of squatters in Metro Manila was done in 1980. There were 1.6 million people and the estimate of the total squatter population now range from 3 to 4.5 million.

difficulty in competing for these locations and are often forced out. Because slum removal by administrative decision has accounted for such a large proportion of involuntary urban displacement, particularly in the Philippines, it is useful to understand its history and mechanisms.

Various types of relocation have been implemented in the Philippines since the early 1960s. National policies and programs dealing with slums and squatters had started with uprooting squatter colonies and relocating them outside Manila (Murphy, 1993). Such policies have been legally backed up by the Presidential Decree 722, which penalizes any person who, by the use of force, intimidation or threat or in the absence of the owner, occupies land. The Philippines is one of only two countries in the world, along with South Africa, which makes squatting a criminal offense.

In the 1970s, on-site and off-site development were introduced and are both being utilized by cities in housing improvement for the urban poor. The most massive and well-known program illustrating this approach was undertaken in the Tondo Foreshore facing Manila Bay. However, in the process of such upgrading programs, the squatters who did not qualify to be beneficiaries were relocated to resettlement areas outside the capital. In many cases, poor households have been forcibly evicted from their dwelling units, often without any place to be relocated to. Although squatters have occupied the fringes and the dangerous areas, settling where resistance is lowest and the threat of eviction seemingly remote, the urban landscape is continuously evolving with all lands subject to development. Therefore, all squatters are susceptible to relocation. While evictions have been constantly witnessed in Metro Manila, the number seemed to have decreased substantially. From 1986-1992, the years

of Corazon Aquino's presidency, an average 100,000 urban poor squatters a year were forcibly evicted in Metro Manila according to a study made by the Asian Coalition for Housing Rights. That number has decreased to 24,000 a year under the current President Ramos administration (Murphy, 1993).

There seem to be three major reasons for this relatively lower rate of evictions; Firstly, the Urban Development and Housing Law (UDHA or Republic Act 7279) issued by the then President Aquino in April 1992 limits evictions, sets guidelines for how they should be carried out, and, most importantly, make evictions clearly illegal in the absence of relocation. If this law could be effectively enforced, this could truly be a milestone in the country's long history of forced evictions, demolitions, and relocation. One problematic feature of UDHA is that it only applies to those squatters who constructed their structures after March 28, 1992, the effective date of UDHA. Secondly, President Ramos, who took office in October 1992, has signaled clearly to government officials and the private sector that he is committed to the plight of the urban poor and intends to strictly enforce UDHA. Thirdly, the government does not have any relocation areas developed to house the displaced people.

There may, however, be a return to the massive evictions of the 1960-1992 period as there has been a persistent criticism that UDHA has become a major obstacle to urban economic development. This will surely increase the number of relocation projects to facilitate the implementation of urban renewal projects. Several large and well-funded public works projects and private efforts were stopped, including the Metro Manila Flood Control Project, the Nagtahan

Bridge link road, and some of the urban road projects⁶. Such disruptions to public development projects are unlikely to continue indefinitely.

In this environment, the organized relocation of squatters and other city residents to rural *barangay* was recently opted for by the government. This was intended to decongest the increasingly urbanized and urbanizing areas and also to make way for the construction of urban infrastructure. By 1992, about 328,000 families were relocated to five resettlement sites located approximately 25~40 km away from Metro Manila⁷ (USAID, 1992). However, most types and experiences of relocation in the Philippines have not been very successful. For example, an abandonment rate of over 60% in the other NHA's projects at Sapang Palay and Carmona, has been reported. The names of the major relocation areas of Metro Manila, Bagong Silang (New Birth), Bagong Bayan (New Village), suggest that these projects were meant to symbolize government beneficence to the less fortunate. They were welfare projects rather than an effort to integrate the beneficiaries into the political economy.

2-2-3. Urban Poverty and Roles of the City

The possibility of being expelled from their homes and communities fills most slum dwellers with dread. Given the economic constraints under which they operate, the inner-city slums are an extremely functional solution to most, if not at all, of the slum-dwellers' major problems. The location of the slums puts their residents within close range of the best job markets and affords multiple opportunities for odd jobs in times of unemployment or financial stress. As casual and non-permanent workers, they have relatively good

⁶Interview with Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) in January 1995.

⁷The NHA has five resettlement areas, generally located with 35 km from Metro Manila. Resettlement areas: (1) DBB, Cavite, (2) GMA, Cavite, (3) Bagong Silang, Caloocan City, (4) Sapang Palay, Bulacan, and (5) Bagong Nayan, Antipolo, Rizal.

chances to find a new job when their contract expires or when they are laid off. Even if they fail, there is still a large informal economic sector that serves them as a safety net for survival. It also places them at the very center of a wide variety of urban services and benefits: free medical clinics, social services, even schools. It gives them a sense of "being where the action is", which figures highly in their satisfaction with urban life. Moreover, slums provide a community where friends and neighbors can be counted on for mutual favors. There is always someone to leave the children with, and food and staples can be purchased on credit from *sari-sari*⁸ stores even at the time when there is no income. This level of sharing may seem trivial, but it is of absolute importance to those living on the margin of subsistence. For those who lack public attention, it provides a minimal, community sponsored social security and family welfare system. Such advantages are not easily available in involuntary resettlement projects, which are often located in peripheral areas.

⁸ local provision shop

Chapter 3. Case Studies in the Philippines

In this chapter, I provide more information on my two case study sites and describe the problems commonly seen in the urban relocation projects in the Philippines.

3-1. Case-1: Bautista in Dasmariñas, Cavite

3-1-1. General Project Outline


NHA has developed its fourth resettlement project since 1974 in Dasmariñas Bagong Bayan (DBB), Cavite, approximately 32 kilometers south of Manila. The project site has been expanded, and 148,137 families are now residing from Area A to Area F that covers 523 hectares of land. Within this huge relocation site, there is Area D, Bagong Bayan - Bautista, which started receiving relocatees in late 1994. This 30.7 hectares of land is home to 3,119 urban poor families as of February 9, 1996. Its occupants came from different places and with different reasons⁹. The relocatees have come from Lawton and Sta. Mesa who were affected by the Pasig River Rehabilitation Program (PRRP)¹⁰, some 650 families from the Plastic Village near the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) area affected by the NAIA expansion and modernization project¹¹, and some 350 families from that infamous Smokey Mountain, which had once represented urban poverty in the Philippines.

⁹ In addition to these people who are affected by such projects classified by the NHA as the "national priority resettlement projects", there are over 800 families who moved in from local squatter areas. NHA does not seem to have any say in selecting these families under the usual procedures, as the governor of Cavite made the list and simply give it to the NHA. This is the clear evidence that the NHA is involved in the game of local politics.

¹⁰ 1,071 families out of 1,475 families planned have already relocated to Bautista.

¹¹ The relocatees from the Plastic Village (Aeroville Extension, Pasay City) were affected by the NAIA Terminal 2 Development Project. The main concerned agency is the Manila International Airport Authority that subcontracted its resettlement program to the NHA with the fee of 53,500 pesos per targeted household.

Figure 2. Map of the Project Area



Source: NHA and DPWH

Having relocatees affected by PRRP, a pet project of the First Lady, and from the President's Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project, it has been claimed that these groups of relocatees have been given some special considerations from the implementing agencies. Although the PRRP and Smokey Mountain have been classified by the NHA as 'national priority resettlement projects', it is my view that the major problems faced by the residents are exactly the same as in other relocation sites developed by NHA in the past 32 years. As the focus of my study is the people who are affected by urban development projects, I have only conducted interviews with people relocated as a result of the PRRP and the NAIA project.

3-1-2. Problems - Basic Services, Livelihood

(1) Basic Services: Most of the people affected by PRRP were relocated to the site between October 1994 and April 1995, while people affected by NAIA came in August 1994. A large number of the relocatees were relatively fresh arrivals, as evidenced by the use of simple housing materials, such as plastic and cardboard. The most immediate problems they have been facing were the lack of water, electricity and livelihood. There are two elevated water tanks to serve the needs of the relocatees, but there is no electricity to run the motors that will pump the water up. The lack of water is further compounded by the required down payment of 1,000 ~ 1,500 pesos (US \$1=26 pesos) for each household's connection. The residents are now buying water from an illegal source at 2.5 pesos for every water container. It may take some time before the relocation area is provided with electricity. One of the requirements of Manila Electric Company (Meralco) is that 70% of the total number of intended beneficiaries of the resettlement site must have applied for electricity before it can install the

primary infrastructure. More families need to apply before electricity can be supplied to the site.

The other common problem that people in the community raised was the loss of access to other services, such as churches. An NHA official commented that the construction of a church should be done by relocatees, as there is an open space provided for community use. Therefore, residents at the Bautista will have to wait a few more years to have their church constructed on a self-help basis. At present, they simply do not have either time or money to start construction. A church or some sort of prayer house is needed not only because the majority of residents are faithful Christians, but also because they need to have some place to gather with other residents and to re-establish a neighborhood network.

(2) **Livelihood:** The lack of livelihood available at or near the resettlement site is the most immediate and long-term problem for the majority of relocatees. Many respondents feel that their living conditions at the relocation site are better than their conditions prior to relocation because they have a homelot and live in a safer and cleaner environment. On the other hand, some claim that their condition at the site is more difficult and/or worse than their previous condition. Many have said that income in Metro Manila is higher and complained about the site's distance from their place of work. Prior to relocation, most of the beneficiaries were transportation workers (pedicab, tricycle, jeepney, bus and truck drivers) or construction related workers (carpenters, electricians, masons, welders, painters, etc). Janitorial and domestic service occupations, such as helpers, janitors, laundry women, baby sitters, small-scale vendors, and factory workers, were also common. As these

jobs are much more easily found in Metro Manila than in the resettlement sites and in the neighboring vicinity, Metro Manila remains the major source of employment for most of the relocated families. In particular, most residents from the NAIA area seem to have kept their previous jobs. These workers are now spending 1.5 to 4 hours commuting by jeepnies daily. They are burdened by the high transportation cost which varies from 20 to 50 pesos a day depending on which part of Metro Manila they work. As commuting is time and money-consuming, some say that they workers prefer to stay at offices, construction sites, or relatives' houses in Metro Manila during the weekdays and come back to the relocation site only during the weekends.

In the past, NHA was trying to set up industrial estates in the resettlement sites. At DBB, it designed and administered an industrial estate composed of nine factories for the purpose of providing alternative employment. As of January 1996, there are only two factories still in operation. Some government officials commented that this is mainly because resettlers tend to create a strong labor union. Friction between management and workers could not be easily resolved, and the situation reached the point where factories decided to leave. These efforts to develop an industrial estate and to absorb the labor force inside the resettlement areas have failed not only at the DBB but also at the other resettlement sites, such as Carmona and Sapang Palay. Given these results and the Presidential Executive Order 90 of 1986, which has limited NHA's direct provision of livelihood services, the same measures could not be taken at Bautista. Under these circumstances, NHA has been required to make serious efforts to coordinate with other agencies in providing alternative options for employment. As each agency has respective priority projects at hand and

without additional financial resources available, NHA has always been given low priority.

However, there are some programs being implemented by other agencies. As NHA has focused on the promotion of home-base production through skill development, the Department of Agriculture (DA) has provided skill training such as agro-processing and *toyo*¹²making, targeting women in particular. The Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) has provided a six-week high-speed sewing course. After completion of this training, trainers will be recommended to factories at the Export Processing Zone (EPZ) in the neighboring vicinities. Residents, however, are generally hesitant to participate in these training programs. The reasons are: (1) The priority is to earn on a day-to-day basis. They cannot afford to forego current income for training; (2) Women sometimes could not find someone who could take care of their children while they are away for training, as a mutual-help network is not yet established; (3) Many residents are used to working as market vendors, and they do not find these production-oriented skills to be relevant. As a result, the impact has been very marginal.

There are signs that some changes might be forthcoming. A new livelihood and productivity center is to be established by the Helping Foundation, Inc. at the NHA's property particularly targeting those who affected by PRRP. The First Lady is a honorary chairperson of this foundation. It is planning to replicate free livelihood seminars and training programs being undertaken at its Livelihood and Productivity Center in Vitas, Tondo (Smokey Mountain). Since July 1995, it has been providing a series of training programs in different

¹²soy source

sectors, such as electronics, mechanics, hotel and restaurant management, computers, and machine operation. However, these courses will be tailored for the conditions at the Bautista. Considering that there are many foreign and local factories in neighboring vicinities in Cavite, NHA is now assisting the foundation to conceptualize course designs based on local industries' demand.

NHA officials are well aware that there is a strong criticism of such skill training. One common criticism is that the machinery being used at these training centers tends to be very obsolete and that such training does not provide high-level skills needed at mainly export-oriented factories. Until now, NHA was trying desperately to secure cooperation not only from local governments, but also from private firms in order to generate livelihood opportunities for the resettlers. With a strong political support coming from the First Lady and additional funding from the Presidential Social Fund, these unwilling partners of NHA have finally been put into the position in which they could not ignore requests to cooperate any longer. For instance, some private companies appear likely to commit to provide machinery needed at the center or to employ people who have completed the training. In the long run, the foundation is hoping to get subcontracting jobs from these factories at the center. The magnitude and impact of such programs on resettlers economic well-being are still uncertain, as they only started operation in July 1995 at Tondo and in February 1996 at the Bautista. It is clear, however, that the foundation's political and financial power surely has made a difference. NHA is able to make inter-agency coordination more feasible through its newly acquired authority as a secretariat of this program.

(3) Housing: At the Bautista, beneficiaries are provided with 50 sq. m. homelot. NHA believes that houses should be improved in accordance with the family's economic capacity and the importance of housing in the overall family's hierarchy of values. This is also believed to increase affordability of a project among beneficiaries compared with other costly schemes that provide a housing unit and a home lot. The other practical reason why the NHA has moved to this strategy of a simple provision of a homelot is that it can reduce the heavy burden of initial development costs. Furthermore, recurrent operational cost is minimized as it does not have to develop sites and provide a house with a lot.

When I visited the Bautista, I observed all different sizes of housing structures that used different materials from salvaged materials to concrete. The majority of the houses are one or two room shacks, averaging 20 sq. m. Given the worsening incomes, housing improvement is apparently not the first priority of residents. The nature of relocation and the assistance by agencies are not significantly related to the type of dwelling units built by the relocatees. Although I presumed that the availability of financial assistance in housing materials could directly influence the types of housing units, it was apparently not the case at the Bautista. (However, this does not apply to the people from the Smokey Mountain, who are receiving 7,000 pesos worth of housing materials from the NHA as part of their compensation package and are not allowed to use the materials they have brought from the previous residence.) For those affected by the PRRP, loans for the purchase of housing construction materials up to 5,000 pesos, were made available to interested families. This loan fund is provided by the Pag-ibig Fund and managed by the General

Mariano Alvarez Credit Cooperative (GMACCO)¹³. About 450 families out of 715 families applied for this loan. The rest of the relocatees seem to be hesitant to take out loans to improve their dwelling units. The most common reasons given for this attitude include the lack of sufficient income to repay their loan and a fear of having loans. They would rather rely on their personal savings or income to spend on their minimal but adequate housing situation. While there is no housing material loan available for the residents affected by NAIA, some residents are using their personal savings or financial assistance from their relatives. As a result, there were no distinctive differences in the type of dwelling units built by the relocatees affected by PRRP and those of other residents.

The price of a Bautista homelot is 15,000 pesos, which is payable over 25 years. Although the scheme is supposed to apply a full cost recovery, it appears to ignore basic market considerations, such as inflation and land speculation. Residents have to pay 50 pesos for monthly amortization over the period of 25 years. At present, collection of monthly amortization at the Bautista reaches as high as 70~80 percent, while it only amounts to 38 percent in other areas of DBB. NHA officials and some NGO workers commented, however, that this high payment rate would soon drop to the level of other resettlement areas in DBB as other resettlement projects. The tendency is for payment rates to drop from three years after the actual relocation. This could be attributed to the poor administrative performance of the government. Although it attempts to operate on a strict cost recovery basis, lenient methods of collection have

¹³ GMACCO was founded in GMA in 1972 in order to assist relocatees from the Smokey Mountain. It has about 487 members at Bautista. It now assumes responsibility to provide housing materials to residents affected by the Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project and helps to process housing material loans for those affected by the PRRP. Those who are interested in taking this loan, which is payable in two years with an annual interest rate of 9%, have to be a member of Pag-ibig and pay 20 pesos monthly contribution to Pag-ibig Fund.

resulted in a situation whereby few residents are actually making monthly payments at the other resettlement sites. One NHA officer pointed out the serious shortage of collectors. For example, there are only 5 collectors who are in charge of 15,000 accounts in the whole DBB. Also, residents tend to be less motivated to make their payments as there is no penalty enforced upon the people who have defaulted. Up to the present, NHA administrators have been reluctant to use eviction as an instrument to force payment, non-payers do not feel seriously threatened.

3-2. Case-2: Family Village Resources (FVR), Cavite

3-2-1. General Outline of Project

Today, as the nation works towards the vision for the "Philippines 2000"¹⁴, there are many government infrastructure projects planned. However, with the promulgation of RA 7279, which requires the mandatory provision of relocation sites for all families that are displaced by government projects, a great number of DPWH's priority infrastructure projects in areas of the National Capital Region (NCR) cannot be made unless and until the mandatory resettlement sites are available. This, in effect, made the DPWH almost totally dependent on the NHA, with which it had contracted its resettlement programs. However, NHA was not able to address the DPWH requirements and meet its priorities, so the DPWH started undertaking its own resettlement activities in March, 1992.

As the DPWH is not mandated to implement a housing resettlement program, it contacted the executive agency for housing, the Housing Urban Development

¹⁴ It is a development vision prepared by the present Ramos administration that was launched in January 1993.

Coordination Council (HUDCC), which administers a National Shelter Program. The HUDCC brought in the Home Insurance Guarantee Cooperation (HIGC) as a Trustee for the purpose of acquiring and developing suitable relocation sites for the families who were going to be displaced by the DPWH's construction projects. HIGC chose a 10-hectare property for development of the DPWH's first such relocation site¹⁵. The site was called the Family Village Resources (FVR) at Barangay Kabilang Baybay in the Town of General Mariano Alvarez (GMA), Province of Cavite. The initial target was to construct 1,800 units of 20 sq. m. row houses on a 32 sq. m. lot. The price of the house and lot was P80,000 per unit, or a total cost of P144 million. As of January 1996, 1,735 houses have been constructed.

Just as in the previous case of the NHA, this site accommodates groups of people relocated as a result of different projects. Initially, this site was developed for the people affected by the Metro Manila Flood Control Project who have been relocated to this site since February 1993. The project aims at controlling the floods which cover 7% of the Metro Manila's land area annually. This problem is compounded by a lack of proper drainage systems and rapid urbanization, which increases storm-water run-off while reducing the capacity of storm channels through siltation and garbage dumping (USAID, 1992). The Flood Control Project is funded by the Japanese OECF, and its resulting resettlement project was also partially financed by OECF. There are currently also about 100 families who were affected by the Circumferential Road 5 (C-5) construction project and some 50 families affected by the PRRP.

¹⁵ Currently, there are two other sites developed; FVR, Bulacan and Taguig.

Having visited the Bautista property, where I could see different sizes of housing structures using all kinds of construction materials from scraps to concrete, it was a pleasant surprise to see how well planned and developed the FVR site was. Roads are well-paved with asphalt and row houses are constructed in an orderly way. Some of the earliest arrivals have already started developing their front-yards. However, despite the first impression, this site is facing problems similar to those at the Bautista, if not worse.

3-2-2. Problems - Basic Services, Livelihood, and Housing

(1) Basic Services: The most immediate problems residents of FVR have been facing are the lack of water and livelihood. Water is running only to a limited number of households, and the amount is too little to serve the needs of all the residents. As the men are leaving the site early in the morning and coming home late in the evening, it is left to the women or children to fetch water from an elevated tank. The Home Owners Association (HOA), which was established in the relocatees' community by DPWH, is supposed to assume the responsibility for maintaining water sources and collecting user charges. At the time of my research, some residents strongly questioned the managerial capacity of HOA and its chairman. Thus, user charges collection has not yet been undertaken. Some people have taken advantage of that situation and sell 4 ~ 10 water containers for 2 ~ 3 pesos each to households who are located away from the elevated tank. This cost is not at all negligible considering the low income level of residents.

(2) Livelihood: A lack of livelihood available at or near the resettlement site is the most immediate and long-term problem for the majority of relocatees. After spending almost three years at the relocation site, many respondents feel

that there have not been any significant improvements in their living conditions as compared to their previous condition. Like the Bautista case, they have commented that income in Metro Manila is better, and that commuting to the work place is a problem. Most of the beneficiaries are transportation workers, construction related workers, factory workers, and those in the janitorial and domestic service occupations such as helpers, janitors, laundry women, baby sitters, and small-scale vendors. Metro Manila still remains the major source of employment for most of these relocated families because of the greater availability of jobs in the city.

Most of the bread-winners are now spending 1.5 to 4 hours a day commuting by jeepnies to work. They are burdened by the high transportation costs that range from 40 to 60 pesos a day. In addition, as the location of FVR is away from the main street where the market is and where jeepnies to Metro Manila operates from. Many people have to take tricycle for 12 to 20 pesos per trip to and from by the main street. As they usually share this cost among three to four people, the individual cost is about three to five pesos. Because commuting is time and money-consuming, there are people who are renting a house at the FVR but staying in Metro Manila. The problem of commuting and the high transportation costs are not limited to adults. Some parents at FVR have stopped sending children to school as it costs about 20 pesos a week to commute to the nearest public primary school, which is located across the valley. Although the school building located on site has been completed, it is not ready to open due to the lack of coordination with the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS).

The DPWH is not equipped to provide livelihood projects by itself and is not allowed to make a direct contract with organizations specialized in this field. Therefore, it has included these projects in a contract with a site developer. DPWH is allowed make contracts only with construction companies, which are not in a position to assume the responsibility for implementing income generation programs. Initially, the FVR developer sponsored training for cooperative development and livelihood projects. It provided a contribution of 141,000 pesos as seed capital for livelihood projects. Residents at FVR used the funds to establish a multi-purpose cooperative that failed miserably primarily due to a shortage of operating funds and management problems. The FVR developer then contracted a local NGO to provide a series of livelihood training projects, such as soap making, *patis* (fish sauce) production, soy sauce production, candle making, etc. None of these training programs were operationalized. At present, there is no income generating project being undertaken except for those residents affected by PRRP. For this special group, the Clean and Green Foundation led by the First Lady, has sent two volunteer workers to implement a rug making project and has provided five sewing machines. As the project is still in its infancy, it is too early to judge how effective this program will be in improving the economic well-being of these beneficiaries. In any case, it is a very limited effort.

(3) Housing: According to DPWH, the two main problems they have encountered in the FVR project are a high abandonment rate and the refusal to pay monthly amortization and sale costs by some of the families in the program. Even the officers of the DPWH have admitted that about 50% of original beneficiaries have left the site and have most likely gone back to Metro Manila. As the NGO representatives pointed out, the relocated people will not

stay in the site without employment. Thus, resettlement remains a vicious cycle, with families returning to the city or broken up by the need of breadwinners to live where they can get jobs.

The price of an FVR unit (house and a lot) is 80,000 pesos which is payable over 25 years with an annual interest rate of 9%. As of January 1996, no one had paid the monthly amortization yet. At the time of my research, officers of the DPWH were trying to assemble the documents necessary to have all residents apply for the existing secondary mortgage programs brought together under the Unified Home Lending Program (ULP) and to collect amortization accordingly. For instance, residents who are not members of the Social Security System (SSS)¹⁶, the Home Development Mutual Fund (*Pag-ibig* Fund) or Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)¹⁷, which are funding sources of the ULP and managed by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corp.(NHMFC), have to pay 671.36 pesos. Since most of the residents are non-formal sector income earners and are not eligible to apply for SSS and GSIS, the DPWH has encouraged them to apply for mortgage loan and amortization support under *Abot-Kaya Pabahay* Fund¹⁸ at the NHMFC. This support is provided to; (1) those with a monthly gross family income of not more than 4,000 pesos and granted loan not exceeding 80,000 pesos; or (2) those with a monthly gross family income of not more than 5,000 pesos and granted loans of more than 80,000 pesos, but not exceeding 100,000 pesos. The support is only applicable during the first five years of their loans. Almost 80% of the FVR residents are categorized as (1), and their monthly amortization is as follows:

¹⁶ Primary provider of funds for home mortgages of private sector employees.

¹⁷ Primary provider of funds for home mortgages of government sector employees.

¹⁸ This is otherwise known as the Socail Housing Support Fund Act (Republic Act 6846).

Table 1. Monthly Amortization

Amortization Period	Amortization Support	Net Monthly Amortization
1st year	35%	436.38 pesos
2nd year	30%	469.95 pesos
3rd year	25%	503.52 pesos
4th year	20%	577.37 pesos
5th-25th year	14%	671.36 pesos

Source: Documents provided by DPWH

For the DPWH, linking up with the ULP has two positive aspects. Firstly, as the DPWH is not equipped to deal with the collection of monthly amortization, efficiency is improved if these related housing organizations do the collections. Secondly, holding these housing mortgage organizations and their collectors accountable is desirable from DPWH's point of view. These secondary mortgage agencies have a stronger presence as an accountable agency for financial matters than the DPWH in the minds of the residents. Therefore, this system is quite convenient for the DPWH as it lessens potential friction with communities.

However, even with this collection system being put into place, the questions of willingness to pay and affordability remain. Why did the DPWH have to wait this long to start collecting documents necessary for amortization collection in the first place? Even the NHA, well known for being bureaucratic and inefficient, usually starts collecting monthly amortization six months after the relocation based on documentation gathered prior to the relocation. There are three main reasons for the DPWH delay: Firstly, DPWH always has a tight deadline to meet and could not spare enough time to collect the documents

necessary for payments and for mortgage program applications. The officers of the DPWH said that it was extremely difficult to collect these documents before the relocation because of the hostility among the residents being relocated. This indicates that there was a serious lack of effort by the DPWH side to develop a consensus on the terms of payment among the affected community. As any delay in the implementation of a project plan would be costly, the DPWH chose not to wait for community consensus before starting to displace people out of the path of the possible projects, such as flood control or highways development.

Secondly, there is a serious problem with the management of relocation projects that stems from the DPWH's organizational structure. It is clear that there is an engineering and technical bias in the DPWH, and this has limited the range of variables taken into consideration in the project planning process. The DPWH's Action Office on Squatter Relocation has about 50 officers. Almost all the officers who are working on displacement and demolition of squatters are engineers. Only seven officers, including one clerk are directly engaged in resettlement, three of whom are working for the FVR. These six officers have degrees in liberal arts or the social sciences, but have no previous experience in dealing with the socio-cultural aspects of resettlement, let alone community organization.

Thirdly, there is simply no willingness to pay on the part of residents. Unlike the Bautista case, I did not feel that residents are feeling obliged to pay or that they are fully aware of their responsibilities to pay. Some have complained that they never thought that they had to pay, at least such a large amount. Also, a number of residents have complained about the poor quality of housing

construction. For what they are expected to pay, they believe that they are entitled to better quality housing. Again, there seems to be a widespread notion that whatever the government does should be for free. This perception gap could be bridged by the careful dissemination of information or by providing consultations prior to relocations.

The biggest issue regarding housing payments is affordability. The level of monthly amortization is simply too high considering the income of the project beneficiaries. Assuming the commonly-used rate of 20% out of total income which households on average spend for shelter needs, the current minimum wage rate of 165 pesos a day yields 900 pesos per month available for housing expense. However, there is a reason to doubt that the average poor family can pay 20 per cent of family income for housing. Studies done along the Pasig River by the sociology team of the PRRP show that rents for 16 sq. m. rooms range from 300 ~ 500 pesos. These rentals probably reflect what the urban poor could afford for urban housing.

Based on the past studies on poverty, food is the single biggest expenditure among the poor households, taking 63 to 76% of total income. Shelter (rent, water and electricity) is the second largest expenditure, followed by education, transportation, medical care, clothing, business investments and recreation (Jumenez, et.al 1986). Most of the residents at FVR are spending one-quarter of their income for transportation. If this 25% is added to food, then these two items alone account for 88% or even go beyond the total household expenditure. That would not leave enough resources for all other expenses, including shelter. According to the Institute of Social Work and Community Development of the University of the Philippines, urban poor families devote

only three percent of their family budget to housing (Rebullida, 1993). Based on a government's poverty threshold income set now in Metro Manila at 5,656 pesos¹⁹, that would amount to 169 pesos a month.

Although there is no way to determine the income levels of residents at FVR from official statistics, an estimate of 4,000 pesos a month or a little less might be a reasonable figure, as this is used as a base figure to apply for amortization support through the *Abot-kaya Pabahay* Fund. This means that only a very limited number of people could meet the required monthly amortization payment. The residents who were relocated due to C-5 construction seem to be relatively well-off and most likely to be able to make this monthly payment, as many of them are permanent workers, such as government officials. On the other hand, it is likely that the majority of the residents will default sooner or later. The DPWH is currently planning to evict those who default so that they could 'motivate' other people to pay. This would also make some houses available for new relocatees, an easier and less expensive option for the DPWH than the development of other sites. This option could be politically costly for the DPWH if there is a disagreement from donor agencies such as OECF. However, the DPWH seems more willing to put this option into practice than the NHA. As a result, residents continue to be kept under the threat of eviction as they had experienced previously in the urban slums.

¹⁹ This is a monthly poverty threshold for a family of six. National Economic and Development Authority. November 21, 1995. "Preliminary 1994 Poverty Estimates." Philippines.

3-3. General Lessons

3-3-1. Economic Repercussions

From the above cases, I have raised serious questions about whether these resettlement projects serve to restore the social and economic well-being of the displaced population. The importance of economic rehabilitation by ensuring an alternate means of livelihood for the people displaced has been given inadequate attention in both case studies. The economic repercussions of relocation seem to fall into three categories: (1) those relating to time and expense of travel to work; (2) those relating to the changes in the availability of jobs, especially for women; and (3) those relating to the need to make monthly mortgage payments for the housing.

It is clear that the time and cost it takes the relocatees to travel to work has increased significantly and causes severe hardship. Low income people, who can ill afford the cost of transportation, generally choose to locate close to their labor market and near the city center. Relocation areas, however, tend to be located on the outskirts of the city where land is still relatively cheap. Therefore, the first effect of relocation is a long and expensive journey to work. I have found that people traveling to the center of Metro Manila would have to travel about two to four hours each day and spend about one-fourth of their daily wage on fares. Considering the worsening traffic congestion in Metro Manila, two to three hours of commuting may not sound unusual. It is, however, imperative to consider the opportunity cost to the poor of long commutes. Some men complained that because of the serious congestion along the highways towards Metro Manila, they have lost their jobs because of being continuously late for work.

Apart from cost in time and money, there is a serious issue of being isolated from the job market. The relocation breaks up information networks which the squatters were able to establish in their former urban neighborhood, and everything is now left to individual initiative. The immediate loss of employment is quite acute, especially among women who have depended on service jobs for the upper classes, such as laundry, sewing, cleaning, etc. They have also lost social networks to look after their children and could not afford to commute long-distances due to physical and financial constraints. With some exceptional cases, most of the male relocatees have retained their former jobs in Metro Manila. There is a strong tendency to continue working at the same job and to tolerate the long daily commute. This reflects the lack of jobs available to them around the relocation sites and the strong demand for low-skilled workers in Metro Manila. Access to new employment in the neighboring areas is quite uncertain for both men and women. Despite the fact that the neighboring area is one of the fastest growing industrial estates in the country, the educational qualifications, skills, and age of workers required at foreign financed factories with a strong orientation towards exports, and even at local industries, do not match those of relocatees.

3-3-2. Morbidity and Food Insecurity

Unemployment and irregular incomes have serious repercussions on the nutritional condition of the relocatees. Particularly during the rainy season when many household-heads are jobless or earn only a minimal income, their families sometimes can not afford to eat three meals a day. Although the urban poor also suffer most during this time of the year, they have greater flexibility than the relocated families to overcome the crisis. They can find a new job much faster, and there are cheap sources of food and fuel supplies, such as

markets, small vendors in and around the slums, and fair price shops. Those who are working also depend on cheap restaurants and roadside vendors of cooked food. However, the price of rice and other basic foodstuffs in resettlement areas is approximately 10-15% higher than in Metro Manila. The market stall holders have to buy their goods in Metro Manila and, therefore, add the transportation costs to the price. In a situation of decreased incomes coupled with higher costs of living, particularly for food, the relocated families cannot afford to purchase as much food as they could in Metro Manila prior to the relocation.

3-3-3. Social Disarticulation

It seems that the implementing agencies are assuming that different communities would live happily together, share amenities, and become integrated during the process of relocation. The selection of a single large site seen as convenient and efficient only from the point of view of the implementing agency. However, bringing people from different slums onto a single relocation area may well lead to tensions between communities. It takes quite some time to reestablish dismantled social support networks, such as mutual-help arrangements, labor exchange relationships, child-care reciprocity, and food borrowing, that are vital assets and life support mechanisms for many families (Cernea 1990). Apart from existing community organizations brought from the original slums people were relocated from, a community organization in a relocation site should be formed to cover the whole area. Its purpose would be to deal with any inter-community difficulties and the problems of planning, maintenance and operation that will inevitably occur. However, this has been difficult in the study area due to the lack of NGOs, civil

organizations, and church organizations that typically initiate such movements.

Social disarticulation can be seen not only in a community, but also in households. I found that there are a quite a number of people who find the cost and time of the daily commute so burdensome that they arrange for a place to stay in the city, returning to the relocation sites only on weekends. There were some incidents of family breakups reported to me during the time of my research. A few men stopped coming home as they had started new families with other women in the city.

3-3-4. Housing Conditions

The government has attempted to convince the squatters of the many advantages that relocation could offer them. They are told that it would put an end to their illegal existence in filthy, over-crowded urban quarters and provide them with a clean and healthy environment. But for most of the relocated families the reality looks completely different. Relocation means a multiplication of costs in almost all aspects of life. Besides the indirect costs of water and electricity charges, and commuting costs, people need to make a monthly mortgage payments for their housing. They must pay for the lot allocated to them despite the deep socio-economic setbacks caused by their relocation. In actuality, the relocated families still have the status of squatters, living on land that does not belong to them and from which they could be evicted at any time. I met a quite number of relocatees who mistake occupancy for a *de facto* ownership that the law does not recognize.

The residents do have the opportunity to own the land legitimately, but the land titles will be allocated to the relocatees only upon the receipt of payment equal to the value of the lot. At the Bautista, the cost is 15,000 pesos for a 50 sq. m homelot, and 80,000 pesos for a house and a lot at the FVR. This is payable within a period of 25 years. Although there is no way to determine income levels of squatter dwellers from official statistics, an estimate of 3,000~4,000 pesos a month or a little less might be a reasonable figure according to the DPWH and the survey done in 1992 by the Urban Poor Associates, a local NGO. (This figure is much less than government's poverty line, set now in Metro Manila at 5,656 pesos.) There is a strong criticism among relocatees that the price of land is too high given their income level. Many people, particularly at the FVR, showed strong resentment over the payments. Not only do they find the price high, but they feel the payment has been forced upon them. The residents feel no particular obligation to pay, as they feel that the land they occupy is theirs by right.

The literature on housing points out that houses can be improved in proportion to the family's economic capacity, the level of perceived security of tenure and the importance of housing in the overall family hierarchy of values. Given the worsening income situation, housing improvement is apparently not given the first priority. The only thing preventing further deterioration of housing conditions is the administrative inefficiency of the implementing agencies. In the case of DPWH, nobody has not yet paid monthly amortization since the FVR first received relocatees in February 1993. In the case of the NHA, although it attempts to operate on a strict cost recovery basis, lenient methods of collection are expected to result in a quite a high default rate, e.g. 50~70% in a few years time.

A major concern now is the impact on residents if NHA or the DPWH starts enforcing collections. Many residents are not able to afford both land payments and house improvement costs. If collections become enforced under threat of eviction, house building activity may well come to a halt. Up to the present, NHA administrators have been reluctant to use eviction as an instrument to force payment, and non-payers are not yet been seriously threatened. Residents seem to be aware that were eviction tactics evoked, the financial gains to these agencies might be more than offset by the political embarrassment of evicting poor relocatees from a project to which the same authorities had sent them. This creates rather favorable conditions to the relocatees, as they presume that they will be able to stay and feel secure, even without actually possessing a land title.

3-3-5. Management Issues

NHA's budget and resettlement land supply are being exhausted due to the depletion of the capital base as a result of the failure to collect amortization payments of relocatees, and the bureaucratic inefficiency. Agencies such as the DPWH, which formerly contracted with the NHA in its resettlement program, have moved into the resettlement business for themselves. The NHA now has an extremely tight budget and a diminished mandate vis-a-vis squatter relocation. The NHA is forced to sit on the sidelines and watch this mere rookie in the game of squatter relocation undertake projects that disregard the experience that NHA has accumulated in this area. Even though it can be agreed that the efforts of NHA in squatter resettlement have been undistinguished, the fact remains that the NHA has considerable experience in this activity.

A major difficulty caused by the diminution of NHA's role is that relocation compensation packages will vary even more wildly than they have in the past. The FVR project of DPWH does not reflect the more standard packages offered by NHA. The FVR project offers houses and lots at a high rate of amortization of 617 pesos. NHA's amortization program, though a dismal failure, generally sets repayment levels of between 30 pesos and 100 pesos. NHA's lot sizes, ranging from 50 to 150 sq. m. (50 sq. m. at the Bautista, where the beneficiaries pay 50 pesos a month under the Presidential Decree 2015), are usually much bigger than those provided by other agencies like the DPWH. At the FVR, DPWH offers 32 sq. m. lots and row house unit of 28 sq. m. This ad-hoc and differential treatment by the government agencies generates much dissatisfaction among the affected communities.

Chapter 4. Conclusions and Recommendations

4-1. Summary of Evaluations of the Relocation Projects

While the predominant effects of urban renewal are indisputably positive for many urban inhabitants, the compulsory relocation that it generates in parallel can have serious adverse effects. The loss of dwelling and assets, and the uprooting from an existing pattern of livelihood carry high impoverishment risks for those affected directly. Much suffering is caused because most of the relocations reviewed involved displacement over large distances. The loss of jobs were not compensated by alternative sources of income in or near the relocation site.

In addition to the tangible economic losses, there are social and cultural disruptions in neighborhood ties and kinship networks. These non-quantifiable social and economic costs include the loss of access to mutual help, child care arrangements, exchange and borrowing opportunities, and other informal support mechanisms. As the communities relocated tend to be from the lower income segments of the society, the social and economic costs of relocation are also most severely felt by these communities. Furthermore, it is likely that they will be further impoverished in the relocation process.

Both case studies in the previous chapter indicate that residents have not yet recovered the standard of living that they enjoyed prior to relocation. Although this "transitional stage" is generally assumed to last only up to 2~3 years after relocation (Scudder and Colson, 1982), residents at the FVR are still at this stage almost three years after the relocation. The major reason is that compensation mechanisms, particularly livelihood programs, have been

dismal. The outcome is not surprising in view of the fact that the projects were implemented from the perspective of the implementing authorities own priorities and not based on the real needs of the affected communities. The participation of the relocatees in the planning and implementation was very limited or non-existent.

4-2. Recommendations for the Filipino Government Agencies

The two case projects examined reveal wide differences in the quality and effectiveness of the approaches to displacement and relocation as used by the two implementing government agencies. Many fundamental life and welfare issues facing the relocatees continue to be disregarded or are resolved inequitably. Based on the results of my project analysis, I would recommend the following to the Filipino government agencies for the purpose of improving their performance in future resettlement programs.

(1) Relocation to In-city Sites or Where Employment Opportunities Exist is Preferable.: Considering the skyrocketing land prices in Metro Manila, inner-city relocation may not be a feasible option, especially for implementing agencies that are facing a serious lack of financial resources to develop resettlement sites. However, it should be considered as one option whenever possible. One way to put this option into practice is to construct medium-rise buildings (MRBs) that NHA has introduced since 1990 at inner-city relocation sites. MRBs maximize the use of the land by increasing the density. As high construction costs of MRBs is the main concern at present, comprehensive study on methods of possible low cost construction should be further looked into to avoid affordability issues.

Furthermore, there is a clear tendency for agencies to establish resettlement sites that are isolated from neighboring communities. If resettlement sites could be established close to middle and high income communities, it would allow many relocatees to find some service-oriented jobs. Location of sites should also be chosen in accordance with the availability of employment opportunities.

(2) Employment Generation by Linking Industrial Development to Relocation Programs: For the purpose of providing employment near the resettlement sites, effective coordination with agencies, such as the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), and the Board of Investment (BOI) of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), is most imperative. For instance, Cavite along with other CALABARZON provinces, is considered as a catch basin for overflows in Metro Manila's industrial manufacturing sector. This is a region where the government and private investors are pouring much of their resources. Establishment of industrial estates (IE) and export processing zones (EPZ) has been accelerated, and the demand for wage labor is strong, but for particular type of industries. These estates usually require higher-level skills attuned to higher states of technology. A strategy based on strong demand for skilled labor would increase employability of trainees, especially if skill upgrading training programs are customized according to the needs of large corporations and industrial estates. In order to have closer linkages with the industries, coordination between DTI or DOLE and the relocation implementing agencies should be encouraged.

(3) Incorporation of NGOs/POs: Having witnessed the successive failures of the government relocation projects, some NGOs and church-based organizations

have been actively involved in getting the relocatees organized so that their needs can be better heard. These organizations also served to defend the rights of relocatees before and during the relocation processes. They have also provided significant help to the people displaced by addressing the complex social and cultural problems of people's involuntary resettlement (Cernea, 1988). NGO intervention is still needed by relocatees for the provision of services at the relocation sites, particularly during the critical adjustment period.

The ability of both NHA and DPWH to provide significant livelihood assistance is unfortunately limited. Together with the disruptive effects of relocation on livelihood, the need for a more concerted approach by NGOs becomes evident. I was disappointed to find that there are not many NGOs working actively at relocation sites. Most of the NGOs that assist residents at FVR and Bautista are training and advocacy oriented NGOs based in Manila. They assisted in setting up people's organizations (POs) in the communities prior to the relocation, but most of these POs are not well developed or equipped to have access to assistance from outside organizations, to provide services, or to implement income generating projects. Most of the NGOs have physical constraints. As they are usually located in Metro Manila, they cannot effectively provide assistance to distant relocation sites. At the same time, many of them do not have any experience or capacity to provide services that relocatees actually need after being relocated.

Active involvement of NGOs and church organizations in the planning period prior to relocation is invaluable, but it is more imperative at the relocation sites. It will be important for implementing agencies to make a list of NGOs

that have enough capacity to assist relocatees at resettlement sites especially during their adjustment period. These agencies should then organize a steering committee with some listed NGOs that will carry out a needs assessment of relocatees, and help to plan, implement, and monitor programs to improve their livelihood. Focus should be put on providing additional income earning opportunities through providing development financing packages, market promotions, and cooperative formation strategies.

(4) Active Involvement of Local Governments: NHA continue to hold the title to the resettlement sites that it administers. This constraints the range of services that could be provided by local governments. The significant number of relocatees represents a substantial block of voting power, particularly for local politicians. Unfortunately, these politicians have no incentive to work for relocatees as long as the relocation sites exist as 'colonies' of federal government agencies. Consultations currently undertaken between NHA/DPWH and local governments appear to be little more a way of preventing opposition from local leaders. If people can organize themselves into a municipality, the local government would have to assume responsible for improving social services. It is thus recommended to (1) assist the relocated community to organize into a *barangay*/municipality; (2) transfer some administrative authority to local governments; and (3) create genuine coordination with local governments to implement basic services, such as water supply, electrification, transportation and livelihood assistance.

(5) Provide Housing Options to Relocatees: The DPWH is currently providing beneficiaries with a homelot and a housing unit (row house) as they do not wish to have shanty towns at their resettlement sites. The appearance of

uniformed rows of houses is impressive to visitors, especially politicians, donors, and government bureaucrats. In other words, it is 'conveniently' tangible to those who have vested interests. However, what are the reaction of residents who are actually living at the resettlement sites? The main complaints I came across related to the high monthly amortization resulting from high development costs, and the poor quality of housing. There was a relatively low level of satisfaction with the housing units among the residents at the FVR as compared with the residents at the Bautista for these reasons.

Although it seems that the DPWH have no desire to reorient their strategy of providing both a homelot and a housing unit towards the simple provision of a home-lot, it is worthwhile to take a close look at the NHA's experience. NHA switched towards a "home-lot provision" approach after first implementing the DPWH strategy. The major reason behind the change is that it could reduce not only the heavy burden of initial development costs, but also the recurrent operational costs, because it does not have both to develop sites and to provide a core house with a serviced lot. This substantial cost reduction contributes to the increased affordability of the housing to beneficiaries. Residents at the Bautista seem to appreciate this freedom of choice in building their houses in accordance with their degree of affordability. Self-build houses are usually preferred by relocatees over government-build housing. Thus, I strongly recommend that the DPWH look into the NHA's past experience and try to provide housing options to its beneficiaries. Depending on their preferences and income levels, it is likely that there are different perceptions among the communities with regard to housing options.

In all cases, it is critical to keep obligatory payment to a minimum and to relate them to the payment capacities of the relocatees. Thorough research prior to relocation is needed to ensure that this is based on a realistic understanding of income, given that income-earning opportunities are likely to be less in the relocation sites.

(6) Retaining Access to Cultural Property: Retaining access to cultural property such as churches, often by physical relocation, can increase the acceptability of a resettlement plan and moderate the social disarticulation caused by relocation.

(7) Standardize Relocation Programs: Given the present situation in which multiple agencies are responsible for urban development and population relocation, it may be too idealistic to recommend the establishment of an overriding agency that would be in charge of resettlement programs. It would be desirable, however, to give overall responsibility to a strengthened national agency which can focus on the formulation of a national urban resettlement policy and strategy. This national agency would coordinate and prioritize programs and policy instruments related to the development of urban areas and their economies. If this recommendation is not a viable one, efforts should be made to formulate a national urban resettlement policy and strategy and to standardize relocation programs, so that beneficiaries of different government resettlement programs would not feel that they are treated differentially.

(8) Allocation of Sufficient Financial Resources: Currently, the DPWH does not have any budget set aside for the relocation of affected communities. This has two implications: First, the quality of relocation programs depends totally on how the project managers perceive relocation and the volume of funds for

relocation they can get from the total project budget. Funds are often a small percentage of the total costs of large projects that necessitate relocation. This could lead to the ad-hoc treatment of resettlement programs. The tighter the budget, the more serious the situation. Limited funding for a resettlement program is particularly a problem with locally funded projects. Second, the development of resettlement sites can only be undertaken when funds are actually made available. Disbursement delays can lead to a serious delays both in implementation of development projects that entail relocation and in the planning of resettlement programs.

The conclusion is that there should be sufficient financial resources set aside specifically for the purpose of relocation. In order to insure that this will be the case, one of the following measures should be undertaken; (a) Full relocation costs should be incorporated in the financial and economic feasibility studies of the whole redevelopment that is planned. This should include land costs, costs of shelter, infrastructure, socio-economic support packages and financial assistance; (b) A pool of funds should be established at each of the national agencies involved in development of public projects which are to be used only for the relocation of affected communities.

(9) Documentation of Project Experiences: In the areas of my research, I was disappointed with the quality of documented materials on the projects. There are few comprehensive documents that detail the context of the relocation, the process itself, its management, and the follow-up activities taken over a number of years. Although the NHA has been involved in resettlement projects over the past 32 years, there was no effort to document project experiences. This reflects poor systematic monitoring and evaluation of

relocation programs that have taken place. An explanation given was that there were no human and financial resources available for documentation. Nevertheless, documentation of project experiences would be invaluable for the NHA and also for other agencies that are undertaking resettlement programs. At the same time, other agencies including the DPWH should also make efforts to document their resettlement operations. This would serve to improve their understanding of the environment of relocation, the relocation process, the costs and benefits of different approaches to relocation, and also their ability to draw conclusions that can guide the development and execution of future relocation programs and projects. Such efforts will have practical use only if the practice is institutionalized and there is enough flexibility in planning and implementation to incorporate and modify existing programs based on documented experiences.

(10) Increase Social Acceptability of Resettlement Programs: Most of the relocatees and NGOs that I interviewed did not strongly dispute the necessity of urban development programs that entail their displacement and relocation. Some were not even opposed to the idea of displacement and resettlement. However, they are greatly disappointed with the unnecessary suffering that has occurred as a result of the relocation. It is clear that any attempt to remove people from their existing physical, social and economic environment will have far-reaching implications. The negative effects of relocation can be minimized if a number of conditions are fulfilled. These conditions include the delivery of the basic services and concerns over the affected population. The relocatees' dream of new life is usually shattered as soon as they step into resettlement sites where the delivery of basic services is lacking. Their impression of the first few weeks without any water and electricity lingers in

their minds for a long time, and makes it more difficult for them to accept and adopt a new living environment at resettlement sites. It is thus imperative that implementing agencies assure the delivery of basic services prior to receiving relocatees.

One of the reasons why relocatees feel disappointed with their new environment is that they simply did not know what kind of life they could expect to have at resettlement sites in the urban fringe. I believe that this is a problem because there is a serious lack of effort by the implementing agencies to provide appropriate information and to earn the trust of their beneficiaries through dialogue sessions. The DPWH is now taking some of their target population to their resettlement sites prior to actual relocation in order to assist them in visualizing their life at resettlement sites. Such efforts, however small they appear to be, can help relocatees to adapt quickly to their new environment faster.

(11) Reconsider Current Urban Development Strategies: One should ask why relocation of low-income household is always perceived as favorable political choice. Despite the fact that urban slum dwellers in Metro Manila occupy only 5% of the total land area of the metropolis, it seems the majority of target populations of virtually all relocation programs are the urban poor households. The overt justification for such relocation programs must be politically acceptable. Some programs are often rationalized on social policy grounds, even when they are just a veiled approach to free valuable real estate for other higher paying users. Infrastructure developments currently undertaken in Metro Manila serve not the urban poor but economic elite,

especially in the fields of real estate and industry, who seek to expand their facilities through massive and expensive infrastructure.

While I acknowledge the fact that there is an urgent need to improve physical infrastructure for economic development, relocation should be planned in such a manner to reconcile the need of the society to improve its physical infrastructure with the protection of the rights and interests of the people most immediately affected. Urban planning seems to be still the exception rather than the rule in the Philippines. This should change, and it is imperative that planning should be done in such a manner that the urban poor could also share the benefits of the new development. The most feasible alternative to relocation lies in creating a steady supply and development of land and housing as well as large scale upgrading/renewal programs. These programs, if undertaken on a reasonable scale, could create a natural process of housing mobility which is consistent with personal or community priorities and in which resettlement ceases to be necessary, at least to such a significant degree.

4-3. Research Questions

This paper has attempted to explore the impact of resettlement on beneficiaries and how to mitigate negative impacts. More research is needed to shed light on the ways relocation project planning impacts on the well-being of beneficiaries. Future research questions on this topic might include the following:

- (1) What political dynamics will be generated by having a great number of relocatees in host communities? How do these affect the relationship between local government and the relocatees?

(2) Relocates are mostly the urban poor who share a common urban culture, while the most of relocation sites are situated in urban fringe where the majority of people still engage in agriculture. General perceptions and the patterns of behavior in such agriculture-oriented communities are often different from those of relocates. To what extent does the relocates' way of life affect a host community or neighboring community?

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Appendix

Survey Questionnaire

Date: Jan. 2 _____, 1996
Place: DBB / FVR, Cavite

Personal Data of Respondent

Name: _____ Age: _____ Sex: _____
Relation to the Land Awardee: _____

I. Physical Profile of the House (BY OBSERVATION 3-11)

1. House size: _____ sq. m
2. Lot size: _____ sq. m
3. House type
a) single detached b) duplex c) others, specify _____
4. Number of stories: a) one b) two c) more than two
5. Walling materials
a) indigenous (e.g., nipa, coconut palm) b) plywood
c) concrete d) salvaged materials e) others, specify _____
6. Roofing materials
a) indigenous (e.g., nipa, coconut palm) b) galvanized iron
c) salvaged materials d) others, specify _____
7. Flooring materials
a) wood b) cement c) soil d) others, specify _____
8. Is there a toilet indoor? a) yes b) none
9. Appliances found in the house
a) electric fan b) radio c) TV d) refrigerator
e) stereo f) video cassette player g) others, specify _____
10. Furniture found in the house
a) sala set b) cabinets c) dining set d) others
11. Is the house supplied with electricity? a) yes b) no
12. If yes, how much do you pay a month? _____

- 13. Is the house supplied with water? a) yes b) no
- 14. If yes, how much do you pay a month? _____
- 15. If no, where do you get water?
 - a) deep-well
 - # of times a day for fetching water
 - location: Is it far?
 - Who does the fetching?
 - b) water seller
 - How much per tank?
 - How many tanks do you consume a day?
 - c) others, specify _____

II. Profile of the Family

History of Migration:

- 16. Where were you born? a) Metro Manila b) Province, specify _____
- 17. Where were you living before coming to this site? (specific brgy.& city)

- 18. How many years did you live there?
 - a) less than one year b) one to two years
 - c) three to five years d) more than five to ten years
 - e) more than ten years
- 19. Why did you leave that place and come here?
 - a) because of the government relocation program
 - b) because you can be a house owner and be secured
 - c) because everyone else in the community decided to come here
 - d) by force
 - e) others, specify _____

Family Composition

- 20. How big is your family? (# of children; nuclear/extended family; relatives)

21. Enumerate names of income earning family members with corresponding occupation, income, work status, place of work, mode of transportation used, time spent and expenses in going to and from place of work. (*permanent, casual, contractual, self-employed, others)

<u>Name</u>	<u>Occupation</u>		<u>Work Status*</u>	
	<u>Before</u>	<u>After</u>	<u>Before</u>	<u>After</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
	<u>Place of Work</u>		<u>Mode of Transportation</u>	
	<u>Before</u>	<u>After</u>	<u>Before</u>	<u>After</u>
	_____	_____	_____	_____
	_____	_____	_____	_____
	_____	_____	_____	_____
	<u>Time Spent</u>		<u>Expenses</u>	
	<u>Before</u>	<u>After</u>	<u>Before</u>	<u>After</u>
	_____	_____	_____	_____
	_____	_____	_____	_____
	_____	_____	_____	_____

22. If the employed family member moved, what caused the moving from previous place of work to the present? (answer as many)
 a) better salary b) lower transportation cost
 c) better working condition d) shorter time of travel
 e) others, specify _____

23. If there are employment opportunities in the neighborhood would the working members of your family choose to work here?
Name
 _____ a) yes b) no, because _____
 _____ a) yes b) no, because _____
 _____ a) yes b) no, because _____

24. If there has been an increase in transportation costs, how is this increased financial burden covered?

25. How often does your working family member come home?
 a) full time resident b) weekends c) twice a month
 d) once a month e) once in two or three months
 f) very irregular

26. What caused his/her less frequent coming home?
 a) distance b) cost of transportation c) demand of the job
 d) others, specify _____
27. Where do they stay when they are not coming home?
 a) previous place in Metro Manila
 b) previous neighboring area in Metro Manila
 c) other areas in Metro Manila
 d) others specify, _____
28. What are the affects on the family of the working members' infrequent coming home?
 a) deteriorating harmony in the family
 b) increasing misunderstanding
 c) others, specify _____

III. Life in Dasmariñas

29. What are the advantages of living here for your family? _____

30. What are the disadvantages? _____

31. Since you first came to live in Damarinas, has your family situation
 a) improved b) gotten worse c) no change
32. What are the difficulties you encountered when you first came in?

33. If are made to choose, would you rather:
 a) return to the last place you stayed in Manila
 b) prefer to stay here
 c) others, specify _____
34. If you plan to return, why? _____

35. Are you planning to move within the next two years?
 a) yes (Why? _____)
 b) no (Why not? _____)

36. Are you satisfied with your house?
 a) yes (Why? _____)
 b) no (Why not? _____)
37. Are you satisfied with your neighborhood?
 a) yes (Why? _____)
 b) no (Why not? _____)
38. Were there people you can turn to in case of emergencies or when you have problems in your former neighborhood?
 a) yes (Who, specify _____)*
 b) none
 *NHA/DPWH, barangay captain, neighbors, relatives, NGO/PO, cooperatives
39. How about in your present neighborhood?
 a) yes (Who, specify _____)*
 b) none
40. What are the your problems in your present neighborhood?
 1. _____
 2. _____
 3. _____
 4. _____
 5. _____
41. What are the things you want to see changed in your neighborhood?
 1. _____
 2. _____
 3. _____
 4. _____
 5. _____

Financial Situation

42. Sources of family income
 a) remittances b) employment c) vending/other services
 d) donations from relatives/friends e) pensions
43. Combined Family Income prior to relocation. _____pesos/month
44. Combined Family Income after relocation. _____pesos/month
45. Combined Family Expenses prior to relocation. _____pesos/month
46. Combined Family Expenses after relocation. _____pesos/month

47. After coming here, do you think there is a change in your nutrition intake?
 a) yes (*better or worse; Why _____)
 b) no
48. With your income, are you able to send your children to school?
 a) yes (*all children or just a few) b) no
49. With you income, are you able to meet basic comforts like clothing, house expenses, transportation expenses, etc.?
 a) yes b) no
50. Are there anything you pay more here than in Manila? (attn. to prices of food)
 a) yes b) no

51. What are the things you pay more?
 1. _____
 2. _____
 3. _____

52. Are there anything you pay less here than in Manila?
 a) yes b) no

53. What are the things you pay less?
 1. _____
 2. _____
 3. _____

House

54. Have you made improvements from the original house constructed?
 a) yes b) no
55. What improvements have you made?
 a) expansion of the living and dining room
 b) added bedrooms c) changed materials
 d) others, specify _____
56. Did you (or will you) receive a loan?
 a) yes; specify a source and amount; _____
 b) no
57. How much is your monthly amortization? _____ pesos/month

58. Do you pay on time? a) yes
 b) no, because can't afford to pay that amount
 because do not have any incentive to pay
 because nobody comes to collect it
 others, specify _____
59. If you can choose the amount, how much do you think your family can afford to pay? _____ pesos/month
60. Are there obstacles to owning the land (to have land tenure)?
61. How much have you spent to improve the house?
63. How much do you think the house is worth now? _____ pesos
64. Do you want to sell it? a) yes b) no
65. If you want to sell it, why? _____
66. When do you want to sell it? _____
67. If you do not want to sell, why? _____
68. Would you like to make the house better than it is now?
 a) yes b) no
69. If no, why? _____

Relocation

70. When did you know that you might be relocated?
 a) a year before actual relocation (or census making)
 b) less than a year before actual relocation (or census making)
 c) less than 3-6 months before actual relocation (or census making)
 d) when census is being undertaken
 e) others, specify _____
71. How did you know that you would be relocated?
 a) rumor
 b) government (NHA/ DPWH/ local government)
 c) barangay captain
 d) others, specify _____
72. What came into your mind when you first heard it? _____

73. Were you given a notice? a) yes b) no
74. If so, how long was the notice served before the relocation?
specify; _____
75. Did you try not to be relocated to Dasmariñas/FVR?
a) yes b) no
76. Why didn't you want to come here ?

77. What did you know about Dasmariñas/FVR? _____

78. Were there discussion/dialogues with the NHA/DPWH?
a) yes b) none
79. How frequent was the discussion?
a) once b) twice c) several times (specify _____)
80. Who joined these dialogues?
a) all relocatees b) barangay officials only
c) others, specify _____
81. Did you join any of the dialogue? a) yes b) no
82. If not, why not?
a) busy
b) timing was wrong (weekday/during working hours)
c) not interested
d) others, specify _____
83. If yes, why?
a) to know more information
b) everyone else said that they would be attending
c) I was told to attend
d) others, specify _____
84. Were there any changes made in compensation package after dialogues?
a) yes (specify _____)
b) none
85. Do you feel that you and your community's needs were being heard and reflected upon actual relocation program?

86. If given the choice, where would you have liked to be relocated?

87. Is there anything you want to ask/complain to NHA/DPWH in their way of handling the whole relocation program? What could have been done better?
88. What do you want from NHA/DPWH?

Displacement and Relocation

89. How did you get here?
90. When did you move in? (month/year)
91. How many days did you live in a temporary housing?
92. Did any of your family continue or discontinue to work or schooling due to the relocation? a) yes b) no
93. Was discontinuance voluntary?
a) yes
b) no (Then why? _____)
94. If someone stopped working for some time, did she/he go back to the same job? a) yes b) no
95. If she/he had to look for a job, how long did it take to start working?
96. How did he/she find a job? (*NHA/DPWH, barangay captain, neighbors, relatives, NGO/PO, cooperatives)
97. If given a choice, what would you have preferred to receive:
a) cash
b) in-kind (housing materials) compensation
c) house and a lot
d) others, specify _____
98. Why would you prefer cash? _____

99. If given cash, how do you spend it? _____

Regarding Job Training (Attn: This part will be only undertaken at DBB)

- 100. Are you aware that DSWD and NHA are providing job technical training? a) yes b) no
- 101. Have you attended? a) yes b) no
- 102. If yes, did you find it helpful? a) yes b) no
- 103. If no, why did you not attend? _____
- 104. If you are given the opportunity to have job training, what skills would you want to acquire? _____
- 105. If you learn the skills that you like, do you think it would be possible for you to find a job? a) yes b) no