
FERC & Electric Industry Restructuring

ESD.126

Overview

- Introduction to FERC
- Electric power industry structure
- Industry restructuring
- FERC rulemakings
- Creating competitive markets
 - o How to price products
 - o Impediments to competition
- Summary



FERC Authority

- Independent agency
 - o Commissioners appointed by President
 - o Budget from Congress
- Industries
 - o Natural gas pipelines
 - o Oil pipelines
 - o Hydroelectric dams
 - o Electric transmission lines

Energy Legislation

- FERC has jurisdiction over wholesale energy transactions, comes from Federal authority over interstate commerce
- 1935: Federal power act and public utility holding company act
- 1978: Public utility regulatory policy act
- 1992: Energy policy act
- 2002?: Legislation to address jurisdiction for reliability, mergers, mandate company restructuring

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FERC Authority from the FPA

- Approve transmission and wholesale energy rates
 - o Rates must be "just and reasonable," FPA 205 (Federal Power Act, section 205)
 - o FERC control revenue from regulated facilities
- Approve transfers of ownership or control of regulated facilities
 - o Filing must be "consistent with the public interest," FPA 203
 - o FERC authority over mergers, ISOs, RTOs

FERC Policy Making

- FERC makes policy by
 - o Issuing rules (rulemaking) not tied to any specific case
 - o Case by case decisions on filings made under the FPA, refine interpretation previous Rules
 - o Litigation Administrative law hearings
 - o Hold conferences coordination with states and stakeholders

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Recent FERC Electricity Rules

- Orders 888 and 889: Open Access for the high voltage transmission system, issued 1996
- Order 592: Merger Policy Statement, issued 1996
- Order 2000: Regional Transmission Organizations, issued 12/1999

Traditional Power Industry Structure

- Supply: Vertically integrated suppliers
 - o Electric utilities control generation, transmission and distribution
- Demand: Native load
 - o Captured customers in a monopoly franchise area
- Product: Buying and selling bundled electric service, energy (kWh) and transmission
- Market: No competitive marketplace

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Power Industry Structure: Which Segments are Competitive?

- Generation
 - o Can be competitive
 - o Public goods, joint products (ancillary services)
- Transmission network
 - o Natural monopoly (common carrier)
 - o * Can not direct or control power flows *
 - o The control of transmission affects the operation of the energy market - source of market power concerns

Power Industry Structure: Which Segments are Competitive?

- Distribution system
 - o Natural monpoly
 - o State jurisdiction
- System operation
 - o Natural monopoly
 - o Intangible good
 - o Operation of the transmission system *and generators* together as one system (one machine)
 - o FERC only has jurisdiction over transmission

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Restructuring the Power Industry

- Vertically Dis-integrate the Incumbent Utilities
 - o Generation
 - Deregulate
 - Create competitive markets
 - Separate ownership?
 - o Remaining segments
 - Continue regulation State and Federal
 - Allow market based rates on case by case basis
 - Unbundle electricity products

Restructuring the Power Industry

- The "unbundled" products are
 - o Energy
 - o Transmission
 - o Generation capacity
 - o Ancillary services: frequency and voltage support, energy reserves (joint products with energy)
- FERC's objective
 - o Ensure the independence of transmission and system operation
 - o Promote competition everywhere else
 - o Prevent abuse of market power

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FERC Order 888

- Require open access to the transmission system
 - o All participants must have unencumbered access to the monopoly owned transmission system
- Define the format for tariffs that utilities must file with FERC
 - o OATT Open access transmission tariff
 - o Tariffs define rates for transmission and ancillary services, and terms under which service is offered

FERC Order 889

- Address how buyers and sellers meet
 - o Create OASIS Open access same-time information system, web-based system to post transmission rates and availability (price & quantity)
- Define "codes of conduct" for communication between affiliated divisions of vertically integrated utilities
 - o Regulated transmission division
 - o Deregulated, merchant, generation division

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Order 888 and ISOs

- Eleven ISO (independent system operator) principles in Order 888
 - o ISO principles added to Order 888 almost as an afterthought
 - o All ISOs at that time were strong centralized power pools (or became one as in California)
 - o ISO owned nothing but controlled almost the entire system transmission and generation

Problems Post-888

- The number and variety of new market participants strained the structure designed by Order 888
 - o Number and type of requests for transmission service
 - o Demands for transparency in system operation decisions
- Numerous allegations of abuse of the codes of conduct
- Many unexpected forms of ISOs were proposed - Principles of Order 888 inadequate

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Order 2000: Regional Transmission Organizations

- Expand and discuss in great detail the eleven ISO principles of Order 888
- Create many new markets
 - o Ancillary services
 - o Balancing
 - o Congestion management
 - o Transmission rights
 - o (Energy)

Order 2000

- Ratemaking: Encourage "innovative" transmission pricing proposals
- Reliability: Maintain system reliability
- Independence: Ensure the independence of the transmission operator from energy market participants
- Flexibility: Allow regional flexibility in defining RTOs

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Pending NOPR

- NOPR = Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
- Current topic is Standard Market Design (SMD)
 - o White paper out now a notice of a NOPR
 - o NOPR end of Spring
 - o Endless comments will be filed
- Rulemaking
 - o FERC does what it wants mixed with inputs from comments
 - o Rulemaking becomes federal policy

Regulation

- What FERC does
 - o Approve transmission and wholesale energy rates
 - Price regulation
 - Rates must be "just and reasonable," FPA 205 (Federal Power Act, section 205)
 - o Approve transfers of ownership or control of regulated facilities
 - Filing must be "consistent with the public interest," FPA 203
 - o Reactive rather than proactive, but provide guidance


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
Deregulation?

- Removing regulatory oversight from a highly concentrated, vertically integrated industry will not result in a competitive market.
- In this situation, competitive markets must be intentionally designed and created.
- The regulatory role changes, but will not disappear until ... ?

Back to Basics

Characteristics of a competitive market





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Introducing Competition

- Economic issues
 - o Design a market place
 - o Mitigate market power a tremendous problem
- Technological constraints
 - o Update existing system operation software to accommodate *more* players who are *competing*
 - o Create new software for internet-based marketplace
- State and Federal jurisdiction battles

Market Design

- Identify (and create) market participants
- Define rights and responsibilities of all participants
- Identify products
- Design the marketplace (idealized goal)
 - o Where will trades occur?
 - o How will price be determined?
 - o How will participants interact?
- Design the transition period
- Address impediments to competition

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The Previous "Marketplace"

- The participants
 - o Electric utilities
 - o Native, captured load
- The product
 - o Bundled electric energy (kWh), including transmission service
- The marketplace
 - o None

Power Industry Structure: Which Segments are Competitive?

- Generation
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 - o Public goods, joint products (ancillary services)
- Transmission network
 - o Natural monopoly (common carrier)
 - o Public goods
 - o The control of transmission affects the operation of the energy market
 - o * Can not direct or control power flows *
- Distribution (state jurisdiction)

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Power Industry Players: Who Wants Competition?

- Interested in competition
 - o Large industrial customers
 - o Energy marketers
 - o Independent generation owners
 - o Federal regulators
- Only moderately interested
 - o Vertically integrated utilities (IOUs)
 - o Municipal and public power utilities
 - o Retail customers benefits small and dispersed
 - o Environmental advocates
 - o State regulators

Market Design: Products

- What are the "unbundled" products?
 - o Transmission
 - o Energy
 - o Capacity
 - o Ancillary services: frequency and voltage support, energy reserves (joint products with energy)
- How should the products be marketed?
 - o Should there be a single energy, capacity and services market, or
 - o Should there be many separate markets?

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Market Design: Marketplace

- Where and how will buyers and sellers meet?
 - o How provide incentives for participation? Force participation?
- Create a centralized or decentralized market?
 - o Require participants to interact through a central facility (internet-based trading floor)?
 - o Require participants to find their own bilateral trading partners?
 - o Allow both methods to be used?

Market Design: Information

- Understanding system design
 - o The market rules are new to everyone
 - o People lack information on how to behave and what to expect from others
- Access to data
 - o Buyers need price transparency
 - o Regulators need data to assess extent of competition
 - o Everyone needs technical data, which may now be proprietary

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Market Design: Price

- How is price determined?
 - o Allow market based prices?
 - o How will market prices be determined *before* a market exists? (The current situation.)
 - o Allow a central authority to set a price cap? Even if set very high, it may be viewed as a security blanket.
 - o Use a theoretical competitive price as a reference point?

Market Design: Standardized

- Motivation "Seams issues"
 - o Different regions have different rules
 - o High transactions costs
 - o FERC is in a good position to define the minimum standard market design
- Resistance
 - o There are legitimate regional differences
 - o FERC does not understand these differences and so could create a rule that undermines markets in some regions

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Specific Products to Price

- **≻**Transmission
 - **Energy**
 - **≻**Capacity

Transmission Ratemaking


- Types of transmission rates
 - o Cost of service rates old
 - o Market based rates new
 - o Performance based rates very new
 - o Discounted rates

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Transmission Ratemaking

- Types of service
 - o Reservation path: Point-to-point ("contract path"), network service
 - o Duration: year, month, week, day
 - o Certainty of reservation: firm, non-firm
- Components of service
 - o Bulk, wholesale transmission
 - o Ancillary services
 - o Losses

Transmission Ratemaking



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Transmission Ratemaking

- Pancaked rates (bad)
 - o Charges imposed by more than one transmission owner when wheeling through systems - multiple access charges
 - o Not based on economic principles, but rather based on vagaries of ownership
 - o Harms the development of competitive energy markets

Energy Prices

- Energy prices
 - o Distinct from transmission rates
 - o No longer regulated
- Centralized energy market
 - o Yes California, New England, Mid-Atlantic, NY
 - o No Midwest, South, Southwest, Pacific Northwest
- Decentralized market
 - o Bilateral energy transactions
 - o All regional allow these transactions

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Energy Prices

- Region or scope for energy prices
 - o Postage stamp single rate for entire region
 - o Zonal rate constant within zone
 - o Nodal rate different at each bus/node
- These mechanisms can be used to price transmission

Unified Pricing

- FERC's objective: To price transmission and energy with a single market mechanism
- Good and bad ➤ Why?
- Transmission Congestion Pricing
 - o Transmission rates determined by the difference in energy prices of the nodes at either end of line
 - o Market for financial transmission rights (FTRs)
 - o The alternative for congestion management is command and control (curtail transactions)

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Impediments to Competition

- Participants lack experience
- Designers lack experience
- General lack of information and data
- Conflicting objectives
 - o Incumbents resist change
 - o Entrants demand immediate change
 - o State regulators protect ratepayers (a.k.a. voters)
 - o Regulatory capture: regulators know and identify with the utilities

Incentives to Incumbents

- In exchange for accepting mitigation, and to avoid long court battles, regulators offer incentives
- Company incentives (bribes)
 - o Allow companies to recover their capital costs more quickly (stranded costs)
 - o Allow market based rates for some products early
 - o Bribes evolve into entitlements!

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What Has Changed? Then...

- Assume I wanted to build a generator pre-1996
- Utility could prevent me from using the transmission system - no "open access"
- I could not sell to the utility's retail load
- I could not buy transmission capacity to sell elsewhere
- There was no facility for price clearing to set energy prices

What Has Changed? Now...

- Transmission owners must let competitors connect to their transmission system
- Transmission owners must post prices and availability of transmission service and not favor their energy marketing affiliates (sort-of)
- RTOs to provide real-time market-based energy prices
- More participants facilitates bilateral trading
- I still can not serve retail load

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Impediment: Market Power

- Traditional, vertically integrated monopolies
 - o Have market power by definition
 - o Can use transmission to influence energy market
 - o Want to use their private property as they see fit
- FERC must *create* competition
 - o Simply removing regulatory oversight is not enough
- Mitigate market power
 - o Difficult to identify (prove) who has market power
 - o Design methods to mitigate market power

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Impediment: Lack of Information

- Information that is required
 - o Price: transmission and energy
 - o Quantity: availability of transmission capacity
 - o Future events: maintenance, other transactions
- Poor access to information is a big hurdle
 - o Past data: Historical competitive prices would be useful for comparison, but don't exist
 - o Future data: Data will probably become proprietary
 - o Regulators need data to assess evaluate competition

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Next Steps for Restructuring

- Federal: Pass federal legislation
 - o Reliability, mergers, mandate RTOs
- State: Pass individual state legislation
 - o Coordinate FERC and state policies via regional FERC-State meetings
- Industry: Source of all changes proposed to states and FERC
- Transition period: Learn from industry what does and does not work for the SMD NOPR

Summary

- FERC overview role limited (self-imposed) to setting agenda, and reacting to proposals by others
- FERC restructuring rulemakings
 - o Open access rule (OASIS, mergers)
 - o Regional transmission organizations
 - o Standard market design

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Summary

- Enabling legislation
- Respond to industry and political winds
- Offer guidance to industry
 - o Define products, new market structures, and participants' responsibilities
 - o Design the implementation, transition period
 - o Provide for market monitoring
 - o Ensure access to data and information
 - o Prevent market power abuse

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Conclusions

- Competitive markets
 - o Promote the efficient use of resources
 - o Incompatible with market power, so some regulation must persist
- FERC's role is to facilitate market development, but not to design and impose a single structure for all regions
- Markets must be purposefully created

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