

Does It Take One Or Two To Tango?
Language Skills, Physical Appearance, and Immigrant Integration
in Germany

by

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S.M. Political Science
M.I.T., 2001

SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN PARTIAL
FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
AT THE
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

SEPTEMBER 2008

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on August 31, 2008 in Partial Fulfillment of the
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Abstract

Breaking with a long-held political stance that Germany is, despite a sizeable share of permanent immigrant residents, not a country of immigration, the German legislature has drawn up a new immigration law, which entered into force in January 2005. It states a new commitment to integrate legal immigrants into German society by teaching them German and acquainting them with the legal, cultural, and historical precepts of the German state and society.

To gauge the role of the host society in the integration process, I use a three-pronged methodological approach to evaluate the influence of physical appearance and several other potentially salient attributes of immigrants on integration outcomes. Statistical analysis of recent census data provides a general picture of economic integration outcomes of foreign national residents in Germany. More specific information gathered by way of a structured survey among second generation immigrants in Germany allows me to investigate deeper levels of integration using variables geared more narrowly to my research question. Finally, qualitative interviews provide valuable insights into whether and to what extent immigrants themselves perceive language skills and physical appearance, as well as other issues, as shaping their integration experience.

Overall, my analysis suggests that language proficiency is a strong predictor of economic integration. The impact of physical appearance, by comparison, is negligible. The survey suggests that despite high levels of cultural, social, and identificational integration, immigrants still feel disadvantage as a function of their cultural difference from the host society. They also universally report having and cherish ties to both German and their society of origin. In-depth interviews suggest that second generation immigrants, although aware of a certain degree of discrimination, do not see it as a major issue. Still, lasting emotional attachment to Germany could be boosted by policies that show genuine acceptance of immigrants' perceived or real ties to two cultures and communities, and recognize the assets they entail.

Thesis Supervisor: Nazli Choucri
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Acknowledgements

I owe gratitude to many people who saw me through this project. First and foremost, I would like to thank my dissertation committee. Professor Nazli Choucri patiently stood by me through phases of doubt and insecurity at M.I.T., and graciously offered support, guidance, and encouragement as I slowly gathered confidence in my writing and research capabilities. Professor Roger Petersen generously agreed to be on my thesis committee, and provided feedback while on sabbatical overseas. Professor Ken Oye offered much-needed methodological advice, which shaped this thesis from its early inception during his research seminar on international relations to its final stages.

I would also like to thank Professor Steve Van Evera, who insisted I try my luck at teaching, and therewith greatly strengthened my confidence at a crucial stage of my M.I.T. experience. He also, in passing, polished my writing skills, for which I owe him lasting and ample gratitude.

Susan Twarog (as well as Monica Wolf and Santina Tonelli before her) helped me navigate the administrative hurdles throughout my time at M.I.T., and always offered warm and encouraging words along the way.

Everywhere I turned for my fieldwork, I met generous and wise people who offered their help and friendship while helping me gather and understand my data. Among them were Camay Çelik, Barbara Barth, Sandra Geßner, and Martina Nieder of the federal and state-level research data centers of the German Federal Statistical Office, Dr. Michael Braun of the Center for Survey Research and Methodology in Mannheim, as well as Gülay Girgin and Dr. Martina Sauer of the Center for Studies on Turkey in Essen.

For help with recruiting survey participants, I am grateful to Cornelia Spohn, Ursula Jimenez, Mrs. Beck-Tchouente and Helga Barrois of the association of binational families and partnerships (*Verband binationaler Familien und Partnerschaften*), Ms Kranjcan and Hartmut Daub of the *Caritas* organization, foreigner advisory board (*Ausländerbeirat*) members Ms Sharifi, Dr. Gundermann, and Ines Richter, Veronika Kabis of the immigration and integration office (*Zuwanderungs- und Integrationsbüro*) Saarbrücken, the team of the Kweto children store (*Kinderladen*) in Berlin, and Elke Rudolph for telephone support.

During the interview research, Professor Josef Zelger and Horst Lösch of Innsbruck University provided valuable guidance and support. I am also and particularly grateful to the people who agreed to be interviewed, and generously opened their hearts and minds to me in a way I never thought possible between strangers prior to venturing into this kind of qualitative research.

Last but not least, I owe gratitude to my family on both sides of the Atlantic. They saw me through this project with enormous patience and magnanimity, and graciously endured more than their fair share of fallout from my graduate career at M.I.T..

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Introduction

In present day Germany, integrating so-called residents with migration background is at the top of the political agenda and a highly salient topic in public debate.¹ This has not always been the case. When German politicians decided to sign guest worker programs with countries in Southern Europe and Turkey to alleviate labor shortages starting in the late 1950s, recruits were not expected to stay in Germany beyond short-term work contracts. In the decades that followed, however, it became increasingly clear that a sizable number of former guest workers had permanently settled in Germany, and that some of them did not fare particularly well economically and socially compared to the ethnic German native population.

The issue did not figure on the political agenda until recently, when a newly elected Social Democrat-Green party coalition at last acknowledged the presence of a sizeable share of permanent immigrant residents in Germany and drew up a new immigration law in 2002. It includes measures geared towards “facilitating the economic, cultural and social integration of foreigners living in Germany,”² which almost exclusively focus on teaching immigrants German, as well as acquainting them with the legal, cultural, and historical precepts of the German state and society.

Since their inception in February 2005, some 100,000 eligible immigrants enrolled in these new integration courses.³ So far, the jury is still out on whether and to what extent the skills they acquire will significantly impact integration outcomes.⁴ The issue of how to successfully integrate immigrants continues to gain salience as the

¹ The term persons with migration background refers to a group of people that includes foreign national immigrants, foreign nationals who were born in Germany, former foreign national residents who acquired German nationality by naturalization, and ethnic German resettlers. It also includes children with at least one parent of the aforementioned groups.

² Bundesgesetzblatt, "Gesetz zur Steuerung und Begrenzung der Zuwanderung und zur Regelung des Aufenthalts und der Integration von Unionsbürgern und Ausländern (Zuwanderungsgesetz) Vom 20. Juni," (2002) [My translation]

³ Bundesministerium für Migration und Flüchtlinge, *Integrationsbilanz für das Jahr 2006* (Nürnberg: BAMF, 2007), p. 2

⁴ See Hartmut Esser, *Sprache und Integration: Die sozialen Bedingungen und Folgen des Spracherwerbs von Migranten* (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2006), p.7

share of immigrants increases relative to the native population, and xenophobia among ethnic German natives spreads.⁵

How to best achieve favorable integration outcomes has become a pressing and contentious issue for both host society and immigrant residents alike. Some see cultural distance between immigrants and host society as the main impediment to integration. The more immigrants' culture and value systems differ from those of the host society, they contend, the more immigrants remain within their own ethnic communities, and thus voluntarily forego the kinds of host society interaction crucial for integration success. Forcing them to acquire the language and cultural skills needed to engage in such interaction is thus seen as a critical first step to facilitate integration.

Others see the main stumbling block in a lack of tolerance and permissiveness of the host society. The majority of immigrants, they contend, already have the language and cultural skills needed to thrive in the host society. Moreover, in the course of often extended residence in Germany, their culture and value systems have become quite similar to that of native ethnic Germans. The latter, however, continues to deny them equal access to mainstream German institutions and society.

My thesis seeks to empirically arbitrate this debate. I first test the validity of the key assumption underlying the current official stance in Germany that the main impediment to immigrant integration is their lack of language skills and knowledge of their host country. In an attempt to gauge the role of the host society in integration outcomes, I also test whether the physical appearance of immigrants significantly predicts integration outcome. I hypothesize that immigrants whose externally visible characteristics suggest that they may not be of ethnic German descent are more likely targets of host society discrimination, and thus may not reap as much benefit from their language and cultural skills towards integration success as those who readily blend in with the host society. Figure 1 illustrates my research hypothesis.

⁵ A recent survey among German residents suggests that xenophobia has become a widespread phenomenon spanning all strata of society. See Oliver Decker and Elmar Brähler, "Rechtsextreme Einstellungen in Deutschland," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 42 (2005)




Figure 1: Key Hypotheses on Immigrant Integration Outcome⁶

I also investigate the degree of similarity and difference between immigrants and host society across a number of attributes generally believed to reflect culture and value systems, and evaluate the degree of voluntary interaction between immigrants and host society in several domains. Taken together, the insights I gather contribute to arbitrating the debate on what, if anything, is amiss in immigrant integration, and what both host society and immigrants can do to further its progress.

I will divide this research into six chapters. In Chapter 1 I briefly sketch the history of immigration movements in Germany after the Second World War. I outline the current makeup of the resident population, and summarize the central argument of my thesis. Chapter 2 sketches the conceptual and theoretical landscape surrounding my topic. I clarify the main concepts associated with physical appearance and integration, respectively, and then locate these concepts within the seminal theoretical literature on immigrant integration in Germany and the United States. Chapter 3, 4, and 5 are

⁶ Figure 1 distills the relationships of interest here. Arrows designate causal relationships. Phenomena linked with an X designate a conditioning or multiplier variable that influences the magnitude of the respective causal relationship. The dotted line and arrows around host society discrimination indicate that although the respective links between immigrant physical appearance, discrimination, and integration outcome constitute testable hypotheses, I do not focus on them directly because discrimination is notoriously difficult to measure (See, among many other discussions on the difficulties of empirically measuring discrimination, Arthur Fischer and others, *Jugend 2000*, 13. Shell Jugendstudie, vol. 1 (Opladen: Leske and Budrich, 2000), p.255). I do include them in the diagram, and review previous research on them because of their relevance for my research. I borrow this way of visualizing a theory from Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to methods for students of political science* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), p.12ff. As I expect cultural skills to be hard to measure empirically and to correlate highly with language skills, I will focus my investigation on language skills alone.

dedicated to the three different methodologies I use to empirically test my research hypotheses. I start with the statistical analysis of census data in Chapter 3, which concentrates on the relationship between physical appearance and economic assimilation. In Chapter 4, I proceed by broadening the range of independent and dependent variables I test. I include both externally visible attributes of differentiation and internal areas of difference commonly associated with different ethnicity, and evaluate their association with commonly-used measures of cultural, social and identificational integration, using my own data gathered with a semi-qualitative structured survey of immigrant residents in Germany. Chapter 5 presents the qualitative analysis of in-depth interviews I conducted with immigrants on their integration experience. In Chapter 6, I conclude, and suggest important policy implications of my analysis.

Research into the dynamics surrounding immigrant integration and the respective roles of newcomers and the society they join is an important step towards devising effective strategies to reach the goals that most benefit society at large. In the German case, government policies and legislation currently focus on improving immigrant skills to facilitate integration. Evaluating the actual state of immigrant integration at various levels of depth, and examining the leverage of language skills in the process as compared to other important factors is crucial to determine the potential success of current policies, and can also suggest areas for improvement.

Chapter 1 Migration in Germany after the Second World War

Although Germany has historically seen phases in which outflows of citizens outnumbered inflows of immigrants, since the mid-20th century, West Germany has received more people than it lost to emigration. German government and society have recently begun to acknowledge and debate the parameters within which immigration occurs, and the kind of society they would like to see emerge and forge from it in the end.

In the following, I will first briefly describe the main groups of immigrants that came to Germany after the Second World War, and place the respective flows in their historical contexts. An overview of the current makeup of the German resident population and its main demographic parameters follows. In a third part, summarize the central argument of my thesis.

1.1. Immigration to Germany after the Second World War

Germany has not always been an immigration country. Historically, immigration to Germany is in fact rather the exception than the norm. In the 19th and early 20th century, more than seven million people left Germany, mostly to escape political persecution and economic plight.⁷ Since the end of the Second World War, however, Germany has de facto been a country of immigration. It first absorbed an estimated twelve million ethnic German expellees from Eastern Europe at the end of the war. In the 1960s, labor shortages prompted by a sweeping economic recovery led to the decision to recruit guest workers from Southern Europe, Morocco, and Turkey. In the late 1980s, the number of people seeking asylum in Germany soared, including a considerable share of nationals from the territory of the former Yugoslavia, who were taken in under temporary protection agreements.

⁷ For a detailed and fascinating account of migration flows in Europe in the past two centuries, see Klaus J. Bade, *Europa in Bewegung: Migration vom späten 18. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart* (München: C. H. Beck, 2002)

In the following, I will briefly describe these flows and their historical context in more detail. I concentrate on the three main groups of immigrants that still shape German society today, namely the group of ethnic German expellees, *Aussiedler* and resettlers, guest workers and their descendants, and asylum seekers and refugees.

1.1.1. Ethnic German expellees, *Aussiedler* and resettlers

In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, some twelve million ethnic German refugees and expellees from former German territory in Eastern Europe, as well as from Poland, then Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Hungary poured into the territory of what would later become the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, and Austria.⁸ Although accommodating and integrating them into post-war German society took effort, the obvious forced character of their migration and the fact that they were ethnically and legally Germans likely made their arrival more palatable to the resident population and smoothed their integration into post-war German society.⁹

Following these mass expulsions of ethnic Germans in the years immediately after the end of the war, a slow trickle of return migration continued from Central and Eastern Europe. Due in part to travel restrictions in the Soviet-occupied countries until the late 1980s, most of them came from Poland and Romania. Between 1950 and 1987, sixty percent of ethnic German repatriates (so-called *Aussiedler*) came from Poland, and fifteen percent from Romania. Despite its sizeable resident ethnic German minority, only 110,000 people, a mere eight percent of the total *Aussiedler* flows in this period, managed to leave what was then the Soviet Union between 1950 and 1987.¹⁰

⁸ See Rainer Münz, Wolfgang Seifert, and Ralf Ulrich, *Zuwanderung nach Deutschland* (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1999), p.28-30

⁹ See Marion Frantzioch, *Die Vertriebenen -Hemnisse, Antriebskräfte und Wege ihrer Integration in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Schriften zur Kulturosoziologie vol. 9 (Berlin: Dietrich Reimer Verlag, 1987)

¹⁰ According to the *Bundesvertriebenengesetz* [Federal law concerning Displaced Persons] of 1953, the term *Aussiedler* referred to member of the German Volk who left the former Eastern German territories of Gdansk, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania or China. In 1957, an amendment to the 1953 law gave *Aussiedler* the same status as expellees, and defined ‘membership of the German Volk’ more narrowly as referring to a person who has openly acknowledged his or her Germanness in his or her home

After the expulsions in the years 1945 to 1949, German immigrants from East and middle Europe continued at a low level and their flows were likely more voluntary, overall, than previous ones.




Figure 2: Ethnic German resettlers by country of origin

Source: Ulrich Mammey and Rolf Schiener, *Zur Eingliederung der Aussiedler in die Gesellschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Ergebnisse einer Panelstudie des Bundesinstituts für Bevölkerungsforschung* (Opladen: Leske and Budrich, 1998), p.9

When the iron curtain came down and administrative hurdles to emigration for *Aussiedler* were lifted in Eastern and Central European countries in the late 1980s, however, the number of ethnic German immigrants to (then Western) Germany increased dramatically. It tripled in 1988 alone from the previous year. In 1990, it peaked at 397,000. From 1988 to 1998, a total of almost 2.5 million *Aussiedler* came to Germany.

Ever since the end of the Second World War, *Aussiedler* could apply for naturalization and stay in Germany easily, even during visits to relatives or after crossing the border illegally. Due to the dramatic rise in *Aussiedler*, however, the Federal Republic of Germany introduced new legislation to curb the number of *Aussiedler* eligible to settle in Germany. In the late 1980s, the

country. See Hubert Heinelt and Anne Lohmann, *Immigranten im Wohlfahrtstaat am Beispiel der Rechtspositionen und Lebensverhältnisse von Aussiedlern* (Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 1992), p.45, 67

Aussiedleraufnahmegesetz (*Aussiedler* admission law) was passed, stipulating that aspiring *Aussiedler* apply for permission to resettle in Germany in their country of origin prior to their departure, and complete a lengthy questionnaire detailing their ethnic heritage to prove their membership to the German *Volk*. Then, in 1992, the so-called *Kriegsfolgenbereinigungsgesetz* (law on the settlement of effects of the war) newly set a yearly maximum quota of 220,000 *Aussiedler*. Ever since 1993, moreover, only residents of the former Soviet Union are entitled unconditional *Aussiedler* status. Ethnic Germans from other countries have to prove that they currently incur disadvantages from their German ethnicity in their countries of residence, or that they still suffer from repercussions of previously incurred disadvantages. They furthermore have to have rudimentary German language skills prior to being granted entry to Germany.

As a result of these legislative changes, the number of *Aussiedler* admitted into Germany has declined steadily, from the maximum quota of 220,000 in 1994 to a mere 134,000 in 1997 and a still lower 103,000 in 1998. By 2004, it had dropped further to 59,000, and reached a historic low in 2006, with 7,747 admitted *Aussiedler* and family members resettling in Germany. Between 1950 and 2005, over five million *Aussiedler* and their families resettled in Germany altogether.¹¹ Most came from Poland and the former Soviet Union.¹²

Resettlers from East Germany were a second group of ethnic German migrants. Even before the two German states were founded in 1949, about 730,000 people had left the Soviet occupation zone and settled in the Western zones. Between 1949 and the completion of the wall separating Soviet and Western occupation zones in August 1961, another 3.8 million East Germans moved to the West. Once the wall was completed, in mid-August 1961, this flow stopped abruptly. Between 1962 and 1988, a mere 23,000 GDR residents resettled in the FRG per year. The fall of the wall in November 1989 again prompted an uncontrolled mass exodus of Eastern Germans to the West. In 1989, a total of 390,000 Easterners resettled in the West, followed by 395,000 in 1990. With German reunification in October 1990, the scope of internal

¹¹ Jan Schneider, *Migration und Integration in Deutschland – Aussiedler* (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2005)

¹² Münz, Seifert, and Ulrich, p.34

East West migration decreased markedly, while the number of people moving from former West to former East Germany increased. Overall, between 1949 (when the GDR was officially founded) and 1997, East Germany lost about a quarter of its population.

Ethnic German expellees, *Aussiedler* and resettlers gain German citizenship immediately upon arrival on German soil irrespective of prior residency in Germany by virtue of their heritage. They thus do not appear in official statistics of foreigners in Germany. The situation differs for those who came to Germany as guest workers, as well as the majority of their descendants, to whom access to German citizenship was, until recently, denied. It is now generally contingent upon a minimum of eight years of permanent residency in Germany.

1.1.2. Guest workers

In present-day Germany, descendants of guest workers are the largest group of residents of non-German ethnic descent. When the export-driven German economic miracle took off in the 1950s, demand for workers rapidly outgrew domestic supply. To remedy the situation, West Germany began recruiting guest workers from Southern Europe. In 1955, recruitment contracts were signed with Italy, Spain and Greece (1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965), and the former Yugoslavia (1968).¹³ The recruitment programs were not meant to regulate immigration, but merely eliminate temporary shortages on the labor market. Only people for who (mostly low paid, low prestige, unattractive) work was readily available were admitted into the country. They were granted limited residence and work permits with an initial tenure of one year.

The German Democratic Republic likewise issued residence and work permits to foreign contract workers, mostly from fellow socialist central European countries, as well as Cuba, Mozambique, and Vietnam. Whereas acceptance for the limited tenure of guest workers soon faded among West German entrepreneurs, GDR officials

¹³ See Hedwig Rudolph, "Die Dynamik der Einwanderung im Nichteinwanderungsland Deutschland," in *Migration in Europa: Historische Entwicklung, aktuelle Trends, politische Reaktionen*, ed. Heinz Fassmann and Rainer Münz (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1996), p.43

continued to apply the rotation principle rigidly.¹⁴ In sheer volume, foreign workers never played as important a role for the economy in Eastern as they did in Western Germany.

In West Germany, employer and employee incentives soon worked against the short work contracts initially agreed upon. Guest workers wanted to stay longer, to earn and save money they planned to invest in their countries of origin upon their return. Employers, on the other hand, were unwilling to continuously retrain new workers rather than keep the ones they already had. In response to pressure from some of the countries of origin as well as German trade unions, the German government eventually eased the rotation principle and allowed extending work contracts in 1971. As a result, short-term stays turned into long-term residence.

As the OPEC oil embargo shook the economy in 1973, the German government abruptly halted all foreign recruitment programs. Faced with the ensuing obstacles associated with frequent commutes between their host and home countries, many resident foreign workers choose to bring their families and thus consolidate their residence in Germany. Most of Germany's current resident foreign population originated from these migration flows in the 1950s and 1960s, from Turkey, Italy, Spain, and Greece, as shown in Figure 4 below.

1.1.3. Asylum seekers and refugees

Until 1993, Germany's asylum laws have been among the most generous in Europe. Article 16 of the German constitution gave persons persecuted for political reasons an individual right to asylum. The provision, drawn up in 1949, was meant in part as a moral gesture to victims of the Nazi regime. Nonetheless, a mere 178,000 asylum seekers settled in Germany between 1953 and 1978, due mostly to travel restrictions associated with the Iron Curtain. Towards the end of the 1980s, however, the number of asylum seekers soared dramatically, as shown in Figure 3. Among them were civil war victims from Sri Lanka, and Kurdish refugees from Turkey, Iran and Iraq. Another estimated 350,000 people from former Yugoslavia were taken in

¹⁴ See Jürgen Dorbritz and Wulfram Speigner, "Die Deutsche Demokratische Republik - ein Ein- oder Auswanderungsland?," *Zeitschrift für Bevölkerungswissenschaft* 1 (1990)

under temporary protection arrangements. As a result of these flows, more immigrants came to Germany between 1989 and 1992 than to the United States.¹⁵




Figure 3: Asylum seekers in Germany, 1953 - 2006

Source: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge. *Asyl 2006: Tabellen, Diagramme, Karten, Erläuterungen*. Nürnberg, 2007, p.9. Prior to and including 1994, the graph shows first- and follow-up applications filed in the respective year. From 1995 onwards, only first-time applicants are counted.

In 1992, public unrest stirred by the magnitude of these flows instigated political debates on how to dampen the number of asylum seekers. In 1993, the CDU-led government finally decided to amend the constitution to restrict access to political asylum. Henceforth, applicants who had reached Germany by land through designated safe third countries (among them all countries adjoining Germany) were turned down and sent back to the safe neighbor countries they had traversed. In addition, asylum seekers from a list of so-called persecution-free countries were turned away immediately. A number of countries agreed to take back people who were thus turned

¹⁵ See Rainer Münz, "Demographische Analysen zur Zuwanderung nach Deutschland und ihren Auswirkungen," in *1. Migrationspolitisches Forum: Rechtsvergleichende und europarechtliche Aspekte einer Regelung der Einwanderung durch Quoten* (Bonn: Forschungszentrum für internationales und europäisches Ausländer- und Asylrecht der Universität Konstanz, 1998)

down as asylum seekers in Germany. In the wake of these constitutional amendments, acceptance rates plummeted, and the number of applications soon dropped as well. As Figure 3 shows, the number of asylum applicants has been declining in recent years. In the past decade, most asylum seekers came from Iraq, Iran, Serbia, Montenegro, and Turkey.¹⁶

1.2. Current demography of the German resident population

The dozen most frequent foreign nationalities presently living in Germany still reflect the nations of origin of the aforementioned immigration flows.¹⁷ Residents with Turkish, Italian, Greek, and Spanish nationality mainly came as or are descendants of guest workers who came in the 1960s and 1970s. Foreign residents from the territory of former Yugoslavia consist of guest workers and their descendants, as well as more recent refugees who fled from hostilities in their home region in the 1990s. The remaining foreign national residents in Germany are mostly smaller shares of citizens of neighboring countries.

Due to decades of below-replacement fertility levels, the population of Germany is decreasing precipitously.¹⁸ Current extrapolations predict that German population will decrease by ten to seventeen percent by the year 2050, and age significantly.¹⁹ The changing relationship between working contributors and recipient pensioners threatens the viability of current social security, pension, and health care schemes.

Immigrants and their descendants, on average, stand to benefit Germany's unfavorable demography. As Figure 5 shows, German residents with migration background (shown in the two darker shades) and foreign nationals (shown closest to the inner age axis) are considerably younger than those without migration

¹⁶ See Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, *Asyl 2006: Tabellen, Diagramme, Karten, Erläuterungen* (Nürnberg: 2007), p.16

¹⁷ Part of the reason for this lies in German naturalization laws, which until recently did not allow acquisition of German citizenship by naturalization at all. Immigrants and their offspring thus continued to be registered as foreigners, regardless of their long residence or birth in Germany.

¹⁸ The current total fertility rate is about 1.34, whereas the one necessary for replacement is 2.1 children per woman. See Statistisches Bundesamt, *Elfte koordinierte Bevölkerungsvorausberechnung: Annahmen und Ergebnisse* (Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt, 2006), p.6

¹⁹ See Statistisches Bundesamt.

background. Combined with relatively high levels of employment, their age structure has already, and will most likely continue to make them net contributors to the German social security schemes.²⁰




Figure 4: Foreign population by most frequent citizenships 2005

Source: Forschungsdatenzentrum des Statistischen Bundesamtes, "Mikrozensus 2005," (Wiesbaden: Forschungsdatenzentrum, 2005), own calculations




Figure 5: Age structure of resident foreign and German population 2006

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, *Statistische Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 2007), p.37

²⁰ See Ralf Ulrich, "The future growth of foreign population in Germany," in *The economic consequences of immigration to Germany*, ed. Gunter Steinmann and Ralf Ulrich (Heidelberg: Physica Verlag, 1994)

Immigrants also stem the population decline of the German resident population. Current fertility rates of some foreign national groups in Germany exceed that of Germans. Turkish women, most notably, still have an average of 2.3 children. The trend may not continue, however. Compared to the 1.3 children of German women, this is high. It is, however, markedly lower than the fertility rate of Turkish women in Turkey (who currently have 2.6 children, on average), and declining. For all other nationalities with sizeable presence in Germany, fertility rates are in fact lower than the one of German nationals. Current Turkish and other foreign national fertility levels taken together are slightly above the German one. Nonetheless, they have declined steadily over the past three decades and are likely to reach German native levels eventually.²¹

Aside from increased fertility of the resident population, demographic decline could be stemmed by immigration. In reality, however, the number of immigrants needed to reach certain desirable population benchmarks in Germany is staggeringly high. The United Nations Population Division recently estimated that Germany would have to admit (and attract) about 320,000 immigrants per year until the year 2050 to maintain its current population of about 82 million inhabitants. To maintain the current ratio between working and retired people, a staggering 3.4 million immigrants per year would have to move to Germany until 2050.²² Given recent declines in net immigration, even the lower scenario is highly unlikely.²³ The higher one is completely out of reach. Immigrants thus may temporarily delay, but are very unlikely to markedly stem population decline in Germany.

1.3. Spatial distribution within Germany

As we will see further below, integration outcomes vary with the spatial domains within which they occur. Despite the fact that some fifteen years have passed since Germany was unified in 1990 and when the latest census data was collected in 2005,

²¹ See Münz, Seifert, and Ulrich, *Zuwanderung nach Deutschland*, p.71

²² See United Nations, *Replacement migration: Is it a solution to declining and ageing populations?* (New York: United Nations Population Division 2001), p.41-47

²³ Since German reunification, net migration of foreigners reached a high in 1992 with 596,392. It has not surpassed 280,000 since, and has more recently averaged some 100,000 per year, with a downward trend. See Statistisches Bundesamt.

considerable differences remain in the spatial distribution of foreign national and native residents between formerly Eastern German and Western German states.²⁴

Overall, the former Eastern states are much more sparsely populated than the Western ones, with an average population density of about 131,000 inhabitants per square kilometer as compared to an average 910,000 inhabitants in the West. The difference is even more pronounced for residents of foreign nationality.

	<i>Resident Population</i>	<i>Foreign National Residents</i>	<i>Percent of total population</i>
<i>Hamburg</i>	<i>1743627</i>	<i>247912</i>	<i>14.2</i>
<i>Berlin</i>	<i>3395189</i>	<i>466518</i>	<i>13.7</i>
<i>Bremen</i>	<i>663467</i>	<i>84588</i>	<i>12.7</i>
<i>Baden-Württemberg</i>	<i>10735701</i>	<i>1277968</i>	<i>11.9</i>
<i>Hesse</i>	<i>6092354</i>	<i>697218</i>	<i>11.4</i>
<i>North Rhine-Westphalia</i>	<i>18058105</i>	<i>1927383</i>	<i>10.7</i>
<i>Bavaria</i>	<i>12468726</i>	<i>1179737</i>	<i>9.5</i>
<i>Saarland</i>	<i>1050293</i>	<i>87627</i>	<i>8.3</i>
<i>Rhineland-Palatinate</i>	<i>4058843</i>	<i>312926</i>	<i>7.7</i>
<i>Lower Saxony</i>	<i>7993946</i>	<i>534001</i>	<i>6.7</i>
<i>Schleswig-Holstein</i>	<i>2832950</i>	<i>152566</i>	<i>5.4</i>
<i>Saxony</i>	<i>4273754</i>	<i>119786</i>	<i>2.8</i>
<i>Brandenburg</i>	<i>2559483</i>	<i>67029</i>	<i>2.6</i>
<i>Mecklenburg-Vorpommern</i>	<i>1707266</i>	<i>39394</i>	<i>2.3</i>
<i>Thuringia</i>	<i>2334575</i>	<i>47773</i>	<i>2</i>
<i>Saxony-Anhalt</i>	<i>2469716</i>	<i>46723</i>	<i>1.9</i>
<i>Total East German States</i>	<i>13344794</i>	<i>320705</i>	<i>2.4</i>
<i>Total West German States</i>	<i>69093201</i>	<i>6968444</i>	<i>10</i>
<i>Germany</i>	<i>82437995</i>	<i>7289149</i>	<i>8.8</i>

Table 1: German and Foreign Resident Population in German States

Source: Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder. "Gebiet und Bevölkerung: Ausländische Bevölkerung (Stand 29.11.2007)." 2008. Accessed at http://www.statistik-portal.de/Statistik-Portal/de_jb01_jahrtab2.asp [January 2008]

Table 1 illustrates these differences, showing German and foreign national resident population of German states in descending order of foreign national share of total resident population. As can be seen, former Western German states (shown in the top eleven rows of the Table) are home to about 95 percent of foreign national residents in Germany, while a mere 5 percent reside in former Eastern German states.

²⁴ I loosely use 'native' here to refer to only ethnic Germans who were born in Germany. 'Native' more narrowly conceived as referring to anyone born in Germany in fact subsumes a sizeable part of foreign nationals as well, given German citizenship laws.

In the same vein, Figure 6 shows the distribution of so-called residents with migration background. The term ‚persons with migration background’ is contemporary jargon in official and public immigrant discourse in Germany. It was first introduced and used by the Federal Statistical Office in 2005. According to their official definition, the term refers to a group of people that includes foreign national immigrants, foreign nationals who were born in Germany, former foreign national residents who acquired German nationality by naturalization, and ethnic German resettlers. It also includes children with at least one parent of the aforementioned groups.²⁵

Figure 6 shows the spatial distribution of residents with migration background in Germany. Darker shades on the map correspond to higher percentages of residents with migration background in the respective areas. The density ranges from 40 percent and more (in the darkest areas) to less than 5 percent (in the lightest shaded regions). As can be seen, with the exception of Berlin, residents with migration background are highly concentrated in former Western German states, where they cluster in urban areas, most notably the city states of Hamburg, Berlin, and Bremen, as well as Stuttgart, Frankfurt, München, Augsburg, Nürnberg, Wuppertal, and Düsseldorf.²⁶

1.4. The central argument of my thesis

How to best integrate immigrants into the societies they join has become of growing interest to all societies admitting sizeable shares of new residents to their

²⁵ Note that the term is misleading in that it suggests that ‚persons with migration background’ have in fact migrated across state borders in their lifetimes, which is not necessarily the case. Conversely, some people who have in fact crossed state borders and/or spent portions or all of their lives abroad (most notably, non-naturalized German citizen émigrés) are not considered to be persons with migration background.

²⁶ Due to the relatively small number of second generation immigrants in Eastern German states, privacy regulations prohibited the use of their district-level residency information that would have allowed me to draw this map for second generation immigrants rather than rely on the broader category of people with migration background shown. Empirical data on second generation immigrant residency patterns in the United States, however, suggest that they are also more likely to live in urban areas in but a handful of states (See Alejandro Portes and Rubén G. Rumbaut, *Legacies - the story of the immigrant second generation* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001), p.34). The map shown in Figure 6 may thus most likely have looked similar for second generation immigrants only.

countries. Germany has only recently, and reluctantly, acknowledged the importance of the issue.




Figure 6: Spatial distribution of residents with migration background 2005

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit: Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund, Ergebnisse des Mikrozensus 2005, p.16

Conceptual imprecision, unfortunately, clouds issues and unnecessarily stokes the fire in public perception and debate. Most notably, controversy reigns over the degree to which immigrants need to abandon (perceived or real) ties to their country or community of origin for host society integration to succeed. Based on my results, I argue that second generation immigrants are, overall, very well integrated in German society. Although they lag behind natives in socioeconomic success, this is due not to a lack of aspiration on their part, but rather to a school system which systematically disadvantages children of lower socioeconomic class.

Cultural and social integration of second generation immigrants leaves much less to be desired than incendiary political rhetoric and media coverage suggest.

Nonetheless, the more culturally different second generation immigrants perceive themselves to be, the more they doubt being given the same opportunities as ethnic Germans. They also highly value their ties to their country or community of origin, and see emotional affiliation to two countries as entirely compatible.

For immigrants as much as anyone, true emotional attachment is predicated upon being accepted and valued as the human being they see themselves to be. The stubborn failure of German politicians, media and society to acknowledge the legitimacy of immigrants' dual affiliation thus endangers achieved integration, and makes immigrants question their existing affiliation to Germany. It may eventually cause them to reverse course and withdraw into their ethnic communities.

Although German language skills are valuable for economic integration, deeper integration will not automatically follow. Policies to acknowledge the legitimacy and value of the wealth of characteristics, experiences, and affiliations immigrants call their own are in order to convey the acceptance needed for lasting emotional attachment to Germany.

Universal approval of dual nationality, giving credit for foreign language skills at school, and strictly enforced antidiscrimination laws would go a long way towards credibly conveying host society acceptance and appreciation.

Chapter 2 Conceptual and theoretical landscape

The process and outcome of what happens at the intersection of immigrants and host society is described on both sides of the Atlantic with a number of concepts, which are rarely clearly defined. This chapter outlines these concepts and the theories in which they are embedded. It is divided in three sections. In the first section, I will first sort out the meanings of the terms surrounding immigrant integration that are most commonly used in scientific and public discourse in Germany and the United States. Among them, immigrant ethnicity and culture is often taken to be a catch-all independent determinant of integration outcomes. To clarify their meanings, I briefly sketch the debates on the degree of constructedness of ethnicity and culture, respectively, and address the question of how to measure ethnic affiliation. In the spirit of value-free analysis to undergird practical policy, I focus on the specific factors or practices that may influence integration outcomes, and do not conceive them as immutably constituent of and reserved for particular cultures. I then consider the integration outcome side. I describe the meaning of integration, acculturation, and assimilation and its various forms, and highlight contentious issues surrounding the respective concepts as they pertain to my endeavor.

In the second section, I map the pertinent theoretical landscape. A relatively recent strand of mostly U.S.-based literature directly addresses the issue of ‘whiteness’ and the nature of societal boundaries, such as those between ethnically or phenotypically different groups. As I focus here on the relevance of physical appearance for integration processes, this body of literature is highly relevant for my research. I then sketch the theoretical landscape on immigrant integration in Germany and the United States. On the German side, I focus on the writings of Hartmut Esser. He is one of the most prominent contemporary German sociologists working on immigrant integration, and served on the advisory committee of the Süßmuth Commission which drafted the new German immigration legislation in Summer 2001. In a nutshell, Esser sees host language skills as the key factor in immigrant integration and attributes empirical differences in integration depth to a deplorable tendency of

certain immigrant groups towards social and spatial segmentation.²⁷ His stance on immigrant integration has greatly influenced the new legislation and the integration measures it contains. I conclude with a brief reference to similarities and differences between Esser's stance, the one of the Süßmuth Commission and the ensuing legislation.

In the United States, the study of immigrants and the mode of their reception spawns many fields, including but not limited to anthropology, demography, economics, psychology, political science, and sociology. A comprehensive review of this literature is beyond the scope of this thesis. I will instead briefly canvass recent theories on the nature of societal boundaries, and then focus on the work of two American sociologists, Milton Gordon and John Berry. Milton Gordon and John Berry are among the most seminal theorists on immigrant adaptation in the United States to date. More importantly, however, their work influenced the thinking and thus policy advice of Hartmut Esser. Gordon and Berry are thus highly relevant to understanding and evaluating Esser's theoretical framework, and consequently, the theoretical underpinnings of the current German legislation.

The third section provides a brief description of methodological triangulation. By combining quantitative and qualitative methods of inquiry, I seek to extend the breath and depth of my analysis. While quantitative analysis methods are ideally geared towards providing an accurate and representative aggregate account of the overall status quo of integration as measured by variables for which data is available, qualitative accounts stand to add meaning to statistical associations by providing a better picture of the process, and illuminate how it is perceived by affected individuals themselves.

²⁷ Segmentation broadly refers here to the process of dividing an entity, such as a community or society, into parts.

2.1. Clarifying the concepts

2.1.1. Ethnicity, race and physical appearance

The concept of ethnicity is a contested one. While a comprehensive survey of the literature on the relationship between ethnicity, race and physical appearance is beyond the scope of this thesis, I briefly delineate their respective conceptual space and how they relate to each other. I also indicate how I derive the operationalization of the respective concepts in my empirical analysis.

The dictionary describes ethnicity as referring to „groups of people classed according to common racial, national, tribal, religious, linguistic, or cultural origin or background.’²⁸ One of the most cited definitions in the social sciences is the one by Max Weber, who defined ethnic groups as „those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization or migration.“ Weber further stipulated that „this belief must be important for group formation,“ and noted that „it does not matter whether an objective blood relationship exists.“²⁹

This latter notion is contested. Citing early twentieth century Jewish-American philosopher Horace Kallen, Samuel Huntington, for instance, recently argued that ethnic identity is permanent in as much as ‘one cannot change one’s grandfather.’ To him, ethnicity thus lacks the fungibility of culture. Culture, to him, refers to “a people’s language, religious beliefs, social and political values, assumptions as to what is right and wrong, appropriate and inappropriate, and to the objective institutions and behavioral patterns that reflect these subjective elements.”³⁰ Equally commenting on Kallen’s argument, Michael Walzer counters that while immigrants may not be able to change their grandfather, they can call him “a ‘greenhorn,’ reject his customs and convictions, give up the family name, move to a new neighborhood,

²⁸ Frederick C. Mish, ed., *Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary*, Eleventh ed. (Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster Inc., 2003), p.398

²⁹ Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie* (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1922), p.532

³⁰ See Samuel P. Huntington, *Who are we? The challenges to America's national identity* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), p.30. To be sure, Huntington concedes that intermarriage undermines his stance, and that, although skin color is, barring drastic procedures, a permanent feature, the perception of what a color means may change. He fails to further elaborate on the repercussions of these caveats.

[or] adopt a new 'lifestyle.'³¹ Other social scientists similarly see ethnicity as fluid and constructed, rather than fixed and inherently static.³²

The assumed degree of fungibility, or constructedness, of attributes associated with ethnicity thus varies among analysts. So does the list of attributes perceived to constitute ethnicity. Huntington argues that ethnicity (to him merely a function of physical descent, as outlined above) is permanent, and should thus be clearly distinguished from more malleable and, arguably, constructed cultural factors. Weber, by contrast, as his stance above implies, sees ethnicity in its entirety based on subjective, and thus, constructed beliefs of commonness in a wide range of areas, including not only physical type, but also, more broadly, shared customs and memories. Phinney similarly sees a shared culture, religion, language, place of origin, as well as kinship as constituents of ethnicity.³³

Of the more externally discernible features co-determining an individual's ethnic affiliation, the salience of any one of them to the respective individual and the environment in which he or she is embedded depends on the particular social context.³⁴ Although some attributes, most notably those referring to physical type, such as hair color and skin color, appear less prone to social construction than others, such as the perception of a shared culture or history, for instance, the meaning attributed by individuals and groups to the respective attributes can change. As we will see in Section 2.2.1 below, even skin color can gain and lose salience in response to changing circumstances, and thus appear to change over time. When physical appearance attributes are the most important determinant of group affiliation within a given society, for instance, people are prone to see and forced to define themselves in reference to these salient identifiers, even though they themselves may not genuinely attribute much significance to these particular feature(s), or agree with the place they

³¹ See Michael Walzer, "What does it mean to be an "American"?" *Social research* 71, no. 3 (2004), p.637

³² See Jean S. Phinney, "Ethnic identity and ethnic self-esteem: A review and integration," *Hispanic journal of behavioral sciences* 13, no. 2 (1991), p.63, as well as Joane Nagel, "Constructing ethnicity: Creating and recreating ethnic identity and culture," *Social problems* 41 (1994)

³³ Jean S. Phinney, "Ethnic identity and acculturation," in *Acculturation: Advances in theory, measurement, and applied research*, ed. K. Chun, P.B. Organista, and G. Marin (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2003), p.63

³⁴ Peter Weinreich, "The operationalization of identity theory in racial and ethnic relations," in *Theories on race and ethnic relations*, ed. John Rex and David Mason (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986)

are, *prima facie*, ascribed by society as a function of salient categories.³⁵ In the same vein, if language use and proficiency is taken by society as a preeminent marker of overall cultural orientation, small idiosyncrasies in speech may gain inordinate importance in determining which ethnic affiliation a person can credibly choose.³⁶

As for the less visible markers of ethnic belonging, Isaiah Berlin, who defined culture as “goals, values, and pictures of the world” which manifest themselves in the speech, laws, and routines of a self-monitoring group, suggests that actions speak louder than words. Cultural anthropologist Richard Shweder similarly argues that actions and routines should be given much more weight than professed creeds or value orientations when assessing the presence and strength of ethnic affiliation.³⁷ As Glazer suggests, however, immigrants’ inherent cultural practices change in response to the circumstances they find upon arrival in the host country, the state of the host economy, and the opportunities they encounter.³⁸ Integration outcomes are thus generally shaped as much by presumably inherent cultural as well as non-cultural factors, with both of them typically being intricately linked. So-called immigrant culture, or presumed aspects thereof, such as, for instance, a universal Asian ‘taste for education,’ should thus, as a cautionary principle, not be hailed as an independent explanatory variable for integration success or failure. A more fruitful and less controversial approach, Glazer suggests, would be to instead identify the specific factors or practices associated with success. Parents reading to their children, for instance, appears to universally benefit literacy. The word on such beneficial practices should then be spread:

“It makes more sense to think of [cultures] as storehouses from which practices suitable for and useful for all may emerge. In any case, [cultures]

³⁵ We will delve deeper into the subject of the salience of boundaries between so-called ingroups and outgroups in society further below.

³⁶ I leave aside here a discussion on the motives and mechanisms by which societal actors create, foster, perpetuate or change the salience of particular characteristics of societal groups or individuals. See, for instance, Anderson’s enlightening work on the connection between perceived group membership to nationalism in Benedict Anderson, *Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991).

³⁷ See Richard A. Shweder, “Moral maps, first world conceits, and the new evangelists,” in *Culture matters. How values shape human progress*, ed. Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington (New York: Basic Books, 2000), p.163

³⁸ Nathan Glazer, “Disaggregating culture,” in *Culture matters: How values shape human progress*, ed. Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington (New York: Basic Books, 2000), p.226

have gone through so much change that it is utopian to think that we can apply their lessons if we are to agree on them, in the large. But the specific practices of ethnic and racial groups [...] empathetically explored, may well tell us something useful."³⁹

The aforementioned points shape the way in which I operationalize concepts in my empirical research. I aim to capture a wide range of information on the salience of particular attributes or practices associated with ethnic affiliation, both to the people themselves and as they perceive to be seen by society at large. Among the features of interest are those that are commonly believed to signal racial affiliation (such as skin color, hair color, and eye color)⁴⁰ as well as other attributes that are discernible externally, as well as characteristics associated with ethnicity that remain hidden to the casual observer but still potentially influence integration outcomes. I categorize them into what American sociologist Milton Gordon refers to as extrinsic and intrinsic cultural attributes.⁴¹ In addition to the aforementioned traits related to physical appearance, extrinsic attributes, in Gordon's view, comprise other features that are readily observable, such as clothing style, or attributes that can be observed in casual interaction, such as speech accent, or ethnic distinctiveness of names. My list of intrinsic attributes, namely those that are less visible to the outside observer, includes features pertaining to lifestyle, such as eating habits and recreational tastes, knowledge of the culture and political institutions of the host society, as well as value orientations, such as religion and life goals. Table 2 shows the respective categories subsumed under ethnicity, with reference to literature suggesting it.⁴² There is, of

³⁹ Glazer, p.230

⁴⁰ I refer to these attributes as related to physical appearance rather than race throughout my thesis for three main reasons. First, the concept of race has become largely discredited as a valid taxonomy for humans in the social sciences. Second, although race is often used to refer to physical appearance, the two are not the same. As racial mixing accelerates, using physical appearance to identify races has become increasingly problematic. See Stephen E. Silver, "Correspondence: Comments and opinions. Skin Color Is Not the Same Thing as Race," *Archives of dermatology* 140, no. 3 (2004). Third, I do not situate my research in the discourse of 'race,' but rather in the broader multidimensional framework of ethnicity.

⁴¹ See Milton Gordon, *Assimilation in American life: The role of race, religion, and national origins* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p.81f as described in further detail in Section 2.2.3 below.

⁴² The table summarizes the various aspects of ethnicity mentioned here with sources in the literature as available. Sources are meant to be illustrative, rather than exhaustive.

course, some overlap between extrinsic and intrinsic categories.⁴³ The manner in which I sort the respective domains here is thus arbitrary to an extent.

		<i>Domain</i>	<i>Attribute</i>	<i>Source</i>	
<i>Ethnicity</i>	<i>Extrinsic attributes</i>	<i>Race / phenotype</i>	<i>Hair color</i> <i>Skin color</i> <i>Eye color</i>	<i>(Silberman, 2007)</i>	
		<i>Language</i>	<i>Proficiency</i> <i>Speech accent</i> <i>Distinctiveness of Name</i>	<i>(Alba, 2005)</i> <i>(Gurr, 1993), p.171</i> <i>(Rumbaut, 1994), p.755</i> <i>(Fearon, 2003)</i> <i>(Gordon, 1964), p.81</i> <i>(Roth, 2005), p.4</i> <i>(Hechter, 1975), p.43</i> <i>(Badar, 2006)</i> <i>(Silberman, 2007), p.18</i> <i>(Goldberg, 1996)</i>	
		<i>Clothing style</i>		<i>(Gordon, 1964), p.81</i>	
	<i>Intrinsic attributes</i>	<i>Value orientations</i>	<i>Religion</i>		<i>(Alba, 2005)</i> <i>(Gurr, 1993), p.171</i> <i>(Zimmermann, 2007)</i> <i>(Zolberg, 1999)</i> <i>(Hechter, 1975), p.43</i> <i>(Gordon, 1964), p.81</i>
			<i>Life goals</i>		
		<i>Lifestyle</i>	<i>Eating habits</i>		<i>(Hechter, 1975), p.43</i> <i>(Gurr, 1993), p.171</i> <i>(Gordon, 1964), p.81</i>
			<i>Rural versus urban provenance</i>		<i>(Gurr, 1993), p.171</i>
			<i>Recreational tastes</i>		<i>(Gurr, 1993), p.171</i> <i>(Gordon, 1964), p.81</i> <i>(Alba, 1994)</i>
	<i>Society-specific knowledge</i>	<i>Cultural skills</i> <i>Political institutions</i>			
	<i>Legal status</i>	<i>Citizenship</i> <i>Current immigrant status</i>		<i>(Alba, 2005)</i> <i>(Gurr, 1993), p.171</i> <i>(Rumbaut, 1994), p.755</i>	

Table 2: Domains of social boundaries for immigrants

⁴³ See also footnote ⁹⁴ below.

Depending on the salience of particular ethnic attributes in the society they join, immigrants may thus be able to deliberately choose some ethnic categories, such as those that are either less salient or less visible, while others are thrust upon them by society, which indiscriminately labels anyone perceived to be different from ‘the norm,’ in terms of the respective salient attributes, whether in appearance, language, or customs.⁴⁴ To capture possible differences in salience between chosen and ascribed features associated with ethnicity, I survey individuals on both the degree of salience they perceive society attributes to a range of ethnic attributes, as well as the degree of salience they themselves believe these attributes have.

Socioeconomic status (and, relatedly, education level) is also often mentioned as a salient societal fault line. Although it is not as obviously related to ethnicity than the aforementioned attributes (and hence not included in Table 2), some analysts, among them, most famously, Max Weber in the early twentieth century, see the high incidence of economic success within certain ethnic groups as an indication for a causal link between aspects of culture, in his case, most notably, Protestantism, and socioeconomic success.⁴⁵

In the spirit of value-free analysis to undergird practical policy Glazer recommends, however, I neither posit nor test ‘culture’ as an independent explanatory variable for integration outcomes. I instead focus on a range of specific factors and practices commonly associated with ethnicity as shown in Table 2.

In the following, I outline the meaning of integration, acculturation, and assimilation and its various forms, and highlight contentious issues surrounding the respective concepts as they pertain to my research.

⁴⁴ See, for instance, Henri Tajfel, *Human groups and social categories* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Phinney, "Ethnic identity and ethnic self-esteem: A review and integration," p.205. Mary Waters describes how West Indian immigrants are often (falsely) ascribed African-American ethnicity in the United States, and fight this ascription to avoid inheriting the negative stereotypes generally associated with African Americans. See Mary C. Waters, *Black Identities: West Indian immigrant dreams and American realities* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999)

⁴⁵ See Max Weber, *The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism* (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1930)

2.1.2. Integration

The meaning of the term *integration*, by far the most common term in German public and political discourse and literature on immigrant adaptation, is generally taken for granted, to refer to a generic and inherently positive adaptation process of immigrants as they encounter and embrace the society of their new home.⁴⁶ Literally speaking, the Latin *integratio* refers to the creation or restoration of a whole, to the process of including and incorporating all parts into a single entity. In the context of immigration in Germany, it is usually meant to refer to a reciprocal adjustment process, in which the receiving society adopts some aspects the immigrants bring along whereas the latter make adjustments in the opposite direction. While inherently appealing and plausible, this notion of integration in fact raises as many questions as it answers about the process it describes. Do both groups adjust equally to the respective other? Are there winners and losers in the process? In which realms does integration manifest itself? What is needed from both immigrants and host society for integration to succeed? These questions address some of the complexities underlying the deceptively simple concept of integration.⁴⁷

Many of these issues have been addressed in pertinent literature on immigrant assimilation in the United States. In fact, the conceptual space of the terms *integration* and *assimilation* as they are used in German and American literature and discourse, respectively, are very similar. I will thus touch upon these questions in the following section.

2.1.3. Assimilation

In contrast to German usage patterns, most of the pertinent scientific literature in the United States refers to the process of what happens when people meet as *assimilation*, rather than integration. The term assimilation, however, is also rarely

⁴⁶ See Adrian Favell, "Integration policy and integration research in Europe: a review and critique," in *Citizenship today: global perspectives and practices*, ed. Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff and Douglas Klusmeyer (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001), p.351f for thoughts on why the term has become fashionable.

⁴⁷ As Favell, p.354 notes, integration has become „a commonplace conceptual shorthand, vaguely referring to a state and process of a smoothly functioning multiethnic society. Its popularity may in fact be due in part to its vague, yet positive-sounding quality.

defined precisely.⁴⁸ In the following, I will thus first delineate the conceptual space of assimilation by considering the etymological roots of the word and how it has been defined both as a general term and in the context of immigration, with particular focus on what value judgments they contain about who wins and who loses in the process of assimilation. I then describe and distinguish the various realms of assimilation, namely cultural, social, economic, and spatial assimilation, and how they are related to each other. I also show that distinguishing the associated processes helps pinpoint the degree of effort needed at each level by immigrants and host society, respectively.

The Latin root of the term assimilation, *assimulare*, generally refers to making something similar. In its generic form, it can also refer to the process of absorbing something into a system, as well as to thoroughly understanding something. The process of becoming similar is inherently neutral, and does not imply any judgment on a concurrent loss or change of prior characteristics of the entities involved. There is usually no value judgment associated with the biological assimilation process associated with digestion, for instance, in which external substances are transformed to materials within the body. Presumably, both prior and subsequent shapes of the matter are valuable, and the transformation itself is understood as a natural and accepted occurrence during the encounter. As the term relates to processes associated with groups of people, assimilation simply means that they adapt to changing conditions. Anyone undergoing any kind of adaptation is likely to assimilate as a result. Rural Americans, for instance, assimilate to their new environment when moving to a city, as do singles as they become couples, and then parents.⁴⁹

When the term assimilation is applied to migration processes across national borders, however, it tends to gather emotional charge.⁵⁰ To be sure, some definitions

⁴⁸ This is in part due to the emotional charge associated with its various connotations. Yet, conceptual imprecision hampers a meaningful discussion of its presumed benefits and drawbacks to the parties involved, and impedes an overall understanding of its place within the generic processes associated with immigration, more generally. The debates on the implications and, hence, desirability of assimilation have been and are still heated on both sides of the Atlantic. I intentionally condense them here to what I believe to be their conceptual origins.

⁴⁹ Herbert J. Gans, "Acculturation, assimilation and mobility," *Ethnic and racial studies* 30, no. 1 (2007), p.161

⁵⁰ As I am writing this chapter, German-Turkish relations are strained as a result of Turkish Prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan telling German residents of Turkish ethnicity that 'assimilation is a crime against humanity.' His remark, as well as the reactions it triggered pointedly reveal the conceptual confusion and emotional reverberations associated with the term. See Bernd Ulrich, "Die

of assimilation in this context do stay close to its neutral etymological root, and retain its relative neutrality. Some, for instance, describe assimilation as the process of „absorbing one cultural group into harmony with another.“⁵¹ Others stress the relative involuntariness the original meaning implies, and define assimilation as „a process in which people of different backgrounds come to see themselves as part of a larger national family.“⁵² In this vein, American sociologist Robert Park, writing in the 1920s, coined his seminal definition of what he referred to as social assimilation as „the processes by which peoples of diverse racial origins and different cultural heritages, occupying a common territory, achieve a cultural solidarity sufficient at least to sustain a national existence.“⁵³

Others, however, add various degrees and forms of value judgment, describing, for instance, „a process whereby a minority group gradually adopts the customs and attitudes of the prevailing culture,“⁵⁴ or, more pointedly, a process in which „an ethnic group loses distinctiveness and becomes absorbed into a majority culture.“⁵⁵ These definitions imply a more or less deplorable loss to the respective assimilating ethnic minority groups.⁵⁶ Still others see such loss as one to the host society, as immigrants conform to the norms of and assume the personality of natives, and thus „have nothing new to offer to the new society.“⁵⁷ Some add to this notion of loss the flavor of force and coercion, likening the changes associated with assimilation to an unwelcome crushing of a weaker by a dominant group, and thus expect the process to be inherently conflictual.⁵⁸

Mauer muss weg! Deutsche und Türken können die Trennlinien überwinden, die Koch und Erdoğan gezogen haben," *Die Zeit*, February 14 2008 for a discussion of the incident.

⁵¹ <http://www.wordnet-online.com/assimilation.shtml>, accessed November 2007.

⁵² <http://www.wordreference.com/definition/assimilation>, accessed November 2007.

⁵³ Robert E. Park, "Assimilation, social," in *Encyclopedia of the social sciences*, ed. Edwin R.A. Seligman and Alvin Johnson (New York: MacMillan, 1930), p.281

⁵⁴ Joseph P. Pickett, *The American Heritage dictionary of the English language*, 4th ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2000), p.109

⁵⁵ Gary Parkinson and Robert Drislane, "The Thomson Nelson Canadian online dictionary for the social sciences" (Athabasca University, 2007)

⁵⁶ The customary use of hyphenated descriptors of ethnicity of immigrants to the United States can be conceived as a way to signal affiliation to both society of origin and destination.

⁵⁷ Laura Zimmermann, Klaus F. Zimmermann, and Amélie Constant, "Ethnic self-identification of first-generation immigrants," *International migration review* 41, no. 3 (2007), p.777

⁵⁸ Francis Parkman, *The Jesuits in North America in the seventeenth century* (Charleston, SC: BiblioBazaar, 1867, 2007) as mentioned in J. Berry, "Social and cultural change," in *Handbook of*

The various nuances in these definitions may appear slight, yet given the immense moral and emotional reverberations associated with the implied consequences for host and immigrant societies, assimilation has become a rather unpopular term in scientific and public discourse on both sides of the Atlantic. In the United States, imprecise definitions appear to be the tool of choice to circumvent heated discussions on its implications, and thus, desirability. German scientists, by contrast, avoid the term assimilation altogether, and revert instead to *integration* as a generic (and, as we have described above, somewhat hollow) descriptor of what happens at the intersection of immigrant and host society.⁵⁹

In addition to and intricately linked to the aforementioned task of clearly establishing what assimilation means and entails, we need to determine which realms it covers. In his aforementioned seminal definition of assimilation, American sociologist Robert Park appears to have taken assimilation to refer to *cultural* adaptation only, encompassing behavioral patterns, rules, values, and symbols.⁶⁰ Some of his contemporaries, however, appear to have used the term *acculturation* to refer to these processes instead. Recalling his days as a graduate student in Chicago, Gans notes that, while Park and his fellow sociologists used the term *assimilation* at the time, their ethnologist colleagues referred to the same cultural processes as *acculturation*.⁶¹ Arguably the most seminal definition of acculturation to date, advanced shortly after Park's definition of social assimilation by anthropologist Robert Redfield and his associates, mirrors the Chicago ethnologist view, describing acculturation as the "phenomena which result when groups of individuals having

cross-cultural psychology, ed. Harry C. Triandis and Richard W. Brislin (Boston Allyn and Bacon, 1980), p.10. We will come back to Berry in Section 2.2.4 below.

⁵⁹ As John Berry, "Immigration, acculturation and adaptation," *Applied psychology* 46 (1997), p.8 notes, conceptual confusion increases further when French terminology is added to the mix. French scholars refer to *interculturalism* as 'the set of processes by which individual and groups interact when they identify themselves as culturally distinct.' Although translation is a common and legitimate source of diverging terminology, both integration and assimilation exist and are commonly used in German and French, as well. Terminological shifts can thus, arguably, not be blamed on linguistic incompatibility in this case.

⁶⁰ See Park.

⁶¹ Herbert Gans, "Toward a reconciliation of assimilation and pluralism: The interplay of acculturation and ethnic retention," *International migration review* 31, no. 4 (1997), p.877

different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact, with subsequent changes in the original *culture* patterns of either or both groups."⁶²

Some more recent analysts, however, do not clearly differentiate between the cultural phenomena thus subsumed under acculturation, or *cultural* assimilation, and those and others comprised in the notion of assimilation, more generally.⁶³ In their more recent and often cited definition of assimilation, Richard Alba and Victor Nee, for instance, describe assimilation as ‘the decline of an ethnic distinction and its corollary *cultural and social* differences.’⁶⁴

Despite its omnipresence as a conceptual shorthand in scientific literature and discourse, however, the meaning of (social) assimilation is often taken for granted in empirical studies, and, given their lack of precise definitions, has to often be inferred solely from the respective indicators used to measure the process. Some theorists use social assimilation (or in the German context, social integration) broadly to cover cultural, as well as social and economic aspects of the relationship between immigrants and the host society.⁶⁵ Others conceive assimilation merely as a process of upward economic mobility, and see it succeed as immigrants achieve parity with natives in employment status and income levels.⁶⁶

Other analysts distinguish among the various aspects and domains of assimilation, and assign each its indicators to empirically measure and track the respective processes. Most commonly, cultural assimilation is operationalized with indicators measuring host language competence, cultural skills, and media use preferences, or the generic perception of immigrants to be able to ‘get on’ in the host society. Social assimilation, by contrast, is commonly gauged with indicators measuring the frequency and depth of various forms of voluntary interaction between members of

⁶² Robert Redfield, Ralph Linton, and Melville J. Herskovits, "Memorandum on the study of acculturation," *American anthropologist* 38, no. 1 (1936), p.149 [emphasis added]

⁶³ I henceforth use cultural assimilation and acculturation as synonyms.

⁶⁴ Richard D. Alba and Victor Nee, *Remaking the American mainstream: Assimilation and contemporary immigration* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), p.10 [emphasis added].

⁶⁵ See, for instance, Hartmut Esser, *Integration und ethnische Schichtung* (Mannheim: Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung, 2001)

⁶⁶ See Wolfgang Seifert, *Geschlossene Grenzen, offene Gesellschaften?* (Frankfurt: Campus, 2000)

host and immigrant society, in the form of acquaintances, friendships, partnerships and marriages.⁶⁷

Cultural and social assimilation thus conceived differ substantially in the degree of effort they entail from immigrants and host society. While acculturation is largely an automatic and unintentional process up to the immigrants themselves, social assimilation is contingent upon them being formally or informally accepted in various settings by the non-immigrants they seek to join.⁶⁸

Although both processes often occur simultaneously and reinforce each other to an extent, immigrants, particularly those of the second generation, may be perfectly acculturated to the host society, such that they are no longer distinguishable from the host society on the basis of the aforementioned cultural attributes alone, and still be denied the acceptance they would need to enter non-immigrant economic and social circles. Without this acceptance, social relations commonly subsumed under social assimilation will not occur.

At his time, Robert Park located the attributes that effectively deny entry to these host society circles and thus assimilation to immigrants in America in physical appearance attributes rather than cultural differences between immigrants and host society:

“Interaction and imitation, intimate association and participation in the common life have achieved definite uniformities in language, manner, and formal behavior. The ease and rapidity with which aliens have been able to take over American customs and manners have enabled the United States to digest every sort of normal human difference, with the exception of the purely external ones, like that of the color of the skin.”⁶⁹

Aside from cultural and social assimilation, *economic* assimilation is commonly mentioned as a realm of assimilation. It generally refers to the attainment of equality

⁶⁷ Note that these indicators of the degree of social assimilation resemble Bogardus' seminal scale of social distance. He assumed minimal distance to exist between an individual and a racially, occupational or religiously different group if the individual could imagine marrying a member of the respective group. As measures of ascending social distance, he used a stated acceptability of regular friendship to the group, a coworker situation, residence in the same neighborhood, knowing members of the group as acquaintances only, an expressed wish to reside in separate neighborhoods, and, finally, the feeling that the group should live outside one's own country altogether. See Emory S. Bogardus, "A social distance scale," *Sociology and social research* 17 (1933), p.269

⁶⁸ Gans, "Acculturation, assimilation and mobility," p.153-154

⁶⁹ Robert Ezra Park and Ernest Watson Burgess, *Introduction to the science of sociology* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1921), p.281

in the aggregate, between immigrant groups and host society on a variety of socioeconomic indicators, such as income, human capital endowment (commonly measured by educational achievement) and occupational status.⁷⁰ Here, again, the term just as readily applies to societal groups in general. It is essentially synonymous to *economic mobility*, namely the move to a higher or lower level of income, wealth, education, employment status and standard of living. As such, economic assimilation describes the experience of immigrants just as other groups in society.⁷¹

Much ink has been spent in the United States on the issue of whether economic assimilation necessarily implies *upward* mobility. Theorists writing on the experience of the descendants of European immigrants who arrived in the United States as low-skill laborers in the early 20th century assumed economic assimilation to be synonymous with upward mobility. Indeed, immigrants at the time easily found work, and, with time, opportunities to advance in the host society.⁷² The assumption does not apply as universally to later immigrants and their descendants, however. In part due to rapid national deindustrialization and global industrial restructuring in the past two decades, immigrant children of later arrivals to the U.S. with modest human capital endowments have fewer opportunities to move up gradually within the working class.⁷³

For current immigrant groups with substantial human capital, conversely, economic assimilation has to be conceived not as a process of socioeconomic catch-

⁷⁰ Richard Alba, "Bright versus blurred boundaries: Second generation assimilation and exclusion in France, Germany, and the United States," *Ethnic and racial studies* 28 (2005), p.21

⁷¹ Gans, for instance, mentions as non-immigrant groups encountering economic assimilation junior faculty promoted to tenure (and hence moving up), or downsized auto workers who go on to work as security guards (and hence move down). Gans, "Acculturation, assimilation and mobility," p.154, 161. Seminal works on economic assimilation of immigrants include George J. Borjas, "Self selection and the earnings of immigrants," *American economic review* 77 (1985) and Barry Chiswick, "The effects of Americanization on the earnings of foreign born men," *Journal of political economy* 86 (1978)

⁷² See Alba and Nee, *Remaking the American mainstream: Assimilation and contemporary immigration*; Saskia Sassen, *The Mobility of labor and capital: A study in international investment and labor flow* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990)

⁷³ Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou, "The new second generation: Segmented assimilation and its variants," *Annals of the American academy of political and social science* 530 (1993), p.76. For seminal statements on what has become known as the phenomenon of 'segmented assimilation' I allude to here, see Abramson, "Assimilation and pluralism," in *Harvard encyclopedia of American ethnic groups*, ed. S. Thernstrom (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981); Portes and Zhou, "The new second generation: Segmented assimilation and its variants," and Herbert Gans, "Second generation in decline: Scenarios for the economic and ethnic futures of post-1965 American immigrants," *Ethnic and racial studies* 15 (1992)

up with host society levels, but rather in terms of being granted the same opportunities as equally qualified host society members to achieve their life goals and pursue contested goods, such as desirable higher-end occupations.⁷⁴ To these immigrants, economic assimilation is contingent less on their own efforts to gain valued skills and experience but rather on whether and to which extent they are given permission to apply and are valued for the skills they already have.⁷⁵

Another interesting question is whether and to which degree economic assimilation, in the sense of equal attainment in income, human capital endowment and occupational status, is contingent upon successful acculturation. Despite the universal (if unspoken) assumption across academic and public discourse that economic assimilation cannot occur without the prior acquisition of linguistic, cultural and behavioral skills commonly subsumed under acculturation, this is not necessarily the case. In certain circumstances, entrepreneurs and workers in ethnic enclaves or in niches within the economy at large have in fact prospered economically without adopting host society ethnic and cultural practices.⁷⁶ Still, some degree of assimilation is likely to occur with mobility in either direction. As Gans notes, ‘upward economic mobility is often accompanied by invitations to join the closed business organizations and social clubs of higher status non-immigrants. Occupational and business requirements may turn invitations into obligations, but in each case, the result is likely to be some degree of assimilation, or at least work-related assimilation.’⁷⁷ Conversely,

⁷⁴ Alba and Nee, *Remaking the American mainstream: Assimilation and contemporary immigration*, p.28

⁷⁵ This holds true equally for highly skilled immigrants to the United States and Germany, although awareness of this issue is less widespread in Germany, partly because high-skilled immigration is a fairly new phenomenon there.

⁷⁶ See Margaret M. Chin, *Sewing women: Immigrants and the New York garment industry* (New York: Columbia 2005); Roger Waldinger, *Still the promised city? African-Americans and new immigrants in postindustrial New York* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Alejandro Portes and Robert D. Manning, "The immigrant enclave: Theory and empirical examples," in *Competitive ethnic relations*, ed. S. Olzak and Nagel J. (Orlando, FL: Academic Press, 1986)

⁷⁷ Gans, "Acculturation, assimilation and mobility," p.158/9. Arguments on the possibility of reaching socioeconomic parity with the host society by participating in ethnically controlled sub-economies have also been made by Kenneth L. Wilson and Alejandro Portes, "Immigrant enclaves: An analysis of the labor market experiences of Cubans in Miami," *American journal of sociology* 86, no. 2 (1980); Robert L. Bach and Alejandro Portes, *Latin journey: Cuban and Mexican immigrants in the United States* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985); Portes and Manning, "The immigrant enclave: Theory and empirical examples;" and Waldinger as well. I will discuss the relationship between upward mobility and invitations to join host society circles again when outlining Esser's stance on immigrant integration in Section 2.2.2 further below.

as we will see, successful acculturation, as evidenced by a native-level mastery of the culture, language and behavioral patterns of the host society does not inoculate immigrants and their offspring against socioeconomic standstill, or even decline.⁷⁸

<i>Realm of assimilation</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Indicators</i>
<i>Cultural assimilation</i>	<i>Gradual (mostly automatic) changes of cultural patterns of immigrants and their descendants (and, to a lesser extent, host society) when both meet</i>	<i>Host language skills and usage, cultural skills, behavioral patterns (e.g., dress, food, media use preferences), perception to be able to 'get on' in the host society</i>
<i>Economic assimilation</i>	<i>Attainment of socioeconomic equality in the aggregate, between immigrant groups and host society</i>	<i>Income, Degree of reliance on social security, Educational achievement, Occupational status</i>
<i>Social assimilation</i>	<i>Admission of immigrants into social circles of mainstream society</i>	<i>Frequency and depth of various forms of voluntary interaction between members of host and immigrant society, such as acquaintances, friendships, partnerships and marriages</i>
<i>Spatial assimilation</i>	<i>Residential proximity of minority to majority groups in metropolitan areas</i>	<i>Measure of the distribution of minority and majority group residences in (metropolitan) areas (index of dissimilarity)</i>

Table 3: Realms of assimilation with indicators

In addition to cultural, social and economic assimilation, the notion of *spatial assimilation* appears frequently in the literature on immigration.⁷⁹ Reflecting on the patterns he observed during mass immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe to Chicago at the turn of the 20th century, Park noted that social relations are correlated with spatial relations, and that social distance could thus be gauged by way of

⁷⁸ I will elaborate on the circumstances under which acculturative assets are less useful for socioeconomic success in the host society further below.

⁷⁹ Mirroring the conceptual confusion between integration and assimilation described earlier, some theorists refer to spatial assimilation and residential integration interchangeably. See Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, "Suburbanization and segregation in U.S. metropolitan areas," *The American journal of sociology* 94, no. 3 (1988), p.613

physical distance.⁸⁰ As immigrants improve their socioeconomic status and acculturate to the host society, he reasoned, they seek and are granted entrance to the more desirable neighborhoods of natives in urban society. More recently, Massey and Denton confirmed this notion empirically for some contemporary immigrant groups and their offspring in the United States. They also found stark differences in the degree of spatial assimilation between immigrant groups, however, which they attributed to persistent discrimination against Blacks in the sale and rental of housing in the more desirable neighborhoods.⁸¹

Table 3 summarizes the realms of assimilation outlined in this section, as well as the indicators commonly used to measure the respective processes in empirical literature on immigration to date. The list of measures is not inclusive but rather meant to capture the most frequent indicators, most of which I will use myself in the empirical part of this study.

In the following, we will take a closer look at the nature of societal boundaries and attempt to identify the characteristics that make certain immigrant groups particularly prone to discrimination.

2.2. Mapping the pertinent theoretical landscape

In the last decade or so, immigration has gained salience as a political issue on both sides of the Atlantic. As differences among immigrants in the degree and speed at which they achieve parity with the respective host society in key areas of economic and social life have become apparent, some new thinking has emerged on the role of societal boundaries in forging these discrepancies, and on how such boundaries are drawn and negotiated between 'ingroups and outgroups' within a common national space.⁸² In the following, I briefly describe the domains in which societal boundaries

⁸⁰ See Robert Ezra Park, "The urban community as a spatial pattern and a moral order," in *The urban community*, ed. Ernest W. Burgess (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1926), p.18. To be sure, physical distance has since become easier to bridge due to recent unprecedented advances in communication and transportation. Residential proximity can thus no longer be assumed to be a prerequisite for contact between groups to the extent it could earlier.

⁸¹ Massey and Denton, p.622

⁸² The literature I refer to here is rooted in part in earlier work on the social construction of ethnic and racial boundaries by Fredrik Barth, *Ethnic groups and boundaries* (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1969);

manifest themselves, and outline and illustrate the mechanisms by which people can reposition themselves in respect to these boundaries. I comment on the ones that are held to be most salient in the United States, Europe, and Germany, respectively, and argue that the focus on one salient aspect (namely, language skills) defining societal boundaries should be broadened in Germany, to identify and address a wider range of potential roadblocks to immigrant integration.

2.2.1. The nature of boundaries in society

Traditional categories in which societal boundaries typically manifest themselves for members of any society net of immigrants include gender, class, and religion. Immigrants are often also grouped, correctly or incorrectly, according to their perceived ethnicity, nationality, immigrant status, host language skills, race, and skin color.⁸³ Newcomers are faced with and position themselves, or, as we have described in Section 2.1.1 above, are forced into an ascribed place in respect to these established fault lines upon arrival in the host society.⁸⁴ Thereafter, they often, in time frames ranging from instantaneous to the course of generations, renegotiate and change their position in respect to some of these boundaries.⁸⁵

Using and expanding Bauböck's work on societal boundaries, Zolberg and Long distinguish three ways in which such repositioning can be achieved, namely boundary crossing, boundary blurring, and boundary shifting.⁸⁶ Boundary crossing is akin to John Berry's assimilation process as described in Section 2.2.4 below, and entails immigrants individually changing themselves to fit in a new space in society, by

Nagel; Michael Omi and Howard Winant, *Racial formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s* (New York: Routledge, 1994), among others.

⁸³ Alba, "Bright versus blurred boundaries: Second generation assimilation and exclusion in France, Germany, and the United States."

⁸⁴ Again, Mary Water's story of West Indian immigrants being incorrectly perceived as and a priori ascribed membership in the African-American category provides a vivid example of the workings of societal fault lines and their repercussions for the affected immigrant groups.

⁸⁵ Note that this process of repositioning in respect to societal boundaries over time is not reserved to immigrants at all. Given the required drive, parental support, skills, or sheer luck, for instance, a 'native' child born into a lower societal class can move up economically and thus in time reposition him- or herself in respect to established class boundaries.

⁸⁶ See Rainer Bauböck, *The integration of immigrants* (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1994); Aristide R. Zolberg and Litt Woon Long, "Why Islam is like Spanish: Cultural incorporation in Europe and the United States," *Politics and society* 27, no. 3 (1999), p.8f

purposively or subconsciously acquiring new attributes, such as, for instance, host language skills, manners, or a host society passport.

Boundary blurring, by contrast, results from increased tolerance for and increasing accommodation of multiple memberships or identities within the mainstream society. In the process of boundary blurring, identities that were previously considered mutually exclusive become seen as compatible.⁸⁷ An oft-cited example of such boundary blurring is the redefinition of the Christian into Judeo-Christian civilization after the Holocaust following a consensus among liberal democracies to see Jews as fellow Westerners. This perceptual shift in time blurred a previously bright boundary separating Judaism and Christianity.⁸⁸ Boundary blurring can also manifest itself in other ways, such as through increased acceptance of public bilingualism, or official sanctioning of dual citizenship.⁸⁹

Finally, boundary shifting is a process by which the demarcation line separating ingroup and outgroup in society shifts, such that entire groups are repositioned relative to the respective boundary. Such boundary shifts are empirically less frequent than boundary crossings and boundary blurring and, as Zolberg and Long concede, occur only after substantial boundary crossing and boundary blurring have taken place.⁹⁰ Italian and Southern European immigrants to the United States in the early twentieth century are among the most notable groups of immigrants who experienced boundary shifting, as they were collectively redefined over time from distrusted in-between swarthy southern Europeans to whites on par with and as such admitted into

⁸⁷ Note that the notion of societal boundaries, boundary crossing, blurring, and shifting is intricately related to the concept of individual and group identity. As individuals and groups change the way they see and define themselves among themselves and in relation to others, and reorder the hierarchy of salience of features they see as defining their affiliation, societal boundaries are crossed, blur, and shift. For a seminal work on identity formation, see Erik H. Erikson, *Identity: Youth, and crisis* (New York: Norton, 1968).

⁸⁸ Interestingly, some theorists now readily reify the alliance forged by this quite recent redefinition into a solidly united category they now see as fundamentally opposed to other presumably incompatible religious categories, such as Islam and Hinduism. See Samuel P. Huntington, *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996)

⁸⁹ Alba and Nee, *Remaking the American mainstream: Assimilation and contemporary immigration*, p.9,19

⁹⁰ Zolberg and Long, p.9

the American mainstream.⁹¹ This boundary shift occurred despite notable differences in education level.⁹²

Which of these boundaries are the ‚brightest,‘ least blurrable fault lines for immigrants and their descendants? Does the answer to this question vary across societies? Reflecting upon the American experience, psychologist Gordon Allport argued that prejudice against certain immigrant groups is a function of both ethnic difference and visibility. “Some ethnic groups seem more menacing than others,” he reasoned, “either because they have more points of difference or a higher visibility.”⁹³ Some thirty years later, sociologist Michael Hechter expressed the same idea, yet gives visibility precedence as a factor to mere internal cultural differences. Inter-group cultural differences matter particularly, he argued, if they are readily identifiable, such as those related to accents, distinctive religious practices, and lifestyle.⁹⁴ More recently, theorists suggest that skin color is the most visible and thus brightest fault line for immigrants to the United States. Comparing post-1965

⁹¹ Alba and Nee, *Remaking the American mainstream: Assimilation and contemporary immigration*, p.288. See also Matthew Frye Jacobson, *Whiteness of a different colour: European immigrants and the alchemy of race* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); David R. Roediger, *Working toward whiteness: How America's immigrants became white* (New York: Basic Books, 2005); James Barrett and David Roediger, "In between peoples: Race, nationality and the 'new immigrant' working class," *Journal of American ethnic history* 16 (1997), p.32 notes that „race [at the time] was more mutable in the eyes of most native whites than the word conveys in its contemporary meaning: it was constituted in indeterminate proportions by biology and culture.“ This phenomenon also underlies Benjamin Franklin’s infamous complaint that German immigrants to his native Pennsylvania would “shortly be so numerous as to Germanize us instead of our Anglifying them, and will never adopt our language or customs, any more than they can acquire our complexion.” Benjamin Franklin, *The papers of Benjamin Franklin*, ed. Leonard W. Labarre (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1959), p.234

⁹² Thomas Sowell noted, despite them being “notoriously uneducated and illiterate during the era of mass migration, and indeed, often resistant to education for their children, Southern and Eastern Europeans eventually became, by 1980, as educated as other Americans and as well-represented in occupations requiring education, such as professional, technical, and managerial positions.” See Thomas Sowell, *Migrations and cultures: A world view* (New York: Basic Books, 1996), p.48

⁹³ Although visibility could be understood here both as a function of density and discernibility, density is unlikely to matter to the host society unless immigrants and natives can be readily differentiated from each other. Allport himself notes that a large and rapid influx of Nova Scotians into New England would likely trigger much less host society prejudice than an equal number of Negroes. Gordon Willard Allport, *The nature of prejudice* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1954), p.229

⁹⁴ Michael Hechter, *Internal colonialism: The Celtic fringe in British national development, 1536-1966* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1975), p.43. Note that the degree of visibility of cultural practices, including those related to lifestyle and religion varies, however. Wearing a Muslim head scarf, for instance, may mark a person as ethnically ‘other’ as much as a visibly different skin color, whereas the mere habit of (mostly private and thus invisible) prayer according to Muslim ritual may go entirely unnoticed, and thus, unsanctioned. The same applies to lifestyle, in general. Presumably private consumption of ethnic media, for instance, may be less noticeable than the scent associated with certain ethnic cooking styles or other more visible presumably foreign spare time activities.

immigrants to the United States to earlier flows, Portes and Zhou, for instance, see the similarity in skin color of earlier arrivals as a major asset facilitating their entry in the American mainstream at the time.⁹⁵

Some evidence suggests, however, that immigrant concurrent economic success in the United States effectively ,whitens' their complexion in the eyes of the mainstream society.⁹⁶ In a similar vein, the curiously absent salience, or selective blurrability, of the racial boundary for contemporary Asian immigrants has been linked to their relatively high skill level and thus, rapid advancement to or ready maintenance of a relatively high economic status in the United States. Similar effects of socioeconomic status on skin color have been reported in other societies. As research on perceived social boundaries in Brazil and the Caribbean suggest, societies define and immigrants in turn self-perceive their own race and phenotype in conjunction with other attributes that co-determine their place in society, such as gender, parental status or origin, and most notably, social status.⁹⁷ This ubiquitous self-perceived change in skin color with gains in social status is even reflected in successive census data.⁹⁸ Socioeconomic status or success thus appears to attenuate the brightness of the phenotype boundary, at least in some respects.⁹⁹ Other factors may facilitate whitening as well, such as educational gains, getting political leverage through naturalization, or intermarriage.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁵ Portes and Zhou, "The new second generation: Segmented assimilation and its variants," p.76

⁹⁶ See also Noel Ignatiev, *How the Irish became white* (New York: Routledge, 1995) on the whitening process of the Irish, and Karen Brodtkin, *How Jews became white folks and what they say about race in America* (New Brunswick NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1998) on that of Jewish immigrants in the United States. Note that, as mentioned before, this path may not be open on as large a scale to current immigrants as it was to newcomers and their descendants at the time. See Sassen.

⁹⁷ See, for instance, Wendy Roth, "Understanding race at home and abroad: The impact of migration on Dominican and Puerto Rican identities," (2004) for the Caribbean case, and Melissa Nobles, "Lessons from Brazil: the ideational and political dimensions of multiraciality," in *The new race question: How the census counts multiracial individuals*, ed. Joel Perlmann and Mary C. Waters (New York: Russell Sage, 2002) for Brazil.

⁹⁸ See Edward E. Telles, "Self versus social classifications of race: Inconsistency, category ambiguity and affirmation in Brazil (University of California at Los Angeles, 2002), p.9

⁹⁹ Alba, "Bright versus blurred boundaries: Second generation assimilation and exclusion in France, Germany, and the United States," p.23. Note that some studies have found ethnicity to outweigh economic status as a salient determinant of residential assimilation, however. See Michael J. White and Sharon Sasser, "Judging not only by color: Ethnicity, nativity, and neighborhood attainment," *Social science quarterly* 81, no. 4 (2000)

¹⁰⁰ In this vein, Gans cites the educational gains for soldiers returning from the Second World War who benefitted from the federal G.I. Bill of Rights. He argues further that the racial shift in the United States was facilitated by immigrant children's right to naturalize and thus gain some political leverage, as well

For Black immigrants to the United States, however, neither social class origin nor language skills appear to offset the detrimental impact of their skin color.¹⁰¹ In their more recent seminal study of the immigrant second generation in America, Portes and Rumbaut thus argue that race still is what sociologists refer to as the master status feature determining an immigrant's place in society:

„In America, race is a paramount criterion of social acceptance that can overwhelm the influence of class background, religion, and language. Regardless of their class origin or knowledge of English, nonwhite immigrants face greater obstacles in gaining access to the white middle-class mainstream and may receive lower returns for their education and work experience. A racial gradient continues to exist in U.S. culture so that the darker a person's skin is, the greater is the social distance from dominant groups and the more difficult it is to make his or her personal qualifications count.“¹⁰²

Does this prevalence of skin color as a salient fault line exist in other societies as well? Some analysts answer this question in the affirmative. Chiswick and Miller, for instance, find race to be salient in Canada as well, where black immigrants earn about twenty percent less than other immigrants, even after controlling for schooling and country of origin.¹⁰³ Considering these tendencies across immigrant countries and beyond, some theorists even argue that racial categories are increasingly hardening into a single black-white divide on a global scale.¹⁰⁴

Although some contemporary scholars studying immigrant integration in Germany share the view that targets of discrimination are usually those who defy the norm in terms

as their right to intermarry. See Gans, "Acculturation, assimilation and mobility," p.234. As outlined in Section 2.2.3 below and shown in Figure 8, Milton Gordon also described the latter dynamic, by suggesting that marital assimilation would in time end discrimination. See also Roediger, p.59-64, 198 on this issue.

¹⁰¹ Portes and Zhou, "The new second generation: Segmented assimilation and its variants," p.92

¹⁰² Portes and Rumbaut, *Legacies - the story of the immigrant second generation*, p.47

¹⁰³ Barry Chiswick and Paul W. Miller, "Language in the immigrant labour market," in *Immigration, Language, and Ethnicity: Canada and the United States* (Washington, DC: The A.E.I. Press, 1992), p.264

¹⁰⁴ See Ghassan Hage, *White nation: Fantasies of white supremacy in a multicultural society* (New York: Routledge, 2000) as mentioned in Paul A. Silverstein, "Immigrant racialization and the new savage slot: race, migration, and immigration in the New Europe," *Annual review of anthropology* 34 (2005), p.367; Aihwa Ong, "Cultural citizenship as subject-making: Immigrants negotiate racial and cultural boundaries in the United States," *Current anthropology* 37, no. 5 (1996) as examples of works that argue for a hardening Black-White dichotomy in the United States. For the global perspective on this issue, see Howard Winant, *The new politics of race: Globalism, difference, justice* (Minneapolis, MN: Minneapolis University Press, 2004)

of their skin color, appearance, or cultural habits,¹⁰⁵ this stance is not widely empirically assessed in the scholarly literature in Germany, for several reasons. First, as I will elaborate in more detail in Section 3.1 below, the data needed to adequately test for a relationship between racial categories or potentially salient phenotypical attributes and integration outcomes is (as of yet) not available. As a result, empirical analyses to date have tested for an effect of nationality only on a range of integration outcome variables. Many of them found such effects.¹⁰⁶ More fine-grained research into the particular internal or external characteristics that correlate most closely with these outcomes has not been conducted in Germany. The notable exception is a study investigating job market discrimination of Turkish youth in the German labor market, in which the authors use an elaborate research design to show that foreign-sounding names are a significant liability on the job market in Germany.¹⁰⁷ A more comprehensive and recent study on labor market discrimination among second generation immigrants in France corroborates and expands these findings using a different methodology and study population.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁵ Faruk Şen, Martina Sauer, and Dirk Halm, "Intergeneratives Verhalten und (Selbst-) Ethnisierung von türkischen Zuwanderern," in *Migrationsbericht des Zentrums für Türkeistudien 2002*, ed. Andreas Goldberg, Dirk Halm, and Martina Sauer (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2002), p.32

¹⁰⁶ See, for instance, Andreas Diekmann, "Der Einfluss schulischer Bildung und die Auswirkungen der Bildungsexpansion auf das Heiratsverhalten," *Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 19, no. 4 (1990); Wolfgang Seifert, "Die zweite Ausländergeneration in der Bundesrepublik: Längsschnittbeobachtungen in der Berufseinstiegsphase," *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 44 (1992); Frank Kalter and Nadia Granato, "Demographic Change. Educational expansion and structural assimilation of immigrants: The case of Germany," *European sociological review* 18, no. 2 (2002); Nadia Granato and Frank Kalter, "Die Persistenz ethnischer Ungleichheit auf dem deutschen Arbeitsmarkt: Diskriminierung oder Unterinvestition in Humankapital?" *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 53, no. 3 (2001); Stefan Bender and Wolfgang Seifert, "Zuwanderer auf dem Arbeitsmarkt: Nationalitäten und geschlechtsspezifische Unterschiede," *Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 25, no. 6 (1996); Marc Szydlik, "Ethnische Ungleichheit auf dem deutschen Arbeitsmarkt," *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 48, no. 658-676 (1996); Johannes Velling, *Wage discrimination and occupational segregation of foreign male workers in Germany* (Mannheim: Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, 1995)

¹⁰⁷ See Andreas Goldberg, D. Mourinho, and U. Kulke, *Arbeitsmarkt-Diskriminierung gegenüber ausländischen Arbeitnehmern in Deutschland*, International migration papers, vol. 7 (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1996). Anecdotal accounts from immigrants with other ethnic backgrounds point in the same direction. See, for instance, Katharina Oguntoye, May Opitz, and Dagmar Schultz, eds., *Farbe bekennen: Afro-deutsche Frauen auf den Spuren ihrer Geschichte* (Frankfurt: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1992), p.199, 115 on Germany, and Rosalind Edwards and Chamion Caballero, "What's in a name? An exploration of the significance of personal naming of 'mixed' children for parents from different racial, ethnic, and faith backgrounds," *The sociological review* 56, no. 1 (2008), p.53 on the United Kingdom.

¹⁰⁸ Roxane Silberman, Richard D. Alba, and Irène Fournier, "Segmented assimilation in France? Discrimination in the labor market against the second generation," *Ethnic and racial studies* 30, no. 1

Overall, however, as Alba notes, the concept of race is deemed inappropriate and rejected as part of the discourse on difference in both France and Germany. As „race and racism have no place in official thinking, no data comparable to those available in the U.S. census have been collected in either country.”¹⁰⁹ Instead, European scientific and public discourse generally focuses on cultural difference as a presumably fundamental and immutable basis of identity and belonging.¹¹⁰ In contemporary Germany, as we have seen, language skills are hailed as the preeminent factor influencing integration outcomes.¹¹¹

To be sure, empirical studies lend overwhelming support for this stance, at least as far as economic assimilation is concerned. Host society language skills have been found to significantly improve immigrants’ chances on the job market, for instance, and subsequently, raise their income.¹¹² When language skills are not amiss, however,

(2007), p.18 find that South East Asians and sub-Saharan Africans largely self-attribute the discrimination they say they encounter to their skin color, whereas Maghrébins and Turks see their names more often as triggers of discrimination than their skin color.

¹⁰⁹ Alba, "Bright versus blurred boundaries: Second generation assimilation and exclusion in France, Germany, and the United States," p.39

¹¹⁰ See, for instance, Silverstein, p.365; Jan Nederveen Pieterse, "Europe and its Others," in *A companion to racial and ethnic studies*, ed. David Theo Goldberg and John Solomos (Malden, MA: Blackwell 2002), p.23. The emphasis of ethnicity rather than race as a salient domain in which societal boundaries manifest themselves most clearly can also be framed in what Pettigrew and his associates described as blatant and subtle prejudice and racism. The blatant racist, to them, is one who believes in the biological inferiority of the outgroup, whereas the subtle racist defends his or her country's traditional values and exaggerates the cultural differences between in- and outgroup (such as values taught to children, language, and religion). See T. F. Pettigrew and R. W. Mertens, "Subtle and blatant prejudice in Western Europe," *European journal of social psychology* 25 (1995), p.103-4

¹¹¹ The notion that language is a central boundary and uniting force of a nation as it anchors all thought and behavior has a long tradition in Germany. Its beginnings are commonly attributed to Wilhelm von Humboldt, who believed that “language is the outer appearance of the mentalities of peoples,” and that “people who share a common language develop a similar subjectivity, a *Weltanschauung* [world view].” See Wilhelm von Humboldt, "Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues und ihrem Einfluß auf die geistige Entwicklung des Menschengeschlechts," in *Wilhelm von Humboldt: Werke in fünf Bänden* (Darmstadt: 1963), p.224. The notion subsequently became known as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. For a description of the hypothesis, see P. Kay and W. Kempton, "What is the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis?" *American anthropologist* 86, no. 1 (1984). For a seminal and recent refutation, see Steven Arthur Pinker, *The language instinct: How the mind creates language* (New York: Harper Perennial 1994). American anthropologists also stress that language is a common marker of group affiliation. Ernest Gellner described its benefits for economic efficiency, while Benedict Anderson mentions it as a way to forge a national consciousness among peoples speaking the same language. See Ernest Gellner, *Nations and nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983) and Anderson.

¹¹² Barry Chiswick, *Immigration, language, and ethnicity: Canada and the United States* (Washington, DC: The A.E.I. Press, 1992), for instance, finds fluency in the dominant language to have a large positive effect on earnings of immigrants in Canada and the United States.

as is the case for the vast majority of German-born second generation immigrants,¹¹³ an integration discourse still indiscriminately focused on language may stand in for other markers of difference, which are, for some reason or other, not openly addressed.¹¹⁴ In this vein, Jacobson describes a shift from a race-centered conception of whiteness as a salient societal fault line in the United States to one centered on ethnicity as a way by which many white Americans exonerate themselves from the responsibility for slavery and racial oppression.¹¹⁵ Perhaps their similarly onerous past predisposes Germans to likewise seek respite by simply avoiding to squarely consider and measure, and, if need be, address the effects of a wider range of ethnicity-related attributes on immigrant integration outcomes.

As we have seen and summarized in Table 2, ethnicity comprises a wide range of potentially salient and intricately related attributes that may define societal fault lines to various degrees. Any attempt to adequately capture and measure the magnitude of their (positive or negative) impact, solely and in combination, in the various domains of immigrant integration in a given context is challenging, of course. My endeavor here cannot be more than exploratory, given the resources needed for an adequately designed and conducted study. I still believe that it is not only worthwhile but sorely needed to clarify and disentangle the contested conceptual space of ethnicity, and squarely identify the aspects of ethnicity, if any, that truly matter for immigrant integration in a given context.

In the following, I outline the process of immigrant integration as seen by one of the most prominent contemporary German sociologists, Hartmut Esser. His stance greatly influenced the new German immigration legislation and the integration measures it contains. After outlining the tenets of his integration framework, I briefly

¹¹³ Several studies have found language skills of second generation immigrants in Germany to be very high. See, for instance, Stefan Bender and Wolfgang Seifert, "Zur beruflichen und sozialen Integration der in Deutschland lebenden Ausländer," in *Deutsche und Ausländer: Freunde, Fremde oder Feinde*, ed. Richard Alba, Peter Schmidt, and Martina Wasmer (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2000), p.81. My own data, although not based on a random sample of second generation immigrants, corroborates their findings, as shown in Table 17 below.

¹¹⁴ Recent research in the United States on why people support English only policies when empirical data suggests that most immigrants already do speak English well and / or are eager to learn English suggests that such attitudes reflect abstract concerns of national identity. See Deborah Schildkraut, *Press ONE for English: Language policy, public opinion, and American identity* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005)

¹¹⁵ See Matthew Frye Jacobson, *Roots ,too: White ethnic revival in post-civil rights America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), p.236.

show how they are reflected in the seminal report by the Süßmuth Commission, and the German immigration legislation it inspired.

2.2.2. Hartmut Esser: Who is to blame for social distance?

As described in Section 2.1.2 above, German public and scientific discourse refer to what occurs at the intersection of immigrants and host society as *integration*. Hartmut Esser, one of the scientific advisors to the Süßmuth Commission, which drafted the new immigrant legislation in Summer 2001, is no exception. In the following, I will describe Esser's theoretical stance in more detail. I start with an outline of his four steps of social integration, comparing and contrasting his concepts to those presented earlier as I proceed. I then describe what he deems to be the main impediments to integration, and present the policy recommendations he derives from his model. I end the section by briefly pointing out how Esser's stance is reflected in and differs from the Süßmuth report and the new immigration legislation it inspired.

In his government-commissioned working paper on immigrant integration, Hartmut Esser describes the process of including immigrants in a host society as '*social integration*,' which he sees to unfold in four stages.¹¹⁶ First, immigrants go through the process of what he terms *culturation*. He describes culturation, virtually synonymous to Redfield's acculturation, or cultural assimilation, as marked by the acquisition of knowledge and (most notably, language) skills necessary to operate effectively in a new cultural realm. Immigrants then achieve what he calls *placement*, by gaining certain rights, such as citizenship and voting rights, as well as positions in society that endow them with material and positional assets, resources and power. Similar to what Gans described as the tendency of the host society to extend invitations to join their circles to upwardly mobile immigrants, Esser argues that by gaining these positional and material assets, immigrants become more attractive

¹¹⁶ Esser, *Integration und ethnische Schichtung*, p.8. Esser has since published work on several aspects of the integration process, such as Hartmut Esser, "Does the 'New' Immigration Require a 'New' Theory of Intergenerational Integration?" *International Migration Review* 38, no. 3 (2004) and Esser, *Sprache und Integration: Die sozialen Bedingungen und Folgen des Spracherwerbs von Migranten*. I refer to his 2001 report here because it was specifically written to inform official policy and thus most clearly lays out the rationale behind official integration measures.

interaction partners to the host society.¹¹⁷ As a result, the host society in time initiates the third stage of social integration, namely *interaction* with immigrants. The fourth and final stage of integration, *identification*, follows interaction and occurs only if and when all previous stages are completed. According to Esser, fourth stage integration typically remains beyond the reach of first generation immigrants.¹¹⁸

Esser cautions that the chain of events leading from cultururation to identificatory integration can stall at several points and through a number of mechanisms. Cultururation, for instance, only occurs if and inasmuch as there are sufficient opportunities or obligations to interact with, and thus, most importantly, learn the language of the host society. To Esser, language acquisition, and presumably all other aspects of acculturation are thus not, as Park suggested, automatic and mostly subconscious processes, but rather contingent upon structured and unstructured casual interaction with the host society.¹¹⁹ Esser also concedes that unstructured interaction is unlikely to occur in the presence of prejudice and discrimination on the part of the host society.¹²⁰ Moreover, he suggests that the transition from placement to interaction between immigrants and hosts depends on the degree to which their respective culture and value systems overlap. Lastly, similar to Gans' caveat on the prerequisite of host society acceptance for social assimilation outlined above, Esser acknowledges that interaction is unlikely to lead to identification with the host society in the presence of discrimination and prejudice.¹²¹ Figure 7 summarizes the main tenets of Esser's theory as described above.

¹¹⁷ See Gans, "Acculturation, assimilation and mobility," p.158/9; Esser, *Integration und ethnische Schichtung*, p.8 ff. Although Esser does not refer to it here, his stance mirrors seminal work by Gary Stanley Becker, "The economics of discrimination," (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971) and Kenneth J. Arrow, "Some mathematical models of race discrimination in the labor market," in *Racial discrimination in economic life*, ed. Anthony H. Pascal (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1972) who argued that discrimination from a purely economic point of view is inefficient and thus prone to cease as peoples' assets become apparent.

¹¹⁸ Esser, *Integration und ethnische Schichtung*, p.27

¹¹⁹ Empirical research on the correlates of language skills suggests that unstructured and structured learning may particularly promote speaking fluency and writing skills, respectively. See Christian Dustmann, "Speaking fluency, writing fluency and earnings of migrants," *Journal of population economics* 7 (1994), p.154. Unfortunately, theorists rarely differentiate between those skills when addressing situations conducive to host language acquisition.

¹²⁰ Esser, *Integration und ethnische Schichtung*, p.67, 27

¹²¹ See Gans, "Acculturation, assimilation and mobility," p.153/4.




Figure 7: Integration process according to Esser

Source: My own distillation of Esser, Hartmut. *Integration und ethnische Schichtung*. Mannheim: Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung, 2001. Arrows designate causal relationships. Phenomena linked with an X designate a conditioning or multiplier variable that influences the magnitude of the respective causal relationship.

To Esser, placement, and the conferment of positional rights it entails, is the key element in the progression through his integration stages. If placement within the mainstream society fails, he argues, immigrants are unlikely to reach interaction and identification with the latter:

A central precondition for the development of 'identifier'y' or at least 'acquiescent' support of the system is satisfactory placement or successful status attainment as well as being embedded within the interactions and social relationships of the system."¹²²

Although Esser does not address this issue, the strength of the link between identification and placement within the *mainstream* society may vary for first and second generation immigrants. The accounts of satisfying placement of immigrants

¹²² Esser, *Integration und ethnische Schichtung*, p.14 [my translation, punctuation in the original].

within their respective ethnic communities in the United States mentioned in Section 2.1.3 above suggest that *first generation immigrants* may be able to avail themselves of status, interaction, and social relationships exclusively within their ethnic community in Germany as well. Moreover, even if their eventual status lags behind the host society average, their tacit support of the overall societal system could simply grow from a realization that, whatever the shortcomings of their lives compared to the host society mainstream, they still have it better than their compatriots back home.

For *second generation immigrants*, however, Esser's assertion of the centrality of placement in the mainstream society seems much more plausible. Whereas their parents may live without significant status and interaction within the host society and still at least tacitly support the system they often chose to join, their children no longer judge their status in relation to the people in their parents' society of origin. They instead aspire to and feel they deserve parity to natives their age.¹²³ They may thus indeed find it difficult to fully identify with the host society if they feel they are unduly denied an equal chance at attaining desirable positions and status on par with native youth.¹²⁴

In addition to the expectation of satisfactory placement, host society openness matters. In the aggregate, financial and positional assets (or social status, more generally) of a person may well correlate positively with his or her attractiveness as an interaction partner. Yet without a prerequisite positive mental disposition towards each other, interaction is unlikely to occur. A sufficiently prejudiced native, for instance, is unlikely to seek interaction with an immigrant, no matter the latter's status or financial assets. Likewise, an immigrant who feels, perhaps due in part to previously experienced discrimination, uncomfortable interacting with a native person

¹²³ For an early analysis of these differences in expectations of first and second generation immigrants, see Michael J. Piore, *Birds of passage* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979). More recently, Portes and Zhou describe this dynamic in reference to U.S.-born children of Mexican immigrants. See Portes and Zhou, "The new second generation: Segmented assimilation and its variants," p.89

¹²⁴ In the German context, Klaus Bade has recently described how assimilated second and third generation immigrants are much more vulnerable emotionally by systematic group-level disadvantages in economic and social spheres than their less assimilated parents. See Klaus J. Bade, "Verletzt, gerade wegen fortgeschrittener Integration: Bildungs-Benachteiligung der Einwanderer schadet dem Standort," *Die Welt*, May 8 2007

in general may voluntarily forgo prospective tangible benefits from interaction.¹²⁵ The pull of such expected interaction benefits may outweigh preexisting aversions at times, but whether it does in any particular instance is hard to foresee.

Esser in fact acknowledges the role of discrimination in general, and the particular difficulties of Turkish immigrants in Germany in this respect:

*Identificatory integration occurs [...] only as a result of satisfactory experiences or as a result of the expectation that membership will be rewarded. Such identification is unlikely to occur where immigrants are marginalized or experience discrimination and disadvantage. [...] The Turkish population apparently suffers from a combination of inequalities in the educational system and a certain non-meritocratic closure of the job market.*¹²⁶

Nonetheless, he attributes the empirical lag in integration depth of Turkish compared to other immigrant groups more to their deplorable tendency towards social and spatial segmentation (which he attributes solely to the large size of their ethnic community in Germany) than to their withdrawal triggered by host society discrimination.¹²⁷

*Importantly, the incentives to segmentation, manifested for instance by subsequent generations of immigrants remaining within ethnic communities is so powerful that the repercussions of segmentation manifest themselves even in the absence of social distancing of any kind.*¹²⁸

He does not delve deeper into the reasons why immigrant offspring may prefer their ethnic community despite levels of human capital that would allow them to venture into and, presumably, successfully compete with natives in mainstream employment and housing markets. Instead, he appears to imply that at the core of such

¹²⁵ Research on the relationship between perceived discrimination and separation as a preferred acculturation attitude lends support to this argument. See R. N. Lalonde, D. N. Taylor, and F. M. Moghaddam, "The process of social identification for visible minority women in multicultural context," *Journal of cross-cultural psychology* 23, no. 1 (1992)

¹²⁶ Esser, *Integration und ethnische Schichtung*, p.27, 54-55 [my translation].

¹²⁷ When comparing the degree of intergenerational gains in integration of immigrants from Turkey with those from former Yugoslavia in language competence, the prevalence of interethnic friendships, and identification with the host society, Esser notes that, despite significant linguistic assimilation from first to second generation in both groups, friendships and identification scores stay low for Turks as compared to immigrants from former Yugoslavia. He attributes the difference to the greater Turkish community in Germany, their greater cultural distance to Germans, as well as a 'greater social distance of the host society towards Turkish immigrants.' Esser, *Integration und ethnische Schichtung*, p.29

¹²⁸ Esser, *Integration und ethnische Schichtung*, p.75 [my translation].

persistent segregation tendencies is a deplorable risk aversion of the respective immigrant offspring who – for some reason – defy Esser’s own stance that in the end, the prospect of material assets (gained through lucrative employment concomitant to their education level) eventually draws all groups towards interacting with each other.

		<i>Social integration in host society</i>	
		<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>
<i>Social integration in society of origin / ethnic community</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Multiple Integration</i>	<i>Segmentation</i>
	<i>No</i>	<i>Assimilation</i>	<i>Marginalization</i>

Table 4: Types of social integration according to Esser

Source: Esser, Hartmut. *Integration und ethnische Schichtung*. Mannheim: Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung, 2001, p.19.

Esser further describes what he refers to as four types of social integration, which he derives from an immigrant’s association with his or her ethnic community and the host society at large, respectively. In a framework not attributed to but curiously similar to John Berry’s seminal model as shown in Table 5 and described in Section 2.2.4 below, Esser distinguishes four alternative forms of social integration, as shown in Table 4. Their respective characterization of assimilation, marginalization, and segmentation (or separation, for Berry) are virtually identical. I thus do not further elaborate on them here, but describe Esser’s framework as I frame Berry’s original stance further below.¹²⁹

To anticipate the description of Berry’s original immigrant adaptation model on Section 2.2.4, Esser’s and Berry’s models differ markedly, in two respects. First, in

¹²⁹ Similar conceptual frameworks appear widely in the German literature. See, for instance, Rainer Strobl, Wolfgang Kühnel, and Wilhelm Heitmeyer, *Junge Aussiedler zwischen Assimilation und Marginalität: Abschlussbericht* (Bielefeld: Institut für interdisziplinäre Konflikt- und Gewaltforschung 1999), p.5; Hans-Joachim Hoffmann-Nowotny, "Integration, Assimilation und "plurale Gesellschaft." Konzeptuelle, theoretische und praktische Überlegungen," in *Ausländer in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, ed. Charlotte Höhn and Detlev B. Rein (Boppard: Bundesinstitut für Bevölkerungsforschung, 1990); Bernhard Nauck, Annette Kohlmann, and Heike Diefenbach, "Familiäre Netzwerke, Intergenerative Transmission und Assimilationsprozesse bei türkischen Migrantenfamilien," *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 49 (1997). Note, however, that the conceptual space and meaning of the term integration in general as outlined in section 2.1.2 and as one (of typically four) adaptation outcomes is not identical.

their mention of the host society as a factor influencing access to these four adaptation options. While Berry, as we will see further below, makes considerable mention of the effect of host society attitudes towards immigrants, Esser completely bypasses this issue in this context. Second, Esser and Berry differ markedly in the way they describe their respective fourth type of integration/ assimilation, namely (multiple) integration. Esser describes multiple integration as a state in which an immigrant is socially integrated in „several culturally and socially distinct areas simultaneously,“ and characterizes multiple integration as

„an often desired, yet theoretically hardly realistic and empirically very rare case.[..] it would manifest itself in the capacity to speak several languages, a mix of social networks and a ‚double‘ or multiple identification or ‚identity.‘“¹³⁰

To Esser, this multiple integration is rare because it requires a degree of learning and interaction opportunities which, Esser argues, most people cannot afford. To him, such multiple social integration can only be achieved by children of diplomats or academics, whose parents can speak to their children in two languages at home and who experience the two cultures in their everyday lives. Moreover, Esser posits, humans naturally try to resolve the psychological burden of cognitive and emotional dissonance that is, he claims, inherent in such multiple identities, and prefer to structure their surroundings and affiliations to fit simple binary ingroup-outgroup schemata, if this does not entail any distancing or devaluation.¹³¹

These caveats associated with the empirical viability of (multiple) integration as a path towards social integration (combined with the drawbacks associated with the marginalization and segmentation alternatives we will describe further below) lead Esser to conclude that in the end, social integration to the host society is only possible by way of assimilation, namely social integration into the host society alone.

Berry, as we will see further below, does not attribute any psychological burden to choosing the integration path, yet sees the option contingent upon host society acceptance of cultural diversity.

¹³⁰ Esser, *Integration und ethnische Schichtung*, p.20-21 [my translation, emphasis in original]

¹³¹ Esser, *Integration und ethnische Schichtung*, p.21

Esser derives a number of policy recommendations from his theoretical stance. Integration policies, he argues, should aim to allocate positions on a strictly meritocratic basis, to decrease obstacles to economic mobility, and to foster equal opportunities to partake in societal resources. As practical measures, he stresses the importance of *preschool attendance* to early host language acquisition, as well as the avoidance of high concentrations of ethnic non-German children in preschool and elementary school classrooms. The latter, he concedes, is due in part to residential segregation, which should be addressed with adequate urban planning and housing policies.¹³²

Although Esser does not explicitly mention the possibility of residential discrimination here, he does acknowledge the detrimental effect of social distance for structural and social integration, more generally. Public appeals for more societal openness, however, would not be effective in his view, as the perception of social distance is part of engrained belief systems that are hard to change. Instead, he stresses the importance of role models:

„Probably the most effective way to reduce social distance – even in decidedly xenophobic circles of society – is by way of declarations by reputable representatives in the public eye, who should take a unanimous, self-evident and credible stance [in favor of immigrant integration] above and beyond all political partisanship and other interests.“¹³³

In navigating the variegated cultural landscape, Esser recommends that, while all individuals should be allowed to freely choose their lifestyle and religious practices, the government should refrain from supporting separate independent ethnic institutions and organizations. Schools should be strictly secularized, with existing separate creed-based religious instruction replaced by one overarching all-inclusive subject for all. Furthermore, he recommends language courses, tutors and counseling services to supplement existing instructional resources as needed.

Lastly, Esser advocates routinely allowing dual citizenship.¹³⁴ Although he does not see immediate benefits to the integration process from naturalization, the opportunity to partake in the political process and civil society that citizenship entails,

¹³² Esser, *Integration und ethnische Schichtung*, p.70

¹³³ Esser, *Integration und ethnische Schichtung*, p.71 [my translation].

¹³⁴ Esser, *Integration und ethnische Schichtung*, p.72

he argues, may strengthen interest and knowledge about, and thus strengthen identification with the host country in the long run. Given the strong emotional attachment of immigrants to their original nationality, he argues, these benefits for the integration process can only be reaped by allowing dual citizenship.

Esser's theoretical framework and policy recommendations shaped the seminal report by the government-appointed Süßmuth Commission. The so-called Süßmuth report advocated a new immigration and integration strategy, and culminated in a new immigration law, which entered into force in January 2005. In the following, I briefly pinpoint some of the similarities and differences between Esser's stance and the Süßmuth report.

Reflecting common usage in scientific and public discourse, the Süßmuth report describes the task of integrating immigrants as one of 'creating or re-creating a common whole' of both host and immigrant society, to which both have to contribute equally.¹³⁵ The majority of measures it recommends to further integration, however, target the lower stages of integration in Esser's framework, and center on the contribution of immigrants. Some are meant to further cultururation (such as, most notably, the acquisition of host language skills), while others concern placement, such as measures to ensure functionally equal access to civic institutions such as schools, and the labor and housing market.

Mirroring Esser, the Süßmuth report laments the lack of spatial integration, which it attributes in part to immigrants' lack of material resources which lower their purchasing power on the housing market. The report (as Esser) further describes the effect of spatial segregation as detrimental to the second generation, a potential trap hindering further economic mobility:

„A decision to remain within the ethnic labor market effectively prevents upward social mobility in the mainstream society, [these people] are more likely to permanently remain on the fringes of society. [...] While ethnic enclaves with a high percentage of co-ethnic inhabitants and ethnic infrastructure are not the cause of segregation and segmentation of immigrants and their social and economic marginality, they can entice them to

¹³⁵ Bundesministerium des Inneren, *Zuwanderung gestalten, Integration fördern: Bericht der unabhängigen Kommission Zuwanderung* (Berlin: Bundesministerium des Inneren, 2001), p.200, 230

*settle for the opportunities it provides and no longer invest in their qualifications and seek intensive contact to the majority society.*¹³⁶

Although the report does acknowledge that the mere existence of a sufficiently large ethnic community does not by itself explain why the second generation remains there, it sees, unlike Esser, spatial segregation as a result of the lack of resources for better housing, and thus recommends initiatives to build housing and create incentives for people to use it as a way to ensure residential assimilation.¹³⁷

As Esser, Süßmuth acknowledges, nonetheless, that emotional identification with the host country is contingent upon their achievement of ‘linguistic, social and structural integration’ and that the former are fundamentally predicated on the acceptance of the host society.¹³⁸

Among the measures the report suggests to further cultural and social integration are, not surprisingly, language courses (targeted particularly at immigrant mothers), as well as, in contrast to Esser’s recommendation, the addition of Islamic religious instruction in schools on par with existing instruction for Catholic and Protestant children.

Although Süßmuth mentions social acceptance as a factor, the three-page section dedicated to the phenomenon merely mentions a number of empirical studies that suggest, overall, that host society acceptance appears to be better than what daily press reports suggest. She acknowledges, nonetheless, that “social distance, host society prejudice and discrimination based on race, ethnicity, or religion can doom even highly motivated attempts to integrate.”¹³⁹ Concrete measures to address host society prejudice and discrimination, such as Esser’s call for role model behavior of highly visible public figures, however, are missing. The report instead again merely cites several empirical surveys on host society perceptions of various immigrant groups, and vice versa, and, echoing Esser’s stance that interaction between

¹³⁶ Bundesministerium des Inneren, p.231 [my translation].

¹³⁷ Bundesministerium des Inneren, p.231. Note that the underlying assumption that residential proximity would automatically lead to interaction and, in time, identification is not elaborated further. Given Massey and Denton’s findings on residential assimilation and host society contact for several groups of immigrants in the United States, the assumption seems questionable. See Massey and Denton.

¹³⁸ Bundesministerium des Inneren, p.231

¹³⁹ Bundesministerium des Inneren, p.231 [my translation].

immigrants and hosts depends on the degree to which their respective culture and value systems overlap, simply suggests that host society willingness to interact is a function of immigrants' perceived difference in lifestyle from native Germans.¹⁴⁰

In the new immigration legislation that followed the Süssmuth report and entered into force in January 2005, mention of and measures aimed at the host society are entirely absent. Among the measures to facilitate the integration of legal immigrants in German society, the new law stipulates integration courses and an integration program aimed solely at immigrants.¹⁴¹ The official ordinance on the implementation of these integration courses states their aim as follows:

*The courses aim to convey German language skills [...] and everyday knowledge as well as knowledge of the legal system, culture and history of Germany, particularly the values of the democratic state system and the principle of the rule of law, equality, tolerance and freedom of religion.*¹⁴²

Overall, we can thus say that, although Esser and Süssmuth still acknowledged the potentially detrimental effect of host society prejudice and discrimination on immigrant integration in certain respects, and at least offered some suggestions as to how they could be addressed, the political consensus reflected in the ensuing new immigration law sees immigrant language skills as the key factor in the integration process, and places the onus to further integration squarely and solely on immigrants.

In the following, I outline two seminal theoretical stances on immigrant integration by American sociologists who have influenced Esser's thinking. I start with Milton Gordon's assimilation model, and then, as mentioned previously, present John Berry's work on alternative modes of immigrant acculturation. Throughout, I compare and contrast both to the way Esser framed them in his work.

2.2.3. Milton Gordon: Why does integration fail?

In his seminal work on 'what happens when people meet,' American sociologist Milton Gordon framed the assimilation process as having seven successive stages. In

¹⁴⁰ Bundesministerium des Inneren, p.241

¹⁴¹ The integration program is meant to supplement the courses with migration specific counseling services as needed. Bundesgesetzblatt, § 45.

¹⁴² Bundesgesetzbuch, "Verordnung über die Durchführung von Integrationskursen für Ausländer und Spätaussiedler," (2005)§ 3.

the following, I sketch his seven steps of immigrant assimilation. I then focus on the main impediments he sees as potentially hindering the assimilation process, and present the policy recommendations he derives from his model. I compare and contrast Gordon's concepts, assimilation process, and main stumbling blocks, respectively, to Esser's stance as described in the previous section.

Milton Gordon framed the assimilation process as having seven successive stages.¹⁴³ He saw (1) cultural assimilation, or acculturation, as the process inevitably set in motion upon arrival of minority groups and entailing, most prominently, their acquisition of the host language and behavior patterns.¹⁴⁴ Drawing on the experience of Negroes, Jews, Catholics, and Puerto Ricans in America of his time, he argued, as Robert Park did before him, that acculturation unfolds automatically, and usually unintended, particularly for the second and later generations of immigrants, as they are exposed to the host school system and speak English as their native language.¹⁴⁵ Barring extreme spatial isolation and deprivation of educational and occupational opportunities, acculturation, Gordon argued further, would occur even when immigrants did not have extensive primary contact with the host society mainstream, and even when none of the other types of assimilation would ever follow.¹⁴⁶

Although Gordon and Esser use slightly different terminology, both mention host society contact as a factor influencing (ac)culturation. They differ, however, in the degree to which they see host society involvement as necessary for (ac)culturation to occur. Gordon believed that immigrants, particularly those of the second generation and beyond who would naturally meet host society members in school, can acquire the culture, language, and customs of the host society merely by engaging in what he termed secondary relationships.¹⁴⁷ Esser, by contrast, sees both structured and

¹⁴³ Gordon, p.70ff

¹⁴⁴ Note that, although given the typical differentials in size and influence, acculturation usually entails greater changes by the minority immigrant groups than the host society, the host society changes as well as it encounters various ethnic groups.

¹⁴⁵ Gans, "Acculturation, assimilation and mobility," p.153 notes that it can at times be purposive, and cites the case of parents encouraging their children to excel in school or immigrants intentionally emulate the lifestyles of those whose status they seek to achieve.

¹⁴⁶ Gordon, p.77f.

¹⁴⁷ Primary relationships are to Gordon those that are "personal, intimate, and emotionally affective," whereas secondary relationships merely involve "impersonal, formal and segmented contact that tends not to come very close to the core of personality." Gordon, p.33

unstructured contact, hence, presumably primary contact in Gordon's view, as necessary to spur the (ac)culturation process.¹⁴⁸




Figure 8: Gordon's seven steps of assimilation

Source: Gordon, Milton. *Assimilation in American life: The role of race, religion, and national origins*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964, p.70ff

The next stages of the assimilation process, Gordon argued, may or may not follow, as it involves primary contact between host and immigrant society, and as such is predicated on the host society's open or tacit acceptance of such encounters.¹⁴⁹ Where such acceptance is present, he argued, immigrants would then (2) assimilate structurally, marking their entrance into cliques, clubs and other societal institutions

¹⁴⁸ Part of the difference between Esser and Gordon may lie in the fact that Esser, while framing his four-stage integration model as outlined in Section 2.2.2 does not differentiate between first and second generation immigrants. While first generation immigrants are generally deprived of the frequent structured interaction with the host society that usually comes with schooling, the second generation, by virtue of acquiring their education among host society youth, will encounter a fair amount of structured, secondary relationships with members of the host society and may thus, for both Esser and Gordon, stand a fair chance of achieving acculturation by virtue of these relationships.

¹⁴⁹ Primary contact of course hinges upon both immigrant and host society openness. Arguably, a case can be made for immigrants being *prima facie* favorable to any host society contact, at least initially. As Gans, "Acculturation, assimilation and mobility," p.160 notes, assimilation resistance by immigrants is unlikely, as they presumably aspire to enhance their cultural and social status upon arrival, and usually stand a better chance at achieving this goal by joining the core society.

of the host society on a large scale. (3) Marital assimilation, by intermarriage and interbreeding would naturally follow, leading in time to what Gordon called (4) identificational assimilation, namely a sense of peoplehood based solely on the host society.¹⁵⁰ As (presumably increasingly multiracial) descendants of the original minority groups would become increasingly indistinguishable from members of the initial host society in both so-called intrinsic and extrinsic cultural traits, Gordon then foresaw the end of both (5) prejudice and (6) discrimination, as well as, finally, (7) value and power conflicts between (formerly) minority and core group(s). Figure 8 summarizes Gordon's assimilation model.¹⁵¹

In Gordon's view, structural assimilation is the linchpin which makes or breaks the assimilation process, and in fact „turned out to be the rock on which the ship of Anglo-conformity foundered” for the U.S. racial minorities.“ While structural assimilation, he argued, is inevitably and naturally followed by all remaining stages of assimilation, „like a row of tenpins bowled over in rapid succession by a well placed strike,“ the progression from cultural to structural assimilation is much less certain.¹⁵²

Esser's and Gordon's framework differ here, and the relationship between Esser's placement stage and Gordon's structural assimilation stage is not entirely clear. Both locate the acquisition of language and cultural knowledge clearly in the preceding (ac)culturation stage. Esser's placement stage, however, seems prior to, or in some respects even unrelated to Gordon's structural assimilation. Some of the rights Esser mentions as being conferred upon immigrants as part of placement, such as citizenship and voting rights do not bear a straightforward relationship to Gordon's

¹⁵⁰ Gordon's ‚marital assimilation' is synonymous to what Park and other scholars refer to as ‚amalgamation,' namely a biological process of fusion of races by interbreeding and intermarriage. Intermarriage more generally refers to crossing a well-defined societal boundary in mate selection, such as a religious, ethnic, or national one. See Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the science of sociology*, p.737

¹⁵¹ I added the two dashed arrows to Figure 8 because, although Gordon does not explicitly mention the respective relationships, they appeared self-evident and compatible with his reasoning overall. The first one (on top) accounts for the possibility that an immigrant, despite his admittance into the cliques and clubs of the host society, does not intermarry (or marry at all, for that matter) yet still reaches (as a function of his presence and comfort in mainstream social institutions) identificational assimilation. The other dashed arrow pays reference to the fact that an immigrant may, despite intermarrying, not develop a sense of host society peoplehood, yet still, because of his or her close association and, in time, physical resemblance to the mainstream appearance norm, not be subject to host society discrimination any more.

¹⁵² Gordon, p.81,114.

process of structural assimilation.¹⁵³ Others (most notably, those that confer material and positional assets, resources and power, such as, presumably, human capital endowment or acquisition and, consequently, high status employment) are much more likely to positively affect the chances of immigrants to be admitted to the inner circles of the host society. A closer reading of Gordon, however, suggests that he appears to have located the acquisition of human capital in his acculturation stage.¹⁵⁴

What then determines whether cultural assimilation is followed by or coincides with the primary contact between ethnic group and host society that structural assimilation entails? Gordon (unlike Esser) distinguishes here between first and second generation immigrants. For the first generation, he locates the obstacle between cultural and social assimilation in a standoff between immigrant newcomers' and the majority society's attitudes towards structural integration. Neither, he argues, is particularly eager to engage in primary contact with the other. His stance here resembles Esser's, in that both appear to refer to the respective culture and value systems, which immigrants and host society do not want to see weakened in the course of interaction:

¹⁵³ An argument can of course be made that the legal status of immigrants in the host country affects the degree to which they are welcomed into the cliques, clubs and societal institutions of the host society. Empirical evidence from both sides of the Atlantic, however, suggests otherwise. In the United States, an oft-cited early example of the two being unrelated is the case of readily welcomed illegal Irish immigrants, who settled in Boston in the 1980s. See Karen Tumulty, "When Irish eyes are hiding," *Los Angeles Times*, January 29 1989. Conversely, in Germany, the derogatory description of naturalized immigrant citizens as '*Passdeutsche*' [passport Germans] hints at the limited effect of a passport on overall acceptance by the host society.

¹⁵⁴ As an example of denied structural assimilation, Milton Gordon cites the predicament of a second generation Jewish immigrant who is denied membership in the prestigious club system of Harvard undergraduate social life: "If only I can go the last steps in Ivy League behavior," the boy reasons, "they will surely recognize that I am one of them and take me in." It thus appears that Gordon places the acquisition of the human capital that let this immigrant son into Harvard altogether as prior to his denied structural assimilation, in the form of being rejected from its inner social circles. See Gordon, p.112

The issue matters, as we will see further below, for the question of whether host society prejudice and discrimination (or, openness, respectively) affect the integration process at the schooling and employment level. Despite differences in terminology, both Esser's and Gordon's framework appear to suggest that the acquisition of human capital and (occupational) positions are prior to and unaffected by the deeper integration stages at which host society attitudes become decisive. On the other hand, both issue clear policy recommendations to improve educational outcomes for second generation immigrants. Esser locates the problem in inadequate language skills as a function, in part, of unduly immigrant-heavy classrooms. Gordon goes further, and at least considers the possibility that they are the indirect manifestation of housing discrimination, which should be addressed.

„It takes two to tango [...] there is no good reason to believe that white Protestant America ever extended a firm and cordial invitation to its minorities to dance. Furthermore, the attitudes of the minority group members themselves on the matter have been divided and ambiguous. [...] He [sic] did not want [structural assimilation], and had a positive need for the comfort of his own communal institutions.“¹⁵⁵

Gordon describes the second generation, by contrast, as willingly surrendering to host society culture and customs, and eagerly striving for access to its social cliques, clubs, and institutions. As a result, while acculturation for all groups beyond the first generation of immigrants is massive and decisive, lack of permissiveness of the core society, particularly to the entrance of racial minorities, effectively thwarts their aspirations to structural assimilation:

[They find], to their dismay that at the primary group level a neutral American social structure was a myth – a mirage. What at a distance seemed to be a quasi-public edifice flying only the all-inclusive flag of American nationality turned out, on closer inspection, to be the clubhouse of a particular ethnic group – the white Anglo-Saxon Protestants. [...] An invitation to join was never really extended, the ethnically neutral image of an inclusive American society turns out to be, upon closer inspection, a myth-a mirage.“¹⁵⁶

As a result, they build and retreat to social institutions and organizations within their ethnic enclave. These dual social structures, he notes, are neither born from nor reflect particular ideological commitments, but are „created solely by the dynamics of prejudice and discrimination.“¹⁵⁷

As we have seen, Esser describes and laments this dynamic as well. Gordon and Esser, however, differ markedly in where they see the main source of this empirical pattern. Esser vaguely mentions inequalities and tendencies towards non-meritocratic closure towards certain groups of second generation immigrants, and, in the end, suggests that even without them the natural pull to remain within ethnic enclaves is just too great. Gordon, by contrast, vividly describes it as the face-saving reaction to host society rejection.

Reflecting on attributes that effectively define the fault lines between groups, Gordon distinguishes between intrinsic and extrinsic cultural traits, and argues that

¹⁵⁵ Gordon, p.111

¹⁵⁶ Gordon, p.113, 235

¹⁵⁷ Gordon, p.114

differences in extrinsic culture, such as “dress, manner, patterns of emotional expression, and minor oddities in pronouncing and inflecting English” are more crucial in the development of prejudice than intrinsic cultural traits, such as religious beliefs and practices, ethical values, musical tastes, recreational patterns, literature, historical language and a sense of a common past.¹⁵⁸ Echoing Gordon Allport as described in Section 2.2.1, Gordon hence surmised that it is the “gap in extrinsic cultural traits between the zoot-suited side-burned slum juvenile and the conservatively clothed and behaving middle-class American [which] gives the signal for mutual suspicion and hostility.”¹⁵⁹

Gordon suggests several ways in which the government should mediate ethnic matters. First it has to guarantee civil rights for all groups equally, eliminate direct or indirect racial criteria at all levels of public life (such as in education, job and housing markets, the military service and as far as access to public facilities is concerned):

„Get the government – the focal expression of the will and welfare of all the people of the country – out of the business of supporting (or condoning) racial discrimination, either directly or indirectly.“¹⁶⁰

Consequently, he also condemned government programs reserved for certain groups as unjust and thus, misguided. Government aid, he argued -- not unlike Esser some forty years later in an entirely different context --, should be available to all citizens based on functional rather than racial or ethnic criteria. Applying this rationale, Gordon also engaged with the debate in mid-1960s America on the introduction of racial criteria to overrule existing neighborhood assignments to public

¹⁵⁸ Gordon, p.79

¹⁵⁹ Gordon, p.82. His terminology implies a link between physical appearance and cultural orientation. This assumption is commonly made (and rarely scrutinized) in both literature and public discourse. It may in fact not be as adequate as it appears, especially for second-generation immigrants who have, despite their inherited ethnic physical appearance, spent their lives mostly away from their parents' birth places. Note also that Gordon in effect describes a 'Catch 22' situation here, in which their difference in extrinsic attributes deny certain visibly 'other' immigrant groups the later stages of assimilation, which in turn he believed to be their only recourse to diminish this very visible difference, namely by intermarriage and interbreeding. Informed by the remarkable change in perception of European immigrants to the United States from distinctly colored to essentially white (and thus, mainstream-worthy), more recent literature has stressed the social constructedness and mutability of ethnic and even racial boundaries over time, and thus casts a more optimistic light on this situation. I will outline the main tenets of this literature further below. See Nagel; Omi and Winant, ; David R. Roediger, *The wages of whiteness* (London: Verso, 1991)

¹⁶⁰ Gordon, p.249

schools to achieve racially-balanced classrooms.¹⁶¹ Gordon suggested that, in that and all other respects, institutional discrimination should be addressed at its root instead of in the various realms it eventually manifests itself. On de facto racial segregation in public schools he noted, for instance:

*[It] exists because of segregation in housing, and the way to fight the battle of civil rights is housing, not the public school system, and the way to fight it is to eliminate racial criteria from the routes of access to housing space, not to inject them into the operation of the educational system.*¹⁶²

Referring to Clark, Gordon suggests, moreover, that integration in fact means more than the absence of civic discrimination encompassed by eliminating racial criteria in public facilities and institutions.¹⁶³ It entails, he argued, attitudinal change as well, „the removal of fears, hatreds, suspicions, stereotypes, and superstitions,“ even though, he conceded, changing hearts and minds among members of all integrating parts of society is a long-term process. Gordon suggested the degree of primary group relations among societal groups as a barometer of progress towards integration, most notably, the prevalence of intimate friendships across groups, and intermarriage.¹⁶⁴

Gordon also addressed two other issues that Esser and Süssmuth raise above. On the value of a functional ethnic sub-society, Gordon does not share Esser's view that ethnic sub-societies hinder assimilation to the mainstream society, and are thus a rather deplorable side effect of continuous migration flows. He instead sees their buffering effect as distinctly beneficial to the sociological and psychological health of first generation immigrants. Ethnic communities, he argued, act not as a defense or bastion but rather as a sturdy bridge, effectively mediating the inevitable transition between old and new cultures across generations.

Ethnic sub-societies and their institutions, he argued further, are ideally placed and should thus consider guiding their members towards refraining from behavior and

¹⁶¹ As we will see further below, the issue bears surprising resemblance to what policymakers struggle with in Germany today.

¹⁶² Gordon, p.251

¹⁶³ See Kenneth B. Clark, "Desegregation: The role of the social sciences," *Teacher's college record* 62, no. 1 (1960) as cited in Gordon, p.246

¹⁶⁴ Gordon, p.246

actions injurious to the society as a whole, even where the latter is as much at fault for creating injustices that may have contributed to the former's behavioral problems.¹⁶⁵

„ The ethnic sub-society, whatever its racial, religious or nationality background, , from a sociological point of view has special opportunities to deal with particular behavior problems which may be related to its social history and current situation, and these opportunities should not be bypassed, even though the more basic roots of the problem lie in the institutions and practices of the larger society. “¹⁶⁶

In reference to the role and responsibility of the media in shaping public opinion on immigrant realities, and their tendency towards distorted reporting that Süssmuth dismissed as mentioned earlier, Gordon argues that the media should not avoid covering issues that may reflect unfavorably on any of the groups involved in the assimilation process, but rather strive to convey them within a non-racial sociological context.¹⁶⁷

Gordon also offered advice on how to „orient the immigrant to American life,“ again clearly differentiating between first and subsequent generations of immigrants. Similar to Esser's fourth stage integration caveat, he deems first generation immigrants unlikely to assimilate structurally, and thus sees attempts to pressure them to do so as tension-prone, unlikely to succeed, and therefore ill-advised.¹⁶⁸ For them, he suggested, the best course of action would be to recognize the functional desirability of immigrant communal life with good grace, while providing significant opportunities for primary contact with native Americans on a thoroughly voluntary

¹⁶⁵ Here, again, although Gordon alludes to the situation of Negroes in American society of the mid-1960s, his suggestion readily applies to and is in fact echoed by contemporary moderate Muslim leaders in Western ethnic sub-societies, who attempt to guide their followers away from extremism.

¹⁶⁶ Gordon, p.261

¹⁶⁷ Gordon, p.257. Whereas Gordon drew on the controversy surrounding coverage of Negro crime rates and its effects on already prevalent tendencies to attribute them to racial deficiencies or inferiority in mid-1960 America here, his suggestion, again transfers well to contemporary Germany, where the media, some argue, tends to give undue attention to the purported ubiquitous rise of immigrant crime and radical Islam. See Bade, Klaus J. *Nachholdende Integrationspolitik und Gestaltungsperspektiven der Integrationspraxis*. Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2007.

¹⁶⁸ Gordon, p.241. Park and his associates in fact expressed this view in 1921 already, arguing that immigrants should best be allowed to adjust at their own pace rather than being compelled to drop their ethnic ties and memories. See William Isaac Thomas, Robert E. Park, and Herbert Miller, *Old world traits transplanted*, 2nd ed. (Montclair, N.J., Patterson Smith: Patterson Smith, 1971), p.280-81.

basis.¹⁶⁹ Nonetheless, in what is strikingly similar to the stated aim of contemporary German integration courses, he argued that major efforts should be directed toward the acculturation end of the assimilation process, with a particular focus on providing instrumental skills that facilitate integration in the job market (such as retraining and education, as well as language and occupational training as necessary), as well as the provision of skills necessary to understand and participate effectively as a (future) citizen in the American political process.

He sees the situation of second generation immigrants, however, as strikingly different from that of their parents. The former's acculturation, Gordon noted, is virtually guaranteed, forceful and swift. Measures to spur the process are thus unwarranted. In fact, given the speed of the process, Gordon instead calls for efforts directed at ensuring the psychological health of the children and their parents in the process, by helping the children retain a "realistic degree of positive regard for the cultural values of [their] ethnic background."¹⁷⁰ Such positive regard, Gordon argued, would provide them with a healthier psychological base for their confrontation with American culture, facilitate their identification with and response to their parents, while not delaying their acculturation process at all.¹⁷¹

Gordon also acknowledged that, where they were found amiss, measures should be taken to foster language and cultural skills in second generation immigrants. He also noted, however, that despite their successful acculturation, second generation

¹⁶⁹ Gordon, p.243. Interestingly, Gordon exempts first generation intellectuals from this rule, claiming that „people for whom ideas, concepts, literature, music, painting“ and other art forms have intrinsic meaning form their own and in fact the only sub-society in which primary group relationships among people of different ethnic backgrounds are both frequent and forged and maintained with relative comfort and ease. See Gordon, p.224,242. As we have seen above, Esser grants a similar exemption to the children of diplomats and academics. Unlike the great majority of migrant offspring, they can achieve what he calls true multiple social integration, given their bilingual upbringing, opportunities to learn about and interact with the respective cultural realms, and a situation in which the respective cultures manifest themselves equally in everyday life. See Esser, *Integration und ethnische Schichtung*, p.21

¹⁷⁰ Gordon, p.245

¹⁷¹ In their recent empirical study on the immigrant second generation in the United States, Portes and Rumbaut agree with Gordon's view, noting that the respective speed with which immigrant parents and their children acculturate affects integration outcomes for the second generation. Depending on the social and economic context, they find significant generational differences in acculturation speed. Such 'dissonant acculturation,' they warn, can increase the children's' risk for downward assimilation. See Portes and Rumbaut, *Legacies - the story of the immigrant second generation*, p.53

immigrants are typically no less affected by host society discrimination and prejudice than their less acculturated parents.¹⁷²

In sum, we can say that many of the issues and dilemmas that German society grapples with today are not entirely new. Drawing on the knowledge and insights seminal American theorists have gained on the integration of earlier immigrant flows thus seems a fruitful and commendable endeavor. Unfortunately, however, German academics like Esser (and with him the political and legal circles he advised) engage with them only selectively, ignoring parts that readily apply to and stand to illuminate important aspects of the current immigrant integration situation in Germany.

Most notably, Esser sees the tendency of some segments of the second generation towards spatial and social segmentation from the host society mainstream as a function of the large size of their respective ethnic community in Germany. He does not delve very deeply into the reasons why these immigrants, presumably despite more lucrative options in the society at large, chose to remain among their kin. Social distance between immigrants and host society, Esser argues, is a function of the degree to which their respective culture and value systems overlap, and thus, it seems, mostly unchangeable.

Gordon, by contrast, attributes the lack of structural integration of the second generation to host society prejudice and discrimination. Persistent ethnic sub-communities, to him, are neither born from nor reflect particular ideological commitments but are the result of host society prejudice and discrimination.

Aside from Gordon's theoretical framework of the integration process, part of Esser's stance on immigrant integration outcomes as described in Section 2.2.2 bear substantial resemblance to John Berry's seminal work on alternative modes of migrant acculturation. In the following, I will thus briefly outline Berry's original work, comparing and contrasting it to Gordon's conceptual stance and to how Esser frames Berry in his report to the Süßmuth Commission. As we will see, Esser's rendering of Berry, as his rendering of Gordon's work, selectively omits Berry's stance on the important role of the host society in shaping immigrants' integration outcomes.

¹⁷² Gordon, p.245.

2.2.4. John Berry: Is integration feasible?

In what has since become a seminal statement on alternative outcomes of immigrant integration, John Berry framed a two-dimensional immigrant adaptation model. It was meant in part to account for differences in outcomes that so-called straight line (sequential) assimilation models such as Gordon's do not adequately capture.¹⁷³

Before describing his model in more detail, I will briefly address differences in conceptualization of assimilation between Berry and Gordon. I then outline similarities and differences between Berry's original acculturation model and how Esser conceived it in his work, with a particular focus on where both of them locate the main impediments to some of the four adaptation alternatives they describe. I also briefly address the relationship of feasible adaptation alternatives to the debate on dual nationality. I conclude the section with a brief survey of pertinent empirical work speaking to this issue.

In contrast to Gordon, Berry stressed the conflictual nature of the integration process. Similar to the dynamic Park described in his seminal race relations cycle, Berry describes relations among ethnic or national groups and the adaptations cohabitation entails for all of them as inherently involuntary and thus, conflictual.¹⁷⁴ As the groups vary in strength, the burden of adaptation, he argued, falls disproportionately on the weaker group(s), which, as 'groups do not lightly give up valued features of their culture,' resent(s) this burden. His view of the acculturation process becomes clearer as we consider his examples of the circumstances and process he has in mind:

„The least acculturation may take place where there is no purpose (contact is accidental), where trade is mutually desired, or where contact is short-lived;

¹⁷³ Straight-line assimilation refers here to a simple continuous process of immigrants adapting to the mainstream host society, with an associated gradual involuntary loss of their culture of ethnic origin. I intentionally simplify my account here. Despite the sequential nature of his model, Gordon did not, as my description above, I hope, makes clear, suggest that all immigrants would necessarily breeze through all the assimilation steps he described. I thus see Gordon's and Berry's model as mostly complementary. Gordon frames the assimilation process as it unfolds in the absence of any outside, or, at best, a benevolent host society influence. Berry, by contrast, as we will see below, explicitly takes the host society mental disposition towards an immigrant's respective ethnic affiliation into account.

¹⁷⁴ See Robert Ezra Park, *Race and culture* (New York: Free Press, 1950), p.150

*the greatest acculturation will take place where the purpose is a deliberate takeover of a society (e.g., by invasion) or of its skills or beliefs (e.g., by education and evangelization) over a long period of time (e.g., by settlement).*¹⁷⁵

His model thus seems to be derived more from forced contact situations than from contact as a result of (presumably mostly voluntary) movement of people from one cultural or national space into another. His conception of strength, moreover, appears to be based more on power, from which he derives the will to purposefully dominate and subordinate. Arguably, strength could equally well be conceived in terms of group size, which may or may not drive deliberate attempts to change the divergent culture of smaller groups. In fact, a host society strong enough in numbers vis-à-vis an incoming minority group may rightly perceive little threat to its language, culture, or value system, and thus simply ignore the newcomers rather than attempt to actively dominate them.¹⁷⁶ In sum, whereas Gordon sees acculturation as an inevitable, automatic and unintentional process, Berry describes it as forced, involuntary, and thus, conflictual.

Based on this conceptualization of the acculturation process, Berry then describes three ways in which immigrants can reduce acculturative conflict: They can adjust to, retaliate against, or withdraw from the dominant culture. Their choice, he argues, depends on the value they place on (1) retaining their own cultural identity and (2) seeking positive relations with the larger society. From their orientation on these two issues, Berry derives his seminal model of acculturation attitudes, which has been widely referred to and used in theoretical and empirical research on immigration outcomes on both sides of the Atlantic.¹⁷⁷ Table 5 illustrates his model, which I briefly outline in turn.

¹⁷⁵ Berry, "Social and cultural change," p.11

¹⁷⁶ The argument that group size and spatial concentration of immigrants influence the degree to which the host society perceives certain ethnic groups as a threat is commonly made in the literature, although it has to be viewed in connection to other factors that influence the salience of particular ethnic groups within the host society. As Allport notes on this subject, the degree of prejudice from a rapid influx of Nova Scotians into a New England "would certainly be less than if an equal number of Negroes should arrive. Some ethnic groups seem more menacing than others - either because they have more points of difference or a higher visibility. Growing density, therefore, is not in itself a sufficient principle to explain prejudice." Allport, p.229

¹⁷⁷ John W. Berry and Uichol Kim, "Acculturation and mental health," in *Health and cross-cultural psychology* ed. Pierre R. Dansen, John W. Berry, and Norman Sartorius (Newberry Park, CA: Sage, 1988), p.211

		<i>Is maintenance of cultural identity valued?</i>	
		<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>
<i>Are relationships to host society valued?</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Integration</i>	<i>Assimilation</i>
	<i>No</i>	<i>Separation</i>	<i>Marginalization</i>

Table 5: Berry's acculturation model

Source: Berry, John W., and Uichol Kim. "Acculturation and mental health." In *Health and cross-cultural psychology* ed. Pierre R. Dansen, John W. Berry and Norman Sartorius, 207-236. Newberry Park, CA: Sage, 1988, p.211

Depending on whether immigrants value maintaining their original cultural identity and relationships to the host society, respectively, they pursue four alternative acculturation trajectories. Assimilation, to Berry, is the strategy pursued by minority group members who “do not wish to maintain their cultural identity and at the same time seek daily interactions with other cultures.”¹⁷⁸ Separation, by contrast, the state Esser referred to as segmentation as shown in Table 4 above, is chosen by individuals who want to maintain their original culture and prefer to avoid interaction with the host society. Integration, the state Esser termed ‘multiple integration’, is the option chosen by those who are both interested in maintaining their original culture and interacting with the host society on a daily basis. Marginalization, finally, describes a situation where there is little interest in or possibility to maintain the original culture, yet also little interest in relations with the host society.

In contrast to Esser, Berry acknowledged that the disposition of the host society influences the ease with which immigrants can pursue these alternative options, and, ultimately, in the case of integration and assimilation, whether they are available to them altogether. When the host society is reluctant or opposed to forging relationships with and thus granting access to their circles to certain groups of immigrants, integration and assimilation may in fact not be viable options, even if the immigrants themselves would like to pursue them. If they chose instead to maintain ties to their respective ethnic communities only, the resulting separation (or segmentation, in Esser’s model) may thus in fact signal the forced exclusion of certain ethnic groups

¹⁷⁸ Berry, "Immigration, acculturation and adaptation," p.9

from the host society mainstream, rather than (voluntarily chosen) separation, as Esser implies.

Host society influence is even more clearly an issue with marginalization, a state, which is, Berry conceded, rarely chosen freely, but usually the result of forced assimilation attempts (which Berry tellingly refers to as ‚a pressure cooker’ situation) combined with forced separation (namely, segregation, or forced exclusion) from the host society.¹⁷⁹

Similarly, Berry saw integration as a viable choice for minority groups only if the dominant group embraces and is willing to accommodate their particular ethnic heritage, stating that ‘while non-dominant groups need to adopt the basic values of the larger society for integration to occur, the dominant group must also be prepared to adapt national institutions (such as in education, health care, and the labor market) to better meet the needs of all groups.’¹⁸⁰ On a deeper level, Berry described the prerequisites for integration as:

„ a widespread acceptance of the value to society of cultural diversity (i.e. the presence of a positive „multicultural ideology“); relatively low levels of prejudice (i.e. minimal ethnocentrism, racism, and discrimination); positive mutual attitudes among cultural groups (i.e. no specific intergroup hatreds; and a sense of attachment to, or identification with, the larger society by all groups.“¹⁸¹

Berry’s acculturation model has been used extensively in empirical studies. Early studies tested and generally confirmed the validity of his instruments.¹⁸² Empirical work then focused on how attractive each of his alternative acculturation paths is to immigrants, and on the degree of psychological well-being associated with each of them. The general consensus to date is that integration is the most preferred acculturation trajectory. In the aggregate, both first and second generation immigrants

¹⁷⁹ Even though Esser does not implicate the host society in the marginalization process, he paints a similarly unfortunate picture of the marginal actor in society, as „an outcast, lonely and homeless foreigner, wherever he goes.“ See Esser, *Integration und ethnische Schichtung*, p.20 [my translation].

¹⁸⁰ Berry, "Immigration, acculturation and adaptation," p.10f

¹⁸¹ Berry, "Immigration, acculturation and adaptation," p.11

¹⁸² For a summary of the instruments and studies testing them in various cultural settings, see John W. Berry and others, "Acculturation attitudes in plural societies," *Applied psychology* 38, no. 185-206 (1989)

appear to prefer integration to all other alternatives.¹⁸³ In the early 1980s, several empirical studies in the United States investigated the psychological impact of alternative integration paths on immigrants and suggested that integration is related to better psychological health than Berry's other modes of adaptation.¹⁸⁴ Most recently, Berry himself studied a large international sample of immigrant youth from thirteen countries and found that those with an integration profile fared best in psychological and socio-cultural adaptation.¹⁸⁵ Implications for the settlement of immigrant youth, Berry concludes, are clear: Youth should be encouraged to retain both a sense of their own heritage cultural identity, and to establish close ties with the larger national society.¹⁸⁶

To be sure, as Berry suggested, stated immigrant preferences do not necessarily translate into the respective outcomes, as the latter depend on host society disposition. A number of studies have in fact found that perceived discrimination is negatively related to immigrant adaptation.¹⁸⁷ Berry also found adolescents fitting the integration and assimilation profiles to report significantly less discrimination than those with other profiles.¹⁸⁸

Even taking the potential dampening effect of host discrimination on assimilation and integration tendencies into account, recent empirical findings for Germany suggest that integration is more prevalent than Esser, who deemed it, as we recall from Section 2.2.2, a “theoretically hardly realistic and empirically very rare occurrence,” suggests. In their study of a nationally representative sample of *first*

¹⁸³ Zenep Aycan and Rabindra N. Kanungo, "The impact of acculturation on socialization beliefs and behavioral occurrences among Indo-Canadian immigrants," *Journal of comparative family studies* 29, no. 3 (1998), for instance, study a national sample of ethnic Asian-Indian families living in Canada and find that both first and second generation immigrants prefer integration among Berry's four acculturation modes. The second choice adaptation option was separation for parents and assimilation for children. Marginalization was the least popular acculturation alternative.

¹⁸⁴ See, for instance, John Berry and others, "Comparative studies of acculturative stress," *International migration review* 21 (1987) and J. Lang and others, "Quality of life and psychological well-being in a bicultural Latino community," *Hispanic journal of behavioral sciences* 4 (1982)

¹⁸⁵ See John W. Berry and others, "Immigrant youth: Acculturation, identity, and adaptation," *Applied psychology: an international review* 55, no. 3 (2006)

¹⁸⁶ Berry and others, "Immigrant youth: Acculturation, identity, and adaptation," p.306-307

¹⁸⁷ See, for instance, Karmela Liebkind and Inga Jasinskaja-Lahti, "The influence of experiences of discrimination on psychological stress: A comparison of seven immigrant groups," *Journal of community and applied social psychology* 10 (2000); Samuel Noh and others, "Perceived racial discrimination, depression and coping," *Journal of health and social behavior* 40 (1999)

¹⁸⁸ Berry and others, "Immigrant youth: Acculturation, identity, and adaptation," p.316

generation immigrants in Germany, the Zimmermanns most recently find that while almost three quarters of their sample self-identify as separated, about one tenth see themselves as assimilated and integrated, respectively.¹⁸⁹ Only a mere four percent of the first generation immigrants reported the entire lack of both ethnic and host society affiliation characteristic of marginalization.¹⁹⁰ Similar self-reported adaptation frequencies for *second generation* immigrants would, arguably, show even higher numbers of integrated and assimilated cases.

In sum, Esser and Berry differ in how likely they deem immigrants to choose (multiple) integration as their preferred adaptation path. Moreover, while both of them added important caveats to the empirical feasibility of the integration option, their respective views on where the main stumbling blocks are located differ markedly. Esser sees integration as predicated upon a rare mix of available learning and interaction opportunities in both cultural realms, and hampered, more generally, by a universal human tendency to prefer simple ingroup-outgroup thinking to the cognitive and emotional dissonance he sees associated with multiple integration.¹⁹¹ Berry, by contrast, clearly implicates host society attitudes towards immigrants as the main factor facilitating or hindering assimilation and integration. If the host society welcomes, values and accepts cultural diversity and does not discriminate against cultural groups, immigrants can choose to maintain their original culture and interact with the host society on a daily basis. If not, the option to integrate or assimilate is simply not available to them.

As we have seen, empirical studies on the attractiveness of the four alternative acculturation paths to immigrants weaken Esser's view on the inherent cognitive and emotional burden of integration. They also lend support to Berry's suggestion that perceived host society discrimination can influence the degree to which the integration and assimilation path is a viable option to immigrants.

¹⁸⁹ Zimmermann, Zimmermann, and Constant, p.773

¹⁹⁰ They themselves do not directly interpret the raw data they present in their article in terms of Berry's categories. The percentages I cite here are thus my own calculations, which I based directly on the frequencies of the respective response categories the authors present in Table 2 in Zimmermann, Zimmermann, and Constant, p.773

¹⁹¹ Esser, *Integration und ethnische Schichtung*, p.21

If we thus acknowledge (multiple) integration as a feasible and even attractive adaptation path, we have to also address the question of whether dual nationality should be granted to immigrants as a way to adequately reflect their (multiple) integration status. Proponents and opponents of dual nationality frequently use metaphors, which, albeit helpful to illustrate their respective points of view, merely reflect two perspectives which, to their respective beholders, appear equally valid.

As is typical among opponents, Samuel Huntington, for instance, likens nationality to mutually exclusive affiliations such as (ideal-type Christian monogamous) marriage, and denies that multiple affiliations can be fruitfully maintained without impinging upon or negating another.¹⁹² Proponents of dual nationality, by contrast, liken emotional attachments to two communities and nations to those to two parents, or children. Loving one, they feel, does not cast doubt on the loyalty and devotion to the other, and spending time fostering bonds with one does not mean that one cares less about the other.

Ties to more than one nation are, incidentally, not particular to immigrants in the United States and Germany only, but equally characterize émigré American or German citizens who, in the course of long-term residence or frequent transnational movements, naturally develop emotional affiliations with their new or alternative places of residence. True congruence between emotional attachment and citizenship status for both long-term resident foreign nationals and long-term expatriate citizens of any given nation could thus be achieved by granting them dual citizenship, or, conversely, release them into statelessness.

Dual nationality is a highly contested issue in present-day Germany. Its notorious salience is mostly due to the unfortunate tendency of some politicians to stir public

¹⁹² See Huntington, *Who are we? The challenges to America's national identity*, p.204-219. "For a person with two or more citizenships," he claims, "no one citizenship can be as important as his one citizenship is to a person who only has one." He further notes that given most citizens' failure to take much interest and participate in the public affairs of a single community and country, dual nationals will surely neglect either one or both of the communities or countries of which they claim to be partaking. Huntington, *Who are we? The challenges to America's national identity*, p.212. For seminal refutations of this stance, see Joseph H. Carens, "Membership and morality: Admission to citizenship in liberal democratic states," in *Immigration and the politics of citizenship in Europe and North America*, ed. Rogers Brubaker (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1989); Michael Walzer, *Spheres of justice: A defense of pluralism and equality* (New York: Basic Books, 1983), p.31-62.

xenophobia as a way to gain votes in state elections.¹⁹³ Acknowledging the psychological benefits and empirical prevalence of (multiple) integration among immigrants, both among theorists like Esser and politicians, is thus not à la mode, because it raises the touchy question of whether they should be granted options to formalize their national affiliations in a way that adequately represents their existing state of emotional attachment to two communities and nations.

Before beginning my empirical analysis, I conclude this chapter with a brief description of methodological triangulation and how it is used in this study.

2.3. On methodological triangulation

Empirical research on the influence of perceived visible difference from the host society in Germany is hampered by a lack of data on pertinent attributes of the resident population.¹⁹⁴ Studies on host society discrimination traditionally select respondents according to their nationality and disregard the potential effects of ethnic origin and accompanying extrinsic and intrinsic cultural traits such as phenotype, hair and eye color, or speech accent, among others. In part due to increased migration and transnational movements more generally, as well as naturalization and intermarriage, nationality has, however, become but a rough proxy for the presence of the kinds of immigrant attributes which may trigger host society discrimination.

My analysis is an attempt to address this issue head on. Given the paucity of existing data in Germany, I use a three-pronged methodological approach to test whether immigrants' extrinsic and intrinsic attributes as described in Section 2.1.1 above significantly influence integration outcomes in Germany. It consists of (a) a statistical analysis of recent government census data, (b) analysis of data I collected

¹⁹³ The most notable example here is a campaign launched by CDU official Roland Koch against dual nationality in 1999, which helped his bid to become minister president of Hessen in 1999. Several observers pointed out soon after his election that many voters asked to be shown where they could 'sign against foreigners,' suggesting that the campaign mislead the public and (successfully) exploited general xenophobia for election purposes. See Hofrichter, Jürgen, and Bettina Westle. "Wahlkampf wirkt - Eine Analyse der hessischen Landtagswahl 1999." In *Querschnitt: Festschrift für Max Kaase*, ed. Peter Mohler and Paul Lüttinger, 149-176. Mannheim: ZUMA, 2000, p.173.

¹⁹⁴ Other countries do collect information on physical attributes of their resident population in their national censuses, using various classifications. Racial and color classification taxonomies are generally arbitrary, and highly political. See, for instance, Melissa Nobles, *Shades of citizenship. Race and the census in modern politics* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000) on racial categorization in the United States and Brazil.

myself with a structured survey, and (c) insights gleaned from in-depth qualitative interviews I conducted with immigrants in Germany.

In line with Mill's method of difference, I hold one study variable, language skills, constant by focusing most of my research on second generation immigrants only.¹⁹⁵ They received their entire formal schooling in Germany and can thus, on average, be expected to have near-native fluency in German.¹⁹⁶ In the following, I briefly outline the rationale underlying my decision to use methodological triangulation for my investigation.

I use the term triangulation here in its broader sense, as a research strategy that combines different methodologies to study the same phenomenon.¹⁹⁷ Despite the vastly different epistemological assumptions underlying qualitative and quantitative methodologies, I believe drawing on both methods can help elucidate complex societal problems and provide sorely needed guidance for public policy.

In combining qualitative and quantitative methodologies, I thus primarily aim to elaborate, enhance, reinforce, clarify, and illustrate results from one method by using the other. More specifically, in the particular area at hand, I see the two methods targeting two distinct but related aspects of integration, namely the state (as proxied by the measures of the degree of economic integration in various realms as shown in Table 3) and the process of integration respectively. While quantitative analysis methods are ideally geared towards providing an accurate and representative aggregate account of the overall status quo of integration outcome measures at one

¹⁹⁵ See John Stewart Mill, "Of the four methods of experimental inquiry," in *A system of logic*, ed. John M. Robson (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1973). The method of difference is used to determine whether a given factor causes an outcome of interest, by taking it away while holding the remaining factors constant, and compare outcomes prior to and after its removal. I do this for the structured survey and qualitative interviews as outlined further below. In my statistical analysis, I do measure the effect of language skills by including first generation immigrants in the analysis as a reference group. Second generation immigrants are defined throughout as people who either were born in Germany or entered the country prior to their sixth birthday, which is when compulsory formal education begins in Germany. I gauge (and essentially confirm) the validity of my assumption on second generation immigrant language skills with a question in the structured survey as shown in Table 17 below.

¹⁹⁶ As mentioned in footnote ²⁵, the term second generation immigrants is misleading in that the people labeled as such often did not migrate at all. Although I believe this criticism to be valid, I use 'immigrants' as a label throughout given its prevalence in literature and public discourse.

¹⁹⁷ I borrow this definition from Norman K. Denzin, *The research act* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978), p.291. It is also used more specifically to refer to corroboration or convergence of results obtained using different methodologies. I take this to be one of several possible outcomes of combining qualitative and quantitative research instead, and differentiate the act of combining methodologies from its outcome.

point in time for which data is available, qualitative accounts stand to add meaning to statistical associations by providing a better picture of the process, as well as how it is subjectively perceived by a subset of affected individuals. By using different methods for different inquiry components, I thus seek to extend the breadth and depth of enquiry.¹⁹⁸

To be sure, triangulation always carries the risk of unveiling some surprises and discrepancies inherent in potentially unexpected and incongruent findings.¹⁹⁹ Although conceptually reconciling such findings is desirable of course, I do not primarily set out to corroborate or validate one set of findings by the other, or, as Denzin puts it, simply add data from different methods to produce ‘a unitary or rounded reality.’ I aim instead at a deeper and more fine-grained understanding of the issues at hand, and hope that results generated with the respective data and methods of analysis will be broadly complementary. In the following, I present each of the three distinct methodologies in turn. I start with the quantitative statistical analysis of census data, and then outline data collection and results for the two qualitative methodologies I pursued, namely a structured survey and in-depth interviews of second generation immigrants in Germany, respectively.

¹⁹⁸ I draw this broad categorization of motivations for combining qualitative and quantitative research from Alan Bryman, "Integrating qualitative and quantitative research: How is it done?" *Qualitative research* 6, no. 1 (2006), p.105-106; Jennifer C. Greene, Valerie C. Caracelli, and Wendy F. Graham, "Toward a conceptual framework for mixed-method evaluation designs," *Educational evaluation and policy analysis* 11, no. 3 (1989); Paul Thompson, "Researching family and social mobility with two eyes: Some experiences of the interaction between qualitative and quantitative data," *International journal of social research methodology* 7, no. 3 (2004); Julia Brannen, "Mixing methods: The entry of qualitative and quantitative approaches into the research process," *International journal of social research methodology* 8, no. 3 (2005), p.177

¹⁹⁹ As I will elaborate further below, I geared part of my qualitative analysis precisely towards shedding light on unexpected results generated by the statistical analysis.

Chapter 3 Statistical analysis

Due in part to the limited range of information in large-scale census data sets, most studies on immigrant integration outcomes in Germany focus on attributes commonly subsumed under economic assimilation, as shown in Table 3. My statistical analysis is no exception. In the following, I outline recent changes in how data on immigrants is collected in the German census, and highlight benefits and limitations of these changes for the particular research question I try to answer. I then describe my choice of study and control variables and provide a first cut graphical view of the relationships between my two independent variable proxies, namely language skills and physical appearance, and the independent variables capturing (economic) assimilation outcomes, namely income, dependence on government support, and occupation status. I then perform the statistical analysis, and present results.

3.1. Data characteristics

Government census data in Germany does not include information on physical appearance of the resident population.²⁰⁰ Nor does it, until very recently, include information on ethnicity. This omission reflects the longstanding tradition of ethnic nationalism in Germany, which is based on an increasingly outdated notion of a society of common descent (*Abstammungsgesellschaft*) in which ethnic origin is held to be synonymous to citizenship, or nationality.²⁰¹

Reflecting a new willingness to acknowledge and document empirical realities, official government census data in 2005 newly includes information on the so-called ‘migration background’ of German residents, and information on whether a person

²⁰⁰ This reflects the long-standing view of Germany as a state with an ethnically and racially homogenous population. Other countries, such as the United States and Brazil, for instance, acknowledge the centrality of race and skin color as salient organizing principles in political, economic and social life by collecting data on these attributes as part of their national censuses. To be sure, debates in these societies rightly focus on the repercussions of the respective categories used to classify people. See on this issue Joel Perlmann and Mary C. Waters, *The new race question: how the census counts multiracial individuals* (New York Russell Sage, 2005); Nobles, *Shades of citizenship. Race and the census in modern politics*

²⁰¹ I henceforth use citizenship and nationality as synonyms.

obtained German citizenship by naturalization, and parental citizenship.²⁰² This information allows to more accurately infer residents' ethnic backgrounds than did the traditional census classification which merely recorded a residents' current citizenship. According to estimates of the German Federal Statistical Office, the new census format newly allows to identify about ten percent of German citizens as descendants of non-German parents, and thus, likely, non-German ethnic origin.²⁰³

Nonetheless, the manner in which data is collected and groups are defined in the census constrains the realm of analyses I would like to undertake to answer my research question, in two main respects. First, it hampers accurate identification of people of partial ethnic German ethnicity. In the new census format used in 2005, information on parental citizenship, arguably a more accurate proxy for a respondent's ethnic origin, and hence, physical appearance, than his or her own current citizenship, was gathered only from a very small fraction of respondents with migration background. Given this lack of data on parental citizenship in the census data, I found it necessary to adopt an alternative approach. I derive the degree of perceived physical appearance difference from a respondents' own current citizenship alone, thus assuming, for instance, that a current Turkish national also has a Turkish ethnic background, as well as their citizenship prior to naturalization, if applicable. I assume, for instance, that a German citizen whose German citizenship was conferred upon him or her by naturalization and previously held Turkish citizenship has a Turkish ethnic background. This method stands to miscategorize people who carry one of their parental nationalities. Those holding only the nationality of their non-German parent then unduly fall into the same respective 'foreign' category, whereas those holding only German nationality end up being wrongly classified as full ethnic Germans.

²⁰² Forschungsdatenzentrum des Statistischen Bundesamtes, "Mikrozensus 2005," (Wiesbaden: Forschungsdatenzentrum, 2005). The census data I use here is a 70 percent anonymized random subsample drawn from the original Mikozenus data, which the Federal Statistical Office provides to researchers for in-house analyses as so-called scientific use files. It is generally considered highly reliable and representative of the German resident population. For a definition of the term 'migration background', see page 25.

²⁰³ Statistisches Bundesamt, *Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit: Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund, Ergebnisse des Mikrozensus 2005*

I believe that despite this flaw, the attempt to identify and separately analyze binational, and thus most likely, multiethnic German residents is worthwhile. People of multiple ethnic backgrounds have attributes that make them particularly interesting for my research. Most of them have one ethnic German parent, and can thus overall be assumed (with appropriate disclaimers regarding the stability of their families and thus degree of influence of their respective parent) to be virtually identical in language and cultural skills to people with full ethnic German heritage. The dual nationality status of these ‘ampersands’ often reflect emotional and /or family attachments and loyalties to both of their communities and countries of citizenship.²⁰⁴ Given their ‘foreign’ parent, however, they may vary considerably in physical appearance from ‘full’ ethnic Germans. Given the aforementioned lack of information on the parental citizenship, I rely on information on dual nationality to identify multiethnic persons of partial ethnic German heritage. I assume a person to be of mixed (half-)German ethnic heritage if he or she holds more than one citizenship, and also indicates to not have acquired German citizenship through naturalization.²⁰⁵

Second, due to idiosyncratic definitions in the census, ethnic German *Aussiedler* or resettlers cannot be accurately identified and studied. Since July 1999, their acquisition of a German passport upon arrival in Germany is not considered nor recorded as naturalization. Ever since, this peculiar change in definitions effectively lumps this group together with all ethnic Germans returning from temporary stays abroad lasting more than six months, thereby disallowing accurate statistical analyses of their particular integration outcomes.²⁰⁶ This is unfortunate, because *Aussiedler*, too, have a set of attributes that would make them particularly relevant for the purpose of my study. Ethnic German *Aussiedler* were traditionally assumed to effortlessly master the linguistic and cultural transition from their previous countries of residence

²⁰⁴ I borrow the label ampersand from Samuel Huntington. See Huntington, *Who are we? The challenges to America's national identity*, p.192. I do not elaborate on this issue further, because it resembles that of the feasibility of multiple integration, as described in Section 2.2.4.

²⁰⁵ This way of identifying multiethnic people, I believe, is reasonably accurate, given that (non-naturalization) automatic *jus soli* acquisition of citizenship at birth, now available to a small fraction of children of foreign national resident parents in Germany, was not available when the people I included in my empirical analyses (at least 15 years old in the statistical analysis) were born.

²⁰⁶ I asked the microcensus expert at the German Federal Statistical Office in Wiesbaden for advice on identifying the *Aussiedler* group in the census, and was informed that the definitional imprecision I describe is a design flaw they hope to rectify in future census surveys.

(including but not limited to Poland, the former Soviet Union, former Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, the former Yugoslavia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, and Albania) to their German ‘homeland,’ as we have seen in Section 1.1.1 above. More recent *Aussiedler*, however, are less equipped with German cultural and linguistic skills.²⁰⁷ Moreover, recent studies suggest that their co-ethnic German hosts do not in fact prefer their presence to that of immigrants of non-German ethnicities.²⁰⁸ Nonetheless, *Aussiedler* can be assumed to be mostly identical in appearance to their German resident co-ethnics, while arguably sharing the linguistic and cultural hurdles of other immigrant groups. This would make them an ideal test case for my study hypothesis in particular, and the widespread belief among Germans that blood is a better predictor of ‘German-ness’ than long-term residence in the country, more generally.

As I cannot give them their due focus in the statistical analyses, I include them in the qualitative part of my work as described further below. In the following, I describe my choice of dependent and independent variables in more detail.

3.1.1. Independent variables

Given the lack of direct measures of my main independent variables of interest, namely language proficiency and physical appearance attributes, I construct proxies for both, using available information on immigrants’ age of arrival in Germany, and their own and parental place of birth, respectively. Table 6 summarizes the data characteristics of my independent variables as described in more detail below.

²⁰⁷ As mentioned in Section 1.1.1, recent changes in immigration legislation in fact reflect and address this issue. Since January 2005, immigrants who would like to enter the country as family members or descendant of ethnic Germans now have to pass a language test before their application is approved. Once admitted, they are now eligible to participate in free language courses for six months on par with immigrants of non-German ethnic origin. See Bundesgesetzbuch, § 9 Abs. 1

²⁰⁸ See Rainer Strobl and Wolfgang Kühnel, *Dazugehörig und ausgegrenzt: Analysen zu Integrationschancen junger Aussiedler*, Konflikt- und Gewaltforschung; (Weinheim: Juventa, 2000); Ulrich Mammey and Rolf Schiener, *Zur Eingliederung der Aussiedler in die Gesellschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Ergebnisse einer Panelstudie des Bundesinstituts für Bevölkerungsforschung* (Opladen: Leske and Budrich, 1998); Anne-Katrin Wickboldt, "Factors influencing public opinion on the immigration of asylum seekers in Germany," *Migration* 42 (2003)

Physical appearance

As mentioned before, I use current citizenship and – for naturalized German citizens – citizenship prior to naturalization, -- a rough proxy for physical appearance, -- as an independent variable. I assign non-German nationals and naturalized Germans to several ethnic origin groups, which I rank in descending order of estimated perceived physical difference from ethnic Germans, thus constructing the variable ‘*EthSim.*’ I derive the ranking I use here from self-perceived appearance information gathered as part of the structured survey I conducted as described in Chapter 4 below.²⁰⁹ Taking existing citizenship frequencies in the census data into account, I assigned some (current or previous) citizenships their own group and aggregated others with much lower frequencies into citizenship regions of origin. I then aggregated the scores of perceived physical difference (in eye, hair, and skin color, clothing, name, and speech accent) of the respective citizenship groups in the survey to obtain averages, and then ranked the census groups in order of average score of physical appearance divergence as expressed in the survey.²¹⁰

In descending order of reported self-perceived similarity to ethnic Germans, I differentiate foreign nationals or naturalized Germans with previous citizenship of, respectively, (1) Poland, (2) the states of former Yugoslavia (including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, and Serbia and Montenegro), (3) Italy, (4) remaining (geographic) Europe (including Bulgaria, Romania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Cyprus), (5) the former Soviet Union (including the current Russian Federation, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Turkmenistan), (6) binational ethnic half- Germans (whose respective foreign parent citizenship could not be determined more precisely in the census, as described above), (7) Turkey, and (8) the rest of the world (including

²⁰⁹ Although thus relying on self-perceived and reported appearance divergence may introduce bias to an extent, assigning people to appearance categories myself, aside from being incompatible with the survey mode I chose, would most likely have been just as arbitrary. As Mark E. Hill, "Race of the interviewer and perception of skin color: Evidence from the multi-city study of urban inequality," *American sociological review* 67, no. 1 (2002) shows, interviewers often lack the ability to carefully distinguish the physical characteristics of people with phenotypes other than their own.

²¹⁰ Despite their prevalence in the German resident population, Italians were entirely missing among the respondents to my survey. I thus used information from the qualitative interviews to determine their rank among the nationality groups I use for statistical analyses.

current or previous nationals of geographic America, the Middle East, Asia, and Africa).²¹¹

	<i>Independent variables</i>	
	<i>Language skills</i>	<i>Physical appearance</i>
<i>Variable definition</i>	<i>German language skills</i>	<i>Perceived degree of physical difference from ethnic Germans</i>
<i>Data characteristics / proxy construction</i>	<i>Two dummy variables proxying language skills derived from age of arrival in Germany (1st generation are those who arrived in Germany after their 6th birthday, and 2nd generation are those who arrived younger). The 2nd generation is assumed to have superior language skills.</i>	<i>Categorical variable, with categories derived from current or previous citizenship (if naturalized German,) rank-ordered in descending order of self-perceived appearance difference as derived from survey question average</i>
<i>Method of analysis</i>	<i>determined by data characteristics of respective dependent variable</i>	
<i>Source</i>	<i>See Table 2 above</i>	

Table 6: Independent variable characteristics

<i>Group</i>	<i>Percent of resident population</i>
<i>Germany</i>	<i>88.3</i>
<i>Poland</i>	<i>0.9</i>
<i>Former Yugoslavia</i>	<i>1</i>
<i>Italy</i>	<i>0.7</i>
<i>Remaining Europe</i>	<i>2.5</i>
<i>Former Soviet Union</i>	<i>1.1</i>
<i>Binational Germans</i>	<i>0.6</i>
<i>Turkey</i>	<i>2.8</i>
<i>Other World</i>	<i>1.9</i>

Table 7: Citizenship groups in Germany

²¹¹ I choose the somewhat cumbersome term “binational ethnic half-Germans” here to convey how I define this group (i.e., in terms of inherited parental citizenships), but also to reflect the assumption that their possession of two citizenships signifies a bi-ethnic heritage. To avoid the rather lengthy label, I henceforth refer to them simply as binational Germans or binational half-Germans as well. I use all these labels as synonyms throughout. They are also referred to as mixed, multiracial or multiethnic individuals in the literature, and debates on how to appropriately label them are ongoing. See, for instance, Edwards and Caballero, p.57

Table 7 lists the aggregate frequencies of the respective citizenship groups in the census sample I used. Figure 9 provides the same information in graphical format.




Figure 9: Foreign nationals according to citizenship groups in Germany

I also construct two dummy variables ‘*EthEurope*’ and ‘*EthNonEurope*,’ aggregating all nationals of geographic Europe into one group and all remaining foreign nationals (including Turkey, the states of the former Soviet Union, and the rest of the world) into another. Some research suggests that the fault line separating perceived ingroup and outgroup in the nationality domain runs between European and non-European citizens.²¹² In the past decade, general population surveys in Germany included a question on the desired degree of restriction to immigration of various groups to Germany. The distribution of answer frequencies for the respective immigrant groups, as shown in Figure 10, suggest that Germans hold more favorable attitudes towards immigration of EU citizens than non-EU citizens.²¹³ Whereas about one third of German residents believe that EU-citizens should be granted free entry to Germany, a mere 10 percent would grant this privilege to non-EU citizens. Reflecting (and perhaps in part at the root of) this binary view of foreigners in Germany and

²¹² See Silberman, Alba, and Fournier, who similarly split their sample of second generation immigrants to France into those of European and those of non-European provenance.

²¹³ I generated this graph with data extracted from empirische Sozialforschung Zentrum für Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen an der Universität zu Köln ZUMA, "Allgemeine Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften ALLBUS," (Köln: ZUMA, various years). The data shown refers to a question on German residents’ opinion regarding the immigration of EU citizens, non-EU citizens, *Aussiedler* and asylum seekers, respectively. It was part of the German General Social Survey conducted in 1992, 1996, and 2000.

Europe in general is a stark divide between the rights conferred upon European citizens and third-country nationals in the European Union. Whereas the former increasingly enjoy rights that resemble those of domestic citizens, the latter are excluded from most of them.²¹⁴ Although expressed attitudes do not per se translate to discriminatory behavior, research on the relationship between restrictionist attitudes towards immigrants and discriminatory behavior in Germany suggests that the two may be linked.²¹⁵




Figure 10: Attitudes toward EU and non-EU immigrants 1996 – 2000

Source: Zentrum für Umfragen, empirische Sozialforschung, Methoden und Analysen an der Universität zu Köln ZUMA. "Allgemeine Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften ALLBUS." Köln: ZUMA, various years

On the other hand, as we have argued in Section 2.2.1 on page 48 above, prejudice against certain immigrant groups is most likely a function of both ethnic difference and visibility. Although EU citizens may in the aggregate be perceived to be more similar to native ethnic Germans in physical appearance than non-EU citizens, the dichotomy may also capture aggregate differences in culture or value orientations between EU

²¹⁴ See Elspeth Guild, *The legal elements of European identity: EU citizenship and migration law* (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2004) for an elaboration on this trend.

²¹⁵ See Andreas Zick and others, "Acculturation and prejudice in Germany," *Journal of social issues* 57, no. 3 (2001)

and non-EU citizens.²¹⁶ The dichotomy between EU and non-EU citizens is thus most likely too coarse for a targeted test of the influence of physical appearance on integration outcomes, albeit nonetheless salient in public perception, as Figure 10 suggests. If the dummy variables ‘*EthEurope*’ and ‘*EthNonEurope*’ I construct here do in fact turn out to be significant predictors of integration outcomes, we still cannot accurately attribute integration outcomes to the respective domains of ethnicity, such as cultural and phenotypical factors.²¹⁷ Results thus will need to be interpreted with caution.

Language skills

The census does not collect data on German resident language skills. As the independent variable measuring language skills, I thus derive language skills from immigrants’ age on arrival in Germany. Immigrants who arrived in Germany after their sixth birthday are classified ‘*1st generation*’ whereas those who were born in Germany or arrived in the country prior to their sixth birthday are labeled ‘*2nd generation*.’ Ethnic Germans (defined as being born in Germany, holding only German citizenship not conferred upon them by naturalization) are used as the control group. Foreign nationals who were born in Germany or migrated to Germany prior to their sixth birthday, the so-called second generation, are assumed to have near native German language skills.²¹⁸ First generation immigrants who arrived after their sixth

²¹⁶ Note, however, that while the existence of a distinct European value orientation is often taken for granted, it is far from adequately defined and proven. There probably is no representative cultural prototype at all. As anthropologist Richard Shweder cautions, more generally, “individuals within cultures vary much more among themselves than they do from individuals in other cultures. [...] if there is any modal type at all, it is typically characteristic of no more than one third of the population.” See Shweder, p.163

²¹⁷ Note, also, that research in other European countries has not found natives to prefer certain immigrant groups over others. See Paul M. Sniderman and others, *The outsider: prejudice and politics in Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), of whom I borrow the ingroup/outgroup dichotomy I use here. They found that Italians perceive immigrants as outsiders regardless of their degree of physical or cultural similarity to themselves.

²¹⁸ Again, the term second generation ‘immigrants’, although widely used in public discourse and literature, is slightly misleading in the German case, where people labeled as second generation immigrants may in fact have never migrated across state borders in their lifetime. The label is an artifact of how immigrants, or ‘persons with migration background,’ as they are called in more recent official jargon are defined in the microcensus data set. Note also that there is some controversy over whether second generation immigrants can be assumed to have near native proficiency in German. I tested this assumption in both my survey and the qualitative interviews I conducted with this group and

birthday are assumed to have weaker German language skills.²¹⁹ Figure 11 shows the frequency of the three groups in Germany, as well as the distribution of ethnicities among second generation German immigrants.




Figure 11: Second generation immigrant nationalities in Germany

As described in Section 2.1.3 above, assimilation (or, using the German jargon equivalent, integration) outcomes can be assessed in many domains, including cultural, economic, social, and spatial realms. Unfortunately, census data does not include information on most of these domains. As outlined earlier, the main aim of this quantitative part of my analysis can thus only be to test for broad variations in integration outcomes for attributes on which data is collected, namely that of economic integration as commonly conceived.²²⁰

From among the measures and proxies commonly used in the literature as indicators of immigrant integration as shown in Table 3 above, three were available in

found the assumption to be supported empirically among the people I surveyed and interviewed. On this issue, see also footnote ²⁷⁴ and the section on language considerations on page 190 below.

²¹⁹ I borrow this approach to identify first and second generation immigrants in microcensus data from Granato and Kalter. This definition is common in the literature, although slight variations exist. Portes and Rumbaut, *Legacies - the story of the immigrant second generation*, p.23, for instance, take the second generation to be native-born children of immigrant parents or foreign-born children brought to the United States before adolescence, rather than before entering school. They define the group of German-born children of foreign-born immigrants and immigrants who came prior to age 6 as the 1.5 generation.

²²⁰ Insights gleaned from the results of the structured survey and qualitative interviews, which both include information on some of the other assimilation realms, will complement the picture, as described further below.

the data set, namely income, occupation status, and the degree of dependence on government social security support. In the following, I provide a first cut graphical view of the relationship between each of them and the independent variable proxies.

3.1.2. Dependent variables

As described above and shown in Table 3, integration occurs and thus can be studied using indicators from several different realms. Socioeconomic indicators are often used to gauge economic integration or assimilation, whereas various cultural or social preferences or behavior patterns are used as proxies for cultural, social and identificational integration. For the quantitative part of my analysis, I focus on socioeconomic indicators, namely income, dependence and occupational status to gauge economic integration outcomes. Table 8 summarizes the data characteristics of my dependent variables, which I describe in more detail below.

	<i>Dependent variables</i>		
	<i>Income</i>	<i>Dependence on government support</i>	<i>Occupational status</i>
<i>Variable definition</i>	<i>Monthly net income</i>	<i>Number of government support payments received</i>	<i>Work in high status versus low status job</i>
<i>Data characteristics / proxy construction</i>	<i>Interval variable, reflecting 12 equal income intervals from below 150 Euro to over 18,000 Euro</i>	<i>Categorical variable with 3 categories of support (no support payments, 1 support payment, 2-4 support payments)</i>	<i>Dummy variable (Occupation Status), differentiating higher status employees from lower status workers</i>
<i>Method of analysis</i>	<i>Ordinary least square regression</i>	<i>Multinomial regression</i>	<i>Binary logistic regression</i>
<i>Source</i>	<i>(Alba, 2005)</i>	<i>(Reinsch, 2001)</i>	<i>(Alba, 2003)</i>

Table 8: Dependent variable characteristics

Income Distribution

To gain a preliminary idea on the aggregate relationship between physical appearance and income, Figure 12 shows how income is distributed among (geographic) European and non-European nationals as well as binational (half) ethnic and full ethnic Germans. For the sake of visual clarity, the categories are not differentiated further in this graph. I arbitrarily arranged the series in the graph to maximize visual clarity.




Figure 12: Income distribution and appearance groups

Source: Forschungsdatenzentrum des Statistischen Bundesamtes. "Mikrozensus 2005." Wiesbaden: Forschungsdatenzentrum, 2005, own calculations

Figure 12 suggests that, overall, both non-German citizenship groups, namely European and non-European foreign nationals, fare worse than full ethnic Germans in income distribution, with non-European nationals being slightly worse off than European nationals, as indicated by a more pronounced skewedness to the left of their respective income distribution histogram. The pattern of income distribution of binationals differs from the others, in that a comparatively high percentage is

clustered in the lowest income category on the far left of the graph, while overall, their bars' taper to the right is less stark, indicating that in the binational group, both very low and higher end incomes are more common than in the other groups shown. With the exception of this peculiar distribution, the graph suggests that there may be a correlation between income and the degree of physical appearance divergence to the ethnic German mainstream.




Figure 13: Income distribution and language skills

Source: Forschungsdatenzentrum des Statistischen Bundesamtes. "Mikrozensus 2005." Wiesbaden: Forschungsdatenzentrum, 2005, own calculations

Figure 13 provides some insight as to the likely correlation between language skills and income, showing first and second generation immigrants as compared to half and full ethnic Germans.²²¹ Overall, full ethnic Germans (shown in the back row) appear to fare best, with both a low percentage clustered in the lower third of income

²²¹ Again, I arbitrarily arranged the series to optimize readability.

categories and a relatively wide spread across the remaining higher income categories as compared to the other groups. Binationals (shown in the front row) are distributed similarly in the higher income categories, but again have a peculiarly high percentage in the lowest income category. Among first and second generation, surprisingly, the former appear to outperform the latter by a small margin, with a slightly better distribution in the lower third of income categories than that of the second generation. This may in part be a function of age. First generation immigrants are likely to be, in the aggregate, older than the second generation, with a correspondingly longer tenure in the workforce, likely giving them the slight income edge over their children we see here.

Both graphs, of course, provide only a rough visualization for first order understanding of the data. To adequately interpret income distributions among ethnicity groups and generational cohorts, we have to account for a host of other factors, with differences in human capital endowment perhaps being the most notable among them.

Dependence on government financial support

The ability to make a living without substantial financial help from the government has also been used as an indicator of economic integration.²²² The census data I use contains information regarding the number of government allowances a person receives. The support payments considered in the census question include subsidies towards rent and living expenses, asylum seeker support payments, unemployment benefits, student stipends, government child allowances and other forms of mostly need-based aid. With the exception of child allowances, qualifying recipients of these subsidies fall below a certain income threshold. As a result, dependence on government support as measured by this variable is significantly correlated with income.

²²² Reinsch, for instance, argues that integration manifests itself in the pattern of distribution of social goods among indigenous and immigrant groups, and suggests using two proxies for self-reliance, namely welfare independence, and income. See Peter Reinsch, *Measuring immigrant integration: diversity in a European city*, Research in migration and ethnic relations series (Burlington, NH: Aldershot, 2001), p.227

Taking existing frequencies in the data into account, I constructed the dependent variable for the degree of dependence from government social security support to have three categories, namely those who receive two to four support payments, those receiving one, and those receiving no government support payments at all.




Figure 14: Dependence on government support and appearance groups

Source: Forschungsdatenzentrum des Statistischen Bundesamtes. "Mikrozensus 2005." Wiesbaden: Forschungsdatenzentrum, 2005, own calculations

Figure 14 shows the degree of government support among each of the citizenship groups in descending order of estimated perceived physical difference from ethnic Germans from left to right. Significantly fewer categories of the dependent variable made it possible this time to show the finer-grained nationality groups rather than the European / non-European dichotomy only as before without losing readability. Ethnic Germans are shown on the far right as a reference group. Each bar has three sections. The top part shows the percentage receiving no government support, the middle part the percentage of people receiving one support payment, and the bottom part reflects the percentage receiving two to four government support payments. As can be seen at a glance, there is no consistent trend from left to right in degrees of dependence on

government support. Surprisingly, binational half ethnic Germans seem to fare best overall, followed by ethnic Germans and residents from the remaining geographic Europe. Nationals of former Soviet Union states fare worst overall, with the remaining categories in between. Although, as before, the graph only provides a rough picture of the situation, it suggests that the degree of physical appearance difference (as proxied by current or previous nationality) from ethnic Germans is not associated with the degree of dependence on government support overall.




Figure 15: Dependence on government support and language skills

Source: Forschungsdatenzentrum des Statistischen Bundesamtes. "Mikrozensus 2005." Wiesbaden: Forschungsdatenzentrum, 2005, own calculations

Figure 15 provides preliminary insights into the relationship between the degree of dependence on government financial support and language skills, as proxied by immigrants' age on arrival in Germany. The graph shows first and second generation immigrants, binational half ethnic and full ethnic Germans, hence presuming a decrease in language skills from right to left. Again, however, the pattern we see does not suggest a straightforward association between dependence on government support and language skills. Binationals fare best overall, as indicated by smaller percentages

of dependents on both higher and lower numbers of government support payments. Surprisingly, the degree of dependence of second generation immigrants appears very similar to that of ethnic Germans, both faring less well than binationals. Not surprisingly, however, first generation immigrants fare worse than all other groups shown. Overall, Figure 15 suggests that, while language skills may be related to economic independence for first generation immigrants, they cannot be implicated as a factor for the second generation. Moreover, whatever attributes distinguish ‘full’ from ‘half’ ethnic Germans, they appear unlikely to be a liability for their economic success. I will elaborate on them further below in this section.

Occupational status

Occupation status has been used as one of the indicators measuring the degree of economic integration of immigrant and native population. Granato and Kalter, for instance, use census data from 1962 and 1996 to analyze the long-term trend in the distribution of high-status and lower-status jobs between native and immigrant population in Germany.²²³ I borrow their way of operationalizing the dependent variable here, comparing the prevalence of employees and workers among the German and foreign national resident population. The rationale behind using these two categories to test for differences in economic assimilation rests on the fact that being employed in Germany is typically associated with privileges (such as a higher degree of job security and pay) that most workers do not enjoy. Employee positions are thus typically more desirable and higher in social status than worker jobs.

Certain caveats apply to this operationalization method, however. The variable from which this measure is constructed includes several other work categories (such as, for instance, self-employment, or military service, that are dropped from the sample. This may skew results, particularly since the share of self-employed people has been shown to be higher among some immigrant groups than among native

²²³ See Granato and Kalter. They find that the share of employees has dramatically risen in the time period they study for both German nationals and foreign national German residents, such that despite improvements, the latter still lag behind German nationals in occupational status.

Germans.²²⁴ Nonetheless, the analysis provides insights into the degree of economic integration.




Figure 16: Employment status and appearance groups

Source: Forschungsdatenzentrum des Statistischen Bundesamtes. "Mikrozensus 2005." Wiesbaden: Forschungsdatenzentrum, 2005, own calculations

Figure 16 shows the prevalence of employees and workers, respectively, in percent across nationality groups in descending order of expressed perceived degree of appearance divergence from ethnic Germans, from left to right. As can be seen, binational half-ethnic Germans again fare better than any other group shown. Even (full) ethnic Germans, although ranking behind them, lag behind them considerably. In descending order of percentage of high-status employment, they are followed by ethnicities of the remaining (geographic) Europe, ethnicities from Asia, the Near and

²²⁴ See Ulla-Kristina Schuleri-Hartje, Bettina Reimann, and Holger Flöting, "Von der Arbeitsmigration zur Selbstständigkeit - Migrationsökonomie als Integrationsfaktor," *Landes- und Kommunalverwaltung* 28 (2006). As there is no easy and justifiable way to rank order the degree of economic integration reflected in or generated by the respective occupational categories, however, I rely on the method advanced by Granato and Kalter here. Incidentally, differences in self-employment among immigrant groups have also been found in parts of the United States. See Portes and Rumbaut, *Legacies - the story of the immigrant second generation*, p.37.

Middle East, Asia, Africa, those from the rest of the world, then Poland, Italy, former Yugoslavia, the former Soviet Union, and, finally, Turkey. Again, this picture does not suggest any clear association between employment status and physical appearance of immigrants. On the contrary, some groups whose non-German ethnicities can, arguably, safely be assumed to be readily discernible fare surprisingly well (most notably, the group of Asian, Near Middle Eastern, and African ethnicities), while others who are likely much closer to home in this respect fare much worse by this measure (most notably, ethnic Poles and Italians). We will have to see whether this picture holds in the statistical analysis, where the influence of obvious intervening factors such as human capital endowment will be controlled for and removed.




Figure 17: Employment status and language skills

Source: Forschungsdatenzentrum des Statistischen Bundesamtes. "Mikrozensus 2005." Wiesbaden: Forschungsdatenzentrum, 2005, own calculations

Figure 17 shows the relationship between employment status and language skills, as proxied by immigrants' age on arrival in Germany. Again, binationals fare best by far, surpassing even full ethnic Germans. The remaining groups follow the pattern we

would expect. As with the degree of dependence on government support before, first generation immigrants fare worst, as indicated by the greatest share of workers, while their offspring fares slightly better. Both full and partial ethnic Germans fare notably better as far as their respective shares of workers and employees are concerned.

Although the jury is still out on whether the impression conveyed by the above graphs withstands more rigorous statistical analysis, the seemingly stellar performance of binationals in both occupational status and the degree of independence from government support payments warrants attention at this point. Three preliminary interpretations of the patterns shown here come to mind. First, an ethnic German parent may be a better guarantor for language skills than, arguably, a predominantly German-speaking environment alone, which any given second generation immigrant may or may not choose to or be able to engage with. The concomitant boost in German language skills to binationals can undoubtedly contribute to economic independence and facilitate access to more desirable employment. There must be more to it than language skills alone, however, given that binationals fare better in both employment status and independence from government support than even full ethnic Germans, who, arguably, speak the language at least equally well.

Second, then, their parents in general, and their human capital endowment in particular, may boost the comparative standing of binational offspring on the aforementioned parameters. Unfortunately, reliable data on intermarriage and its potentially interesting demographic and socioeconomic correlates is not available in Germany.²²⁵ Empirical research in the United States suggests that education level is positively correlated with the likelihood of ethnic intermarriage, and that out-marrying immigrants tend to have a better economic position than their co-ethnic peers.²²⁶ Proficiency in the host language has also been found to increase the

²²⁵ Bundesministerium des Inneren, p.229

²²⁶ See, for instance, Matthijs Kalmijn, "Intermarriage and homogamy: causes, patterns, trends," *Annual review of sociology* 24 (1998); Stanley Lieberson and Mary C. Waters, *From many strands: Ethnic and racial groups in contemporary America* (New York: Russell Sage, 1988) on the United States, and Xin Meng and Robert G. Gregory, "Intermarriage and the economic assimilation of immigrants," *Journal of labor economics* 23, no. 135-175 (2005) on Australia.

likelihood of ethnic exogamy of immigrants.²²⁷ Although none of these studies explicitly address repercussions for the offspring of ethnically intermarried couples, they do suggest that parents of binational children are endowed with a comparatively broad set of skills, which they most likely transfer to their offspring to a degree.

Third, in addition to or perhaps due in part to these parental attributes, children of mixed marriages appear to identify less with a single group, and hold less negative attitudes towards other groups, which may contribute to their financial independence and occupational success.²²⁸

All of these factors may plausibly equip them with resources that render them more likely to be financially independent and successful in landing a higher status job. Unfortunately, the lack of data on the respective attributes of parents and children in the census data I use forecloses a statistical test of any of these propositions. We can therefore not confidently attribute the comparative self-sufficiency and employment success of second generation binationals to any of these factors in the German context. Nonetheless, Figure 18 below suggests that educational achievement may indeed be related to some of the patterns we have seen for second generation binationals, as they have the highest percentage of *Gymnasium* graduates among all nationality groups, including full ethnic Germans. Inasmuch as their advantage is linked to their educational background, however, we expect the effect we have seen in the graphs above to disappear in the quantitative analysis further below, as education is used as a control variable in all regression equations.

In conclusion, a first cut graphical view of the census data does not suggest a clear association between physical appearance (as proxied by nationality groups in order of self-reported degree of difference in appearance from the ethnic German mainstream) and any of the three indicators of economic assimilation tested. Although language skills (as proxied by immigrants' age on arrival in Germany) do seem to be related to economic assimilation overall, the patterns are not entirely as we would expect. While in income, for instance, full and partial ethnic Germans surpass immigrants as we may

²²⁷ See Sean-Shong Hwang, Rogelio Saenz, and Benigno Aquirre, "Structural and assimilationist explanations of Asian American intermarriage," *Journal of marriage and the family* 59, no. 758-772 (1997); Gillian Stevens and Gray Swicegood, "The linguistic context of ethnic endogamy," *American sociological review* 52 (1987) on Canada.

²²⁸ Kalmijn.

expect, first generation immigrants appear to fare better than their (presumably linguistically more adept) offspring, surprisingly. Similarly, for dependence on government support, while presumably better German speakers are less dependent overall, as we may expect, binational Germans, surprisingly, outperform ethnic Germans. A similar picture emerges for occupational status: Better language skills are associated with greater shares of high status employment overall, yet binationals, again, clearly surpass presumably more linguistically adept full ethnic Germans.

Given their performance on these indicators of economic assimilation, binationals may be an interesting set of cases that warrants closer scrutiny. We will thus focus on their experiences and views in greater depth in the qualitative part of this study, which follows in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. During the statistical analyses, we control for educational level, and will thus find out if there is more to their peculiar integration outcomes than what can be explained by differences in schooling alone.

3.1.3. Control variables

Several factors are known to significantly influence economic integration. In the following, I briefly describe their effect on outcomes, and how I constructed the respective control variables. Table 9 summarizes their characteristics.

	<i>Control variables</i>		
	<i>Education</i>	<i>Gender</i>	<i>Region of residence</i>
<i>Variable definition</i>	<i>Length of secondary school attendance</i>	<i>Male and female</i>	<i>Residence in formerly Eastern or Western German states</i>
<i>Data characteristics / proxy construction</i>	<i>4 categories modeled after the 3-tier German school system (from lowest (high school dropouts) to highest (conferring the right to pursue university studies))</i>	<i>Dummy variable (Gender)</i>	<i>Dummy variable (EastWest)</i>
<i>Method of analysis</i>	<i>determined by data characteristics of respective dependent variable</i>		
<i>Source</i>	<i>(Chiswick and Miller, 1992) (Kalter and Granato, 2001) (Arrow, 1973)</i>	<i>(Keith and Herring, 1991)</i>	<i>(Gurr, 1993)(Massey and Denton, 1988)</i>

Table 9: Control variables characteristics

Education

In addition to the study variables introduced so far, I include education as a control variable in the regression analyses to account for the well-documented influence of human capital endowment on integration success. Education plays a vital role in immigrant integration. It is closely linked to language skills as well as employment status, and thus income as well.²²⁹ Due to its powerful influence on the integration process, using education as a control variable in the regression analyses is likely to dampen or even eliminate the effect, if any, of the independent variables.²³⁰ Figure 18 and Figure 19 below show the relationship between educational achievement and our independent variable proxies for physical appearance and language skills, respectively.²³¹ Figure 18 shows the length of school attendance of the respective nationality groups, with the latter again sorted in descending order of physical appearance difference to ethnic Germans from left to right. The time categories used here are modeled after the highly stratified structure of the contemporary German school system. After voluntary preschool, compulsory schooling starts at age six with four years of elementary education. Based on teachers' recommendations and grade reports, children then continue on one of three alternative highly stratified paths of

²²⁹ As Chiswick and Miller, "Language in the immigrant labour market," p.233 suggest, the positive correlation between educational attainment and host language proficiency may be due to a variety of factors. Language skills may be enhanced by formal instruction of the language in higher grade levels. Higher educational attainment may also signal proficiency in acquiring human capital more generally. Alternatively, both high educational attainment and host language proficiency may be rooted in higher intelligence levels.

²³⁰ The close association between human capital endowment and indicators of socioeconomic integration, such as income and occupational status often leads researchers to conclude that the role of job market discrimination in determining integration outcomes is negligible. See, for instance, Granato and Kalter. Others warn, however, that the fact that discrimination is hard to pin down empirically does not prove its absence. Discrimination, they argue, is often subtle and notoriously difficult to measure. See, for instance, Wolfgang Seifert, *Berufliche Integration von Zuwanderern in Deutschland: Gutachten im Auftrag der Unabhängigen Kommission 'Zuwanderung'* (Düsseldorf: Landesamt für Datenverarbeitung und Statistik NRW, 2001), p.8

²³¹ There is an extensive literature on the relationship between educational achievement and language skills of immigrants in general, and on the role of language skills among immigrant youth in (wrongly or rightly) determining their fate in the German school system and labor market, in particular. This topic is clearly very important. A recent discussion on the situation in Germany can be found, among many other sources, in Helena Flam, *Migranten in Deutschland: Statistiken - Fakten - Diskurse* (Konstanz: UVK Verlagsgesellschaft, 2007). My research does not engage this issue directly, given my focus on the influence of physical appearance and language skills on integration outcomes. Nonetheless, I account for the known influence of human capital endowment on the integration of immigrants by controlling for it in the statistical analyses. The figures in this section are, as before, only meant to provide a rough picture of the relationship between educational achievement and the respective independent variables.

secondary education. The highest tier, *Gymnasium*, confers upon its graduates the right to pursue university studies after nine years of secondary education (making up the thirteen years of schooling category in Figure 18). The middle tier, *Realschule*, lasts six years (leaving their graduates with a total of ten years of schooling) and is often followed by traineeships in vocational industrial, administrative, or technical fields. The lowest tier, *Hauptschule*, lasts five years (for a total of nine years of schooling) and may also be augmented by traineeships upon its completion. As traineeships are becoming increasingly rare and sought after by *Gymnasium* and *Realschule* graduates as well, however, the chances of *Hauptschule* graduates to successfully compete for traineeships or other employment are, however, generally low. People with less than nine years of schooling (essentially high school dropouts) are even worse off on the contemporary German job market.²³²




Figure 18: Level of schooling and appearance groups

Source: Forschungsdatenzentrum des Statistischen Bundesamtes. "Mikrozensus 2005." Wiesbaden: Forschungsdatenzentrum, 2005, own calculations

²³² There are alternative paths of secondary education as well (such as schools integrating the three tier system within one school, and private schools). The three paths I sketch here, however, are by far the most frequent, and thus capture the vast majority of children and young adults in the German school system.

Figure 18 shows that binational Germans, as we surmised, fare very well, as shown by a low percentage of both dropouts and graduates of the lowest secondary education tier. They also have the highest percentage of *Gymnasium* graduates.²³³ Ethnic Germans also rank high in educational profile overall, followed by Poland and the remainder of (geographic) European ethnicities. Ethnic Turks and Italians are clearly at the lower end, with all others somewhere in between. American, Near Middle Eastern, African and other ethnicities, as well as people from the former Soviet Union, interestingly, have both a relatively high percentage of high school dropouts and high percentages of *Gymnasium* graduates. In sum, there is no pattern that would suggest a relationship between educational achievement and physical appearance differential from ethnic Germans.




Figure 19: Level of schooling and language skills

Source: Forschungsdatenzentrum des Statistischen Bundesamtes. "Mikrozensus 2005." Wiesbaden: Forschungsdatenzentrum, 2005, own calculations

²³³ Based in census data from 1996 and 2000, Özcan similarly reports that dual nationals have markedly better education than (single) foreign nationals in Germany, See Veysel Özcan, "Aspekte der sozio-ökonomischen und sozio-kulturellen Integration der türkischstämmigen Bevölkerung in Deutschland," in *Die Situation der türkischstämmigen Bevölkerung in Deutschland: Gutachten im Auftrag des Sachverständigenrates für Zuwanderung und Integration* ed. Cem Özdemir (Berlin: 2004), p.27

Figure 19 shows the duration of schooling in relation to language skills, as proxied by the *generation* variable derived from the age on arrival in Germany. For the lowest schooling category, there is a clear pattern the way we would expect, with the percentage of high school dropouts increasing from presumably perfectly fluent (full) ethnic Germans on the far right, to binational Germans, and on to second generation and first generation foreigners on the far left side of the graph. Interestingly, however, the same is not true for the highest tier *Gymnasium* graduates share at all. Here, binational Germans fare best by far, followed, surprisingly, by first generation foreigners and only then ethnic Germans. Second generation foreigners fare worst on this measure.

The rank of first generation foreigners is clearly puzzling. Although the question specifically referred to the educational background in terms of the German school system, first generation foreigners (who, by definition, received at least part of their schooling, if any, in their respective countries of origin) may have understood the question as asking for the equivalent foreign schooling level. This appears especially likely given the fact that the German three-tier secondary school system does not exist in their respective countries of origin. Even then, the percentage of first generation immigrants with self-reported *Gymnasium* equivalent schooling remains remarkably high.

EastWest

As outlined in Section 1.3 above and shown in Figure 6 above, immigrants are distributed highly unevenly among Eastern and Western German states. Empirical studies in Germany suggest that perceived xenophobia levels differ among foreign youth residing in formerly Eastern and Western German states, perhaps in part due to the difference in contact frequency between German and foreign youth in the two parts of Germany.²³⁴ Consequently, I use *EastWest*, a dummy variable for the place of residence, throughout the regression analyses to account for possible systematic effects of residing in either formerly Eastern or Western German states.

²³⁴ See Fischer and others, p.257. I do not elaborate on the extensive literature on the complex relationship between interethnic contact and prejudice here. For a primer, see H. D. Forbes, *Ethnic Conflict: commerce, culture and the contact hypothesis* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997)

Gender

Research on people of color in the United States suggests that, while skin color matters for socioeconomic and social standing overall, it appears to affect men and women differently. Keith, for instance, finds that, unlike their male peers, lighter-skinned women are more likely to attain higher education and occupational levels than darker-skinned women, and that they have higher family incomes than darker-skinned women, as well.²³⁵

3.2. Model Specification

To statistically test the influence of language skills and physical appearance on integration outcomes, I use both categorical and dummy independent variables and interval, dummy and categorical dependent variables. Accordingly, I employ three different statistical procedures to accommodate the nature of the data I use. Some of the independent variables to be included in the analyses were highly correlated, and thus could not be used together in regression equations.²³⁶ For each of the three dependent variables, I therefore distribute the independent variables among several models to capture the effect of every independent variable on the respective dependent variable and compare the overall fit of the models.

²³⁵ Referring to a similar argument put forth by St. Clair Drake and Horace R. Cayton, *Black metropolis: A study of negro life in a northern city* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1945), p.498, Keith and Herring surmise that this difference in family incomes may be due to male partiality to fair skin color women. See Verna M. Keith and Cedric Herring, "Skin tone and stratification in the Black community," *The American journal of sociology* 97, no. 3 (1991), p.773 More recently, Cedric Herring again concludes that light skin color confers advantages overall, but the mechanism through which it operates differs for men and women, as well as by social context. See Cedric Herring and others, "Book Reviews - Skin Deep: How Race and Complexion Matter in the "Color-Blind" Era," *The American journal of sociology* 110, no. 1 (2004)

²³⁶ I include the correlation table in the appendix. The high correlation is of course not surprising at all since I constructed the variables pertaining to nationality groups (namely, *EthSim*, *NonEthEuro*, *EthPoland*, *EthFormerYugoslavia*, *EthItaly*, *EthOtherEU*, *EthFormerSovietUnion*, *EthHalfGermany* and *EthOtherWorld*) from the same data, merely aggregating them differently.

3.3. Regression results

Dependent Variable: Income

For income as the dependent variable, I distribute the independent variables to be tested among eight models and perform an ordinary least squares regression analysis, with the following basic regression equation:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Income} = & \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 (\text{1st Generation}) + \alpha_2 (\text{2nd Generation}) + \alpha_3 (\text{NonEthEuro}) \\ & + \alpha_4 (\text{EthSim}) + \alpha_5 (\text{EthPoland}) + \alpha_6 (\text{EthFormerYugoslavia}) + \alpha_7 (\text{EthItaly}) \\ & + \alpha_8 (\text{EthOtherEU}) + \alpha_9 (\text{EthFormerSovietUnion}) + \alpha_{10} (\text{EthHalfGermany}) + \\ & \alpha_{11} (\text{EthOtherWorld}) + \alpha_{12} (\text{EastWest}) + \alpha_{13} (\text{Gender}) + \alpha_{14} (\text{Education}) + \varepsilon \end{aligned}$$

Table 10 shows the regression results for income as the dependent variable.²³⁷ As can be seen, the signs of the coefficients are consistent across models, with the exception of *EthOtherEU* in Models 6 and 7. Most coefficients are close to zero, signifying low, albeit statistically significant, relationships between dependent and all independent variable.

The robustness of the three control variables, *EastWest*, *Gender*, and *Education* across all model specifications, both in terms of their statistical significance and magnitude is remarkable, and not influenced by the presence of other independent variables. Living in the former West German states is associated with higher income, and so is being male and, not surprisingly, having spent more years at school.

The model fit, as measured by R-squared values, does not vary much across specifications. However, given the large number of cases, even minimal changes in R² signify real differences for the respective population groups. The base model (Model 1) with all control variables alone explains a great deal of fit by itself.

The addition of the language skill dummy variables *First Generation* and *Second Generation* in Model 2 improves the fit further (with greater language proficiency being associated with higher income), and by exactly the same amount as the addition of the appearance proxy *EthSim* (with greater similarity associated with higher income) to the base model in Model 3.

²³⁷ The cells contain the coefficients for the independent variables in the regression equation, followed by the standard error in parentheses.

Independent Variables	Models							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
<i>1st generation</i>		-.090** (0.02)		-.059** (0.027)			-.100** (0.023)	-.057** (0.025)
<i>2nd generation</i>		-.052** (0.04)		-.039** (0.043)	-.013** (0.043)	-.018** (0.046)	-.059** (0.042)	-.047** (0.041)
<i>NonEthEuro</i>				-.044** (0.035)				
<i>EthSim</i>			.099** (0.003)		.092** (0.004)			
<i>EthPoland</i>						-.030** (0.06)		
<i>EthFormer Yugoslavia</i>						-.027** (0.055)		
<i>EthItaly</i>						-.011** (0.069)		
<i>EthOtherEU</i>						-.025** (0.037)	.031** (0.04)	
<i>EthFormer Sov.Union</i>						-.061** (0.054)		-.039** (0.058)
<i>EthHalf Germany</i>						-.011** (0.137)		
<i>EthTurkey</i>						-.032** (0.043)		
<i>EthOther World</i>						-.066** (0.043)		-.039** (0.048)
<i>EastWest</i>	-.160** (0.014)	-.179** (0.015)	-.172** (0.014)	-.179** (0.015)	-.178** (0.015)	-.179** (0.015)	-.179** (0.015)	-.178** (0.015)
<i>Gender</i>	-.336** (0.011)	-.339** (0.012)	-.340** (0.011)	-.340** (0.012)	-.340** (0.012)	-.339** (0.012)	-.340** (0.012)	-.339** (0.012)
<i>Education</i>	.274** (0.007)	.269** (0.007)	.270** (0.007)	.268** (0.007)	.270** (0.007)	.272** (0.007)	.268** (0.007)	.272** (0.007)
<i>R-squared</i>	0.215	0.225	0.225	0.226	0.225	0.227	0.226	0.227
<i>N</i>	391821	365725	388533	388533	365725	365725	388533	388533

** p-value < .005

Table 10: Regression results with income as the dependent variable

Adding both of them (in Model 5, where *First Generation* was omitted due to high correlation with *EthSim*) does not result in a better fit. A very slight improvement in fit can be achieved by the inclusion of the dummy variable for all ethnicities not belonging to (geographic) Europe, which is associated with lower income as shown in

Model 4, instead of *EthSim* or, as in Model 6, by swapping *EthSim* with the dummy variable for other European ethnicities. The latter is, in this model only, associated with higher income.²³⁸

As measured by R^2 , Models 6 and 8 outperform all others by a small margin. Model 6 includes one of the language proxies, along with all ethnicity dummy variables (which are all associated with lower income). Model 8 is a more parsimonious specification, achieving the same degree of fit with the fewest ethnicity dummy variables, namely *EthFormerSov.Union* and *EthOtherWorld* (the latter essentially comprising geographic African, American, North and Middle Eastern, and South and South East Asian ethnicities).

If we compare the magnitude of the coefficients of the ethnicity dummy variables in Model 6, we see that ethnicities from the former Soviet Union and those subsumed under *EthOtherWorld* have the lowest coefficients. Turks, Poles and ethnicities of the former Yugoslavia fare slightly better. Italians and binational (half-) ethnic Germans, albeit still not on par with full ethnic Germans, tend to have still higher income levels.²³⁹ After controlling for the effect of education, the place of residence, and gender, binational half-Germans earn less, in the aggregate, than full ethnic Germans.

Overall, these results indicate that, not surprisingly, education, gender, and the region of residence in Germany are strong predictors of income levels. Language skills matter as well. Physical appearance, as proxied by *EthSim*, however, albeit a significant predictor of income, matters less than belonging to particular ethnicity groups.

Dependent Variable: Dependence on government social security support

Taking existing frequencies in the data into account, I constructed the dependent variable for the degree of dependence from government social security support to have three categories, namely those who receive two to four support payments, those receiving one, and those receiving no government support payments. I then performed

²³⁸ This *EthOtherEU* category subsumes geographically European ethnicities that are not Poles, Italians, or ethnicities from former Yugoslavia.

²³⁹ Due to the peculiar switch in sign for *EthOtherEU* between Model 6 and Model 7, I do not interpret their rank here. The switch may be due in part to the coefficients being close to zero.

a multinomial logistic regression analysis, again distributing highly correlated independent variables across several models. For the categorical dependent and independent variables, I designated people without government support and ethnic Germans, respectively, as the base case reference groups. The basic regression is again the following:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Dependence of social security support} = & \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 (\text{1st Generation}) + \alpha_2 (\text{2nd} \\ & \text{Generation}) + \alpha_3 (\text{NonEthEuro}) + \alpha_4 (\text{EthSim}) + \alpha_5 (\text{EthPoland}) + \alpha_6 \\ & (\text{EthFormerYugoslavia}) + \alpha_7 (\text{EthItaly}) + \alpha_8 (\text{EthOtherEU}) + \alpha_9 \\ & (\text{EthFormerSovietUnion}) + \alpha_{10} (\text{EthHalfGermany}) + \alpha_{11} (\text{EthOtherWorld}) + \\ & \alpha_{12} (\text{EastWest}) + \alpha_{13} (\text{Gender}) + \alpha_{14} (\text{Education}) + \varepsilon \end{aligned}$$

For better readability, I display the results in two separate tables, with Table 11 showing the results for recipients of two to four government support payments, and Table 12 showing results for recipients of one support payment only. Both tables show coefficients, asterisks indicating significance, and percentage change in odds within parentheses.²⁴⁰ For better readability, (identical) model fit information is shown in both tables.²⁴¹

The results are consistent across models for gender and place of residence, with men and residents of former Eastern Germany having higher odds of receiving two to four support payments. The length of time of formal schooling also influences the odds of relying on public support. Dropping out of high school is associated with a tremendous (454.7 to 680.1 percent) increase in odds of relying on two to four support payments as compared to the base case of *Gymnasium* graduates. The increase, although not as stark, is also significant for the other two education categories.

²⁴⁰ The percentage change in odds value allows to easily interpret results. A value of (680.1) for instance, as shown in Table 11 for ‘Less than 9 years of schooling’ in Model 1, means that if someone is a high school dropout, his or her chance of relying on two to four support payments is 680 per cent higher than that of a *Gymnasium* graduate (i.e., the education base case).

²⁴¹ The model fit information appears in the last five rows of each table. p-value of Chi Square, Cox-Snell, Nagelkerke and McFadden statistics are measures used to gauge model fit. The latter three can be interpreted similar to R-squared in OLS regression.

	<i>Models</i>				
	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>
<i>Constant</i>	-3.622**	-1.883**	-3.841**	-1.985**	-3.974**
<i>1st generation</i>		-1.116** (-67.2)		-0.664** (-48.5)	
<i>2nd generation</i>		-0.841** (-56.9)		-0.421** (-34.4)	0.137** (14.6)
<i>NonEthEuro</i>				-0.759 (-53.2)	
<i>Poland</i>			1.483** (340.7)		1.476** (337.7)
<i>Former Yugoslavia</i>			1.138** (212.1)		1.159** (218.8)
<i>Italy</i>			1.131** (209.8)		0.592** (80.8)
<i>Remaining Europe</i>			1.744** (472)		1.729** (463.4)
<i>Former Soviet Union</i>			0.472** (60.4)		0.48** (61.6)
<i>Half German</i>			0.719** (105.2)		0.781** (118.4)
<i>Turkey</i>			0.738** (109.2)		0.747** (111.1)
<i>Other World</i>			0.804** (123.6)		0.8** (122.6)
<i>< 9yrs schooling</i>	2.054** (680.1)	1.782** (494.1)	1.713** (454.7)	1.76 (481.3)	1.818** (516.1)
<i>9 years of schooling</i>	0.26** (29.7)	0.336** (40)	0.314** (36.9)	0.339** (40.4)	0.349** (41.8)
<i>10 years of schooling</i>	0.454** (57.5)	0.5** (64.9)	0.506** (65.9)	0.494** (64)	0.498** (64.6)
<i>Gender</i>	-0.239** (-21.3)	-0.298** (-25.8)	-0.257** (-22.6)	-0.315** (-27)	-0.314** (-27)
<i>EastWest</i>	0.684** (98.2)	0.911** (148.7)	0.833** (129.9)	0.903** (146.8)	0.901** (146.2)
<i>Chi Square</i>	8160.73**	10605.41**	11518.71**	10777.68**	10986.71**
<i>Cox-Snell</i>	0.021	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.03
<i>Nagelkerke</i>	0.028	0.039	0.04	0.04	0.041
<i>McFadden</i>	0.16	0.22	0.023	0.023	0.023
<i>N</i>	391364	365304	388081	362269	362269

**p<0.001

Table 11: Results Dependence on Government Support (2-4 payments)

Adding the two language proxies, *First Generation* and *Second Generation* improves the model fit. Their signs and coefficients in Models 2 and 4 are consistent, and confirm that language skills improve one's odds of economic independence across the board.²⁴² Both immigrant groups fare worse than ethnic Germans, with the second generation better off than their parents.

As required for multinomial regression, the appearance proxy *EthSim* was entered as categorical dummy variables, essentially converting it back to a set of nationality group proxies. Their odds ratios (in Models 3 and 5) indicate that all nationality groups, including *Half Germans*, stand a higher chance of relying on two to four support payments as compared to full ethnic Germans. They vary widely, from a 472.2 percent increase for *EthOtherEU* ethnicities to a 60.4 percent increase for ethnicities from the former Soviet Union.

The order of magnitude of odds ratios among ethnicity groups does not suggest a clear relationship to physical appearance divergence from ethnic Germans (with Turks, binational Germans and ethnicities from the rest of the world being less likely dependent on two to four support payments than ethnicities from former Yugoslavia, and Poles). A comparison of Model 2 and 4 shows that adding the aggregated dummy variable of all ethnicities from outside geographic Europe (*NonEthEuro*) to the base model with the language proxies does not improve its overall fit. A clear separation of ingroups and outgroups between European and non-European citizens thus does not seem to be borne out by empirical realities of government dependence.

Overall, the results indicate that both language skills and physical appearance proxies explain some of the outcome, but none clearly outperforms the other as a predictor of outcomes.²⁴³

²⁴² The coefficient for '*Second Generation*' in Model 5 is reversed, because in this specification, the base case reference group comprises both ethnic Germans and *First generation* immigrants. See also footnote ²⁴⁷ below.

²⁴³ Judging by the model fit statistics of Model 2 and 3, the impact of my physical appearance and language proxies, respectively, appear to be comparable. Comparing, with appropriate caution as to their stability across model specifications, the coefficients of language skill and appearance proxies across Models 2, 3, 4, and 5, we see that the associated changes in odds of receiving two to four support payments are higher for some ethnicity groups than for the language skill proxies (such as for ethnicities of the former Soviet Union) while for other ethnicities (such as those from remaining Europe), the reverse is the case.

	<i>Models</i>				
	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>
<i>Constant</i>	-1.301**	-0.489**	-1.362**	-0.486**	-1.399**
<i>1st generation</i>		-0.486** (-38.5)		-0.252** (-22.3)	
<i>2nd generation</i>		-0.378** (-31.5)		-0.191** (-17.4)	0.056* (5.8)
<i>NonEthEuro</i>				-0.418** (-34.2)	
<i>Poland</i>			0.529** (67.9)		0.514** (67.1)
<i>Former Yugoslavia</i>			0.667** (94.8)		0.667** (94.8)
<i>Italy</i>			0.432** (54)		0.086 (9)
<i>Remaining Europe</i>			0.899** (145.7)		0.903** (146.6)
<i>Former Soviet Union</i>			0.129** (13.8)		0.118** (12.5)
<i>Half German</i>			0.322** (38)		0.325** (38.4)
<i>Turkey</i>			0.479** (61.4)		0.467** (59.5)
<i>Other World</i>			0.298** (34.7)		0.313** (36.8)
<i>< 9yrs schooling</i>	0.591** (80.5)	0.483** (62)	0.412** (50.9)	-0.471** (-39.9)	0.468** (59.7)
<i>9 years of schooling</i>	-0.322** (-27.5)	-0.303** (-26.1)	-0.321** (-27.5)	-0.306** (-26.3)	-0.313** (-26.8)
<i>10 years of schooling</i>	0.041** (4.2)	0.052** (5.3)	0.049** (5)	0.049** (5)	0.043** (4.3)
<i>Gender</i>	0.244** (27.7)	0.229** (25.7)	0.244** (27.1)	0.225** (25.2)	0.225** (25.2)
<i>EastWest</i>	0.196** (21.7)	0.272** (31.2)	0.252** (27.5)	0.269** (30.8)	0.269** (30.9)
<i>Chi Square</i>	8160.734**	10605.416**	11518.711**	10777.686**	10986.711**
<i>Cox-Snell</i>	0.021	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.03
<i>Nagelkerke</i>	0.028	0.039	0.04	0.04	0.041
<i>McFadden</i>	0.16	0.22	0.023	0.023	0.023
<i>N</i>	391364	365304	388081	362269	362269

Table 12: Results Dependence on Government Support (1 payment)

The results for one support payment as the dependent variable mirror the ones for two to four support payments as far as the influence of gender and place of residence are concerned. Again, males and residents of former Eastern German states stand a higher chance of receiving support.²⁴⁴ The influence of education, however, is less straightforward. While high school dropouts and people with ten years of schooling still stand a higher chance of getting one support payment compared to the *Gymnasium* graduate base case, people with nine years of schooling are, surprisingly, less likely to receive that kind of support.

Language skills again explain some of the outcome as well.²⁴⁵ Both first and second generation are at a disadvantage compared to the base case of ethnic Germans with respect to having to rely on one support payment, with the second generation having lower odds of dependence than the generation of their parents, as we would expect. When comparing the respective strength of language and ethnicity measures, the picture is, again, mixed. Fit statistics of Model 2 and 3 (with the language skill proxies and ethnicity group dummies added to the base model, respectively) are comparable. All ethnicity groups again have higher odds of relying on one support payment than ethnic Germans. Judging from the changes in odds across models, however, for some groups (most notably, those from *Remaining Europe*), the toll of their respective nationality appears to outweigh the benefit of language skills. For others (such as ethnicities from the former Soviet Union), the reverse seems to be the case.

Dependent Variable: Occupational status

For occupational status as the dependent variable, I distribute the independent variables among six models and perform a binary logistic regression analysis, again with the following basic regression equation:

²⁴⁴ Due to a coding mishap, the signs of the coefficients and odds ratios in the tables for *EastWest* are not consistent across analyses. The results, however, were, and are described as such in the text.

²⁴⁵ There is an increase of the Cox-Snell, Nagelkerke and McFadden statistics from Model 1 to Model 2. Moreover, the signs of the coefficients of *First Generation* and *Second Generation*, as well as their respective magnitudes support this interpretation. Note, again, that the coefficient for '*Second Generation*' in Model 5 is reversed, because of the change in base case for this specification, as explained in footnote ²⁴² and footnote ²⁴⁷.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Occupation Status} = & \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 (\text{1st Generation}) + \alpha_2 (\text{2nd Generation}) + \alpha_3 \\ & (\text{NonEthEuro}) + \alpha_4 (\text{EthSim}) + \alpha_5 (\text{EthPoland}) + \alpha_6 (\text{EthFormerYugoslavia}) + \\ & \alpha_7 (\text{EthItaly}) + \alpha_8 (\text{EthOtherEU}) + \alpha_9 (\text{EthFormerSovietUnion}) + \alpha_{10} \\ & (\text{EthHalfGermany}) + \alpha_{11} (\text{EthOtherWorld}) + \alpha_{12} (\text{EastWest}) + \alpha_{13} (\text{Gender}) + \\ & \alpha_{14} (\text{Education}) + \varepsilon \end{aligned}$$

Table 13 shows the regression results.²⁴⁶ Again, I designated ethnic Germans and *Gymnasium* graduates as the base case reference groups for the language proxies, *EthSim*, and schooling variable, respectively. As can be seen, the signs of the coefficients remain stable across specifications in most cases. The control variables *EastWest*, *Gender*, and *Education* are statistically significant and robust throughout, with the odds of holding a higher-status employee position directly related to the number of years of schooling as we would expect. Being a woman decreases the odds of having an employee job, as does, somewhat surprisingly, residing in the former West German states.

The model fit does not vary much across specifications. Adding the language skill dummy variables *First Generation* and *Second Generation* improves the fit of the base model. The associated percentage change in odds indicates that, as with income and dependence on government support, better language skills improve the odds of a more desirable integration outcome, in this case, the one of landing a higher status job.²⁴⁷ Adding the appearance proxy *EthSim* to the base model instead does not yield the same degree of fit.²⁴⁸

²⁴⁶ As before, the table shows coefficients, asterisks indicating significance (**p<0.001) and percentage change in odds within parentheses. I designated employee status, 0 worker status.

²⁴⁷ In Models 5 and 6, the odds for the second generation are reversed as compared to the ones in Models 2 and 4. This is most likely due to the exclusion of the '*First Generation*' variable in the former set of specifications (to avoid high correlations among independent variables). The omission changes the respective reference groups against which the result has to be compared. In Models 5 and 6, the second generation is compared to the group of both ethnic Germans (the base case) and the '*First Generation*,' whereas in Models 2 and 4, we are comparing '*Second generation*' with just ethnic German cases. Interpreting the results of the latter two models is thus probably more straightforward, and thus, reliable.

²⁴⁸ Nonetheless, the variable is significant and the sign in line with our research hypothesis (with one unit increase in the degree of appearance similarity corresponding to a 23 to 27 percent increase in odds of working as an employee, as shown in Model 3).

	<i>Model</i>						
	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>7</i>
<i>Constant</i>	0.245**	0.486**	-1.458**	0.486**	-1.756**	0.48**	0.479**
<i>First Generation</i>		-1.567** (-79.10)		-1.236** (-71.00)			-1.371** (-74.60)
<i>Second Generation</i>		-0.531** (-41.20)		-0.290** (-25.20)	0.690** (99.4)	0.918** (150.4)	-0.454** (-36.50)
<i>EthSim</i>			0.210** (23.3)		0.245** (27.8)		
<i>EthNon Europeans</i>				-0.557** (-42.70)			
<i>EthPoland</i>						-1.687** (-81.50)	-0.316** (-27.10)
<i>EthForm Yugoslavia</i>						-1.38** (-74.80)	
<i>EthItaly</i>						-0.981** (-62.50)	0.391** (47.8)
<i>EthRem Europe</i>						-1.039** (-64.60)	0.333** (39.5)
<i>EthForm Soviet Union</i>						-2.156** (-88.40)	-0.785** (-54.40)
<i>Half EthGermans</i>						-0.114 (-10.80)	
<i>EthTurkey</i>						-1.885** (-84.80)	-0.513** (-41.10)
<i>EthOther World</i>						-1.364** (-74.40)	
<i>less than 9 years schooling</i>	-4.485** (-98.90)	-4.315** (-98.70)	-4.262** (-98.60)	-4.35** (-98.70)	-4.389** (-98.80)	-4.356** (-98.70)	-4.357** (-98.70)
<i>9 years of schooling</i>	-3.062** (-95.30)	-3.248** (-96.10)	-3.173** (-95.80)	-3.278** (-96.20)	-3.274** (-96.20)	-3.264** (-96.20)	-3.264** (-96.20)
<i>10 years of schooling</i>	-1.822** (-83.80)	-1.995** (-86.40)	-1.928** (-85.50)	-2.014** (-86.70)	-2.003** (-86.50)	-1.999** (-86.50)	-1.999** (-86.50)
<i>Gender</i>	-1.406** (-75.50)	-1.455** (-76.70)	-1.422** (-75.90)	-1.458** (-76.70)	-1.447** (-76.50)	-1.463** (-76.90)	-1.463** (-76.80)
<i>EastWest</i>	-1.062** (-65.40)	-1.296** (-72.60)	-1.212** (-70.20)	-1.304** (-72.80)	-1.275** (-72.10)	-1.304** (-72.90)	-1.304** (-72.90)
<i>Hos.Lem. Test</i>	623.606**	554.278**	652.066**	249.378**	316.757**	231.214**	230.694**
<i>Cox-Snell</i>	0.255	0.279	0.27	0.278	0.274	0.279	0.279
<i>Nagelkerke</i>	0.345	0.39	0.376	0.39	0.384	0.391	0.391
<i>N</i>	142408	136668	140981	135355	135355	135355	135355

Table 13: Results occupational status

Model 4 includes both language proxies and the *EthNon Europeans* dummy variable, to again gauge the strength of a pattern in line with the ingroup outgroup hypothesis as outlined above. Although the variable itself is significant, indicating that the odds of holding a lower status occupation is significantly higher for ethnicities from outside geographic Europe, its addition does not achieve a better fit than the model with the language skill proxies alone. Adding both physical appearance proxy (*EthSim*) and one language proxy, (again omitting *First Generation* due to high correlation with *EthSim*) as shown in Model 5, does not improve model fit either. Model 6 shows that, with the exception of binational (half-) ethnic Germans (for whom the results turned out to be insignificant), all ethnicity groups have lower odds of being an employee than full ethnic Germans. Odd ratios across nationality groups do not vary much, nor do they seem to rank in a pattern consistent with their degree of physical appearance difference from ethnic Germans.²⁴⁹

When comparing the respective strength of language and ethnicity measures across models, we see that changes in odds of landing an employee job are highest for ethnicity groups, followed by language skills and appearance differentials (the latter measured by *EthSim* in Models 3 and 5). Comparing the fit of Models 2 and 3 also suggests that language skills carry more weight in explaining outcome here than differences in appearance, as proxied by *EthSim*.

As with income and dependence on government support, better language skills again improve the odds of a more desirable integration outcome. Overall, although ethnicity matters, the results do not strongly support the hypothesis that physical appearance differentials are at the core of differences in achieved employment status, and instead point to language skills as one of the key predictors of high-status employment.

Even though our graphical view of the relationship between occupational status and both language skill and appearance group proxies suggested that binational half Germans outperform all other groups, including, remarkably, full ethnic Germans, the

²⁴⁹ Odd ratios range from 62.5 to 88.4 percent, and suggest that ethnicities from the former Soviet Union, Turkey and Poland fare worst, followed by ethnicities from former Yugoslavia and the rest of the world. The odds of other European ethnicities and Italians to land employee jobs are closer to those of the base case of ethnic Germans. This sequence does not clearly suggest a link to physical appearance differentials from ethnic Germans.

statistical analysis provides a different picture. When the influence of educational attainment, gender, and place of residence is removed, being a binational half ethnic German has no influence in one's chances of landing an employee job at all.²⁵⁰

Table 14 summarizes the results of the statistical analysis. It shows whether the proxies measuring the respective independent variables turned out to be significant predictors of outcomes for each of the three dependent variables.²⁵¹ The numbers in parentheses give the approximate rank of significance in the respective model. Equal numbers mean that a ranking between the respective proxies could not be clearly established.

<i>Indep. Variable</i> <i>Dep. Variable</i>	<i>Language skills</i>	<i>Ethnicity</i>		<i>Control variables</i>
		<i>Physical appearance</i>	<i>Non-German nationality groups</i>	
<i>Income</i>	<i>Significant (3)</i>	<i>Significant (3)</i>	<i>Significant (2)</i>	<i>Significant (1)</i>
<i>Dependence on government support</i>	<i>Significant (2)</i>	<i>Significant, but not consistent with physical appearance difference ranking (2)</i>		<i>Significant overall (1)</i>
<i>Occupational status</i>	<i>Significant (2)</i>	<i>Significant (4)</i>	<i>Significant overall (3)</i>	<i>Significant (1)</i>

Table 14: Summary result of the statistical analyses

As can be seen, the three control variables capturing the effect of education, gender, and place of residence explained the biggest part of outcomes for all three dependent variables. In two of the three equations, language skills were the second strongest set of predictors. The two proxies measuring physical appearance defy a clear ranking in significance. Whereas nationality group dummy variables outperform the categorical proxy for physical appearance differentials *EthSim* as predictors for income, the reverse is the case for occupational status.

Overall, we thus find educational achievement to be the key factor for successful economic integration. Language skills matter, as well. Compared to these two factors,

²⁵⁰ I did not run the analyses necessary to further isolate the key variable among the three candidate controls that may, singly or in combination, have captured and removed the benefit to binationals in the statistical analysis. Nonetheless, given the circumstantial evidence provided in Figure 19 above, education likely plays a key role.

²⁵¹ "Significant overall" means that although some results were not significant (such as the half-German case for occupational status, for instance), the respective indicators turned out to be significant, overall.

ethnicity and physical appearance differentials are less powerful, albeit still significant predictors.

The observation that second generation immigrants in Germany lag behind their ethnic German peers in educational achievement and are thus less likely to reach the income, and associated financial and occupational status of their ethnic German peers is not new.²⁵² Few studies on Germany have tried to tease out further whether the discrepancy in education between immigrant and host society youth is due to ethnic discrimination or genuine lack of interest or talent to achieve better results among certain groups of immigrants. The main reason for this lacuna is that discrimination is simply hard to measure directly. Verifying its influence involves the daunting task of controlling for all other factors known to affect educational outcomes, and then, by way of a hypothetical *bona fide* attribution, ascribing the remaining difference to discrimination.²⁵³

In the United States, the question of the origin of systematic differences in educational achievement between ethnic groups has manifested itself in its starkest form in what is generally referred to as the Bell curve controversy, which followed the publication of Herrnstein's and Murray's incendiary bestseller, *The Bell Curve*.²⁵⁴ As analysts struggled to explain the persistent single standard deviation difference in IQ test scores between Afro-Americans and Euro-Americans in the United States, the authors claimed that intelligence is a better predictor of income and job performance, among other issues, than parental socioeconomic status and education level, in effect suggesting that differences in intelligence are due (at least in part) to genetic differences.

More recent literature on the subject suggests that, while the U.S. test score gap between Afro-Americans and Euro-Americans is a significant predictor of later

²⁵² See, among others, similar results reported by Kalter and Granato; Goldberg, Halm, and Sauer, *Migrationsbericht des Zentrums für Türkeistudien 2002*, p.178; Heike Diefenbach, Günter Renner, and Bernd Schulte, *Migration und die europäische Integration: Herausforderungen für die Kinder- und Jugendhilfe* (München: Verlag Deutsches Jugendinstitut, 2002); Uwe Hunger, "Bildungspolitik und "institutionalisierte Diskriminierung" auf Ebene der Bundesländer," in *Integrationspolitik in föderalistischen Systemen*, ed. Lale Akgün and Dietrich Thränhardt (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2001)

²⁵³ See Richard D. Alba, Johann Handl, and Walter Müller, "Ethnische Ungleichheit im deutschen Bildungssystem," *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 46, no. 2 (1994), p.212, as well as Helena Flam's recent critique of this stance in Flam, p.47

²⁵⁴ See Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray, *The bell curve: Intelligence and class structure in American life* (New York: Free Press, 1994)

occupational status and income, it in fact measures learnable cognitive and educational skills rather than innate intelligence. Still, class and social background appear to not fully explain the test score gap either.²⁵⁵ Some analysts thus point to cultural differences to explain the remaining difference. Both Meredith Phillips and Howard Gardner, for instance, see cultural beliefs and practices in general, and parents' expectations in particular, as a crucial short-term and long-term influence on the educational career of a child.²⁵⁶ Even prior to their findings, Nathan Brody similarly argued that the educational achievement of mixed marriage children of Black and White parents as compared to children of entirely Black and entirely White parentage suggest that typical White intellectual socialization practices are conducive to educational success.²⁵⁷ Phillips and her collaborators frame their findings in class rather than racial terms, concluding that for "parents who want their children to do well on tests (which means almost all parents), middle-class parenting practices seem to work."²⁵⁸ More recently, Kao and Tienda, more generally, suggested that immigrant parents' optimism about their children's socioeconomic prospects decisively influences their school success.²⁵⁹

I do not engage with this highly charged debate in more depth here. I mention parenting practices here only to highlight them as a potentially significant variable influencing educational achievement, and thus, integration outcomes.²⁶⁰ Identifying factors that influence outcomes, whether inherited by socialization from preceding generations or perhaps rooted in more recent institutional constraints, is crucial for the kind of outcome-oriented and constructive research I aim for here. In the end, my research question cannot be adequately answered with the statistical census data

²⁵⁵ See Christopher Jencks and Meredith Phillips, *The black-white test score gap* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998)

²⁵⁶ See Howard Gardner, "Cracking open the IQ box," in *The Bell curve wars: Race, intelligence, and the future of America* ed. Steven Fraser (New York: Basic Books, 1995), p.30-31 and Meredith Phillips and others, "Family background, parenting practices, and the black-white test score gap," in *The black-white test score gap*, ed. Meredith Phillips (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998)

²⁵⁷ Nathan Brody, *Intelligence* (San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 1992), p.41

²⁵⁸ See Phillips and others.

²⁵⁹ See Grace Kao and Marta Tienda, "Optimism and achievement: ," in *The new immigration: An interdisciplinary reader* ed. Carola Suárez-Orozco Von Marcelo M. Suárez-Orozco, Desiree Baolian Qin, Desirée Qin-Hilliard (New York: Routledge, 2005), p.342

²⁶⁰ Such 'cultural' practices can often be changed faster and more effectively than structural factors. Pointing out their causal role in shaping outcomes thus does not mean condemning oneself to the status quo.

currently available. The analyses of survey and interview data that follow are an attempt to fill this gap.

Chapter 4 Structured survey

As we have seen, information in large-scale census data sets does not allow a detailed analysis of the correlates of successful immigrant integration to date. Among my independent variables of interest, information on virtually all variables but nationality is missing. Available outcome variables only pertain to the degree of economic integration as outlined in Section 2.1.3. Insights into a wider range of attributes of ethnicity and the degree to which they influence cultural, social, and spatial integration has thus as of yet not been undertaken. I launched a structured survey among second generation immigrants in Germany to collect data for such an analysis. My endeavor is meant to complement the statistical analysis of economic integration outlined above and to contribute to filling the gap in empirically supported knowledge on immigrant integration in Germany.

In the following, I first describe methodological issues pertaining to the distribution and design of the survey. I then outline my recruitment strategy and the characteristics of the pool of survey respondents it produced. The presentation of the survey results follows. I conclude the chapter with a broad overview of the main insights it provides.

4.1. Methodological considerations

The way in which units of analysis are drawn from the pool of eligible participants and their number influences whether results can be generalized to a given population in empirical research. In this section, I briefly describe and explain the sampling methodology I used to recruit survey participants, and its consequences for the scope of my endeavor. I then outline how I administered the survey and explain decisions on questionnaire design and construction.

4.1.1. Sampling methodology and survey scope

Given temporal and financial constraints, as well as the lack of adequate sampling frames for second generation immigrant residents in Germany, probability sampling was not a feasible option for the qualitative part of my research.²⁶¹ I instead used a variety of non-probabilistic sampling strategies, including snowball and convenience sampling.²⁶² I also purposively targeted second generation immigrants with multiple ethnicities. To ensure complete anonymity of respondents in line with both U.S. human protection practices stipulated by the Committee on the Use of Humans as Experimental Subjects (COUHES) and similar German data protection laws, I distributed the survey through intermediaries of several non-governmental organizations working with immigrants in all sixteen German states, as well as officials with contacts to various ethnic communities in Germany nationwide. Given this recruitment strategy, coverage error was unavoidable.²⁶³ The results thus cannot be generalized to the entire population of second generation immigrants in Germany.

The main aim of this part of my study is thus exploratory. In line with general recommendations for exploratory research, I aimed to collect between one hundred and two hundred responses. Given the dearth of data on many of the variables I include in the survey, the endeavor still promises to contribute valuable and entirely novel insights to inform both reigning theories on integration, and also guide public policy to enhance integration outcomes.

²⁶¹ A sampling frame consists of all units of the population that are drawn for inclusion in the survey. Adequate sampling frames depend on a reliable list of the entire survey population. Such lists of all second generation immigrant residents are currently not available in Germany.

²⁶² Snowball sampling involved asking intermediaries and previously recruited survey participants for references to other potentially helpful intermediaries or prospective survey participants who fit the selection criteria and might also be willing to participate in the survey. Convenience played a role in recruiting efforts as well, as I paid personal visits to some intermediaries I had previously contacted by phone. Given financial and time constraints, I was unable to do this nationwide.

²⁶³ The term coverage error is, strictly speaking, reserved to the domain of probabilistic sampling. It results from every unit in the survey population not having a known, non-zero chance of being included in the sample. For a more detailed discussion of repercussions for internal and external validity, see Section 5.1.2

4.1.2. Survey mode

There are several ways in which surveys can be conducted. Differences in survey modes exist between administration by a physically present interviewer and more anonymous self-administration strategies. The latter formats can be delivered to the respondent either as paper questionnaires sent by regular mail or in electronic format by way of internet survey platforms or email delivery. In the following, I briefly outline benefits and drawbacks of each of these modes, and explain the choice of survey mode for my study.

Self-administered and face-to-face format

I decided to launch my survey as a self-administered questionnaire, for four main reasons. First, considerable evidence suggests that social desirability effects, the tendency of respondents to provide answers they believe are more acceptable socially, are more common in face-to-face than in self-administered survey modes.²⁶⁴ More generally, self-administration is a reliable way to ensure and credibly convey response anonymity. Second, in a similar vein, the tendency of respondents to agree with others, most notably, a personally-present interviewer, the so-called acquiescence problem, appears to be more pronounced in modes which involve direct interviewer interaction with respondents.²⁶⁵ Third, given the focus on appearance-related attributes of respondents and their effect on integration outcomes, self-administered

²⁶⁴ See Charles F. Turner, Judith T. Lessler, and James W. Devore, "Effects of mode of administration and wording on reporting of drug use," in *Survey measurement of drug use: Methodological studies*, ed. Charles F. Turner, Judith T. Lessler, and Joseph C. Gfroerer (Rockville, MD: U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration, 1992); William S. Aquilino, "Interview mode effects in surveys of drug and alcohol abuse: A field experiment," *Public opinion quarterly* 58 (1994); Roger Tourangeau and Tom W. Smith, "Asking sensitive questions: The impact of data collection mode, question format, and question context," *Public opinion quarterly* 60, no. 2 (1996); Edith D. De Leeuw and Johannes Van der Zowen, "Data quality in telephone and face-to-face surveys: A comparative analysis," in *Telephone survey methodology*, ed. Robert M. Groves et al. (New York: Wiley, 1988); Don A. Dillman and others, "Understanding differences in people's answers to telephone and mail surveys," in *New directions for evaluation series: Advances in survey research* ed. Marc T. Braverman and Jana Kay Slater (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1996); Theresa J. DeMaio, "Social desirability and survey measurement: A review," in *Surveying subjective phenomena*, ed. Charles F. Turner and Elisabeth Martin (New York: Russell Sage, 1984).

²⁶⁵ See Don A. Dillman and John Tarnai, "Mode effects of cognitively-designed recall questions: A comparison of answers to telephone and mail surveys," in *Measurement errors in surveys*, ed. Paul P. Biemer et al. (New York: Wiley, 1991)

modes appeared to minimize bias by way of (perceived) interviewer ethnicity.²⁶⁶ Fourth, collecting the desired number of survey responses nationwide face-to-face would have entailed prohibitive time and financial expense.²⁶⁷ The combination of these four factors led to the decision to collect the data in self-administered modes.

Mail and electronic format

There are currently two self-administered survey formats, namely traditional mail-based delivery and delivery in electronic form, the latter either written as or attached to an email or delivered by way of a web-based platform. Each of these formats has advantages and drawbacks. Traditional mail-based surveying is much more expensive and time-consuming than web-based methods. The customary method of mail-based surveying (as described in further detail below) involves expenses associated with copying and distributing (at times repeated) mailings, and is only feasible in generous time frames that allow for initial delivery, return mailings, and, as the case may be, repeated attempts to solicit responses. Compared to computer-assisted self-administered questionnaires, mailed surveys also appear to be inferior in the degree of perceived privacy, which may negatively impact respondents' willingness to report sensitive information.²⁶⁸

²⁶⁶ For a description of my experience with my research subjects' interest in my ethnicity during the qualitative interviews, see Section 5.1.3 below, particularly footnote ³⁷⁷. Other potential interviewer effects were also considered, although the subject area did not suggest them. See Francisco Flores-Macias and Chappell Lawson, "Effects of interviewer gender on survey responses: Findings from a household survey in Mexico," *International journal of public opinion research* 20, no. 1 (2008), p.108 for issues that are likely associated with gender-of-interviewer bias.

²⁶⁷ In the early stages of the decision process, I consulted the Center for Survey Research and Methodology in Mannheim on mode options and associated expense.

²⁶⁸ See Tourangeau and Smith, p.283. Note, however, that some research suggests that this mode sensitivity may be more pronounced among adolescent respondents than among those over 19 years of age, making it less of an issue for my survey which, for legal reasons, had to be limited to participants eighteen years of age or older. Wright and her associates, for instance, find adolescents to be significantly more willing to report illicit drug use in computer-assisted self-administered questionnaires than in self-administered paper questionnaires. Overall, they find, however, that young adults are equally likely to report sensitive information by way of computer-assisted self-administered mode as by self-administered paper questionnaires. See Debra L. Wright, William S. Aquilino, and Andrew J. Supple, "A comparison of computer-assisted and paper-and-pencil self-administered questionnaires in a survey on smoking, alcohol, and drug use," *Public opinion quarterly* 62, no. 3 (1998), p.351

Web-based delivery methods, however, come with their own set of disadvantages. First, access to email and the internet, although growing, is still far from universal.²⁶⁹ Surveying the general public with web-based methods alone is thus still inadequate.²⁷⁰ Moreover, computer equipment and literacy, as well as transmission speeds generally vary among potential respondents, impinging upon the methodological requirement to apply an equal stimulus for all survey respondents. More generally, relying solely on web-based or paper-based delivery modes unduly inconveniences respondents who may prefer filling in a questionnaire on paper, or submitting it online, respectively.²⁷¹

On the upside, web-based survey platforms provide unique options to deal effectively with skip patterns and accommodate graphic elements, both of which can increase response rates by facilitating the survey process and adding appeal, respectively.

In an attempt to garner the benefits of web-based surveying while alleviating associated concerns about limited coverage, access, and convenience I decided to launch a mixed mode survey, with identical questionnaires distributed by mail and through a web-based survey platform.

Some research has found systematic variation in answer choices of respondents across different survey modes.²⁷² Most of this variation has been attributed to different instrument construction across modes. To alleviate this phenomenon, I minimized such differences between paper and web-based survey, aiming for so-called unimode construction, as described in more detail below.

²⁶⁹ Dillman warns that limited access of the general population in the United States to the Internet and email still greatly curtails the accuracy of any web-based survey. The situation in Germany is likely similar. See Don A. Dillman, *Mail and internet surveys: The tailored design method* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2007), p.355

²⁷⁰ Note that even if access to the internet and possession of email addresses were universal, achieving random samples in emailed surveys from which statistical inferences for a defined population can be made hinges upon standardized email addresses in which each member of a population would have a known nonzero chance (i.e., one known email address) of being included in a sample. Such standardization in the virtual world has yet to materialize. See Dillman, *Mail and internet surveys: The tailored design method*, p.356,448

²⁷¹ Robert M. Groves and Robert L. Kahn, *Surveys by telephone: A national comparison with personal interviews* (New York: Academic Press, 1979) reports such preferences of respondents for certain modes.

²⁷² See Dillman, *Mail and internet surveys: The tailored design method*, p.217

4.1.3. Survey design

I designed both survey questions and the structure of the survey instrument more generally according to common principles as outlined in Dillman's seminal guide on mail and internet survey design.²⁷³ I briefly describe pertinent principles below.²⁷⁴

Question design

Generally, following Dillman's recommendations on writing survey questions, I aimed for simplicity, regularity, and symmetry to facilitate the response task as much as possible.²⁷⁵ Wherever possible, I conceived questions that allow essential comparisons with previously collected data among similar populations.²⁷⁶ I used complete sentences asking closed-ended questions, and steered clear of 'check-all-that-applies' formats to avoid bias from the known tendency of respondents to 'satisfice' by reading and checking a limited number of all available answer choices only.²⁷⁷ For the same reason, all answer choices to a question appeared vertically in one column in both paper- and web-based questionnaires, fully visible to respondents without the need to scroll down or to the side, click on drop-down menus, or turn the page.²⁷⁸ Answer boxes were placed on the right throughout.

²⁷³ See Dillman, *Mail and internet surveys: The tailored design method*

²⁷⁴ The original German survey that resulted from this effort is shown in the appendix. English translations of the questions are shown with the answer frequencies in Section 4.3 below. My decision to launch the survey in German only was based mainly on my experience with second generation immigrants and their universal German language proficiency, as well as prohibitive distribution complications associated with supplying intermediaries with the respective translations of the paper survey for each potential respondent. Literature supporting my assumption of overall superior host language skills of second generation immigrants are outlined on page 143 below. For my experience with language choice during the qualitative interviews, see Section 5.1.3 below.

²⁷⁵ See Dillman, *Mail and internet surveys: The tailored design method*, p.50-78. I compromised on simplicity only where and in as much as the information to be solicited concerned complex scenarios which I had to set up as part of the question. This was the case, most notably for the questions on self-perceived versus perceived attributed extrinsic and intrinsic cultural attributes.

²⁷⁶ I will refer to published results obtained with comparable survey instruments as applicable when reporting my survey results in Section 4.3 below.

²⁷⁷ See Jon A. Krosnick, S. Narayan, and W. R. Smith, "Satisficing in surveys: Initial evidence," in *New directions for evaluation series: Advances in survey research* ed. Marc T. Braverman and Jana Kay Slater (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1996); J. D. Smyth and others, "Comparing check-all and forced-choice question formats in web surveys," *Public opinion quarterly* 70, no. 1 (2006)

²⁷⁸ For a description of bias toward choosing upper-end answer categories in drop-down and scroll-down format, see Mick P. Couper and others, "What they see is what we get: Response options for web surveys," *Social science computer review* 22, no. 1 (2004). For literature on the underlying mechanisms, see footnote ²⁸⁹ below.

Three question formats were used to solicit information, namely closed-ended questions, scalar questions, and ranking questions.²⁷⁹ I briefly elaborate on each of them in turn. The bulk of information was gathered using closed-ended questions. Answer choices of closed questions were unordered, yet mutually exclusive and the same for all questionnaires and across survey modes. Although randomizing the sequence of answer choices can reduce the risk of so-called primary or category order effects (i.e., respondents' tendency to choose from among the first response categories they encounter), the associated drawbacks of randomization (such as respondent confusion associated with continuously changing response categories, as well as a vastly complicated questionnaire production task), however, outweighed its benefits.²⁸⁰

Scalar questions were labeled consistently throughout, with equal numbers of fully-labeled positive and negative categories. Where applicable, 'undecided' or 'don't know' categories were set aside and clearly distinguished from the middle 'neutral' position of the answer scale. In accordance with known respondent expectations, higher positions on a scale always meant 'better.'²⁸¹ The layout of scalar questions in both paper and web surveys was linear and sized to avoid uneven spaces between scalar categories and its associated bias, as well as unintended line breaks in the scalar line in the web layout.²⁸²

In addition to closed-ended and scalar questions, I used six ranking questions, with five to nine items to be ranked by respondents. Although this number of ranking items is deemed appropriate in the literature and worked reasonably well during pretesting,

²⁷⁹ The original German language survey appears in the appendix. This section relies heavily on Dillman, *Mail and internet surveys: The tailored design method*, as well as Rolf Porst, *Wie man die Rücklaufquote bei postalischen Befragungen erhöht*, ed. ZUMA, ZUMA How-to-Reihe, vol. 9 (Mannheim: ZUMA, 2001) and Rolf Porst, *Formulierung von Fragebogen-Fragen*, ed. ZUMA, ZUMA How-to-Reihe, vol. 2 (Mannheim: 2000).

²⁸⁰ See Todd H. Rockwood, Roberta L. Sangster, and Don A. Dillman, "The effect of response categories on survey questionnaires: Context and mode effects," *Sociological methods and research* 26 (1997) for a description of category order effects.

²⁸¹ See Roger Tourangeau, Mike.P. Couper, and Frederick G. Conrad, "Spacing, position, and order: Interpretive heuristics of visual features of survey questions," *Public opinion quarterly* 68, no. 3 (2004)

²⁸² This strategy for displaying scalar questions is recommended, for paper-based and web-based questionnaires, respectively, by Don A. Dillman and Leah Melani Christian, "Survey mode as a source of instability in response across surveys," *Field methods* 17, no. 1 (2005) and Leah Melani Christian and Don A. Dillman, "The influence of symbolic and graphical language manipulations on answers to paper self-administered questionnaires," *Public opinion quarterly* 68, no. 1 (2004).

it turned out to be unworkable in the survey as a whole. Unfortunately, the limited information (with many obvious completion errors) from these questions thus had to be discarded.

Question order, instructions, graphical elements

Decisions on question order were based on a number of common principles. Generally, questions were grouped by topic, from most salient and interesting to least salient to the respondent to increase response motivation, and from broader to narrower focus within subject categories.²⁸³ Potentially threatening questions (such as, in my case, those concerning dual nationality and income, as well as those indirectly asking about discrimination) appeared late in the survey.²⁸⁴ To soften the impact of these questions, I solicited income information in broad categories rather than an open-ended question format, and embedded the only question that directly solicited an opinion on the degree of encountered discrimination as a list item in a series of other questions of the same format that were much less charged, as shown in Table 19 below.

In choosing question sequence, I also tried to avoid known order effects.²⁸⁵ Items with the same response categories were grouped in an item-in-a-series format with a common introduction to reduce redundancy and thus ease the completion process. For the same reason, question numbers were used to indicate progress and facilitate navigating the questionnaire in both paper and web formats. The web-based survey

²⁸³ See Thomas A. Heberlein and Robert Baumgartner, "Factors affecting response rates to mailed questionnaires: A quantitative analysis of the published literature," *American sociological review* 43 (1978). To parallel branching into early survey termination due to lacking eligibility criteria to participate in the web-based survey instrument, the first set of questions in the paper format gathered demographic information as well. Demographic questions are not ideal questionnaire starters from the point of view of enhancing instant appeal to potential respondents. Keeping the question order of web-based and paper-based questionnaires the same, however, appeared preferable to ensure unimode construction and its associated benefits as outlined below.

²⁸⁴ Dual nationality was a hot button issue in Germany at the time I launched the survey. There was heated debate on motives and repercussions of immigrants gaining dual nationality by circumventing German legislation prohibiting dual nationality. The debate culminated in a decision by the Federal Constitutional Court in January 2007 authorizing the revocation of German passports from citizens who could be shown to have (illegally) regained their previous passports after naturalization in Germany.

²⁸⁵ For instance, I adhered to the norm of evenhandedness, steered clear of anchoring, addition, subtraction effects, and summary item effects. See Roberta L. Sangster, "Question order effects: Are they really less prevalent in mail surveys?" (Doctoral dissertation, Washington State University, 1993)

also showed a progress indicator at the top of each screen to convey a sense of place in the completion process and thus prevent premature termination at the later stages of answering the questionnaire.²⁸⁶ To minimize the frustration associated with the need to repeatedly refer to instructions on a separate sheet in the process of filling out the survey, I placed instructions directly with each question to which they applied.

Graphical elements were used to enhance clarity and appeal.²⁸⁷ To improve compliance with skip patterns in the paper survey, for instance, the associated instructions appeared in bold font. In the same vein, words and phrases that introduced important but easy to miss changes in wording were emphasized with bold font.²⁸⁸ Background shading was used in the paper survey to clearly group answer choices with their respective questions.²⁸⁹ Unshaded space marked the beginning and end of each question.

To enhance the first-glance appeal of the survey, I placed a photograph on the front cover of both paper and web survey. Empirical findings on the effect of including color photographs on questionnaire covers to date are not clear-cut, but the marginal increase in expense seemed worth the attempt to achieve the small increase in response rate that some analysts have found.²⁹⁰ Aside from the front cover, no other images were used.²⁹¹

²⁸⁶ Dillman, *Mail and internet surveys: The tailored design method*, p.397 recommends the use of progress bars in web-based surveys for this purpose.

²⁸⁷ See Cleo Jenkins and Don A. Dillman, "Towards a theory of self-administered questionnaire design," in *Survey measurement and process quality*, ed. L. Lyberg et al. (New York: Wiley - Interscience, 1997)

²⁸⁸ See Dillman, *Mail and internet surveys: The tailored design method*, p.133. I used font variation, for instance, to highlight the difference between the question inquiring about *self-perceived* extrinsic and intrinsic cultural difference and *perceived attributed* extrinsic and intrinsic cultural difference, respectively. The latter does not appear in Section 4.3 because response patterns were very similar to that of the former question.

²⁸⁹ See Dillman, *Mail and internet surveys: The tailored design method*, p.397. He recommends this method to alleviate the drawbacks associated with people's limited range of vision and thus failure to see and consider all possible answer choices when they are double-banked. See Daniel Kahnemann, *Attention and effort* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973). For space considerations, I double-banked one question (namely question 43 as shown in the appendix).

²⁹⁰ Gendall, for instance, finds the net effect of using what he calls a 'likeable' cover to be an increase in response rate of about two to three percent. See Philipp Gendall, "Can you judge a questionnaire by its cover? The effect of questionnaire cover design on mail survey response," *International journal of public opinion research* 17, no. 3 (2005), p.360. In their empirical analysis of the influence of color photographs on questionnaire covers on response rates, Kaplowitz and Lupi, by contrast, find that color photographs and design elements do not have an effect on response rates in the first, but some in the second wave of survey mailings. See Michael D. Kaplowitz and Frank Lupi, "Research Note: Color photographs and mail survey response rates," *International journal of public opinion research* 16, no. 2

Unimode construction

To minimize variations in response patterns due to mode differences, I followed a unimode construction approach for both paper-based mail and web-based questionnaires.²⁹² The fact that both survey formats were visual ones (namely, web-based and paper-based self-administered, as opposed to aural ones such as telephone surveys and face-to-face modes) already alleviated potential bias due to mode differences to an extent.²⁹³ To minimize it further, all questions and response options, as well as question ordering and format, were kept the same across modes. Both questionnaire modes were also prefaced with an identical motivational welcome message that emphasized the ease of responding, and briefly stated the purpose of the study and sponsorship, and emphasized confidentiality and voluntary participation.²⁹⁴ In the web-based format, it also instructed respondents about how to proceed to the next screen.²⁹⁵ By the same token, both modes ended with an identical completion and 'Thank you' message.

There are only three aspects in which web- and paper-based surveys differed. All of them are inherent in the mode difference, and as such, unavoidable. First, the web platform achieved branching by way of automatic skip patterns based on previous answer choices. This streamlined and shortened the response process and made it

(2004), p.204. Given that my paper surveys were distributed entirely through intermediaries, the likelihood of reaching particular survey respondents with repeat mailings was small. Incorporating color elements thus did not seem to be a promising strategy to boost response rates in this mode. I still put a color photograph on my paper survey cover as shown on page 241, to ensure unimode construction with the web-based format, in which repeated access by the same potential respondent was more likely.

²⁹¹ Couper and his associates report that visual images throughout web surveys do not reduce the frequency of breakoffs and can influence answers. Using them beyond the first page thus seemed unwise. See Mick P. Couper, Roger Tourangeau, and Kristin Kenyon, "Picture this! Exploring visual effects in web surveys," *Public opinion quarterly* 68, no. 2 (2004)

²⁹² Unimode construction refers to writing and presenting the questions so as to ensure that respondents receive a common mental stimulus regardless of the survey mode they chose to answer. See Dillman, *Mail and internet surveys: The tailored design method*, p.232

²⁹³ Some mechanisms known to influence response behavior, such as the presence or absence of an interviewer, variations in time pressure and control of question sequence were the same across modes in my case.

²⁹⁴ This strategy is recommended by Dillman, *Mail and internet surveys: The tailored design method*, p.367-403.

²⁹⁵ In accordance with human protection practices stipulated by COUHES, I programmed the survey to not require answers to a question before allowing respondents to continue the survey. Answering each question was thus truly voluntary in both modes, which increased the number of partially completed (mostly web-based) questionnaires, as outlined in Section 4.2.

user-friendly and virtually fool-proof. In the paper version, by contrast, branching instructions had to be written explicitly in a way that respondents could easily follow by themselves. I used visual cues to minimize navigational errors associated with skipping in the paper survey.²⁹⁶

Second, the web-based survey had a screen-by-screen format, whereas the paper survey was a multiple-page booklet. The formats thus differed in the degree of backward and forward scrolling they afforded respondents in the answering process. Although the overall effect of this difference has to my knowledge not yet been empirically documented, it is worth noting that corrections were made by respondents in several instances in paper-based questionnaires. Similar amendments could, by design, not be made online.

Third, there are obvious differences in ease of responding to web- and paper-based modes associated with computer literacy, equipment, and transmission speeds. I tried to alleviate these differences by offering respondents a choice between modes, hoping that each would choose the format he or she felt most comfortable answering.

4.2. Recruitment strategy and respondent profile

After settling on the survey mode and constructing the survey instrument, I recruited participants from among my population of interest. In the following, I briefly outline the recruitment process and describe the resulting pool of respondents. I focus on their ethnic backgrounds and income, comparing and contrasting my survey respondents to the second generation nationality and income distribution of the census data I used in Chapter 3.

The process of recruiting participants for the survey proceeded in several stages. Prior to launching the survey, I reviewed its form and content as well as the cover letter with a knowledgeable expert working in survey research in Germany.²⁹⁷ I then pretested the questionnaire on a handful of ‘mock’ respondents who agreed to share

²⁹⁶ See the recommendations in Dillman, *Mail and internet surveys: The tailored design method*, p.47.

²⁹⁷ I am grateful for valuable feedback and suggestions at this stage by Dr. Michael Braun of the Center for Survey Research and Methodology in Mannheim.

their thoughts during completion to identify confusing and ambiguous questions, which I revised as needed.²⁹⁸

In a first wave in Spring 2006, I then contacted about thirty non-profit organizations working with immigrants nationwide by mail, with a detailed personalized cover letter explaining the purpose and importance of the survey, mentioning its voluntary and confidential nature, as well as the selection criteria for participation.²⁹⁹ I solicited their help in finding potential survey participants from among their professional or personal acquaintances, and announced a follow-up telephone contact a few days later to discuss my project, address potential concerns, and inquire about their preferred way to assist me in distributing the survey to potential participants. The mailing included a paper survey and a separate one-page announcement and description of the web-based survey platform, with instructions on how to participate online.³⁰⁰

During the ensuing telephone conversations, I gathered information on whether the respective intermediaries were capable and willing to help me, and if so, discussed the kinds of information and material they would need to do so.³⁰¹ Some requested a self-contained cover letter including the link to the web-based survey as well as an attached e-version of the survey by email for further electronic distribution to potential intermediaries and participants they knew. Others agreed to distribute paper questionnaires (in self-addressed first class stamped return envelopes) to potential

²⁹⁸ Mostly for financial reasons, I skipped the more in-depth pilot-testing generally recommended for large-scale surveys. See Dillman, *Mail and internet surveys: The tailored design method*, p.146

²⁹⁹ Overall, I again followed Dillman's suggestions on effective cover letter design, as well as survey launching, more generally. See Dillman, *Mail and internet surveys: The tailored design method*, p.158-164.

³⁰⁰ Initiating contact by mail has been recommended when the survey topic is potentially sensitive. A letter appears to be a better medium than a telephone call to convey a survey's legitimacy and to decrease the reservations of respondents, or in my case, intermediaries. See D. L. Moore, *Survey of grass seed growers in Washington* (Pullman, WA: Washington State University, Social and Economic Sciences Research Center, 1998) as mentioned in Dillman, *Mail and internet surveys: The tailored design method*, p.242. As described further below, I used a different strategy in a second wave of solicitation of survey participants.

³⁰¹ In some instances, the first telephone contact following the initial mailing was not successful due to missing telephone numbers or continuous answering machine screening. In these cases, I tried (and mostly succeeded) to find email addresses of the respective intermediaries, and used them to substitute for the telephone contact. Email as a second contact, however, was much less effective in soliciting support.

participants they knew.³⁰² Still others offered to display the announcement of the web-based survey (which also gave interested people the alternative to request a paper survey) in places they knew would be seen by my target group.

In the course of the telephone conversation, I also asked intermediaries (and was often told spontaneously) about any other people or organizations they would suggest I contact in addition or instead of themselves to further my cause. I then followed up by sending the requested material.³⁰³ About two weeks later, I again contacted intermediaries I had thus supplied, asking about their distribution experience, and offering further material as needed. This third contact occurred by telephone or email, according to the contact preference they had expressed during the initial telephone conversation.

In general, despite quite positive reception of my project by the intermediaries I contacted, and, as far as I could tell, their sincere efforts to help me recruit potential survey participants, motivating people to fill out the survey was difficult. I was repeatedly told that the length of the survey (twenty-two pages with a total of seventy-two questions) appeared daunting, and that (especially younger) potential respondents asked intermediaries about compensation (none) before declining to participate in the survey. In all, this first wave of distribution, during which I sent out about seventy paper questionnaires and about forty one-page announcements of the web-based survey platform, resulted in thirty-three returned completed paper questionnaires and fifty-seven online survey submissions.

To bring the number of completed surveys closer to the targeted 100 to 200 exemplars, I launched a second effort to gain participants in Fall 2006. With the help of a professional call center agent, I contacted some fifty intermediaries by telephone to solicit their help in publicizing the survey among eligible second generation

³⁰² I offered individual self-addressed return envelopes because they relieved intermediaries of the cumbersome task of keeping track of completed surveys and returning them to me. In one case, I accepted an intermediary's spontaneous offer to distribute and collect a number of paper surveys on my behalf and send them back together. First-class postage, although marginally more expensive than bulk-rate postage stamps, has been found in US and German survey research to increase response rates. See Don A. Dillman, "The design and administration of mail surveys," *Annual review of sociology* 17 (1991); Sven Stadtmüller and Rolf Porst, *Zum Einsatz von Incentives bei postalischen Befragungen*, ed. Universität Mainz and ZUMA, ZUMA How-to-Reihe, vol. 14 (Mainz, Mannheim: 2005)

³⁰³ First-class postage, although marginally more expensive than bulk-rate postage stamps, has been found in US and German survey research to increase response rates. See Dillman, "The design and administration of mail surveys;" Stadtmüller and Porst.

immigrants.³⁰⁴ During this second phase, I sent out about 60 paper questionnaires and about thirty one-page announcements. Three month later, in December 2007, I had gathered a total of 135 completed or partially completed surveys.³⁰⁵ Among them were forty-two completed paper questionnaires, and ninety-three web questionnaires, forty-six of them partially completed.³⁰⁶

Since my recruiting strategy did not allow for the use of pin numbers to limit access to the survey, I continuously checked incoming responses and identified obvious duplicate and empty submissions by way of comparing submission dates and times, as well as IP addresses of respondents. The response rate for the mailed paper surveys, the number of returned surveys divided by the number of surveys I sent out and were not returned as undeliverable or identified as having inadvertently gone to an ineligible respondent, was about thirty-two percent.³⁰⁷

<i>Mother birth country</i>	<i>Father birth country</i>							
	<i>Former Yugoslavia</i>	<i>Turkey</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Remaining Europe</i>	<i>Other World</i>	<i>Poland</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Former Yugoslavia</i>	27		1		1			29
<i>Turkey</i>		28						28
<i>Germany</i>		1	3	2	11	1	1	19
<i>Remaining Europe</i>			4	15				19
<i>Other World</i>			5		11			16
<i>Poland</i>						5		5
<i>Former Soviet Union</i>	2		2		1			5
<i>Total</i>	29	29	15	17	24	6	1	121

Table 15: Parental ethnicities of survey respondents

³⁰⁴ I chose to initiate contact by telephone this time, hoping that an experienced call agent would be more successful in conveying the purpose and raising interest for the survey this way. Moreover, initial telephone contact shortened the time period from first contact to survey response.

³⁰⁵ I counted returned surveys as responses if they were completed partially or completely.

³⁰⁶ The average partially-completed questionnaire had 29 of 72 questions answered.

³⁰⁷ Response rates for web surveys cannot be calculated due to the anonymous distribution strategy for this mode.

Table 15 provides an overview of the ethnic background of survey respondents, roughly aggregated into the nationality groups introduced in Chapter 3.³⁰⁸ The number of respondents whose parents share the same ethnic background, eighty-nine in total, appear in the diagonal.³⁰⁹ The remaining respondents, thirty-two, have parents who differ in ethnicity. Twenty-eight of those have one ethnic German parent.³¹⁰




Figure 20: Second generation foreign ethnicities in survey and census sample

Figure 20 compares second generation ethnicities of survey participants to nationality frequencies in the census sample I used in Chapter 3. As can be seen, the distribution of ethnicities of survey participants diverges from that in the census quite a bit. Whereas the share of second generation immigrants from Poland, and the nationalities subsumed under ‘Remaining Europe’ and ‘Other World’ are represented roughly similarly, people from Former Yugoslavia are overrepresented in the survey as compared to the general population. Italians and second generation immigrants

³⁰⁸The answer categories of the survey on nationality were much more numerous, and conceived after the paper questionnaire of the General German Population Survey (ALLBUS).

³⁰⁹ As can be seen, three of them indicated that both their parents were born in Germany. The respondents are thus most likely third generation immigrants.

³¹⁰ The high percentage of survey respondents with mixed ethnicity reflects my particular effort to recruit them. Among my intermediaries, I contacted federal and state-level branches of a non-governmental association working with and for binational families and partnerships.

from the Former Soviet Union, on the other hand, were entirely missing among survey participants, although their respective shares in the general population, as reflected in the census data, are considerable.

Table 16 gives an indication of the income profile of survey participants and census sample. The table shows the percentages in each category of net monthly income in Euro. The data are roughly comparable.³¹¹ A sizeable number of survey respondents left this question blank. A comparison of those who reported their income in the survey and census shows that, overall, survey respondents are wealthier than the random sample of second generation immigrants in the census.³¹² The exact repercussions of this imbalance for the survey results are hard to predict. In as much as income (by itself and due to its close link to a number of other variables, such as education) is correlated with integration outcomes, we will have to bear in mind that the picture emerging from the survey may be more positive than the reality for the average second generation immigrant living in Germany.

What is your approximate personal monthly net income in Euro? (This is the amount at your disposal after all taxes and social security payments have been deducted)

	<i>N in survey</i>	<i>Percentage in survey</i>	<i>N in census</i>	<i>Percentage in census</i>	<i>Diff.</i>
<i>Under 500 Euros</i>	23	28.0	2825	38.1	+10.1
<i>From 500 to 999 Euros</i>	15	18.3	1911	25.8	+7.5
<i>From 1000 to under 1500 Euros</i>	13	15.9	1047	14.1	-1.8
<i>From 1500 to under 2500 Euros</i>	24	29.3	1310	17.7	-11.6
<i>From 2500 to under 5000 Euros</i>	6	7.3	259	3.5	-3.8
<i>Over 5000 Euros</i>	1	1.2	57	0.8	-0.4
<i>Total</i>	82	100	7409	100	

Table 16: Second generation income profile in survey and census

The differences between survey and census participants shown in Figure 20 and Table 16 are not entirely surprising, of course, given the non-probabilistic sampling strategies I employed to recruit survey participants. As outlined in Section 4.1.1 above, insights gleaned from the survey can thus not be generalized to the entire

³¹¹ The census question asked about income in the month prior to the survey administration in 2005, whereas the survey question referred more generally to the current income, and was administered in 2006.

³¹² Note that a sizeable number of survey respondents did not answer the income question. The problem of nonresponse to income inquiries is known, and not particular to this survey. The bias is likely less in the census data, since answering (interviewer-administered) census questionnaires is compulsory in Germany, whereas participation in my survey was voluntary.

population of second generation immigrants in Germany. They nonetheless promise to be very interesting, not least because many variables on which I collect data are entirely new, and the information the data provides has potential implications for both integration theory and policy.

4.3. Survey analysis

As part of the structured survey, I collected finer-grained information on my study variables. In this section, I briefly describe the rationale behind my choice of dependent and independent variable indicators, review existing pertinent empirical studies and then present the results I obtained for each indicator. Here and throughout this section, I present results in tabular format with the respective survey question in English. The original German questionnaire appears in the appendix. I again start with my independent variables, namely host language skills and physical appearance attributes, and then present results on a wider array of dependent variables, focusing this time on indicators of social and identificatory integration as described in Chapter 2.

I conclude with descriptive statistics relating a range of extrinsic and intrinsic attributes of difference, respectively, to the respective integration outcome variables in cross tables that indicate significant relationships, if any, and allow for comparisons of their respective strengths. Among the dependent variable, I include a proxy measure of perceived discrimination as well.

4.3.1. Independent Variables

Language skills

I designed my analyses on the premise that a focus on second generation immigrants effectively controls the influence of host society language skills on integration outcome. The underlying assumption is that immigrant children who are born in Germany or came before starting school speak German equally well, and at a near-native level. Although the issue is (at least in Germany) still debated to an extent, many empirical studies attest to the near-native language skills of second generation

immigrants.³¹³ Joshua Fishman and Calvin Veltman were among the first to investigate the strength and speed of immigrant language shift in the United States, and found a swift replacement of immigrant languages by English within two generations, leading to what they described as a striking linguistic homogeneity in the United States.³¹⁴ Although the speed of language shift varies among immigrant groups, more recent research confirms their findings of 'only English by the third generation' for most immigrants to the United States, and finds that immigrant children are not only proficient in but also *prefer* speaking English to their parental language.³¹⁵

In Germany, most studies on language skills concern immigrants at large, and do not specifically address the second generation. Turkish immigrants of all generations, for instance, have been surveyed on their German language skills, and self-reported slightly lower skill levels than the ones found in the United States for second generation immigrants.³¹⁶ Panel data on language skills of several immigrant groups in Germany confirm this discrepancy, and suggest that skill levels have increased across the board in the past decade, although Turkish immigrants still lag behind other

³¹³ I purposefully leave aside here the negative repercussions of swift language shift of immigrant children to the host language, both in terms of losing potentially valuable human capital in the form of ethnic language skills and potentially detrimental effects on the psychological health of the parent-child relationship. The latter has not only been described by Gordon, as noted above, but also in more recent studies, such as Lily Wong Fillmore, "When learning a second language means losing the first," in Marcelo M. Suárez-Orozco and others, *The new immigration: An interdisciplinary reader* (Routledge, 2005). Other researchers argue that swift host language acquisition by the second generation is only problematic if and inasmuch as parental host language skills lag behind. (See, for instance, Mouw and Xie, who also argue that speaking the parental language of origin has a positive effect only when parents are not proficient in English, such that bilingualism is advantageous only where it ensures communication between parents and children. To my knowledge, German academia has yet to address these issues. See Ted Mouw and Yu Xie, "Bilingualism and the academic achievement of first and second generation Asian Americans: Accommodation with or without assimilation?" *American sociological review* 64, no. 2 (1999)

³¹⁴ See Joshua A. Fishman, *Language loyalty in the United States* (The Hague: Mouton, 1966); Calvin Veltman, *Language shift in the United States* (Berlin: Mouton, 1983)

³¹⁵ See Richard Alba and others, "Only English by the third generation? Loss and preservation of the mother tongue among the grandchildren of contemporary immigrants," *Demography* 39, no. 3 (2002), p.480. Portes and Schauffler report that a full 73 percent of the immigrant children they surveyed rated their ability to understand, speak, read, and write English as 'very well' and an additional 26 percent as 'well.' See Alejandro Portes and Richard Schauffler, "Language and the second generation: Bilingualism yesterday and today," *International migration review* 28, no. 4 (1994), p.647,659

³¹⁶ See Martina Sauer and Andreas Goldberg, *Die Lebenssituation und Partizipation türkischer Migranten in Nordrhein-Westfalen* (Münster: Zentrum für Türkeistudien, 2001), p.70. They asked immigrants to rate their ability to understand, speak and write German. Those rating their skills as excellent or good range from 87.4 percent (for understanding) to 63.6 percent (for writing).

groups in their self-reported language skills.³¹⁷ Most recently, research that differentiates first and second generation of Turkish, Yugoslav and EU migrants also found that, while the second generation self-reports much higher levels of spoken language skills than their parents across all groups, a mere forty percent of second generation Turks report very good language skills, as compared to sixty-five percent among EU migrants and eighty percent second generation immigrants of Yugoslav descent.³¹⁸

We thus know that, at least compared to the generation of their parents, second generation immigrants on average have high host society language skills in Germany and the United States. In hopes of replicating previous studies and thus lend credence to my premise that a concentration on the second generation would essentially hold language constant as an independent variable as shown in Figure 1, I gathered information on language skills from my respondents. I used a common question format inquiring about the self-perceived ease of understanding, speaking, reading and writing skills, as shown in Table 17.

Please tell us how you would rate your German language skills. Please indicate in each row what best applies to you.

	<i>N</i>	<i>Excellently</i>	<i>Very well</i>	<i>Adequately</i>	<i>With difficulty</i>	<i>Not at all</i>
<i>I understand German.</i>	131	97	3			
<i>I speak German.</i>	130	94.6	5.4			
<i>I read German.</i>	129	97.7	2.3			
<i>I write German.</i>	129	89.1	10.1	0.8		

Table 17: Self-reported language proficiency of survey participants (in percent)

As Table 17 shows, among the second generation immigrants who participated in my survey, self-reported German language proficiency was very high. These results, together with existing empirical studies on language shift of second generation immigrants in Germany and the United States left me reasonably confident that

³¹⁷ See Statistisches Bundesamt, *Datenreport 2004: Zahlen und Fakten über die Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2004), p.578

³¹⁸ See Claudia Diehl and Rainer Schnell, "'Reactive ethnicity' or 'assimilation'? Statements, arguments, and first empirical evidence for labor migrants in Germany," *International migration review* 40, no. 4 (2006), p.802

restricting my analyses to second generation immigrants was an effective way to control for the effect of language skills on integration outcomes.

Physical appearance

Roughly modeled after Gordon’s categories of extrinsic and intrinsic cultural traits, I collected data on several attributes of physical appearance (namely self-perceived divergence from the average ethnic German in dress pattern, eye, hair, and skin color, as well as speech pattern and name), and intrinsic cultural attributes (including overall lifestyle, eating habits, life goals in general, values, the importance of religion, as well as self-perceived knowledge of German culture and political institutions).³¹⁹ Table 18 and Figure 21 show the results for extrinsic cultural attributes, and Table 19 and Figure 22 for a range of intrinsic cultural attributes. Both figures display the frequencies (in percent) of answers in ascending share of ‘indistinguishable’ answers.

How different or alike do you feel you are in the following respects compared to the average person of your age and social class living in Germany? [Please choose one box in each row]

	<i>N</i>	<i>Indistinguishable</i>	<i>Very similar</i>	<i>Similar</i>	<i>Somewhat different</i>	<i>Very different</i>
<i>Dress</i>	111	54.95	32.43	9.91	2.7	0
<i>Eye color</i>	110	38.18	12.73	29.09	20	0
<i>Speech pattern / accent</i>	110	71.82	16.36	9.09	2.73	0
<i>Hair color</i>	110	38.18	15.45	20.91	19.09	6.36
<i>Skin color</i>	111	41.44	14.41	18.92	13.51	11.71
<i>Name</i>	110	12.73	6.36	9.09	31.82	40

Table 18: Self-perceived extrinsic difference

As Figure 21 shows, survey participants saw themselves as least divergent from ethnic Germans in their speech pattern and accent, followed by their clothing style, and most different in respect to their names. Attributes generally attributed to ‘race’, namely eye, hair, and skin color, ranked in between. If we consider instead the prevalence of ‘very different’ answers, a slightly different and starker picture emerges. By this measure, name, again, is perceived as very different by the greatest share of respondents, and speech pattern and clothing style again among the ones

³¹⁹ See Gordon, p.81 f.

perceived to be least different. Likewise, however, none of the respondents felt they markedly differ in eye color from ethnic Germans. Hair and skin color, by contrast, were perceived to be very different by roughly 6.4 and 11.7 percent of respondents, respectively.

In terms of extrinsic attributes controlled by processes one could situate in the realm of the mostly subconscious and automatic processes of acculturation and cultural assimilation as described in Section 2.1.3 above, such as language acquisition and adaptation in clothing styles, respondents saw themselves overwhelmingly on par with ethnic Germans. More ‘resilient’ attributes, either by nature (in the case of eye, skin, and hair color) or by custom (in the case of inherited ethnic names), were, not surprisingly, still reported to mark respondents as different from ethnic Germans to an extent.




Figure 21: Self-perceived extrinsic difference

Although these answer frequencies cannot be taken by themselves to support policy, they do suggest that the salient markers of otherness of immigrant children are, at least in their eyes, not under their control. Within the realms they can affect, they overwhelmingly perceive themselves to be very similar to the indigenous population.³²⁰

³²⁰ In a similar study on German and foreign national youth attitudes in Germany, Fischer and his associates likewise conclude that the often-lamented presumed unwillingness of foreign youth to adapt German lifestyles and habits is unfounded. See Fischer and others, p.252.

<i>How different or alike do you feel you are in the following respects compared to the average person of your age and social class living in Germany? [Please choose one box in each row]</i>						
	<i>N</i>	<i>Indistinguishable</i>	<i>Very similar</i>	<i>Similar</i>	<i>Somewhat different</i>	<i>Very different</i>
<i>Overall Lifestyle</i>	113	28.32	38.05	23.89	8.85	0.88
<i>Values</i>	113	19.47	34.51	24.78	17.70	3.54
<i>Knowledge of German culture</i>	113	36.28	37.17	15.04	10.62	0.88
<i>Importance of religion</i>	113	23.89	18.58	24.78	24.78	7.96
<i>Eating habits</i>	113	20.35	29.20	24.78	18.58	7.08
<i>The way you spend your free time</i>	113	33.63	27.43	27.43	7.08	4.42
<i>Knowledge of German political institutions</i>	113	37.17	31.86	20.35	7.96	2.65
<i>Life goals in general</i>	114	27.19	34.21	21.05	14.91	2.63
<i>Chances to reach them</i>	114	28.07	24.56	27.19	14.91	5.26

Table 19: Self-perceived intrinsic difference

Table 19 and Figure 21 show results for the question on intrinsic cultural attributes. Judging again by the ascending shares of ‘indistinguishable’ answers from top to bottom in Figure 21, we see that respondents see themselves as most alike to ethnic Germans in their knowledge of German political institutions and culture. The smallest share of ‘indistinguishable’ answers, by contrast, went to values, eating habits, and the importance of religion, with all remaining categories in between. For eating habits and the importance of religion, respectively, the share of respondents perceiving themselves as very different confirms their salience as a distinguishing attribute. Religion, in fact, was the domain in which most respondents felt very different from ethnic Germans.

If we again consider shares on both ends of the scale together and subtract ‘very different’ shares from ‘indistinguishable’ shares, knowledge of German political institutions holds the top spot of perceived similarity to ethnic Germans, followed by knowledge of German culture, free time activities, and overall lifestyle. On the other end, somewhat surprisingly, eating habits are perceived to be most divergent overall, followed by values, the importance of religion, and chances to reach life goals.




Figure 22: Self-perceived intrinsic difference

This latter aspect was, purposefully hidden within this battery of items, meant as a direct measure of perceived discrimination. The results on this measure do not suggest that respondents perceive themselves as overly disadvantaged in their chance of reaching their life goals as compared to ethnic Germans.³²¹

Overall, answer frequencies of my independent variables by themselves suggest that (1) self-perceived language skills among the second generation immigrants I surveyed are very high, (2) the external characteristics by which they see themselves differ most from ethnic Germans are inherited, such as skin and hair color, and names). Within realms they can affect, such as speech patterns and accent, and clothing styles, by contrast, second generation immigrants perceive themselves to be very similar to the indigenous population. Their experience thus seems to reflect Gordon’s account of second generation immigrants more than Esser’s of immigrants more generally, as outlined in Section 2.2 above. They willingly adapt their appearance to host society culture and customs, yet are still distinguishable (and hence, feel different) by way of their physical features, and names. As far as intrinsic characteristics are concerned, (3) my respondents see themselves on par with ethnic

³²¹ What one would consider ‘acceptable’ in this respect is, of course, debatable. Moreover, hiding this question within a battery of seemingly much less charged items may have biased responses. Given that discrimination is notoriously difficult to measure empirically, and openly solicited self-perceived opinions on its prevalence would have been at least equally biased, the method I employ here appeared reasonably appropriate to get a general idea of its perceived prevalence among survey respondents.

Germans in their knowledge of German political institutions and culture, yet different in their values, eating habits, and the importance they attribute to religion.

In sum, if we take their perceptions at face value, integration success for this group appears to hinge not on their lacking language skills and knowledge about the legal, cultural, and historical precepts of the German state and society, but rather on persistent salient societal fault lines defined by physical appearance and, perhaps, social distance manifested in differences in eating habits, value orientation and religious affiliation.

4.3.2. Dependent Variables

While data availability limited the focus of the statistical analysis in Chapter 3 above to indicators of economic integration, the survey allowed me to consider and collect data on a wider array of integration realms, and particularly focus on cultural, social and spatial assimilation as shown in Table 3. In the following, I first present answer frequencies for each of the dependent variable proxy questions I devised to that effect. I start with attributes that, in Gordon's view as described in Section 2.2.3 above, fall within the realm of acculturation, or cultural assimilation. I then proceed to deeper levels of integration, namely social and identificational assimilation, that involve conscious choice and are more contingent upon structured and unstructured casual interaction with the host society.³²² Where systematic differences between bi- and single ethnic respondents seem likely, I will report results for both groups separately. I will again interpret results in terms of the theoretical frameworks discussed in Chapter 2, and hint at policy implications as applicable.

Several of the questions I used to inquire about social assimilation solicit information not only on the degree of affiliation to German and the respective ethnicities respondents considered their own, but to ethnicities other than German and their own as well. In the United States, some analysts have drawn attention to and investigated the possibility that immigrants may adopt neither the host society nor their respective parental ethnicities, but choose instead to adopt a wider identity that

³²² The order in which I present integration outcomes at various levels is, of course, arbitrary to an extent, as there is no definitive objective temporal or depth rank order among them.

transcends differences in language, culture, and national origin, a so-called pan ethnic identity, which encompasses several minority groups perceived to be similar, based on shared experiences (including, but not limited to racism) and interests.³²³

Thus broadening Berry's and Esser's two-dimensional immigrant adaptation model as shown in Chapter 2 by a third dimension can cast their four alternative paths in a different light. A person who, by virtue of his or her orientation towards their own ethnic and host communities appear marginalized, may see herself as in fact transcending single (or dual) ethnic affiliations by leaning towards a broader universal stance.

One may of course doubt the prevalence and the sustainability of such a mindset on psychological or philosophical grounds, as Samuel Huntington does a dual affiliation as outlined in Section 2.2.4. above. Such critique none withstanding, I believe that immigrants themselves should be heard on where they see themselves along these categories.

Cultural assimilation

I Ability to cope in Germany

The ability to cope in the host country is often used as a generic indicator of the degree of cultural assimilation. It reflects progress in the kinds of automatic adaptation processes that lead to an understanding and success in navigating the customs, habits, and societal institutions particular to a country and its people.

As Table 20 shows, most of the second generation survey respondents reported to be fully capable of finding their way around Germany. Surprisingly, although the frequencies do not differ much, binational ethnic half-Germans report a slightly lower

³²³ In the United States, this notion of panethnicity has been derived from identity formation among Asian Americans (See, for instance, Nazli Kibria, *Becoming Asian American: Second-generation Chinese and Korean American identities* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press 2002) and Yen Le Espiritu, *Asian American panethnicity: Bridging institutions and identities* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992). Although similar (officially defined and artificially sanctioned) common identities among groups in Germany do not as obviously suggest themselves, I was surprised by the frequency with which second generation immigrants spontaneously expressed feelings of solidarity with all foreign rather than only their own nationals in Germany when I first explored my thesis topic. I thus decided to include a third category of potential group affiliation to several questions, as shown in the respective sections.

ability to cope. If we take subjective coping skills into account, immigrants whose connection to Germany is by residence alone thus seem at least to be no less capable of navigating their home than those who are tied to it by way of actual descent.

<i>Overall, do you feel you get by decently in Germany?</i>			
	<i>N</i>	<i>Binationals</i> %	<i>Others</i> %
<i>Yes, absolutely</i>	70	84	87.5
<i>Yes, mostly</i>	10	16	10.71
<i>No, not really</i>	1	0	1.79
<i>No, not at all</i>	0	0	0

Table 20: Self-perceived ability to cope in Germany

II Media use patterns

Some analysts see the degree of reliance on mainstream society media by resident immigrants as a sign of and mechanism that furthers their societal integration.³²⁴ Relying on German media is, so the story goes, a sign of successful integration, whereas using primarily ethnic media signals segregation tendencies and consolidates immigrants' orientation towards their respective ethnic communities.³²⁵

Yet immigrants may prefer ethnic media to host society information sources for a variety of reasons. Most obviously, those who have difficulties understanding host society TV or reading local print media naturally turn to resources in the language they understand to satisfy their basic information needs. Immigrants for whom the choice of media is not dictated by language skills, such as, arguably, most of the second generation, may still rely on ethnic media as complementary information sources on topics German media does cover. Ethnic media sources, for instance, typically dedicate more space to news from the respective country of origin, or, in the case of ethnic media published for immigrant communities in Germany in particular, topics specifically related to the immigrant experience itself.

³²⁴ Relying on the same information sources is more generally a way to forge and unify communities. See Anderson.

³²⁵ See Erk Simon and Gerhard Kloppenburg, "Das Fernsehpublikum türkischer Herkunft — Fernsehnutzung, Einstellungen und Programmervwartungen: Ergebnisse einer Repräsentativbefragung in Nordrhein-Westfalen," *Media Perspektiven* 3 (2007)

The purported effect of media use patterns on integration thus depends crucially on whether ethnic media are used exclusively, or rather, in conjunction with German media, and whether exclusive use can be traced to (as yet) lacking language skills (which may widen as language skills are acquired, in turn giving way to a broader media use pattern, and, presumably, deeper integration)³²⁶ or whether it is, - to use Esser's stance as outlined in Section 2.2.3 above, part and parcel of a deplorable natural pull among immigrant children to remain within their ethnic enclaves. The issue is related to the general question of whether ethnic and host society orientation are complementary, or rather alternatives in a zero-sum game. As such, it again mirrors our earlier discussion of the feasibility of (multiple) integration and dual nationality, as outlined in Section 2.2.4.

Most empirical studies on media consumption patterns among immigrants in Germany to date have been on Turkish immigrants.³²⁷ In 2006, a nationwide survey on media consumption of Turks of all generations in Germany found, for instance, that ninety-two percent of second generation Turkish immigrants use both German and Turkish media. About four percent use only German, and about three percent only Turkish-language media.³²⁸

I modeled my question after the aforementioned study to make results comparable. In addition to the German and own ethnic media category, I include English as an answer option to gauge the presence of a more transnational orientation. Table 21 shows media use patterns of my survey respondents. I split respondents into children of biethnic (mostly half-German) parentage and those of parents of a single ethnicity. Multiple answers were possible.

³²⁶ Some analysts argue that such presumably transitory exclusive use of ethnic media can by itself slow or even halt host language acquisition, in as much as it enables immigrants to permanently satisfy their information needs in another language, making the endeavor of acquiring the new language less pressing and necessary. Sauer, for instance, describes this possibility, adding that exclusive use of ethnic media in general, and television in particular, is often mentioned as a possible cause for the purported lack in German language skills among children of Turkish descent. See Martina Sauer and Andreas Goldberg, *Türkeistämmige Migranten in Nordrhein-Westfalen: Stand der Integration, Einstellungen und Meinungen, Inanspruchnahme von Unterstützung bei der Erziehung* (Essen: Stiftung Zentrum für Türkeistudien, 2006), p.163

³²⁷ See Josef Eckhardt, "Nutzung und Bewertung von Radio- und Fernsehsendungen für Ausländer: Studie in Nordrhein-Westfalen," *Media-Perspektiven* 8 (1996); Inge Mohr, "SFB MultiKulti: Öffentlich-rechtliches Hörfunkangebot nicht nur für Ausländer," *Media Perspektiven* 8 (1996)

³²⁸ See Sauer and Goldberg, *Türkeistämmige Migranten in Nordrhein-Westfalen: Stand der Integration, Einstellungen und Meinungen, Inanspruchnahme von Unterstützung bei der Erziehung*, p.165.

	<i>German</i>		<i>My non-German mother / father tongue</i>		<i>English</i>	
	<i>Binational</i>	<i>Other</i>	<i>Binational</i>	<i>Other</i>	<i>Binational</i>	<i>Other</i>
<i>Television</i>	81.82	84.06	9.09	10.14	9.09	5.8
<i>Radio</i>	81.25	93.44	6.25	6.56	12.5	0
<i>Daily newspaper</i>	82.35	88	5.88	10	11.76	2
<i>Weekly newspaper</i>	83.33	88.64	0	2.27	16.67	9.09
<i>Internet</i>	62.96	68.35	7.41	15.19	29.63	16.46
<i>Other</i>	58.33	75	16.67	16.67	25	8.33

Table 21: Media use patterns of binational and other second generation

As we can see, my survey respondents overwhelmingly rely on German-language media to satisfy their information needs. This is true for both binational and other second generation immigrants, with the latter, surprisingly, slightly more likely to draw on German news media than the former. Overall, patterns of media use are similar for binational half-Germans and people with both parents of non-German ethnic origin. Binationals, interestingly, more frequently rely on English-language media than other immigrant offspring. Taken together, my results suggest that media consumption patterns among second generation immigrants do not bear out a segregation interpretation, but rather points to a complementary and universalist media use pattern among second generation immigrants.

Social assimilation

I Residential area characteristics

As mentioned in Section 2.1.3 above, the residential proximity of minority to majority groups, and, as part of equal access to resources, the quality of housing in general for immigrants and host society is used as an integration indicator. The quality of housing is obviously linked to income, but can also be gauged using several more specific indicators, such as the degree of ownership in housing, its interior features, as well as the subjective perception of residential satisfaction. Drever and Clark, for instance, investigate systematic differences in residential quality between German and foreign residents in Germany over time and find that although living conditions have improved between 1985 and 1998, significant differences between native and

immigrant residences persist.³²⁹ My research design did not allow for such comparisons between Germans and immigrants. I did, however, gauge overall residential satisfaction among survey participants, as shown in Table 22.

Overall, how happy are you with your current housing situation?[in percent]

	<i>N</i>	<i>Totally happy</i>	<i>Very happy</i>	<i>Rather happy</i>	<i>Neither nor</i>	<i>Rather unhappy</i>	<i>Very unhappy</i>	<i>Totally unhappy</i>
<i>Binationals</i>	19	42.11	31.58	21.05	5.26	0.00	0.00	0.00
<i>Others</i>	67	25.37	25.37	34.33	5.97	1.49	1.49	1.49
<i>Total</i>	86	29.07	30.23	31.40	5.81	1.16	1.16	1.16

Table 22: Residential satisfaction

Although this measure carries less meaning without a reference (host society) measure to compare it to, the overwhelmingly positive assessment of residential conditions among my survey participants, is, by itself, noteworthy. For both biethnic and single ethnic immigrants, the vast majority are totally, very, or rather happy with their current housing situation. Differences between the two groups are small, with binationals marginally more happy.

I also included a question on the perceived residential ethnic makeup of survey respondents. As we have seen in Chapter 2, residential segregation is often claimed to be among the main impediments to immigrant integration. Although survey data cannot serve to arbitrate the debate on the roots of this pattern, it can suggest the scope of residential segregation. Table 23 draws together the frequencies of answers regarding respondents' perceived residential ethnic makeup and community size. The community size categories shown here are approximate translations of standard German community size categories.

As we can see, more than half of my respondents describe their residential community as primarily populated by ethnic Germans. Another quarter reports living among approximately equal numbers of German and non-German ethnicities. Communities with non-German ethnic majorities are reported rarely, and only within metropolitan cities. Judged from the ethnic makeup of the residential environment of

³²⁹ Anita I. Drever and William A. V. Clark, "Gaining access to housing in Germany: The foreign-minority experience," *Urban studies* 39, no. 13 (2002)

my survey participants, segregation thus does not appear to be a commonplace occurrence.

<i>Please tell us the size of the community in which you reside.</i>	<i>The majority of people living in your neighborhood are</i>					<i>Total</i>
	<i>Ethnic Germans</i>	<i>My non-German ethnicity</i>	<i>Other non-German ethnicities</i>	<i>About the same German and non-German ethnicities</i>	<i>I don't know</i>	
<i>In a metropolitan city</i>	21	2	3	13	3	42
<i>In the suburb or the outskirts of a metropolitan city</i>	9	0	0	3	2	14
<i>In a medium-size city</i>	18	0	1	8	2	29
<i>In a rural village.</i>	6	0	0	1	0	7
<i>In a detached house or farm in the countryside</i>	0	0	0	0	0	0
<i>Total</i>	54	2	4	25	7	92

Table 23: Residential ethnic composition and community size

II Ethnicity of best friends

The ethnicity of reported best friends is often used as an indicator of social integration.³³⁰ Table 24 shows that overall, among the second generation immigrants I surveyed, more than half reported their first (best) friend to be of German ethnic origin.³³¹ About one quarter indicated their best friend to be of their own non-German ethnic origin, with best friends from another or mixed ethnicity being reported less frequently. As far as German and own ethnicity distributions, similar frequencies were reported for second and third best friends. Among the latter two categories, other ethnicities and mixed ethnicity friendships were reported more frequently.

These results cast doubt, again, on Esser's suggestion that the second generation retreats into their own ethnic communities. The people I surveyed count ethnic

³³⁰ See, among others, Goldberg, Halm, and Sauer, *Migrationsbericht des Zentrums für Türkeistudien 2002*, p.48

³³¹ The ethnicity of best friends is widely used as an indicator of social assimilation. See for Germany, among others, Diehl and Schnell, p.796

Germans among their best friends far more frequently than their ethnic peers, although they also foster close ties to people of their own and other ethnicities.

<i>Which ethnic origin do your 3 best friends have? Please choose the box that applies for each of your three best friends. If you have less than 3 best friends, just leave the respective columns blank</i>	<i>Answer frequencies</i>		
	<i>First friend</i>	<i>Second friend</i>	<i>Third friend</i>
<i>German ethnic origin.</i>	49	35	47
<i>My non-German ethnic origin.</i>	21	17	18
<i>Another non-German ethnic origin</i>	15	19	9
<i>Mixed ethnic origins (their parents are of different ethnic origins)</i>	6	14	13
<i>Total</i>	91	85	87

Table 24: Ethnicities of best friends

Some analysts warn, however, that frequency of contact does not necessarily correlate with the perceived intensity of friendships. As Entzinger and Biezeveld argue, immigrants may strongly identify with their country of origin even though the bulk of their current contacts are, by necessity, in their country of residence.³³²

<i>How often do you communicate with your best friends (either in person, by (e-)mail, or by phone)?</i>	<i>Answer frequencies</i>		
	<i>First friend</i>	<i>Second friend</i>	<i>Third friend</i>
<i>Daily</i>	31	10	10
<i>About 2 to 4 times per week</i>	36	32	24
<i>About once per week</i>	17	23	31
<i>About once a month</i>	9	14	15
<i>Less than once a month</i>	2	6	6

Table 25: Frequency of contact to friends

Although the frequency with which my respondents mentioned ethnic Germans among their best friends suggests that this may not be the case, overall, for second generation immigrants, I did test the correlation between stated importance and frequency of contact of friends. Table 25 suggests that overall, stated importance (as a function of rank) of friends does correlate with the frequency of contact to the respective friends in the aggregate. We can thus with reasonable confidence interpret the reported rank order of friends in Table 24 to reflect true depth of association.

³³² Han Entzinger and Renske Biezeveld, "Benchmarking in immigrant integration," (Rotterdam: European research on migration and ethnic relations ERCOMER, 2003), p.7

Overall, reported ethnicity and contact frequency to friends suggest that my second generation survey participants are far from voluntarily withdrawing into friendship networks within their non-German ethnic communities.

III Frequency of interaction with ethnic Germans

The frequency and depth of contact between immigrants and host society is another indicator of social integration. The areas in which contact occurs suggest varying degrees of voluntariness, with contacts at work on one end and contacts among family and relatives on the other end of the spectrum. In successive surveys of (first and second generation) Turkish residents in North Rhine Westphalia, contacts between Turks and Germans were reported to be most frequent in the neighborhood, followed by those at work, among friends and acquaintances, and, finally, relatives and family, respectively.³³³ Whereas the percentage of respondents reporting contact to Germans in the first three areas varied between eighty-one and seventy-four percent in these surveys, contact among friends and family, by contrast, were reported by a mere thirty percent.

<i>How often do you have contact to ethnic Germans in the following spheres of life? [in percent]</i>						
	<i>N</i>	<i>Daily</i>	<i>About 2 to 4 times per week</i>	<i>About once a week</i>	<i>About once a month</i>	<i>Less than once a month</i>
<i>In my neighborhood</i>	92	70.7	14.1	5.4	3.3	6.5
<i>At work</i>	87	89.7	5.7	1.1	3.4	0.0
<i>Among friends and acquaintances</i>	93	61.3	25.8	3.2	5.4	4.3
<i>In my family/ among relatives</i>	90	60.0	26.7	3.3	5.6	4.4

Table 26: Frequency of contact to ethnic Germans in various settings

Results from my own survey, as shown in Table 26, show a slightly different distribution, with (presumably more voluntary) contacts in the neighborhood reported

³³³ Şen, Sauer, and Halm, p.49. The results are not entirely comparable to mine due to slight variations in the survey instrument. It still allows for a comparison of overall tendencies.

to be more frequent than (less voluntary ones) at work. I also found the difference of contact frequency in the various realms of life to be much smaller than the study of Turkish residents in North Rhine Westphalia. Contact frequencies in the four areas varied a mere ten percent for my survey participants, as compared to fifty percent between neighborhood and family contacts for the aforementioned survey among Turks.

Some of these differences are likely due to differing study populations. Whereas Şen and his associates studied a representative sample of the population of people with a number of Turkish-sounding last names represented in public telephone directories in North Rhine Westphalia regardless of their immigrant generation status, I focused on immigrants of any non- or partial-German ethnic heritage in Germany of the second generation only. My respondents are thus likely to be younger overall. A number of studies, among them the one of Şen and his associates itself, suggest in fact that younger residents of non-German ethnic heritage have more contacts to ethnic Germans than older ones.³³⁴

Again, the overall very high frequency of inter-ethnic contacts I found suggests that second generation immigrants are far from voluntarily withdrawing from the German mainstream society. The overwhelming majority of them in fact interact with ethnic Germans on a regular basis as neighbors, colleagues, friends, and family.

As these results may have been attributable in part to availability of the respective ethnicity groups, I also asked respondents whether they would like to have more contact to ethnic Germans, people of their own non-German ethnicity, or people of other non-German ethnicities. I related these answers to the respective reported ethnic makeup of their residential communities, as shown in Table 27.³³⁵

As can be seen, my respondents were overall equally likely to report a desire to meet people of all three ethnicity groups. A slightly greater share of respondents did not indicate a wish for more contact to any group as compared to those who did. Table 27 also shows that reported desire to have more contact to any one group is also

³³⁴ See Şen, Sauer, and Halm, p.49; Hartmut Esser and Jürgen Friedrichs, *Generation und Identität: Theoretische und empirische Beiträge zur Migrationssoziologie* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1990), p.185-205

³³⁵ Multiple answers were possible here, hence the number of respondents to this question cannot be reported.

unrelated to the actual perceived ethnic makeup of respondents' residential neighborhoods.

Overall, the answer frequencies to this question again do not suggest the tendencies towards social segregation Esser laments as described in Section 2.2.2.

<i>Would you like to have more contact to</i>		<i>The majority of people living in your neighborhood are</i>					
		<i>Ethnic Germans</i>	<i>My non-German ethnicity</i>	<i>Other non-German ethnicities</i>	<i>About the same German and non-German ethnicities</i>	<i>I don't know</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Ethnic Germans</i>	<i>Yes</i>	23	1	1	9	4	38
	<i>No</i>	25	1	3	15	3	47
<i>People of my non-German ethnicity</i>	<i>Yes</i>	22	1	1	9	4	37
	<i>No</i>	24	1	3	15	2	45
<i>People of other non-German ethnicities</i>	<i>Yes</i>	23	1	1	12	3	40
	<i>No</i>	24	1	3	12	3	43

Table 27: Ethnicities in neighborhood and desired contact

Identificational assimilation

I Where do you feel at home?

The place in which immigrants report feeling most at home is often used as an indicator for deeper integration.³³⁶ I conceived the question to gauge the strength of affiliation to several places at once, thus allowing for a comparison among them, as shown in Table 28. I again broadened the range of categories to include one sub-national affiliation, as well as one supranational universalist one.³³⁷ I labeled them in

³³⁶ See, for instance, Goldberg, Halm, and Sauer, *Migrationsbericht des Zentrums für Türkeistudien 2002*, p.94-98, who used this indicator studying Turkish nationals in North Rhine Westphalia.

³³⁷ When I started exploring the issue of emotional affiliation of immigrants, I was often told by immigrant acquaintances that they really feel at home in their respective residential communities. When asked where they belong, they would often spontaneously answer 'Berlin' (or even, Kreuzberg, one of many Berlin districts), for instance, rather than Germany, or Turkey. I further included the

line with Berry's adaptation alternatives as shown in Table 5, adding localisation to describe the disposition of those who reported their primary home to be the city or town in which they reside, and transnationalism to describe those who reported feeling at home everywhere.³³⁸

<i>Where do you feel most at home? Please select from the following list the places where you feel at home, and rank them. Give the place you feel most at home the lowest number, and the place you feel least at home the highest number.</i>	<i>Answer frequencies</i>					
	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>6</i>
<i>In Germany.</i>	33	22	8	6	4	-
<i>In the country of origin of my ethnically non-German parent(s)</i>	4	22	19	9	5	2
<i>In both countries equally</i>	16	2	16	12	3	3
<i>In the city / town where I currently live.</i>	29	15	10	8	5	-
<i>Everywhere.</i>	4	7	5	7	18	4
<i>Nowhere.</i>	4	1	1	2	2	31

Table 28: Feeling at home in Germany

Respondents were asked to rank only the affiliations they feel they have, giving their first affiliation the lowest number, and their weakest the highest number. Germany was chosen most frequently. Of the seventy-three respondents who ranked Germany, seventy-five percent ranked it as their first or second strongest affiliation. Sixty-seven respondents ranked the city or town where they currently live, 66 percent of them as their first or second ranked choice. In descending order of overall frequency follow their country of non-German ethnic origin (61 mentions, 42 percent as first or second choice), both countries equally (52 mentions, 35 percent as first or second choice), everywhere (45 mentions, 24 percent as first or second choice), and nowhere (with a total 41 mentions, 12 percent as first or second choice). Judged by

'Everywhere' category to gauge the presence of a wider affiliation that transcends any particular place, in a similar vein as the panethnic universalist identity described on page 151.

³³⁸ Although the phenomena I describe are well-known in the literature, analysts still struggle with precise definitions and argue over the best way to label them. Leo Lucassen, for instance, refers to the phenomenon of sub-national home town affiliation as bi-localism, and describes the ones I labeled transnational as pan-ethnic identities. See Leo Lucassen, "Is transnationalism compatible with assimilation? Examples from Western Europe since 1850," *IMIS Beiträge* 29 (2006), p.20. For seminal literature on this issue, see Peggy Levitt, *The transnational villagers* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001); Alejandro Portes, Luis E. Guarnizo, and Patricia Landolt, "The study of transnationalism: Pitfalls and promise of an emergent research field," *Ethnic and racial studies* 22 (1999); Steven Vertovec and Robin Cohen, *Migration, diasporas, and transnationalism* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1999)

either frequency with which the respective categories were ranked (indicating that respondents felt that they are affiliated to it to some degree) or the actual (first and second) rank they were given, a clear hierarchy emerges: The majority of my respondents feel at home in Germany, followed by those who feel at home in the city or town in which they currently reside. The country of origin of their ethnically non-German parent(s) ranks third, followed by ‘both countries equally’, and, chosen less frequently, ‘everywhere’, and ‘nowhere.’

Judging from the chosen first choice affiliation only, the hierarchy changes, as shown in Table 29, with the country of origin of non-ethnic parents dropping back considerably to fourth place, which it shares with both ‘everywhere’ and ‘nowhere.’

<i>Primary emotional affiliation of survey respondents</i>		
<i>In Germany</i>	<i>Assimilation</i>	<i>38%</i>
<i>In the country of origin of my ethnically non-German parent(s)</i>	<i>Separation</i>	<i>4%</i>
<i>In both countries equally</i>	<i>Integration</i>	<i>18%</i>
<i>In the city / town where I currently live.</i>	<i>Localisation</i>	<i>32%</i>
<i>Everywhere</i>	<i>Transnationalism</i>	<i>4%</i>
<i>Nowhere</i>	<i>Marginalization</i>	<i>4%</i>

Table 29: Primary emotional affiliation of survey respondents

Table 29 allocates affiliations to categories reflecting Berry’s immigrant adaptation model as shown in Table 5. As we can see, the (supplemental) localisation category was chosen by a sizeable share of respondents as their primary emotional affiliation. It was surpassed only by those who chose Germany, and who thus fit Berry’s (and Gordon’s) assimilation profile. Eighteen percent, by contrast, displayed an integrationist profile, by reporting to feel equal attachment to their parent’s (non-German) home country and Germany. The remaining categories, by comparison, among them separation, are much less prevalent.

In sum, again we see that most respondents are actually assimilated by that measure. Judged by where they say they feel at home, most are in fact perfectly integrated in Germany. Among Berry’s and Esser’s alternative adaptation paths, integration is the second most frequent orientation. Significantly more of my respondents, however, are attached not to any one or two nations, but rather feel attached to the city or community in which they reside. Current immigrant integration

theories (as outlined in Chapter 2) do not usually dedicate as much attention to such subnational affiliations as they do to national ones. I believe that doing so is worthwhile, and can, as the inclusion of a universalist orientation to the common binary host or ethnic community dichotomy, importantly broaden our perspective on adaptation alternatives and add to our understanding of salient categories in the eyes of immigrants themselves.

II Intention to stay in Germany indefinitely

Immigrants' reported intention to stay in the host country indefinitely has been used as an integration indicator.³³⁹ While some theorists link it to actual language skills upon arrival, others argue that regardless of initial skill levels, immigrants who consider returning an option are less likely to invest in acquiring human capital specific to the host country specific. Michael Piore, for instance, suggests that an average 32 percent of immigrants to the United States between 1908 and 1910 returned to their countries of origin, with much lower rates for immigrants from English-speaking countries of origin than other countries.³⁴⁰ Edna Bonacich argues that immigrants who consider returning to their countries of origin an option are typically reluctant to invest in host society-specific financial and educational assets.³⁴¹ Both dynamics likely contribute to the purported association between the intention to stay indefinitely and integration success.

Empirical studies in Germany using this indicator generally found the shares of immigrants planning to stay in Germany rising across the board, with much higher numbers among the second generation.³⁴² Table 30 reports my findings on this indicator, for binationals and others, as well as the entirety of respondents who answered this question.

³³⁹ Although it is widely used in empirical studies, using this measure as an indicator of integration has been criticized. Helena Flam argues that many immigrants cope with the challenges associated with continuously being perceived as outsiders by clinging to the myth of eventually returning to their country of origin. This return myth, which may manifest itself in professed intentions, satisfies a psychological need to belong somewhere, and is rarely meant literally and acted upon. See Flam, p.52

³⁴⁰ Piore, p.151

³⁴¹ Edna Bonacich, "A theory of ethnic antagonism: The split labour market," *American sociological review* 37 (1972). By the same token, employers who expect immigrant employees to eventually return to their countries of origin are usually equally reluctant to invest in their on-the-job training.

³⁴² See, for instance, Özcan, p.40, or Şen, Sauer, and Halm, p.95

<i>Do you intend to stay in Germany indefinitely? [%]</i>				
	<i>N</i>	<i>Probably yes</i>	<i>I don't know</i>	<i>Probably no</i>
<i>Binationals</i>	19	21.05	57.89	21.05
<i>Others</i>	65	67.69	23.08	9.23
<i>Total</i>	84	57.14	30.95	11.9

Table 30: Intention to stay in Germany indefinitely

As can be seen, for both groups combined, more than half of my respondents plan to settle in Germany. About one third indicates being unsure, whereas ten percent say they will probably not settle in German indefinitely. Overall, then, about half of my respondents appear to be integrated by that measure.

If we consider binational respondents separately, the picture changes quite a bit. Among them, surprisingly, significantly fewer intent to stay in Germany despite it being the home of one of their parents. More than half of them report being unsure, whereas more than twenty percent say that they will probably leave Germany eventually. Blood ties thus again appear to be no guarantee for superior integration outcomes. One may, of course, argue that reported intentions are unlikely to be acted upon. If we want to actively shape German society in the long run, however, we have to take such indications seriously, and consider their implications for commonplace theoretical assumptions that cultural distance is among the main impediments to identificational assimilation, which these results clearly do not support.

III Openness to Ethnic German Partner

As we have seen in Section 2.2.3, Gordon considered intermarriage as one of the final steps towards immigrant integration. Other theorists echo his view. In the United States, Drachsler already considered intermarriage a crucial indicator of social cohesion.³⁴³ Similarly, studying immigrants to Canada, Hurd suggested intermarriage rates as both indicator and method of assimilation.³⁴⁴ More recently, Hirschman and Lieberson, among others, used it to gauge immigrant integration outcomes in the

³⁴³ Julius Drachsler, *Intermarriage in New York City: A statistical study of the amalgamation of European peoples* (New York: Columbia University, 1921), p.82

³⁴⁴ Burton W. Hurd, *Origin, birthplace, nationality and language of the Canadian people* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1929), p.23

United States.³⁴⁵ Empirical studies appear to lend credence to the suggestion that immigrants married to host society partners have better integration outcomes, on average, than other immigrants.³⁴⁶

Overall, intermarriage between immigrants and non-immigrants in the contemporary United States has increased, yet stark differences among groups remain. Whereas some studies estimate that a full half of Asian Americans, Latinos and native Americans are marrying whites,³⁴⁷ Blacks still intermarry much less than any other ethnic group.³⁴⁸ Recent empirical research on ethnic intermarriage patterns in Norway similarly suggests that at the individual level, endogamy is higher among non-white immigrants.³⁴⁹ Among the fault lines traditionally salient in partner selection (such as ethnicity, religion, race, and social status), race thus still appears to be paramount.

There are several obstacles to using intermarriage rates as a measure of integration outcome, however. Some plague the endeavor in general, and some are particular to the German case. The exclusive focus on marital unions falls in the first category. Although the majority of people still marry, marriage has become one of several forms of close-knit partnership.³⁵⁰ Particularly among the younger population cohorts

³⁴⁵ Charles Hirschman, "America's melting pot reconsidered," *Annual review of sociology* 9 (1983); Stanley Lieberson and Mary C. Waters, "Recent social trends: ethnic mixtures in the United States," *Sociology and social research* 70, no. 1 (1985)

³⁴⁶ Part of this relationship may be due to effects on language acquisition. Studying intermarriage effects in Germany, for instance, Dustmann suggest that immigrants with a partner fluent in German are more likely to exhibit stronger language skills themselves, which the author finds to be an important determinant of their income. See Dustmann, p.155. Of course, his findings could be due to selection effects, with immigrants with better host language skills more likely to intermarry in the first place.

³⁴⁷ See Alba and Nee, *Remaking the American mainstream: Assimilation and contemporary immigration*, p.263-267

³⁴⁸ See, among others, George A. Yancey, *Who is white? Latinos, Asians, and the new black/nonblack divide* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003); Zhenchao Quian, "Who intermarries? Education, nativity, region, and interracial marriage, 1980 and 1990," *Journal of comparative family studies* 30 (1999); Lichter and Blackwell include cohabiting couples and come to the same conclusion. See Daniel T. Lichter and Debra L. Blackwell, "Mate selection among married and cohabiting couples," *Journal of family issues* 21 (2000). More recently, using an extended set of ethnicity groups, Xuanning Fu concludes that the barrier between Blacks and non-Blacks remains high. 'If the melting pot is an apt description of these intermarriage patterns,' he concludes, 'it must be a divided melting pot not well stirred.' See Xuanning Fu, "Inter-racial marriage and family socio-economic status: A study among Whites, Filipinos, Japanese, and Hawaiians in Hawaii," *Journal of comparative family studies* 38, no. 4 (2007), p.229

³⁴⁹ See Frank Van Tubergen and Ineke Maas, "Ethnic intermarriage among immigrants in the Netherlands: An analysis of population data " *Social science research* 36 (2007)

³⁵⁰ I am indebted to PD Dr. Michael Braun of the Center for Survey Research and Methodology in Mannheim for pointing out that a question on *partnership* is more appropriate in Germany given a general loss in appeal of marriage as compared to other forms of cohabitation.

in Germany who are the focus of my study, many prefer (initial or permanent) cohabitation.³⁵¹ The latest census data in Germany in fact suggests that slightly more than one quarter of the German resident population currently live in non-marriage relationships with (same-sex or opposite-sex) partners in one household.³⁵² A sole focus on married couples thus would have missed a substantial share of the population with perhaps non-random characteristics.

Another weakness of intermarriage as an integration indicator has to do with its reciprocal nature. As Kalmijn notes, marriage takes two, and when one group is open yet the other one is closed, endogamy may still prevail. In a similar vein, some researchers suggest that there may be temporal dynamics at play, with (initial) openness towards other ethnicities of one group in time adjusting to the degree at which it is perceived to be reciprocated by the respective targeted ethnic group.³⁵³ The particular instance at which opinions on inter- and intra-ethnic partnerships are recorded in relation to perceived experiences of acceptance or rejection by members of other groups may thus matter as well.

Among the difficulties associated with analyzing intermarriage rates in Germany in particular, most revolve around data availability and reliability. Official German marriage statistics do not currently record information on ethnic origin, such that a lack of the presumed positive effect on integration outcome to an immigrant spouse of a German native may be due to an unaccounted common non-German ethnic background between marriage partners. Moreover, many inter-ethnic marriage ceremonies are performed abroad or in German consulates abroad, both of which are

³⁵¹ Although the notion that rising rates of alternative forms of cohabitation influence (inter-)marriage rates is uncontested, analysts advance various hypotheses on the exact dynamics at work. Some argue that cohabitation is best conceived as an intermediary stage that delays but eventually leads to marriage. Others argue that interethnic or interracial cohabitation may more frequently be an alternative to intermarriage, particularly if the respective marital union is still highly stigmatized. See Quián, p.72

³⁵² See Statistisches Bundesamt, *Leben in Deutschland: Haushalte, Familien und Gesundheit. Ergebnisse des Mikrozensus 2005 - Pressebroschüre* (Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt, 2006), p.27

³⁵³ Kalmijn. In the same vein, Arthur Fischer and his associates note that the findings on the attitude of Turkish nationals in Germany towards inter-ethnic unions may not stem from their own perceptions of social or cultural distance to Germans alone, but may in part be prompted by and mirror Germans' attitudes towards them. Fischer's survey among Turkish and German youth aged 15 to 24 in fact finds attitudes to be similar, with some 10 percent of both Germans and Turks unable to imagine having the respective other as a partner. See Fischer and others, p.252

not recorded in official German statistics.³⁵⁴ Lastly, due to privacy regulations constraining the use of district-level census information, needed data on residential area group sizes and gender ratios of particular ethnicities is not available in Germany. Group size and geographic dispersion, however, greatly affect the odds of intra- and interethnic unions, and would thus have to be taken into account when analyzing opportunity structures that influence intermarriage patterns.³⁵⁵

These obstacles prevented me from analyzing marriage patterns as part of my statistical analysis. I instead included a question related to marital assimilation propensity in my survey. In an attempt to capture both marital and other partnerships, I asked survey participants on their personal stance towards ethnically endogamous and exogamous partnerships, more generally. I framed the question as a scalar question with four categories as shown in Table 31.

<i>In principle, would you be open to having</i>				
	<i>Absolutely</i>	<i>Maybe</i>	<i>Probably not</i>	<i>Never</i>
<i>a partner of your non-German ethnic origin?</i>				
<i>an ethnic German partner?</i>				
<i>a partner of another non-German ethnic origin?</i>				

Table 31: Partnership preference question

Table 32 summarizes the results on self-reported propensities of engaging in same, other or German ethnicity partnerships, again grouping them into Berry’s adaptation categories as shown in Table 5. The numbers here are raw numbers.

If we take the information and ranking of all three ethnicity categories into account, however, distributing responses into their four neat categories becomes more difficult. As Table 33 shows, we can distinguish integration, separation, and

³⁵⁴ Şen, Sauer, and Halm, p.43 mention this caveat for marriages of Turkish to German citizens, in particular.

³⁵⁵ Among empirical studies that report group size and spatial dispersion to have large effects on intermarriage patterns in the United States are, for instance, Dina G. Okamoto, "Marrying out: A boundary approach to understanding the marital integration of Asian Americans," *Social science research* 36 (2007); Sara S. Lee, "Class matters: Racial and ethnic identities of working- and middle-class second generation Korean Americans in New York City," in *Becoming New Yorkers: Ethnographies of the new second generation*, ed. Philip Kasinitz, John H. Mollenkopf, and Mary C. Waters (New York: Russell Sage, 2004)

assimilation further into three subcategories, respectively, depending on how respondents ranked the third, ‘other ethnicity’ preference.

<i>Equally open to own ethnicity and German partner</i>	<i>Integration</i>	<i>51</i>
<i>Prefer own ethnicity partner to German partner</i>	<i>Separation</i>	<i>13</i>
<i>Prefer German to own ethnicity partner</i>	<i>Assimilation</i>	<i>13</i>
<i>Prefer another ethnicity to both own ethnicity and German partner</i>	<i>Marginalization</i>	<i>4</i>

Table 32: Openness to ethnic German versus own-ethnic partner

Labeling the resulting nine ranking variations is much less straightforward than the three main categories imply. A person who appears to be integrated by the way he or she ranked preferences for own and German ethnicity partners, for instance, appears much less so once we know that he or she actually indicated her first preference to be a partner of a third ethnicity. I arbitrarily labeled this (rare) occurrence multidimensional marginalization, as shown in Table 33.

<i>Equally open to own ethnicity and German ethnicity partner</i>	<i>Integration</i>	<i>51</i>
<i>German ethnicity = other ethnicity preference</i>	<i>Multidimensional integration / Universalism</i>	<i>38</i>
<i>German ethnicity < other ethnicity preference</i>	<i>Multidimensional marginalization</i>	<i>2</i>
<i>German ethnicity > other ethnicity</i>	<i>Bidimensional integration?</i>	<i>11</i>
<i>Own ethnicity more preferred than German ethnicity</i>	<i>Separation</i>	<i>13</i>
<i>German ethnicity = other ethnicity preference</i>	<i>Multidimensional separation</i>	<i>6</i>
<i>German ethnicity < other ethnicity preference</i>	<i>Bidimensional separation</i>	<i>5</i>
<i>German ethnicity > other ethnicity preference</i>	<i>Early stage assimilation?</i>	<i>2</i>
<i>German ethnicity more preferred than own ethnicity</i>	<i>Assimilation</i>	<i>13</i>
<i>Own ethnicity = other ethnicity preference</i>	<i>Multidimensional assimilation</i>	<i>7</i>
<i>Own ethnicity < other ethnicity preference</i>	<i>Early stage marginalization?</i>	<i>4</i>
<i>Own ethnicity > other ethnicity preference</i>	<i>Bidimensional assimilation</i>	<i>2</i>

Table 33: Partner preference rankings

Likewise, someone who prefers a German partner to one of his or her own ethnicity, a clear case of assimilation by Berry’s standards, may slide into marginalization when his or her advances to ethnic Germans are not reciprocated, and

he or she is not open to partners of his or her own ethnicity either. To reflect this potentially precarious preference ordering, I labeled this case early stage marginalization. The same, of course, is true when preferred own ethnicity partners are unavailable and alternative ethnicity partners deemed unacceptable.

Definitional questions aside, the general point I would like to make here is that bidimensional immigrant adaptation models are too coarse to capture emotional dispositions of immigrants and their descendants in an ever increasing multidimensional environment. My results suggest that assuming the simple binary ingroup-outgroup schemata as the common norm underestimates the capacity of immigrants, and, perhaps, humans, more generally, to navigate a multidimensional ethnic space.

Again, results on partner preferences may differ for binational and other respondents. Children whose parents are of different ethnic origin may be particularly likely to broaden binary templates to accommodate multiple ethnicities they inherit as their own. Splitting respondents into binationals (half-German ethnics) and full non-German ethnics gives a clearer picture in this regard.

<i>Equally open to own ethnicity and German ethnicity partner</i>	<i>Integration</i>	
	<i>Binational %</i>	<i>Other %</i>
<i>German ethnicity = other ethnicity preference</i>	85.71	50.72
<i>German ethnicity < other ethnicity preference</i>	0.00	2.90
<i>German ethnicity > other ethnicity preference</i>	7.14	14.49
<i>Own ethnicity more preferred than German ethnicity</i>	<i>Separation</i>	
	<i>Binational %</i>	<i>Other %</i>
<i>German ethnicity = other ethnicity preference</i>	0.00	8.70
<i>German ethnicity < other ethnicity preference</i>	0.00	5.80
<i>German ethnicity > other ethnicity preference</i>	0.00	2.90
<i>German ethnicity more preferred than own ethnicity</i>	<i>Assimilation</i>	
	<i>Binational %</i>	<i>Other %</i>
<i>Own ethnicity = other ethnicity preference</i>	7.14	8.70
<i>Own ethnicity < other ethnicity preference</i>	0.00	2.90
<i>Own ethnicity > other ethnicity preference</i>	0.00	2.90

Table 34: Own and potential partner ethnicity

As Table 34 shows, binational respondents are indeed more likely to be integrated (as judged by equal preference of their own non-German and German ethnicity partners) than respondents with one ethnicity. Almost 93 percent of binational respondents fall in the integration category, as compared to some 68 percent of single ethnicity respondents. None of the (mostly partial German ethnic) binationals self-report preferences that fall in the separation category. Interestingly, however, they are also less frequently assimilated than second generation immigrants of one ethnicity. A majority of binational respondents, about 86 percent, in fact express no preference at all among their own non-German, German, and other ethnicity partners. Albeit less stark, this latter fact is also true for respondents of one ethnicity.

Judged by their professed partner preferences, binationals thus again lag behind in assimilation. They display not only the dual emotional (integrationist) attachments Samuel Huntington warned would eventually threaten the one-dimensional national creed he claims most single ethnic natives hold dear.³⁵⁶ Their emotional affiliations also go beyond the two ethnicities they inherited, to most likely encompass human beings *per se*, above and beyond ethnicity.

<i>As far as you can tell, the majority of people living in your neighborhood are</i>	<i>Partner preference profile</i>			
	<i>Integration</i>	<i>Separation</i>	<i>Assimilation</i>	<i>Marginalization</i>
<i>Ethnic Germans</i>	39	5	7	2
<i>People of your non-German ethnicity</i>	1	0	0	0
<i>People of other non-German ethnicities</i>	0	3	0	0
<i>About the same proportions of ethnic Germans and ethnic non-Germans</i>	18	4	3	0
<i>I don't know</i>	4	1	2	0

Table 35: Openness to inter-ethnic partnerships and residential composition

Irrespective of how one wants to interpret this trend, overall, what is clear is that integrationist emotional dispositions already reign in partner choice among second generation immigrants. As intermarriage becomes a more frequent occurrence and

³⁵⁶ See Huntington, *Who are we? The challenges to America's national identity*

binational offspring continues to choose partners as generations turn over, they will likely spread further.

As outlined earlier, availability influences partner choice. Table 35 takes into account opportunity structures as reflected in the self-perceived ethnic composition of respondents' residential neighborhood, and relates it to their reported partner preference. Although the small number of respondents prohibits a meaningful systematic analysis of partnership preferences in relation to perceived group size and thus heterogeneity within the respective residential neighborhoods, we see that integrationist partner preferences prevail across almost all neighborhood compositions for the respondents who took part in my study. Neighborhoods in which ethnic Germans are perceived to be in the majority do not house more assimilation-minded immigrants. The three respondents who hold separationist partnership preferences, however, do live in neighborhoods that are predominantly non-German. Interpreting this fact, of course, is a chicken-and-egg problem: Given their partner preferences, these people may have chosen to live among their own. Conversely, being among their co-ethnics may have shaped their preferences. Nonetheless, Table 35 suggests that residential ethnic composition is not be systematically related to partner preferences.

As outlined earlier, immigrant openness to inter-ethnic partnership is a necessary but not sufficient condition for its realization. I did not survey ethnic Germans on their propensities to intermarry as part of my study. Several empirical studies in Germany on the topic suggest that low rates of intermarriage for certain ethnic groups (most notably, Turks) are due in part to ethnic German reluctance towards such unions. In this vein, commenting on several studies of ethnicity preferences of *marriage* partners among Turkish youth in the past decade, Faruk Şen and his associates point out that low rates of acceptance of binational marriage among Turkish nationals overall correlate with and may thus be related to equally low degrees of reported comfort with Turks as family members in the eyes of ethnic Germans.³⁵⁷

³⁵⁷ See Şen, Sauer, and Halm, p.44-46. This caveat echoes Kalmijn's aforementioned warning that marriage takes two, and low rates of intermarriage may be due to reluctance by both groups equally.

In the same vein, Arthur Fischer and his associates, who gauge preferred ethnicities of future partners surveying a probability sample of younger respondents of German, Italian, and Turkish descent, found 21.5 percent of Turkish nationals to be unable to fathom engaging in a mixed-ethnicity partnership.³⁵⁸ Interestingly, an even greater 28.4 percent of German youth shared this view.³⁵⁹ Overall, the bottleneck thus may be more German reluctance towards a Turkish partner than vice versa.

Both aforementioned studies found education to significantly correlate with expressed openness towards interethnic partnerships. Unfortunately, the relatively small number of responses combined with a relatively high number of education categories prevents meaningful use of the information on respondent's own education level for my survey respondents.³⁶⁰ Nonetheless, it appears that, as far as intermarriage is concerned, education matters.

In his extensive synopsis of prominent theories and empirical literature on the correlates of intermarriage in a variety of countries, Matthijs Kalmijn echoes this view, and in fact suggests more generally that, when choosing marriage partners, ascribed attributes of group membership, such as ethnicity, parental status, and religion are losing salience, whereas achieved bases of group membership, most notably, education, continue to matter.³⁶¹ My own research design was not conceived to provide the longitudinal data needed to analyze such trends for Germany. Overall, however, results from my own and other studies suggest that current attitudes towards intermarriage do not suggest segregationist mindsets in Germany.

³⁵⁸ See Fischer and others, p.253. The results reported here are not directly comparable to mine because of differences in the survey population and instrument. I mention them here, nonetheless, because they point towards similar conclusions.

³⁵⁹ For ethnic German youth, their response on this indicator correlated significantly with educational level and place of residence within Germany. Respondents pursuing secondary and tertiary education degrees and residing in Western German states consider a mixed-ethnicity partnership a viable option much more frequently.

³⁶⁰ I borrowed the instrument to collect data on respondent education level from Zentrum für Umfragen empirische Sozialforschung, Methoden und Analysen an der Universität zu Köln ZUMA, "Allgemeine Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften ALLBUS," (Köln: ZUMA, 2000), p.84. Although it is a valid instrument, it turned out to be too detailed for my purpose in hindsight.

³⁶¹ Kalmijn, p.417

IV Soccer cheer

Although self-reported emotional affiliation to an ethnicity is undoubtedly related to what theorists like Esser and Gordon commonly subsume under advanced identificational assimilation or integration, it may not adequately capture the depth of the associated sentiments. As Miller argues, sentiments of nationality are often hidden and emerge only when triggered by dramatic events, such as a national football team winning, armed conflict, or natural disasters.³⁶² When I launched my survey in Summer 2006, Germany was hosting and galvanized by the soccer world cup, which afforded me the unique opportunity to gauge deeper national sentiment with a question related to the soccer championships, as shown in Table 36.

If Germany had played against the non-German country of origin of your father and/or mother in the soccer world cup finals, which team would you have rooted for?

	<i>N</i>	<i>Binationals %</i>	<i>Others %</i>
<i>Germany</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>21.05</i>	<i>31.58</i>
<i>The country of origin of my father / mother</i>	<i>61</i>	<i>52.63</i>	<i>69.86</i>
<i>I don't care who would have won</i>	<i>21</i>	<i>26.32</i>	<i>21.92</i>

Table 36: Soccer cheer question

As can be seen, a majority of both binational and other immigrant respondents reported cheering for the country of origin of their (non-German) ethnic origin. Given the high integration levels in the cultural and social realm as outlined above, these low levels (if we are to interpret them as such) are surprising. Perhaps an event as heated and emotional as a soccer game in Germany does in fact trigger emotions that reflect deeper layers of affiliation that everyday life just does not reveal. To be sure, about one quarter of both binational and other respondents reported being indifferent to the issue altogether.

Awareness of such shortcomings in ultimate identificational attachment unfortunately does not by itself tell us anything about the dynamics and mechanisms that affect such deeper emotional attachment, however. To this effect, hidden at the

³⁶² David Miller, *On nationality* (Oxford University Press, 1995), p.14, 18

end of a battery of questions of the same format,³⁶³ I asked respondents directly on the degree to which they feel they have an equal chance to reach their life goals as ethnic Germans. Although this question does not directly mention discrimination, it is the one which comes closest to asking about the perceived degree of discrimination, in general.

As Table 37 shows, almost thirty percent feel they have an equal chance to reach their life goals. Another half of them still perceive their chances to be very similar, or similar to those of ethnic Germans. Some twenty percent, by contrast, believe they are disadvantaged in this respect as compared to the host society.

How different or alike do you feel you are in the following respects compared to the average person of your age and social class living in Germany? [%]

	<i>N</i>	<i>Indistin- guishable</i>	<i>Very similar</i>	<i>Similar</i>	<i>Somewhat different</i>	<i>Very different</i>
<i>Binationals</i>	27	22.22	25.93	33.33	14.81	3.7
<i>Others</i>	77	32.47	24.68	23.38	12.99	6.49
<i>Total</i>	104	29.81	25	25.96	13.46	5.77

Table 37: Self-perceived chances to reach life goals

If we compare binational to other respondents, we see that answer frequencies between them differ somewhat. Binationals less frequently choose the highest category, and tend more towards the middle response category. If we sum the first three (similarity) categories and the last two (difference) categories, however, binationals and others differ by only one percent, with binationals reporting marginally better chances to reach their life goals. Overall, survey participants with an ethnic-German parent were thus not as overwhelmingly convinced to have equal chances to reach their life goals. Overall, however, their assessment on this issue was as positive as that of respondents of non-German ethnic parentage.

Arguably, a full twenty percent of people reporting perceived lower chances to reach their life goals as compared to ethnic Germans should be reason for concern. The question is too broad to actually locate the main areas of perceived difference. As

³⁶³ Dillman suggests such embedding as a way to soften the impact of potentially charged questions. See Dillman, *Mail and internet surveys: The tailored design method*, p.38

a general indicator, however, it suggests that a sizeable share of second generation immigrants do not feel they are offered the functionally equal access to civic institutions (among them, most likely, education, employment, and housing) that Esser's crucial placement stage towards immigrant integration envisions.

Moreover, immigrants who see themselves as targets of discrimination and prejudice are, as Gordon suggested in Section 2.2.2., more likely to seek refuge in and strengthen alternative social structures.³⁶⁴ As long as discrimination is perceived to be an issue, ethnic enclaves cannot be assumed to reflect true ideological commitment to ethnic communities. People who see themselves as being denied an equal chance to reach their life goals in the resident mainstream community may also, if and when their resources permit, opt to leave to settle elsewhere.

Overall, the results presented so far for my dependent variables suggest that integration of second generation immigrants is high. In the realms in which cultural assimilation, or acculturation, is commonly thought to unfold, a vast majority of the second generation immigrants I surveyed appear to be integrated. They perceive themselves to be very capable to cope in Germany, and also rely heavily on German-language TV and print media to satisfy their information needs.

Their degree of social assimilation is also high. A majority of my second generation respondents live in residential communities with primarily ethnic German neighbors, and are happy with the way they live. More than half of them also report having as their best friend a person of German ethnicity. In the same vein, the reported frequency of voluntary contacts between immigrants and hosts is high, and on par with the level immigrants would like it to be.

In the realm of identificational assimilation, the picture is no different. A majority of respondents report feeling at home primarily in Germany, with a sizeable share also choosing the city or community of residence in Germany as the place they primarily call home. When asked whether they plan on staying in Germany indefinitely, a majority of respondents report that they do, overall, although the share of binational respondents among them is much lower. A majority of respondents also indicate to be equally likely to choose a partner of their own non-German as of German ethnicity.

³⁶⁴ See Gordon, p.114 as described on page 64.

This marked equal openness towards both ethnicities (or, in the case of binationals, all ethnicities) alike is mostly unrelated to the ethnic makeup of their current residence environment. When surveyed about yet deeper sentiments of emotional attachment, arguably triggered by the soccer world cup in Summer 2006, a majority of both binational and other immigrant respondents report cheering for the country of origin of their (non-German) ethnic origin.

In all but this last realm of integration, then, the second generation immigrants who participated in my survey turn out to be adapted well to the society of their country of residence, in the cultural, social and identificational realm. Blood ties to ethnic Germans are neither an asset nor a liability in this respect.

4.3.3. Descriptive Statistics

I conclude with descriptive statistics relating the components of my primary dependent variable, physical appearance, operationalized in terms of extrinsic and intrinsic difference categories as shown in Section 2.2.2 above, to the respective integration outcome variables in cross tables. These cross tables indicate existing significant relationships, and allow for comparisons of their respective strength. They thus show which of the intrinsic and extrinsic attributes are related to integration outcomes. Table 38 shows the relationships of extrinsic attributes, and Table 39 displays those between the respective intrinsic attributes and integration outcomes.³⁶⁵

Based on the chi-square statistics, which show associations, yet not causality, we see that speech pattern and accent is, by a small margin, related to the greatest number of outcome variables tested. It correlated with media use patterns, residential satisfaction, and the degree to which respondents feel at home in Germany.

³⁶⁵ As in the previous paragraph, I grouped ‘self-perceived chances to reach life goals’ with the dependent (outcome) variables. To convert the respective categories of some of the dependent variables to numerical values, I assigned meaningful weights to reflect their integration depth. In line with Esser’s stance, I assigned assimilation the highest degree of integration/assimilation, followed by integration (in Berry’s sense) as a middle position, separation, and lastly, marginalization. When ranking the remaining categories, I followed a common sense approach, giving the ethnicity of a declared first friend slightly more weight than that of a second, for instance.

	<i>Extrinsic attributes</i>					
<i>Integration Outcomes</i>	<i>Skin color</i>	<i>Eye Color</i>	<i>Hair color</i>	<i>Dress</i>	<i>Speech pattern and accent</i>	<i>Name</i>
<i>Able to cope in Germany</i>	0.084	0.095	0.034*	0.536	0.768	0.349
<i>Media use patterns</i>	0.261	0.184	0.612	0.663	0.002**	0.187
<i>Residential satisfaction</i>	0.504	0.645	0.315	0.041*	0.000**	0.549
<i>Residential ethnic composition</i>	0.494	0.290	0.418	0.226	0.121	0.117
<i>Ethnicity of friends</i>	0.553	0.469	0.489	0.587	0.108	0.291
<i>Contact to Germans</i>	0.612	0.806	0.438	0.996	0.780	0.614
<i>Feel at Home in Germany</i>	0.116	0.007**	0.055	0.099	0.031*	0.692
<i>Intention to Stay Indefinitely</i>	0.263	0.129	0.100	0.658	0.711	0.021*
<i>Openness to German partner</i>	0.197	0.272	0.286	0.595	0.463	0.517
<i>Soccer Cheer for Germany</i>	0.519	0.924	0.574	0.013*	0.917	0.023*
<i>Belief in Equal Opportunity</i>	0.037*	0.010*	0.059	0.107	0.187	0.266

*Pearson's Chi-square statistics: ** p-value < .01 * p-value < .05*

Table 38: Extrinsic attributes and integration outcomes

The association of divergent speech pattern and media use patterns could be due to the effect of deficient German language skills, which presumably naturally steer immigrants towards alternative (ethnic) information sources they can use more easily. If we take into account the very high self-reported German language skills reported in Table 17, however, (with no one indicating below adequate competence), causality may in fact run in the opposite direction, with primary reliance on ethnic media preventing the acquisition of the small intricacies of the German language that, in everyday interaction, may mark otherwise entirely competent speakers as non-native, due to slight accents, or minor grammatical mishaps that can be noticed, yet do not

hamper communication efficiency at all. Further research, of course, would be necessary to substantiate this causal inference of the association we see here.

Interpreting the relationship between residential satisfaction and speech pattern, as well as the degree to which respondents reported to feel at home in Germany is more challenging. The former, taken alone, may suggest residential discrimination based on the minor differences in speech pattern and accent that often make immigrant offspring discernible as such to potential landlords. The lacking association between speech pattern and the belief in equal opportunity, however, weakens the plausibility of this explanation. The same picture emerges for the association of reported difference in clothing style and residential satisfaction. Here, again, residential discrimination is unlikely the culprit, or at least, immigrants themselves do not see it that way.

Feeling at home in Germany may also hinge upon the degree to which these small but potentially salient markers of difference persist. Immigrants do not appear to believe that they are important (as indicated, again, by the lack of association between their chance to reach their life goals and speech accent). Ethnic Germans, by contrast, may still use speech accent as a salient fault line differentiating ingroup and outgroup, and transfer this view to immigrants by ascription, with the latter in turn mirroring it in their own perception. A more significant association between immigrants feeling at home in Germany and the degree of *perceived ascribed* speech pattern difference by ethnic Germans would add plausibility to this hypothesis. Although not shown in Table 38, chi-square statistics actually support this interpretation.³⁶⁶

Judged from the significant associations with the belief in equal opportunity, which is conceived here, as before in this Chapter, as a dependent outcome variable, we see that only self-perceived difference in skin and eye color appears to matter. This result is not surprising. If reported belief in equal opportunity indeed measures the degree of host society discrimination, skin color, and, to a lesser extent, eye color, are

³⁶⁶ I collected information on perceived attributed difference for all extrinsic and intrinsic attributes to see whether immigrants' own perception differs from the way they feel they are seen by ethnic Germans. The results, however, turned out to be very similar overall, which is why I did not include them in the results section. For perceived attributed divergence in speech pattern and feeling at home in Germany, however, the p-value was 0.006, hence indeed more significant than the 0.031 p-value shown between self-perceived difference in speech pattern and feeling at home, as shown in Table 38.

undoubtedly among the prime attributes that mark outgroup status and thus make certain immigrant strata more vulnerable to discrimination. What is more surprising is that the degree of distinctiveness of names and hair color appear not to matter in this respect. Perhaps foreign-sounding names, despite of what previous research found on this issue as mentioned in Section 2.2.1, are losing significance as salient markers of societal boundaries overall. Although self-perceived difference in hair color to ethnic Germans did not turn out to be significantly related to the reported belief in equal opportunity, perceived *attributed* difference in hair color did, with a highly significant p-value of 0.001.³⁶⁷ It is, thus, the feeling of *being seen by Germans* as different in hair color, rather than respondent's own perception, that is significantly related to their belief in equal opportunity. *Self-perceived* difference in hair color was also significantly related to the ability to cope in Germany, whereas eye color correlated with one of the measures of identificational integration, namely the feeling of being at home in Germany.

Among the measures of deeper identificational integration, the (presumably deepest) soccer cheer measure turned out to be significantly related to both reported difference in clothing style and name. In the first case, the association was not significant for *perceived attributed* difference, however. Whereas immigrants who themselves feel they dress different from the ethnic German norm tended to cheer for the country of origin of their non-ethnic German parent, those who felt *to be seen* as dressing differently did not. As far as foreign-sounding names are concerned, the picture was more consistent. Both self-perceived and perceived attributed difference in name was associated with reported soccer cheer behavior.³⁶⁸

Overall, the picture that emerges from Table 38 does not suggest a strong relationship between extrinsic attributes of immigrants and their degree of cultural, social, and identificational integration. Although some correlations exist, they are, by themselves, too sparse to be interpreted as a general pattern.

³⁶⁷ This result is, again, not shown in Table 38. I mention results for perceived attributed difference in the respective areas only where they turned out to be different from the results for self-perceived difference shown.

³⁶⁸ The association was even stronger between perceived attributed name divergence, with a p-value of 0.008.

Table 39 shows descriptive statistics relating intrinsic cultural attributes to integration outcomes. I grouped attributes into those pertaining to overall lifestyle, value orientations, and society-specific knowledge. As we can see, the belief in equal opportunity is strongly related to all but two of the eight intrinsic attributes tested. Only the reported value of religion and knowledge of German political institutions barely missed the below 0.05 p-value significance cutoff. Overall, people who described themselves as different from the host society in lifestyle, value orientation, and knowledge about German culture were more likely to feel that they are not granted an equal chance to reach their life goals.

Cultural assimilation (as measured by the ability to cope and media use patterns in Germany) turned out to be mostly unrelated to the reported degree of intrinsic difference across all areas I tested. The only exception is a significant association between media use patterns and self-reported knowledge of German culture. Respondents who rely on German-language TV and print media were more likely to highly rate their knowledge of German culture. Although the association itself does not imply causality in any direction, clearly, effects may run both ways here. Near-native knowledge of German culture may make it easier to navigate German media. Relying primarily on local German TV and print media, in turn, undoubtedly lets immigrants to absorb and aggregate some of the information into an overall knowledge of German culture, more generally. Differences in lifestyle and value orientations, by contrast, do not significantly affect acculturation. Nor does, for that matter, acculturation (as measured by our indicators) obliterate lifestyle and value differences.

The picture does not differ much for social assimilation. Of thirty-two possible associations between measures of social assimilation and integration outcome, only four turned out to be significant. Two involved the degree of contact to ethnic Germans. It was related both to the reported degree of similarity in overall lifestyle and values. Here, again, causality, if we are to infer it, could run both ways. Respondents who feel similar to ethnic Germans in lifestyle and overall value orientation may seek more contact to those they feel alike in these respects. Conversely, time spent in contact may have contributed to this kindred feeling in the first place. Perceived similarity in values is also significantly associated with

residential satisfaction, and residential ethnic composition is associated with knowledge of German culture. As far as the latter association is concerned, similar to the association with media consumption patterns mentioned above, respondents may feel that living among ethnic Germans exposes, and in time familiarizes them with their culture.

In terms of associations at the deeper level of identificational assimilation, only two lifestyle-related attributes show significant relationships. Perceived similarity in eating habits, for once, correlate with reported openness towards a German ethnic partner. Perceived similarity in overall lifestyle, moreover, relates to respondents cheering for the German soccer team. The former association may have a rather banal explanation: People who like the same food may be more likely to agree to a lifetime of shared meals.

Overall, a broad range of intrinsic attributes that could potentially mark salient societal fault lines, including those related to lifestyle, value orientations, and society-specific knowledge, turned out to be unrelated, overall, to cultural, social, and identificational assimilation. Yet almost all of these intrinsic attributes were related to the degree to which immigrants believe to have opportunities to reach their life goals on par with ethnic Germans.

To sum up the insights we have gathered in this Chapter, the degree of social and identificational integration of second generation immigrants in Germany as reported by my survey participants is high. An overwhelming majority of second generation immigrants speaks, reads and write German with ease. They are fully capable of getting along in Germany, watch German TV and read German newspapers. They are overall happy with their place of residence and mostly live in close proximity to ethnic Germans. They count Germans among their best friends, and are satisfied with the amount of interethnic interaction, which they pursue as colleagues, neighbors, friends, and relatives. Most feel at home in Germany, Frankfurt, or both Germany and Turkey alike, as the case may be. An overall majority of them also wants to stay in Germany indefinitely, although those of mixed half-German ethnicity express less certainty in this respect. A majority can also imagine having an ethnic German partner, with as much ease or difficulty as they can fathom themselves living with a partner of their own non-German, or, for that matter, any ethnicity. In fact, the only

area in which my respondents' assimilation appears to lag is revealed on the highly charged arena of a German soccer field. A majority of the second generation immigrants I surveyed reports cheering for their non-German country of origin.

If we are to interpret this last finding as a lack of deep emotional attachment to Germany, however, we also need to consider and interpret the fact that a sizeable share of respondents plainly did not care about soccer at all. If soccer elicits true national attachments, the glaring lack of any emotions at all by some twenty percent of then presumably entirely marginalized respondents should, arguably, sound more alarm bells than a share of respondents attached to their non-German national team about twice that of professed fans for the German soccer team.

What unequivocally stands out, however, is the stable and significant association between reported self-perceived intrinsic cultural difference and the belief to not be given equal opportunities to reach life goals as compared to ethnic Germans.

	<i>Intrinsic attributes</i>							
	<i>Lifestyle</i>			<i>Value orientation</i>			<i>Society-specific knowledge</i>	
	<i>Overall lifestyle</i>	<i>Eating habits</i>	<i>Free time activities</i>	<i>Values</i>	<i>Importance of religion</i>	<i>Life goals in general</i>	<i>Knowledge of German culture</i>	<i>Knowledge of German political institutions</i>
<i>Able to cope in Germany</i>	0.097	0.596	0.887	0.414	0.691	0.609	0.607	0.587
<i>Media use patterns</i>	0.311	0.753	0.307	0.363	0.256	0.128	0.001**	0.178
<i>Residential satisfaction</i>	0.303	0.473	0.299	0.001**	0.407	0.551	0.578	0.855
<i>Residential ethnic composition</i>	0.78	0.469	0.61	0.637	0.12	0.727	0.011*	0.816
<i>Ethnicity of friends</i>	0.857	0.737	0.443	0.496	0.432	0.537	0.198	0.766
<i>Contact to Germans</i>	0.000**	0.077	0.15	0.041*	0.353	0.129	0.199	0.423
<i>Feel at Home in Germany</i>	0.095	0.052	0.431	0.128	0.429	0.389	0.885	0.323
<i>Intention to Stay Indefinitely</i>	0.067	0.25	0.108	0.608	0.173	0.275	0.066	0.23
<i>Openness to German partner</i>	0.165	0.043*	0.207	0.608	0.545	0.358	0.705	0.065
<i>Soccer Cheer for Germany</i>	0.047*	0.198	0.384	0.466	0.306	0.051	0.753	0.205
<i>Belief in Equal Opportunity</i>	0.000**	0.001**	0.016*	0.004**	0.052	0.005**	0.005**	0.07

Pearson's Chi-square statistics: ** p -value < .01 * p -value < .05

Table 39: Intrinsic attributes and integration outcomes

Chapter 5 Qualitative interviews

As outlined in section 2.3 above, I draw on qualitative interviews to add meaning to the results of the statistical analysis, and gain a better understanding of the integration process as it is perceived by subsets of second generation immigrants that are particularly interesting in the context of my research question. In the following, I first address methodological issues concerning in-depth qualitative interviewing, and then briefly describe my recruitment strategy and the characteristics of the pool of interviewees it produced. I then present the analysis of the collected verbal data and provide a broad overview of the main insights it provides.

5.1. Methodological considerations

Among the methodological considerations that affect the validity of empirical research, the process by which units of analysis are selected and the number of such units play an important role. In this section, I briefly describe the sampling methodology I used to recruit my interview participants, and explain my decision to settle for twenty interviewees. I also outline the issue of how these decisions affect external and internal validity.

5.1.1. Sampling methodology and sample size

As with the structured survey described above, I used a variety of non-probabilistic sampling strategies to recruit interviewees, purposively targeting second generation immigrants with multiple ethnicities and people of varying degrees of self-reported physical appearance divergence from ethnic Germans. I also aimed for approximate balance along potential key characteristics such as gender, the existence of an ethnic German parent, and ethnic European versus non-European provenance. More generally, I

used the criteria suggested by Morse to select meaningful cases as survey and interview participants.³⁶⁹

The sample size for this part of my analysis was primarily determined by data saturation.³⁷⁰ Data saturation, namely the point at which the information gathered becomes repetitive and further collection reaches the point of diminishing returns, is usually recommended as the standard criterion to determine the size of purposive samples in qualitative research. Alas, published guidelines or tests to gauge or estimate the amount of data needed to reach saturation are scarce. I primarily relied on recommendations I found in two studies. First, in testing the relationship between data saturation and interview number, Guest and his collaborators report that the full range of thematic concepts appears in the first twelve interviews, and basic meta-themes present as early as six interviews.³⁷¹ In a similar vein, researchers relying on GABEK the method I use to analyze the interview data, which I describe in more detail in Section 5.3 below, suggest that reliable results can be obtained even when the amount of underlying data material is relatively small.³⁷²

Overall, both the aforementioned recommendations and my own sense of increasing redundancy of concepts and ideas in the interviews I gathered over time guided my decision to conduct twenty interviews.

³⁶⁹ Janice M. Morse, "Designing funded qualitative research," in *Strategies of qualitative research*, ed. Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (London: Sage, 1998), p.73 suggests selecting interviewees who have the necessary knowledge and experience to provide the respective information, the capability to reflect and articulate themselves, and are willing to participate in a study.

³⁷⁰ I use the term sample size here as a synonym for interviewee number, and do not mean to imply a probabilistic sample in the statistical sense of the term.

³⁷¹ Greg Guest, Arwen Bunce, and Laura Johnson, "How many interviews are enough? An experiment with data saturation and variability," *Field methods* 18, no. 1 (2006), p.59, 66. More precisely, they found that seventy-three percent of content-driven codes assigned to thirty interviews had appeared in the first six interviews, with the analysis of an additional six interviews upping the percentage to ninety-two percent. To be sure, data saturation varies with the topic, depth and length of the respective interviews, of course.

³⁷² See Jochen Hofer, "Zur Stichprobengröße bei GABEK-Untersuchungen," in *GABEK II. Zur qualitativen Forschung*, ed. Renate Buber and Josef Zelger (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2000). Of course, the amount of data needed to obtain valid results depends on the degree of conceptual coherence and complexity of the subject area under investigation.

5.1.2. External and internal validity

In contrast to quantitative statistical data analyses, external validity of in-depth qualitative research is limited. Due to the lack of adequate sampling frames as well as funding and time constraints as described in Section 4.1.1 above, interviewees were chosen by purposive sampling. Insights gained from their accounts can thus not be generalized to the entire population of second generation immigrants in Germany. Still, insights from the interviews I conducted provide a better picture of how the integration process is subjectively perceived by affected individuals. They can help provide a more detailed view and understanding of the broad trends and associations revealed by statistical analyses, and suggest areas for further study.

As for internal validity, namely the certainty with which causal inferences can be made, data gathered by way of in-depth qualitative interviews are not foolproof, for several reasons. A series of accounts of personal experiences may omit potentially relevant social circumstances. Moreover, the sum of a limited number of individual accounts cannot be assumed to fully constitute structural dimensions of social life, in general, although they do reflect the reality as it is perceived by the respective informants. Lastly, interviews tend to generate rather unstructured, open-ended and somewhat descriptive data. Given these properties, they should not be used as the sole base for hypothesis-testing but rather to complement elements of an analysis.³⁷³

Quantitative methodologies are not exempt from threats to internal validity either, however. Where hypotheses are straightforward, variables easily measurable, and prerequisite assumptions met, quantitative analysis is a superb tool to test their validity. Where many potential independent variables defy quantification and measurement, however, it is, arguably, less useful. As we have seen previously, the phenomena surrounding immigrant integration outcomes tend to be complex, and many inherently ambiguous concepts (such as, for instance, the degree of emotional attachment to friends or a country, or discrimination) are thus either excluded from existing quantitative

³⁷³ Mira Crouch and Heather McKenzie, "The logic of small samples in interview-based qualitative research," *Social science information* 45, no. 4 (2006), p.490

analyses entirely, or they are measured using arbitrary proxies that often reflect the blurred boundaries of the underlying concepts they are meant to capture.³⁷⁴

In sum, despite its limitations, qualitative interviews stand to greatly enrich my research with authentic expressions of people's experiences which include and accommodate a fuller range of salient aspects of the integration process than statistical analysis could accommodate.³⁷⁵

5.1.3. Interview mode

Several decisions had to be made concerning the way in which to collect the interview data. In the following, I first describe and explain my decision to conduct the interviews by phone. I then lay out the strategies I employed to establish rapport with my interviewees, and finally explain my decision to conduct all interviews in German only.

Telephone versus face to face mode

To determine the most appropriate interview mode for my purpose, I started my qualitative research by pilot-testing an equal number of face-to-face and telephone interviews. In addition to the obvious advantages associated with time and cost efficiency, two factors shaped my subsequent decision to conduct the actual interviews by telephone rather than in person. First, compared to face-to-face interviews, telephone interviews are known to reduce interviewer effects. Several are mentioned frequently in the literature, such as effects related to interviewer age, ethnicity, socioeconomic status and gender, both *per se* and as compared to the respective interviewee.³⁷⁶ What appeared

³⁷⁴ In this context, Adcock and Collier provide an interesting account of the need to tackle conceptual clarification and refinement prior to discussing meaningful measures for a given concept. See Robert Adcock and David Collier, "Measurement validity: A shared standard for qualitative and quantitative research," *American political science review* 95, no. 3 (2001)

³⁷⁵ See on this point David Silverman, *Interpreting qualitative data: methods for analysing talk, text and interaction* (London: Sage, 1993), p.91

³⁷⁶ See Roger Shuy, "In person versus telephone interviewing," in *Handbook of interview research: Context and method*, ed. James A. Holstein and Jaber F. Gubrium (New York: Sage, 2001); Peter Atteslander, *Methoden der empirischen Sozialforschung* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2003), p.540; Lenore Manderson,

most relevant for my particular issue area was the effect of my ethnicity and physical appearance in relation to that of my interviewees. Conducting the interviews by telephone reduced the potential impact of appearance-related factors, one of the central issues of interest, and thus most likely increased validity.³⁷⁷

Second, in light of my experiences during the pilot phase of interviewing, telephone interviews appeared to be a more suitable mode for the potentially sensitive topic at hand. Although the literature clearly states the difficulty of determining mode effects in answers to sensitive questions in general, I could not find more specific advice or empirical research on a relationship between interview mode and the likelihood of eliciting truthful answers on questions related to my particular topic.³⁷⁸

I found the respective pilot-phase interviews to be comparable in the range of topics my interlocutors spontaneously brought up as well as the ease of communication. In one instance, a potential face-to-face interviewee launched into a spontaneous hour-long description of his integration experience during our first telephone contact before I could even suggest we schedule a face-to-face interview. He then cancelled our personal encounter a day later, conveying to me that he was uncomfortable meeting with strangers in general, with a female in particular, and, moreover, as he saw it, for the purpose of

Elizabeth Bennett, and Sari Andajani-Sutjahjo, "The Social dynamics of the interview: Age, class, and gender," *Qualitative health research* 16, no. 10 (2006)

³⁷⁷ The majority of my interview partners did not inquire about my own ethnic background or physical appearance during the interviews. Few asked me whether I was German, to which I replied that I grew up in Germany and am thus interested in the subject. Although some may have interpreted this answer as implying ethnic German descent, I believe that the bias thus incurred was much less than that which would have been associated with face-to-face interviews.

³⁷⁸ Most empirical studies on interview format effects compare answers to questions on alcohol and drug use in telephone and face-to-face interview modes, with mixed results. Aquilino, for instance, finds that people admit to alcohol abuse with the same ease in telephone and face-to-face interviews, yet have a considerably harder time admitting to drug use on the phone, where, he surmises, confidentiality and trust may be harder to convey. Sykes and Collins, by contrast, find that people admit to alcohol use more easily in telephone than in in-person encounters. See Wendy Sykes and Martin Collins, "Effects of mode of interview: Experiments in the United Kingdom," in *Telephone survey methodology*, ed. Robert M. Groves et al. (New York: Wiley, 1988). Still others find different answering patterns in the two modes to be related to gender, with women less likely admitting to drug use in person and males being more reluctant to do so on the telephone. See Johnson, Timothy T., James G. Houghland, and Richard R. Clayton, "Obtaining reports of sensitive behavior: A comparison of substance use reports from telephone and face-to-face interviews," *Social science quarterly* 70 (1989) In respect to questions related to racial attitudes, Groves and Kahn find that telephone interviewees report more unease answering than people in face-to-face interviews.

delving into his past, which he feared would stir painful memories. In light of the insights gleaned from the literature as well as my own experiences during the pilot phase, I subsequently decided to conduct all interviews by telephone.

Establishing rapport

The quality, depth and validity of data gathered by in-depth interviews crucially depend on whether rapport can be established between interviewer and interviewee. I followed several general guidelines to achieve this objective.³⁷⁹ During the initial contact and again early in the interview itself, I briefly described my project, characterizing my aim as gaining insights by talking to people with first-hand experience, rather than formally interviewing them, to minimize the potential of being perceived as a threat.³⁸⁰ I also emphasized that our conversation would remain confidential.³⁸¹

Throughout the actual interviews, I tried to reduce social distance and increase the likelihood that respondents shared and self-generated what was on their minds by adopting what Agar refers to as a 'one down' position.³⁸² I briefly conveyed my general knowledge of the topic, yet emphasized my eagerness to be further enlightened by their particular experiences and opinions. I followed their lead in conversational style and language register, and tried to avoid disclosing my own perspective or knowledge unless asked for it directly (in which case I offered to share my views at the end of the interview, rather than injecting them in the middle and therewith potentially biasing the ensuing conversation). Being close to the average age (+/- 6 years) of my interviewees allowed me to offer them the informal German *Du* address for the interviews. Most of

³⁷⁹ See Atteslander, p.161,164; Eleanor E. Maccoby and Nathan Maccoby, "The interview: A tool of social science," in *Handbook of social psychology*, ed. Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson (Cambridge MA: Addison-Wesley, 1954), p.465

³⁸⁰ See the recommendation by Steve Weinberg, *The reporter's handbook: An investigator's guide to documents and techniques* (New York: St. Martin's, 1996), p.83

³⁸¹ Beth L. Leech, "Asking questions: Techniques for semistructured interviews," *Political science and politics* 35, no. 4 (2002), p.666 suggests this as an appropriate way of increasing rapport. See also footnote ³⁷⁸ on this issue.

³⁸² Michael Agar, *The professional stranger: An informal introduction to ethnography* (New York: Academic Press, 1980)

them spontaneously accepted, lending the ensuing encounters instant rapport and familiarity.

Language considerations

All interviews were conducted in German. Taking the information I had previously gathered in the survey on self-perceived language skills into account, I assumed my target population to not be unduly limited expressing themselves in German during the interviews.³⁸³

In the course of recruiting interviewees, I did not encounter a single instance in which language was an issue during the initial contact, and thus may have led to selection effects in the group of people who then agreed to schedule an interview.³⁸⁴ This experience appeared to corroborate my survey result on German language proficiency among second generation immigrants shown in Table 17 above. Overall, I am reasonably confident that conducting the interviews in German did not unduly skew the pool of participants.

5.1.4. Interview structure

Prior to conducting interviews, I had to decide on the degree of structure and question format most appropriate for the kind of data I aimed to collect. In the following, I briefly describe and explain my decision to employ a semi-structured open question interview format for my research.

³⁸³ Although this decision may have led to selection effects in the process of soliciting interview partners initially, I believe that it was the better of two choices which both had benefits and drawbacks. While some potential interviewees may have been intimidated by a request to share their thoughts in a language they may not have felt sufficiently at ease with, initiating requests for interviews of second generation immigrants with an offer to use languages other than German seemed to convey the implicit and, arguably, patronizing notion that such an offer was warranted to begin with. Given my experience with second generation immigrants until then, I felt that assuming *prima facie* that they are completely fluent and thus willing to use German as the interview language was the more appropriate choice.

³⁸⁴ Language did not ever appear to hamper communication during the actual interviews either. Although there were several instances early in interviews in which I could locate interviewees (as they could myself) within Germany based on distinctive German regional dialects, speech patterns associated with underlying secondary languages were much less perceptible to me, if at all.

Semi-structured interviews

I used a semi-structured interview format for the in-depth qualitative interviews as a methodological complement to the structured survey. As the degree of structure of a research tool appears to be inversely related to its likelihood to elicit personal viewpoints held by interviewees, a semi-structured format seemed most appropriate to generate authentic true-to-life experiences and viewpoints while keeping the conversation within the confines of the issue area at hand.³⁸⁵

To implement this method, I devised an interview guide with a series of open questions. Although all questions were raised during the interview, I varied the question order and phrasing to minimally disturb the conversational drift my interview partners chose to follow. In many instances, they themselves raised and addressed the respective subjects, so that I did not have to mention them explicitly at all. Table 40 lists the interview guide questions.³⁸⁶

To start with, could you briefly describe where your parents originally came from, perhaps how they met and since when you reside in Germany?

Which role, if any, does the ethnic origin of your parents play in your everyday life in Germany? What experiences do you make with Germans in this respect?

What comes to your mind when you think about integration?

How did you personally experience integration in Germany?

In your opinion, what could be done to improve the well-being of people with migration background in Germany?

Imagine you were in charge of German official integration policies. Which measures would you introduce, and what would you hope to achieve with them?

Would you like to add something to what you have said so far?

Table 40: Interview guide

I started the conversation with what Spradley called a ‘grand tour question’, soliciting subject-related information intimately familiar to my interviewees to start the

³⁸⁵ See Uwe Flick, *An introduction to qualitative research* (Thousand Oaks CA: Sage, 2002), p.74

³⁸⁶ The original German version interview guide is included in the appendix.

communication flow in a fairly focused direction and establish trust and rapport.³⁸⁷

Within the subject area, I let my interlocutors choose topics, the order in which they were raised, and the amount of detail accorded to each of them. I used floating prompts (such as "How?" "Why?" and "And then?") or nondirective probing (such as "Tell me more about that." "Why do you feel this way?" "Can you give me an example?") to keep the conversation flowing and resorted to questions formally included in the interview guide only when floating prompts did not work or the interviewee had not yet raised the particular topic him- or herself in the course of the conversation. Interview guide questions as shown in Table 40 were roughly ordered from more general to more specific issue areas, although I rarely stuck to that order during the actual interviews. Typically, my interview partners spontaneously covered several of the issue areas as part of their answer to the first question, naturally progressing in their narrative from the migration experience of their parents to their own.³⁸⁸

Open question interview

Question format has been shown to influence answers considerably.³⁸⁹ The highly structured closed question formats I used in my survey as described in Chapter 4 generate data that can be easily organized, analyzed and displayed. On the downside, however, respondents generally have little leeway in how they answer such questions, and the answer categories they are offered and must choose from may or may not reflect their actual experiences. They nonetheless tend to answer each question, and thus perhaps unduly confirm the salience of arbitrary response categories.

Open questions, by contrast, do not carry this risk, because in answering them, interviewees choose freely which issues to raise and address. Open questions are also

³⁸⁷ See James P. Spradley, *The ethnographic interview* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979); also Shuy, p.543

³⁸⁸ Leech reports a similar dynamic during her semi-structured interviews for a public policy project. See Leech, p.668

³⁸⁹ See Howard Schuman and Stanley Presser, "The open and closed question," *American sociological review* 44, no. 5 (1979) for an early but still valid contribution on the benefits and weaknesses of both formats, respectively.

believed to increase rapport by conveying true interest in the particular experience of the interviewed person, rather than assuming its similarity to preexisting categories, and more generally by facilitating a verbal exchange that resembles an actual conversation.³⁹⁰ An open question format thus appeared well suited to gain an understanding of salient factors in the integration experience of second generation immigrants.

In analyzing their accounts, I used a more inductive approach than the one for the structured survey, in that I derived coding categories entirely from the verbal material I gathered, rather than starting out with a set of categories deduced from theory. Moreover, in contrast to the survey format, I did not assume nor mention physical appearance and language skills as factors related to integration experience in the interview questions, and instead inquired more generally about factors *my interviewees* considered important for successful integration. Removing the question stimulus for either study variables of interest allowed me to test whether and to what extent my study variables are in fact salient issues in the perception of my study population.³⁹¹ Thus dropping my predetermined factors naturally carried the risk of seeing the scope of my inquiry broaden or even shift as I analyzed the interview material. The associated potential gain in depth and authenticity, however, made this endeavor worthwhile.

³⁹⁰ Many of my interviewees conveyed gratitude for my interest in their opinions towards the conclusion of the interviews, and were quite eager to share their experiences. Perhaps as a result, the average interview length of 51 minutes considerably exceeded the 20 minute maximum generally recommended in the literature for telephone interviews. See, for instance, Shuy, p.543, and Dillman and Christian, "Survey mode as a source of instability in response across surveys," p.35

³⁹¹ The issue of the influence of the question stimulus on responses is described in greater detail in Atteslander, p.135-157. Even though perceived salience and actual influence may differ, it appears reasonable to assume that the personal experiences immigrants convey reflect objective realities to a degree. Although their accounts may not allow generalizations on par with statistical quantification, immigrants should at least mention language skills and physical appearance if we are to assume their importance to integration outcomes, overall.

5.2. Recruitment strategy and interviewee profile

Potential interview partners were recruited either directly, by way of intermediaries or snowball sampling in Fall 2006 and Spring 2007.³⁹² About one quarter of the interviewees could be successfully recruited from among the pool of survey participants who had expressed interest to participate in in-depth interviews.³⁹³ I drew another quarter from my own extended environment by way of contacting acquaintances and snowball sampling. An intermediary at a *Caritas* organization recruited another quarter on my behalf, making initial contacts to potential participants he knew and soliciting their agreement to be contacted to schedule an interview.³⁹⁴ Given a persisting dearth of interviewees with self-perceived highly visible physical appearance divergence from the ethnic German average by these strategies, I purposively recruited the remaining quarter among and through organizations working with people of color in Germany.

Generally speaking, recruiting interview partners was much easier than finding people willing to participate in the survey. Some potential interviewees even appeared genuinely flattered by the suggestion that someone actually cares to hear about their experiences and opinions.³⁹⁵

Of about 30 interview offers I extended, a third did not materialize, for three main reasons. First, about half of the failed interview attempts were due to prospective participants' lack of convenient access to terrestrial phone lines. They turned out to rely

³⁹² Snowball sampling involved asking previously recruited interview partners for references to people they knew fit the selection criteria and might also be interested in being interviewed. In line with Water's account of using this method, I found this strategy to be more effective than approaching unknown potential interviewees myself. See Waters, p.347-371

³⁹³ They constituted a mere third of all survey participants who expressed interest in being interviewed. The remaining two thirds could not be interviewed for a variety of reasons. Some had changed their minds between agreeing to an interview in the survey and when I took them up on the offer several weeks later. Others did not respond to email or telephone contact regarding their expressed willingness to be interviewed. Several expressed interest in an interview in the respective survey question, yet unfortunately forgot to provide the needed contact information for the purpose in the space provided.

³⁹⁴ The German branch of the international *Caritas* organization is the biggest philanthropic charity organization in Germany. One of its many social missions is supporting legal immigrant integration through a variety of counseling and networking services.

³⁹⁵ Allerbeck and Hoag describe the same experience interviewing Turkish youth in Germany. See Klaus R. Allerbeck and Wendy J. Hoag, "Wenn Deutsche Ausländer befragen: Ein Bericht über methodische Probleme und praktische Erfahrungen," *Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 14 (1985)

exclusively on cell phones during the initial contact, which had proven prohibitive for meaningful interviews during the pilot phase due to noise and interruptions. On two occasions, people who had previously agreed to be contacted to schedule an interview subsequently changed their minds. Another prospective interviewee could not be reached under the contact information s(he) had given the intermediary with his/her consent to be interviewed. Overall, given that the main impediment to interviewee recruitment was exclusive cell phone use, my sample may have slightly underrepresented the younger, less affluent among second generation immigrants.³⁹⁶

I recruited a total of twenty interviewees, aiming to allocate even quotas to groups with potential key attributes. Table 41 summarizes their key study and demographic characteristics. As can be seen, the sample is approximately evenly split regarding gender, the existence of an ethnic German parent, and ethnic European versus non-European provenance.³⁹⁷ To evaluate potential systematic differences correlated with the degrees of perceived physical appearance, I assigned interviewees to three categories ranging from no (0) to marked (2) appearance divergence from (full) ethnic Germans. I derived the score for this category from unsolicited statements by the interviewees regarding their appearance in a variety of contexts. Reflecting the stark imbalance in spatial distribution of people with migration background throughout Germany as shown in Figure 6 above, interviewees who grew up in former East Germany account for a mere 15 percent of interviewees.

³⁹⁶ Telephone interviews are generally believed to be associated with systematic selection bias, underrepresenting the elderly, poorly educated, and younger adults (Shuy, p.543). More recently, exclusive cell phone users in the United States have been found to be younger, less affluent, more likely to rent their home, more urban, and more liberal on many political questions, for instance. See Scott Keeter and others, "What's missing from national RDD surveys? The impact of the growing cell-only population," in *Annual Conference of the American Association for Public Opinion Research*, ed. American Association for Public Opinion Research (Anaheim, CA: 2007); Pew Research Center, *The cell phone challenge to survey research: National polls not undermined by growing cell-only population* (Washington, DC The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 2006)

³⁹⁷ I include gender here because empirical research suggests that integration experiences vary between men and women. Some empirical analyses also found interview behavior to vary with gender, with men prone to minimal and neutral answers, and women providing much more interactional feedback, expressing agreement and positive support, and offering extended responses (See Janet Holmes, "Women, language and identity," *Journal of sociolinguistics* 2, no. 1 (1997)). A considerable difference in average interview length for men and women in my study, 39 and 59 minutes, respectively, lends support to this hypothesis.

<i>App. Diff.</i>	<i>Gender</i>	<i>Age</i>	<i>Maternal Origin</i>	<i>Paternal Origin</i>	<i>European Heritage?</i>	<i>Grown up in German</i>	<i>Ethnic German Parent?</i>
0	F	37	Bulgaria	Bulgaria	Yes	East	No
0	F	21	Uzbekistan	Uzbekistan	No	West	Yes
0	F	25	Uzbekistan	Uzbekistan	No	West	Yes
0	M	39	Italy	Italy	Yes	West	No
0	M	25	Slovenia	Slovenia	Yes	West	No
1	F	26	Philippines	Germany	No	West	Yes
1	F	23	Italy	Italy	Yes	West	No
1	F	19	Turkey	Turkey	Yes	West	No
1	F	26	Italy	Italy	Yes	West	No
1	M	27	Turkey	Turkey	Yes	West	No
1	M	35	Italy	Italy	Yes	West	No
1	M	32	Turkey	Turkey	Yes	West	No
1	M	30	Iran	Iran	No	West	No
1	M	39	Germany	Spain	Yes	West	Yes
1	M	19	Japan	Germany	No	West	Yes
2	F	36	Afghanistan	Afghanistan	No	West	No
2	F	34	Germany	Nigeria	No	East	Yes
2	F	21	Germany	Jamaica	No	West	Yes
2	F	38	Germany	Ghana	No	East	Yes
2	F	46	Suriname	Suriname	No	West	No

Table 41: Demographic characteristics of interviewees

After pilot testing the interview format and strategy, the actual telephone interviews were conducted in Spring 2007. Due to the open-question format, their length varied considerably, from 17 to 96 minutes, with the average interview lasting 51 minutes. Interviewees were given the appropriate assurances regarding voluntariness, confidentiality, use, storage and eventual deletion of interview and personal data prior to the actual interview.³⁹⁸ All gave their consent to tape-recording. Interviews were thus recorded, transcribed verbatim, analyzed and translated into English as necessary.³⁹⁹

³⁹⁸ I used both the guidelines by the MIT committee on the use of humans as experimental subjects (COUHES) at <http://web.mit.edu/committees/couhes/guidelines.shtml> and recommendations by the Center for Survey Research and Methodology in Mannheim to comply with applicable U.S. and German data protection laws. The only objection to tape-recording occurred prior to a face-to-face interview in the pilot phase, with a subject of half Chilean and half Eastern German origin. Due in part to a rocky history of parental escape from the then US-supported Pinochet regime, the person harbored strong negative feelings towards anyone even remotely affiliated with the U.S. or any of its institutions, and suspected a coveted attempt to gather information for US intelligence.

³⁹⁹ Naturally, translation shifts meanings to an extent. I resolved any translation ambiguity in favor of meaning equivalence rather than literal term equivalence.

5.3. Interview analysis

Interviews were conducted during a three month period in Spring 2007, transcribed verbatim and analyzed using the *GABEK* method to structure and concisely present the verbal data.⁴⁰⁰ *GABEK* is a method and associated computer program to analyze qualitative data. It supports code-based theory building as well as conceptual network building. As such, it is similar to *ATLAS/ti*, which is more widely known and used for this purpose in academia in the United States.⁴⁰¹ Unlike *ATLAS/ti*, however, *GABEK* accommodates easy revision of original data files, which let me selectively translate verbal data as needed, and spared me the labor of translating the entire interview material (some 500 pages of written text) before starting the analysis.

I pursued data analysis and collection simultaneously, which allowed me to recognize new themes as they emerged, and also notice increasing redundancy as I approached data saturation.⁴⁰² In the following, I will briefly outline the analysis steps *GABEK*-supported analysis entails, and then present results in more detail.

The *GABEK* method is geared towards structuring and organizing knowledge by recognizing regional semantic networks in verbal data. The analysis involves three basic steps. First, the interviews are partitioned into coherent smaller semantic units and assigned three to nine key concepts mentioned in the respective text bit which capture its content. Thus partitioning and labeling the entire verbal data generates a semantic index containing all key concepts that appear in the data. This index can be used to draw association graphs, which show commonly made associations among concepts, in the

⁴⁰⁰ *GABEK* is a German acronym. It stands for *GANzheitliche BEwältigung von Komplexität* [Holistic Processing of Linguistic Complexity], and refers to a method and computer program to analyze and visualize unstructured verbal data. See Josef Zelger, "Qualitative research by the *GABEK* method," in *Qualitative research: Different perspectives, emerging trends*, ed. Jurij Fikfak, Frane Adam, and Detlef Garz (Ljubljana: ZRC Publishing, Institute of Slovenian Ethnology at ZRC SAZU, 2004); Josef Zelger, "Twelve steps of *GABEK*. WinRelan: A procedure for qualitative opinion research, knowledge organization and systems development," in *GABEK II. Zur qualitativen Forschung*, ed. Renate Buber and Josef Zelger (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2000). I am indebted to Professor Zelger of Innsbruck University for his help in teaching me this method, and applying it to the verbal material at hand.

⁴⁰¹ For information on the latter, see <http://www.atlasti.com/>, accessed November 2008.

⁴⁰² The particular instance at which one considers data collection to be completed and saturation reached is of course arbitrary to an extent. In addition to increasing redundancy of issues mentioned in the interviews, I again relied on recommendations by Guest, Bunce, and Johnson, as well as Hofer, as mentioned above.

form of so-called linguistic mind maps. By the same token, mind maps surrounding specific concepts of interest can be generated and compared for the data generated by subgroups of interviewees who differ in particular key characteristics (such as, in my case, physical appearance) to reveal possible differences in association patterns. Semantic coding also allows identifying clusters of semantic units, which are densely connected to each other because they share many key concepts. A closer look at these clusters provides a quick overview of the main issues and general drifts in the respective underlying verbal data.

Second, all statements containing negative and positive evaluations of a state, situation, phenomenon, action, or process are identified and coded. I coded two sets of evaluations, depending on their temporal reference point. One set of evaluations concerned the status quo in the eyes of the respondent, and another one the desired state of affairs he or she envisioned or would like to see in the future. Although the former often imply the latter, explicitly separating statements according to their expressed temporal reference point more clearly draws out respondents' views and wishes for the future. Comparing the prevalence of negative and positive evaluations in general, as well as patterns of evaluations concerning particular issues of interest in data gathered from respondents with particular attributes again provides valuable insights as to the presence (or absence) of systematic differences among groups.

In a third step, all causal statements in the data are identified and coded. This coding results in a comprehensive list of all dependent and independent variables as expressed by interviewees. The causal relationships they express can then be visualized as causal networks of varying complexity (namely, graphs similar to the arrow diagrams shown in Figure 1, Figure 7, and Figure 8 above).

In the following, I present the results of my analysis in more detail, moving from the more general to the more detailed. I start with a description of overall patterns in the data and then zoom in on the expressed issues surrounding integration and how they are perceived by my interviewees to impact integration outcomes.

5.3.1. General mood

Looking at the frequencies of expressed positive and negative evaluations in the data overall, as well as in and across particular subsets of interviewees gives a feel for the general light in which respondents see the issues they address in the interview, as well as differences in outlook between groups in the aggregate.⁴⁰³ As mentioned before, I distinguish between evaluations concerning the status quo and those referring to the future, in the eyes of the respondents. Thus differentiating expressed evaluations according to their temporal point of reference provides further insights, most notably regarding the mental outlook to the future.

Table 42 shows the overall frequencies of positive and negative evaluations concerning both status quo and future state of affairs. It further distinguishes frequencies in data gathered from interviewees of various degrees of appearance difference to ethnic Germans (with *App.Diff.0* referring to those indistinguishable, and *App.Diff 2* referring to clearly visibly different ones from ethnic Germans), as well as of no versus partial ethnic German parentage.⁴⁰⁴

⁴⁰³ A caveat is in order here. Although I do compare frequencies throughout the qualitative analysis, mostly as a rough indication of differences in salience of particular concepts across groups, the primary aim of this part of my study is not to determine how many ‘hits’ of the respective concepts there are, but rather to uncover and interpret thematic strands of topics. Although I do count on occasion, my primary mission here is still one of finding out, in Walker’s words, ‘what things ‘exist’ [rather] than determining how many such things there are. See Robert Walker, "An introduction to qualitative research," in *Applied qualitative research*, ed. Robert Walker (Aldershot: Grower, 1985), p.3

⁴⁰⁴ The groups are mutually exclusive within the two attribute categories, namely appearance difference and ethnic German parentage, respectively. Across these categories they overlap, as shown in Table 41. For my sample, presence of an ethnic German parent happens to mean both biological parentage and actual physical presence of an ethnic German parent in the household during childhood and adolescence of an interviewee. In one case, a binational respondent grew up with a German stepparent instead of his biological German parent.

<i>Sample</i>	<i>Nr of Semantic Units</i>	<i>Evaluations</i>	<i>Status Quo</i>		<i>Desired Future</i>	
			<i>Number</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percent</i>
<i>All</i>	<i>810</i>	<i>Positive</i>	<i>656</i>	<i>50.7</i>	<i>585</i>	<i>84.8</i>
		<i>Negative</i>	<i>638</i>	<i>49.3</i>	<i>105</i>	<i>15.2</i>
		<i>Total</i>	<i>1294</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>690</i>	<i>100</i>
<i>App.Diff.0</i>	<i>239</i>	<i>Positive</i>	<i>261</i>	<i>57.6</i>	<i>156</i>	<i>92.3</i>
		<i>Negative</i>	<i>192</i>	<i>42.4</i>	<i>13</i>	<i>7.7</i>
		<i>Total</i>	<i>453</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>169</i>	<i>100</i>
<i>App.Diff.1</i>	<i>308</i>	<i>Positive</i>	<i>241</i>	<i>64.5</i>	<i>254</i>	<i>83.6</i>
		<i>Negative</i>	<i>132</i>	<i>35.5</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>16.4</i>
		<i>Total</i>	<i>373</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>304</i>	<i>100</i>
<i>App.Diff.2</i>	<i>273</i>	<i>Positive</i>	<i>154</i>	<i>32.8</i>	<i>175</i>	<i>80.6</i>
		<i>Negative</i>	<i>314</i>	<i>67.2</i>	<i>42</i>	<i>19.4</i>
		<i>Total</i>	<i>468</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>217</i>	<i>100</i>
<i>Ethn. Ger. Parent</i>	<i>334</i>	<i>Positive</i>	<i>280</i>	<i>44.6</i>	<i>224</i>	<i>81.5</i>
		<i>Negative</i>	<i>348</i>	<i>55.4</i>	<i>51</i>	<i>18.5</i>
		<i>Total</i>	<i>628</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>275</i>	<i>100</i>
<i>No Ethn. Ger. Parent</i>	<i>476</i>	<i>Positive</i>	<i>373</i>	<i>56.3</i>	<i>361</i>	<i>87.0</i>
		<i>Negative</i>	<i>289</i>	<i>43.7</i>	<i>54</i>	<i>13.0</i>
		<i>Total</i>	<i>662</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>415</i>	<i>100</i>

Table 42: Frequency of positive and negative evaluations

Compared to a wealth of other contexts in which the *GABEK* method has been used, the number of positive as compared to negative evaluations in the verbal data overall is quite high, suggesting that my interviewees did not perceive the topic area as particularly problematic or conflict-prone.⁴⁰⁵ Although the tone of opinions voiced in interviews naturally depends on the respective issue area and context, and frequencies are thus not entirely comparable across analyses, this formal aggregation of positive and negative evaluations confirms my intuitive impression during data collection that my interviewees overall perceived their integration as a rather smooth and even positive experience. During my initial contact to potential interviewees, for instance, many warned me that they might not be ‘ideal’ participants in my study given their rather smooth and uneventful integration experience.

⁴⁰⁵ Josef Zelger made this observation in a personal communication regarding my analysis in August 2007.

A closer look at Table 42, however, reveals striking differences among subsets of respondents. The range of percentage shares of expressed positive evaluations of the status quo is quite high, from a mere 32.8 percent positive evaluations in the data gathered from the group with the highest appearance divergence, *App.Diff.2*, to 64.5 percent for respondents who self-reported to be of medium physical appearance difference, *App.Diff.1*, as compared to ethnic Germans. However, no systematic relationships exist between the frequency of positive and negative evaluations and either degrees of physical appearance divergence or the presence of an ethnic German parent. Interestingly, for the latter criterion, interviewees of partial German ethnicity conveyed a less positive account of their integration experience than those of entire non-German parentage.

The group that stated the greatest physical appearance difference from ethnic Germans, *App.Diff.2*, paints a markedly grimmer picture of the status quo than any other group. The high number of positive evaluations by people with a medium range appearance difference (*App.Diff.1*, with a variety of ethnic backgrounds, including Italy, Turkey and Iran, as shown in Table 41 above), however, precludes the inference of a systematic inverse relationship between the degree of appearance difference and the degree of expressed optimism regarding the status quo.

The presence of an ethnic German parent does not positively correlate with the degree of optimism about the status quo either. Interviewees with an ethnic German parent in fact have a slightly higher share of negative evaluations than those with both parents of non-German ethnicity. Given their respective actual integration outcomes, this is surprising. The statistical analysis above suggests that in the aggregate, binational Germans (who make up the *Ethn. Ger. Parent* group in Table 42) do fare better than most other immigrant groups in terms of occupational status (as shown in Figure 16 above), and also seem to be better off overall in terms of their educational achievements (as suggested by Figure 18). They also have high levels of cultural, social, and identificational integration, as we have seen in Section 4.3. Taken together, if outcomes (as measured by our respective indicators of economic, cultural, social, and

identificational integration) influence evaluations of the status quo, binational interviewees' evaluations of the status quo should be equally or even slightly more positive than those of all other subgroups shown in Table 42.

Several interpretations of the pattern shown here come to mind. Conceivably, offspring of an ethnic German parent may simply be more aware or eager to voice opinions on what they believe is currently amiss, thus giving their overall evaluation of the status quo a negative tinge regardless of how they themselves actually fare in society in the aggregate.

The results may also be a function of the reference groups by which the respective categories of people evaluate their degree of integration.⁴⁰⁶ While second generation immigrants of non-German parents may positively compare their standing to the inferior one of their parents, interviewees with one German parent may see themselves in reference to their ethnic German parent, and thus evaluate their standing somewhat less positively as a result. Their negative evaluations would then reflect the slight lag in income and degree of dependence on government support compared to ethnic Germans that our statistical analysis revealed. This interpretation mirrors Esser's stance on the centrality of placement, in conjunction with Gordon's differentiation between first and second generation immigrants as outlined in Section 2.2.2 above. While Esser confines his argument to economic assimilation only, the dynamic he describes can plausibly play out at deeper levels of integration as well, such as, in Gordon's view, at the threshold to social integration into host society cliques, clubs, and institutions, as outlined in Chapter 2.

The pattern we see here is also compatible with the suggestion raised earlier, that immigrants who are more integrated in general tend to become more sensitive to

⁴⁰⁶ See footnote ¹²³ above on this issue. This dynamic has also been pointed out in the literature on relative deprivation. See seminal works by Walter Garrison Runciman, *Relative deprivation and social justice: A study of attitudes to social inequality in twentieth-century England* (University of California Press, 1966) and Ted Robert Gurr, *Why men rebel* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970). Piore also describes this phenomenon, arguing that second generation immigrants tend to be less satisfied with inferior jobs in segmented job markets since they compare their status to that of native youth, whereas their parents readily accepted such jobs as still better than what they would have had to do in their country of origin.

perceived or actual disadvantages, perhaps due in part to the aforementioned gradual shift in reference groups. In this vein, Klaus Bade recently warned that,

*“integration and assimilation have a mental side effect which is often not sufficiently recognized: With increasing integration and especially, assimilation, immigrants, particularly those of the second generation, become more sensitive to economic and social disadvantage they encounter or suspect. This sensitivity is, paradoxically, a sign of advanced integration.”*⁴⁰⁷

The comparatively small share of binational survey participants describing their chances of reaching their life goals as indistinguishable from those of (full) ethnic Germans we saw in Table 37, despite (or, perhaps, in fact then rather *because of*) their otherwise high levels of economic, social, and (to a somewhat lesser extent) identificational integration also fits this explanation.

In keeping with the importance of reference groups in shaping perceptions, respondents with a medium-range self-perceived appearance difference to ethnic Germans may, despite a possible objective lag in integration by some measures, perceive their overall situation in a more positive light, if they compare themselves to other immigrant groups who fare worse. Expectations, formed in part by comparisons with different reference groups, could thus explain at least part of the peculiar evaluation profiles shown in Table 42. Evidence of the presence of the suspected underlying thought patterns would be needed, of course, to further substantiate this hypothesis.

As for the initially posited inverse relationship between visible physical appearance characteristics and integration success, however, the overall mood variations shown in Table 42 do not support this hypothesis. While this does not directly refute the research hypothesis I put forth in Chapter 1 above, it does in fact weaken the plausibility of the stated causal relationship between integration outcome and physical appearance, inasmuch as we would expect the number of positive and negative evaluations of the status quo to reflect a perceived prevalence of discrimination.

⁴⁰⁷ See Bade, "Verletzt, gerade wegen fortgeschrittener Integration: Bildungs-Benachteiligung der Einwanderer schadet dem Standort," [my translation]

Overall, then, the frequencies of positive and negative evaluations of the status quo among interviewees suggests that comparatively positive experiences do not correlate with the degree of physical appearance divergence from the average ethnic German. They are similarly unrelated to actual blood ties to ethnic Germans. In fact, the latter may, despite their integration success, in fact tarnish binationals' general belief in their equal opportunity, and, more generally, the general light in which they see the status quo of immigrant integration in Germany.

The last two columns of Table 42 show that the evaluation profile for the future is much more positive and similar across subgroups. Respondents overall made only half as many evaluations of the future state of affairs as they did concerning the status quo, yet the latter were highly optimistic across the board.⁴⁰⁸ Regardless of how positive or negative respondents saw the present, in the aggregate, they were hopeful about what the future holds. As we will see in the next section, they also readily offered suggestions on how to expedite the process towards improvement.

5.3.2. Evaluations of the status quo

To gain a better understanding of the impact interviewees attributed to various factors in the integration process, we now move away from the overall mood described above with aggregate frequencies of positive and negative evaluations and zoom in on the content of these value statements, and see how frequently particular factors were mentioned as beneficial or detrimental in the interviews overall, as well as within particular subgroups. These frequencies can again be used, with appropriate caveats, to compare the salience of positive and negative (designated with a + and – sign,

⁴⁰⁸ The higher numbers of positive evaluations of the future may in part be a function of the questions I asked during the interviews, as shown in Table 40. Two of them specifically solicited suggestions on measures and programs to enhance integration outcomes, thus generating views on how to improve the future, which by necessity contained positive evaluations. Nonetheless, both the frequency with which these suggestions were offered and the overall optimism these positive evaluations convey across the board can and should be seen, I believe, as a good sign.

respectively, in Table 43) issues overall, as well as to particular subgroups varying in ethnic parentage and expressed physical appearance.

Table 43 shows all concepts mentioned as either positive or negative regarding the status quo in descending order of total frequency.⁴⁰⁹ Again, the groups are mutually exclusive within the three appearance difference categories and the two parental ethnicity categories, respectively. Since interviewees were classified according to both their appearance and their ethnic parentage, however, frequencies can only be compared within but not across these two categories.

In the following, I elaborate on the issues that were most frequently mentioned as either beneficial or detrimental, and illustrate them with paradigmatic examples from the interviews. I also comment on their respective prevalence within groups, and interpret them within the context of insights gained in previous chapters. I do not elaborate on all concepts shown, yet concentrate on the ones mentioned most frequently, as well as less frequent concepts that are closely related to my primary study hypothesis, such as discrimination, racism, and language courses.

As Table 43 shows, the most frequently mentioned positive concept mentioned was simply being *integrated*, with *integration* ranking not far behind. In part this is undoubtedly a function of the interview topic and question.⁴¹⁰ Nonetheless, the positive thrust of the notion is noteworthy, and reflects the overall perception among those I interviewed that they are themselves perfectly integrated, as evidenced, in their view, most frequently by a successful educational and professional career in Germany. The feeling of perfect integration among the second generation immigrants I contacted was so strong, in fact, that many were initially reluctant to being interviewed, claiming to be rather uninteresting examples of smooth and uneventful integration.

⁴⁰⁹ I capped the table at concepts mentioned a minimum of five times in the entire verbal data, and confine my analysis here to evaluations concerning the status quo only, as it most directly speaks to my study hypothesis.

⁴¹⁰ The same most likely holds for the occurrences of Germany and German (as an adjective) in the verbal data base, which is why I do not comment on these two in more detail here.

Concept	All Categories			App. Diff. 0		App. Diff. 1		App. Diff. 2		Ethn. Ger. Parent		No Ethn. Ger. Parent	
	Total	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
<i>integrated</i>	19	19		5		9		5		8		11	
<i>preschool</i>	18	17	1	6	1	10		1		3	1	14	
<i>fear</i>	14		14		2		3		9		11		3
<i>identity</i>	14	13	1	7	1	2		4		4	1	9	
<i>bilingual</i>	13	13		4		3		6		6		7	
<i>language</i>	13	12	1	5		4	1	3		7		5	1
<i>integration</i>	12	11	1	1		9		1		5	1	6	
<i>Germany</i>	11	7	4	4		2		1	4	5	2	2	
<i>school</i>	10	8	2	3		3		2	2	2	1	6	1
<i>understand</i>	10	7	3	1		5	2	1		4		3	3
<i>accept</i>	9	5	4	1	2	3	2	1		2	2	3	2
<i>experiences</i>	9	4	5			3	1	1	4	1		3	5
<i>racism</i>	9	1	8		1			1	7	1	6		2
<i>cultures</i>	8	8		8						3		5	
<i>German adj</i>	8	7	1	3		2		2		7			1
<i>discrimination</i>	7		7				1		6				7
<i>friends</i>	7	7		5		1		1		4		3	
<i>parents</i>	7	7		3		3		1		3		4	
<i>support v</i>	7	6	1	4		2			1	4	1	2	
<i>crime</i>	6	6			6						6		
<i>feel good</i>	6	6		3		2		1		3		3	
<i>foreigners</i>	6	2	4	2	1		1			2	2		2
<i>luck/ happiness</i>	6	6				2		2		3		3	
<i>among themselves</i>	5	1	4		3			1		1	4		
<i>circle of friends</i>	5	5		1		2		2		2		3	
<i>contact</i>	5			2		1		2		1		4	
<i>hate</i>	5		5		4	1					4		1
<i>integrate</i>	5	4	1	3		1	1			1		3	1
<i>language courses</i>	5	5		1		1		3		1		4	
<i>learn</i>	5	5		5						5			
<i>mixed</i>	5	5		1		4				5			
<i>money</i>	5	1	4			1			4		3	1	1
<i>Moroccans</i>	5		5		5						5		
<i>politicians</i>	5		5		1		1		3		3		2
<i>prejudice</i>	5		5				3		2		2		3
<i>segregate</i>	5		5				4		1		2		3

Table 43: Positive and negative evaluations of the status quo

Many, particularly among the binational Germans I approached, seemed genuinely surprised by the idea that their (partial) immigrant background would set them apart from native Germans of their age to a degree significant enough to warrant a researcher's

attention. Typically, they saw their lives and educational and professional careers as perfectly comparable to that of any (full) ethnic German:

[E11] Well, I feel integrated, inasmuch as I could, just as any regular German here, participate in life here. I went to school, got a vocational degree, went to college, found a secure and good job, in that respect, then, I feel integrated, of course. But also in terms of the entire political events here in our town, and the state, and the country. I feel integrated with that as well.

Similarly, forceful positive marks were given to *preschool* and *school*. Reflecting on their own early childhood experience, many of my interviewees remarked that preschool was the primary venue in which they acquired their first oral German language skills, with school then building the formal written language skills their parents usually lacked. Both were deemed crucial for their subsequent success in school and society:

[G12] I learned German only through preschool. My parents don't speak German at home, not to this day. [...] And when you spend five or six hours a day in preschool, you just pick up a lot there. [...] That's the easiest way to learn a language. From kids who speak German in preschool.

Although the distribution of these two concepts across groups varies, no clear association to physical appearance can be seen. Children of partly ethnic German parentage mentioned both preschool and school less frequently than other groups, by comparison. This may in part be due to their particular situation. As they grew up with an influential host society language and culture representative at home, namely, a parent, they may not perceive preschool and school as a prominent language builder as much as children with foreign ethnicity parents do.

Fear was the concept most frequently expressed as detrimental in the interviews. It was often mentioned as the perceived root cause of the lack of interethnic communication and, consequently, understanding:

[J21] Somehow we have to address the fear, the fear of the stranger. Sure, not all fair skinned people are scared of dark skinned people and the other way around, but .. there is this unease. I would wish that in a world that embraces economic and political globalization, we also welcome cultural globalization. We should be curious to learn about other cultures, willing to broaden our horizons..

[N25] I think getting to know the other better.. I think the fear of the stranger is still the biggest problem. If you know the other, if you know what makes him or her tick, if you talk to each other and then notice, hey, we can actually go out for a drink, or just jabber, there is really nothing scary about the other, I think this is the best that can happen.

Moreover, fear was mentioned related to going to certain places where assaults on foreigners were believed to be more likely:

[T54] [...] Well, here in B., you probably heard about that, we had several assaults on foreigners. You really have to be scared now to go into certain neighborhoods. I am always scared there. My oldest son is out alone right now, too, and I always fear something might happen to him. I think those assaults are on the rise, really. You are more cautious these days, more sensitive..

People who described their physical appearance as very distinct from the ethnic German average (*App.Diff 2*), and those with one ethnic German parent mentioned fear much more frequently than other groups. As the average degree of physical appearance difference of binational Germans as expressed in the survey was close to that of the *App.Diff 2* group, overall, this pattern suggests a correlation between physical appearance attributes and *fear* being a factor in one's integration experience. The notable prevalence of negative evaluations concerning *discrimination*, *racism*, and *experiences* in the *App.Diff 2* group as shown in Table 43, further strengthens this hypothesis. Fear appears to be, at least partly, rooted in real-world negative experiences of discrimination and racism in Germany, with all four concepts being mentioned most frequently by interviewees most easily identifiable as non-German ethnics. Interviewees may in fact, due to interviewer effects or general reluctance, have substituted fear, an accepted human emotion, for discrimination or racism, given the latter's high emotional charge in the German context. We will examine the perceived complex role of *fear* as both dependent and independent variable within the context of integration in more detail further below.

As Table 43 shows, identity was predominantly seen in a positive light. Although many interviewees reported times during which their ethnic background led them to second-guess and explore their identities, often during early adolescence, most felt at ease

with their heritage, and reported eventually coming to cherish the broader perspective it afforded them:⁴¹¹

[N2] These days I am very happy and completely at ease with the fact that I have both the German and the Spanish influence. .. Yes, but there were situations as well, when I felt kind of torn in between. I really wasn't sure about anything, I thought perhaps I had to decide between the two [...] Then I think you don't really know, where the heck am I?

[E16] Yes, I think I can distinguish between [the two cultures], see their respective strengths and weaknesses, benefits and drawbacks in each society, their political systems. I think I managed to keep the good things. I probably kept some of the bad stuff, too, the oddities... But I think I pick aspects from both, well, many, actually, there are so many different ethnicities in S. today, the community here has become pretty multicultural.. I manage to pick and weave bits of many cultures into my personality, make it part of my identity. I think being able to do that is a huge asset.

The latter statement illustrates, coincidentally, the tendency to broaden a given binary to a more inclusive transnational perspective we saw in the survey as described in Section 4.3 above. Interestingly, many interviewees also mentioned in this context a continuous and positive attachment to their non-German ethnic community, be it within or outside Germany, as crucial to the process of successful identity formation:

[E54] I think it is very important to stay connected to one's ethnic heritage. The culture, and also to be in touch with the society one came from. I think trying to undermine that, cut the ties has negative consequences. It negatively affects one's own identity, and also one's readiness to engage with the new society and its institutions. People need to preserve their ties to their country of origin.

This stance stands in stark contrast to the negative effects Esser attributes to the maintenance of foreign-ethnic ties, as discussed in Section.2.2.2 above. The second generation immigrants I interviewed did not perceive their multiple identities as a psychological burden at all, nor did a professed desire to preserve or achieve (multiple) integration appear to be the rare and unaffordable case Esser makes it to be. Integration

⁴¹¹ Their descriptions markedly differ from Stonequist's seminal description in 1937 of children of mixed relationships as tragically confined to a marginal "in between world." See Everett V. Stonequist, *The marginal man: A study in personality and culture conflict* (New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1937)

(understood in Berry's narrow sense as the maintenance of ties to both ethnic and host society), by contrast, appears to not only be feasible but perceived by immigrants as distinctly beneficial to successful adaptation to the host society as well.⁴¹²

In a similar vein, bilingualism was mentioned frequently during the interviews and seen in a positive light across the board. As Table 43 shows, positive evaluations of bilingualism were in fact as frequent as for language more generally. Most commonly, being bilingual was seen as a potential asset that augments human capital endowment, even though, as some regretfully noted, the German education system generally does not give credit to and allow immigrant children to benefit from or even expand their foreign language skills within the formal school setting:

[N17]I think this is a big advantage, growing up with two languages. I think that's a gift. You learn a lot. It's a big asset when you learn other languages. Even when people don't grow up exactly half and half language-wise. Even just hearing another language often, you learn a lot. And that's a good thing. That can open many doors, if you know how to take advantage of that. I think that's a very positive thing.

In the same vein, however, there was universal agreement that host language skills are a crucial component of integration success. As Table 43 shows, this notion was shared by interviewees across all subgroups. Consequently, improving the quality of and access to language courses was one of the most frequently mentioned suggestions to improve integration outcomes for both recent newcomers and long-term resident first generation immigrants who, due to lack of exposure to the host society at work or in neighborhoods may not have had the opportunity to learn German so far. Respondents also frequently suggested that efforts to improve language skills should start at as early an age as possible, and preferably occur in preschool or elementary school:

⁴¹² What at first glance may appear paradoxical, however, may not in fact be so strange after all. In a pointed example, Helena Flam notes that sizeable parts of German academia and public still assume that eating *Knödel* and *Schnitzel* (traditional German dumplings and fried veal cutlets, respectively) are essentially incompatible with drinking *raki* and *ayran* (traditional Turkish anise liquor and yoghurt beverage, respectively). Peculiarly, the same people would probably never think twice about eating *Bratkartoffeln* (traditional German fried potatoes) one day and spaghetti (Italian-style pasta) the next. See Flam, p.52

[H11] Because the people who come to Germany first have problems with the language. I think many struggle with that, just like my mom did back then. We probably need courses, or schools, or classes, just to learn the language. I think this would be very important for the people who come here and are more or less strangers in this country.

[B12] I would pay for language courses, I would start a school program to drastically decrease the number of foreign kids who leave school without a degree, or who drop out of school or have bad grades. That means, preschools need to work towards giving foreigners, foreign kids the skills in terms of language and overall education, so that when they are ten years old they are on par with German kids at school.

In their expressed view on the role of host language skills for integration success, second generation immigrants thus entirely agree with the centrality Esser, the Süßmuth report and the new German legislation accords them. Their accounts also confirm the effectiveness of some of the practical measures Esser recommends to foster integration as described in Section 2.2.2, such as early *preschool attendance* to acquire language skills. They also acknowledge, more broadly, the crucial importance of education for integration success.

In contrast to the official German stance, however, my interviewees spontaneously covered a broader range of factors, perhaps because they intuitively thought of integration as encompassing more than economic assimilation. As Table 43 shows, the notion that successful integration hinges upon mutual understanding and genuine acceptance between host society and immigrants, for instance, was expressed almost as frequently as the importance of school. Although the distribution of positive and negative accounts varies across groups, they do not seem to be linked to physical appearance attributes. The following two quotes illustrate the range of contexts in which understanding and acceptance were held to matter. Both quoted interviewees are German-born sons of guest worker immigrant parents, the first one of Italian ethnicity, the second one of Turkish ethnic origin:

[E62] And feeling that.. “You are welcome here, you can feel comfortable here, this can be your home, as much as it is mine or anyone's who may have a German passport.” This, I think, best describes this state of mind. To be valued as a

person, not only as the son of a guest worker, for instance, but as a human being. If you feel this state of mind, you feel well, and then you fully identify with Germany. You feel you are seen, you can be yourself and contribute to society. This kind of acceptance and respect I think is crucial..

[R49] Frankly, sometimes .. I sometimes feel I should just return to my own country. Because apparently, even if I try to meet people half way, they really don't understand me, regardless. I don't think it is all that hard to get our concerns [regarding Islam dress codes for young women participating in physical education classes at school], but no one really wants to understand. Essentially, they just want to tell us: "You are not welcome here, go back to where you came from."

As we can see, both quotes refer to fault lines in society. The first comments on the role of acceptance in general, and mentions the continuous salience of socioeconomic status in German society. The second one bemoans the lack of acceptance of religious practices, which s/he feels is a pretext for a much more sweeping rejection of foreigners at large.⁴¹³

Interestingly, my interviewees attested both immigrants and hosts an unwillingness to accept and understand each other. Germans were most often, as in the previous quote, blamed for having a hard time with religious tolerance, whereas immigrants, some noted, often do not care to learn about and understand the host society:

[R07] Germans have a hard time.. they don't accept strangers. They have that in common, pretty much, unfortunately. Anyone with another religion or another ethnic background.. I wouldn't say they flatly disapprove.. but you get into discussions where you are always asked to explain your views, justify yourself.. unfortunately. Emotionally that can make living in Germany very taxing..

[Q20] You get to know your environment, the history.. and when you know the history, you understand the people. You know why they are the way they are. You know a lot more, and feel more secure that way. You have to get to know the people, you can't just wait for them to get to know you. You have to make an effort

⁴¹³ It is noteworthy that some analysts agree with him/her on the particular issue he/she raises here. Martin Spiewak found that the universally presumed lack of Muslim parents' willingness to compromise religious principles for the sake of their daughters' assimilation at school is in fact not nearly as prevalent as the heated public debate on the issue suggests. See Martin Spiewak, "Ins Schwimmen geraten: Politiker klagen, dass viele muslimische Schülerinnen den Turn-, Schwimm- und Sexualkundeunterricht boykottieren. Stimmt das überhaupt?" *Die Zeit*, December 7 2006

to learn about them and understand them. And to try and get rid of your prejudices. Because not all Germans are idiots..

Although not framed in terms of formal knowledge about German culture and institutions, general knowledge about Germany and the Germans was thus deemed important to understand their way of life, and feel at ease among them. Although the majority of second generation immigrants I surveyed see their knowledge about German culture and political institutions as indistinguishable or very similar to that of ethnic Germans themselves, as shown in Figure 22 above, they agree with the notion that those among them who are not (yet) in that position should be open to learn more about the host society.

Although the terms were less frequently mentioned in the interviews as shown in Table 43, I now take a closer look at *discrimination*, and likely related to it, *racism*, and *experiences*, because the former is one of the main study variables I put forth in my analysis. Although discrimination and racism are obviously linked, they appeared only once in a sentence together. *Experiences*, by contrast, was mentioned with *racism* in three instances, and twice with *discrimination*. Despite their rather weak associations as measured, somewhat arbitrarily, by their proximity in the verbal data, however, Table 43 shows that all three received, not surprisingly, predominantly negative evaluations and appear mostly in interviews with people of the *App. Diff. 2* group, who described themselves as physically very different from the ethnic German average. This pattern is as yet the strongest indication that they are, in their own view, faced with discrimination and racism more than other immigrant groups in Germany. The pattern was less stark for *prejudice*, suggesting that the perceived experience of negative actions was more concentrated in the *App. Diff. 2* group, whereas negative attitudes were perceived more evenly across groups.⁴¹⁴ If the frequency with which the respective issue areas are mentioned as negative factors in the interviews are any indication, however,

⁴¹⁴ A meaningful differentiation between discrimination and prejudice hinges upon our confidence that respondents actually distinguish between negative actions and attitudes. In the American context, Mary Waters suggests that, given the widespread use of these terms in many different contexts, this may not always be the case. See Mary C. Waters, Reed Ueda, and Helen B. Marrow, *The new Americans: A guide to immigration since 1965* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), p.11

discrimination, racism, and prejudice do not appear to figure among the most salient issues in the minds of the second generation immigrants I interviewed. Each of them occurred as negative factors in five to eight instances in the entire verbal interview data. Their combined negative thrust does not come close to the positive one of integration, (pre)school, language, as well as understanding and acceptance, which all occurred much more frequently, as Table 43 shows.⁴¹⁵

Overall, the way in which interviewees saw the status quo suggests that integration to them was a positive and smooth process. Preschool and school attendance often played a key role for language acquisition which is, in turn, perceived universally as a key factor in integration success.

Fear emerged as a factor hampering the interethnic communication and understanding deemed necessary for deeper integration. Its comparatively greater prevalence among interviewees with easily discernible appearance difference to ethnic Germans together with their mention of discrimination, racism, and prejudice suggests that their exterior makes them more vulnerable targets of such forms of host society hostility and rejection. Overall, however, discrimination, racism, and prejudice do not appear to figure among the most salient issues in the minds of the second generation immigrants I interviewed. They instead describe integration as a positive experience. The factors they mentioned as key to integration success, namely school and preschool attendance, language skills, and knowledge about the host society, mirror those mentioned in official government statements, yet go further mainly by including mutual acceptance and understanding as a key factor in fostering deeper levels of integration.

In the following, we will examine the role attributed to issues surrounding these and other key concepts of interest in more detail, focusing on the causal inferences interviewees made.

⁴¹⁵ The picture becomes even starker when we consider the frequency (not shown here) with which the issues were mentioned in general, within or without an evaluative statement. *Discrimination* was mentioned in 12 of a total of 810 semantic units in the entire verbal data. By comparison, school appeared in 65, language in 62, preschool in 60, and understand and accept in 40 instances each.

5.3.3. Expressed causal inferences surrounding study variables

All causal statements in the verbal data were identified and coded. I then generated a list of all dependent and independent variables as seen by the interviewees, and visualized the stated causal relationships as causal networks. This endeavor serves three primary purposes. First, on a practical level, displaying the stated causal relationships as causal networks provides an instant picture on the issues second generation immigrants perceive to be important in shaping certain outcomes, and on how they see them related to each other. Second, examining these causal inferences helps identify what immigrants perceive as effective ways to strengthen desirable processes and alleviate detrimental ones. Third, depicting what they deem to be key factors in this process and illustrate how the latter are linked to each other in an arrow diagram allows for easy and potentially interesting comparison to the way Esser described the integration process as shown in Figure 7.

A few notes on how to read the following graphs are in order. In line with the rationale underlying the diagrams shown in Chapter 1, arrows designate causal relationships, with the arrows starting at the independent and pointing to the dependent variable. Green arrows represent beneficial effects, red arrows stand for stated detrimental effects. Pointed arrow heads link variables held to increase or decrease together, round arrow heads designate perceived inverse causal relationships. The following graphs show causal inferences made at least once in the entire interview data I gathered. Where necessary, concepts were marked as nouns (_n), adjectives (_adj), singular (_sg) or plural (_pl) forms.

In the following, I will examine the causal inferences made concerning several issue areas. The first three, most pertinent to the study hypothesis I set out to investigate, are *integration, language, and discrimination*.⁴¹⁶ As noted above, given its salience in the

⁴¹⁶ As Table 43 shows, several concepts in the verbal data can be taken as almost synonymous to these, for *integration*, the preposition *integrated*, and for *language*, its plural *languages* and *language skills*. As mentioned before, *racism* may be closely related to *discrimination* as well. As far as possible, I include these closely related concepts in the respective graphs, or comment on their perceived role wherever including them would have resulted in a graph too complex for visual clarity.

interviews, we will also examine the perceived complex role of *fear* as both dependent and independent variable within the context of integration in more detail. Some of the issue areas shown in the following causal networks already appeared in the previous evaluations of the status quo. I will thus not elaborate on them in great detail here. Those that newly appear are again illustrated using paradigmatic examples from the interviews.⁴¹⁷

Integration: What matters to the second generation?

Figure 23 shows what interviewees suggested (at least once, but often more frequently) as conducive and detrimental to *integration* and *integrate*. I roughly sorted the respective concepts into issue areas in the graph to improve readability. As the ubiquitous green arrows show, interviewees expressed a wealth of beneficial independent variables related to these concepts as they reflected on their experiences, effectively offering suggestions on how to improve integration outcomes. Not surprisingly by now, *language* and its variant concepts *language skills* and *language building measures* (in the middle bottom part of the graph) appear among the factors they consider helpful. In the same vein, they deemed *language deficits* detrimental to integration.

A similarly coherent picture also emerges (in the middle right part of the graph) in respect to the perceived effect of interaction between immigrants and host society. *Mix* in general, as well as *mixed neighborhoods*, *mixed preschools*, and *meeting venues* were all deemed beneficial for integration. *Segregation*, by contrast, namely a tendency of communities or groups to remain *among themselves*, and *ethnic ghettos* were deemed detrimental. As far as the benefits of language skills and the drawbacks of segregation are concerned, my interviewees thus agree with the official German stance.

Yet, again, they go further. As can be seen at the right side of Figure 23, a surprisingly broad number of concepts mentioned revolve around the notion that the mental attitude of

⁴¹⁷ The graphs include both concepts directly causally related to the respective central issues (shown in squares) and those one step removed. Wherever feasible, I expanded the grid further to include issues of central interest, such as, for instance, *racism* among the causal variables surrounding *fear* in Figure 26.

immigrants and host society towards each other influences integration outcomes. Ideally, my interviewees suggested, encounters of immigrant and host society, both literally and figuratively, should occur *at an even level*, driven by equal efforts and a willingness of *both sides to meet half way*. A genuine *interest in each other* and their *different ways* of life was deemed helpful in this respect. Perceived *one-sided integration measures* only targeting immigrants, by contrast, were seen as stumping the process:

[B13] They say, you foreigners need to do this, that, and the other... and the Germans don't need to do anything at all. They should encourage people to approach each other from both sides instead. If a foreigner wants to stay here, he or she needs to contribute their share of the process, but the Germans also need to make an effort to understand why those people are the way they are..




Figure 23: Expressed causal inferences surrounding *integration*

Acceptance, again, appears as a factor positively affecting *integration*. *Growing up with many nationalities* was mentioned as a setting conducive to acceptance, as was being *self-confident*, which, in turn, was believed to hinge upon being approached by the host society *at an even level*. In other words, the acceptance needed for integration is unlikely to materialize without equality between hosts and immigrants.

Overall, the causal inferences surrounding *integration* again suggest that my interviewees feel that language skills matter for integration, as does contact between hosts and immigrants. Moreover, though, they stress that both immigrants and host society need to be interested in and invested in achieving a positive outcome, and perceive each other as equal partners in the endeavor.

Comparing these notions to Esser's integration model as shown in Figure 7, we see that they both include language skills as an independent variable positively affecting integration. They also share the notion that the degree of interaction between host and immigrant society matters. What is suspiciously absent to Esser's integration model, and, for that matter, to most academic and public discourse on immigrant integration in Germany more generally, is the idea that immigrants and the host society have their respective share of cultural and attitudinal adjustments to make to achieve a positive outcome.

Language: What matters to the second generation?

Owing to the centrality of language we have uncovered so far, we take a still closer look at professed causal inferences made in relation to *language* (as well as its close relative, *language building measures*, *language courses*, and *language learned*, as shown in Figure 24. We again see that all of them are held to cause *integration*.⁴¹⁸ Aside from furthering integration, *language* is mentioned as enabling communication in various forms (such as *expressing oneself*, *arguing*, and *justifying oneself*). Being *determined* to learn the language was also mentioned as beneficial to language acquisition. Among the

⁴¹⁸ To limit complexity and avoid redundancy with Figure 24, independent variables of integration shown here are limited to the ones which occurred at least three times in the interviews.

factors mentioned to positively affect *language learning*, interestingly, most reflect rather unstructured and voluntary *contact* to the host society, involving *children*, *youth clubs*, and *private tutoring*. A second generation Italian recalls, for instance, how her mother learned German:

[I25/26] My mom taught herself, pretty much. I really don't know how she did that.. no idea! She started to know more and more at some point.. I think she listened to us kids, as we started speaking more and more German among ourselves.

Interaction in more structured settings was also mentioned as conducive to language acquisition of first generation immigrants:

[H13]Dad was always outside, at work, he was in touch with the world out there. This is how he learned the language. Mom was always at home, she went shopping or met friends, but they were Italians as well. I think this is why she didn't really learn the language well at first.

In contrast to the two rather neutral concepts *language* and *language learned*, no direct independent variables were offered as to how *language building measures* and *language courses* could be promoted. True they also facilitate integration, yet compared to learning a language, more generally, these more structured settings appear to be less salient in the perception of the second generation experience. Most of them may simply, as outlined above, have picked up German in preschool and school, or from a German parent. Despite their recent centrality in political discourse and new legislation, formal language courses are not the typical venues in which my interviewees acquired their skills.




Figure 24: Expressed causal inferences surrounding *language*

Nonetheless, the way in which they see language to factor into the integration process corroborates Esser’s integration model in some respects. Both state that mental preparedness to engage in the process influences language outcomes. Whereas Esser sees immigrants’ intention to stay, integrate and acculturate as variables shaping language acquisition, second generation immigrants acknowledged, more broadly, that *determination* and being *interested* in the language helps the process. Both also suggest that structured and unstructured interaction between hosts and immigrants further language skills (which are a central component of Esser’s cultururation stage, as shown in Figure 7). The variety of issues my interviewees spontaneously mentioned to be helpful in learning the language, however, suggests that they perceive unstructured voluntary forms of contact as more conducive to language acquisition than more structured ones.

Discrimination: What matters to the second generation?

When we look at the causal inferences made surrounding *discrimination* and *racism*, we see, not surprisingly, that the factors mentioned as augmenting them were considered to be detrimental, as the prevalence of red arrows shows. Racism and discrimination, moreover, were perceived to be directly causally linked, with the former causing the latter.

Looking at the variables conducive to racism, *social background* was deemed to be a factor here, with members of *lower social strata* and *social class* prone to experience (as immigrants) and dole out (as host society) racist and discriminatory behavior, respectively. A presumably more favorable *social background*, by contrast, was held to counteract discrimination tendencies. This notion appears in the account of a second generation child of an immigrant medical doctor, who perceived the general esteem for her father's profession in Germany to have led to her family being valued as human beings, as well:

[A13] My parents' circle of friends and acquaintances was almost exclusively German. My parents were pretty spoiled in this respect, I think. And then my father was a medical doctor, both parents well-educated, you were more valued as such as a human being among acquaintances, I think...

Discrimination and racism are also taken to be at the root of immigrant tendencies to *withdraw, hole up, join gangs, feel lonely and not at home*, and shy away from forging *friendships with Germans*. Having *German acquaintances*, by contrast, is believed to decrease the likelihood of encountering discrimination. Both the vicious circle of withdrawal and discrimination and its counterpart feedback loop of acquaintance, friendship, and acceptance are seen as reinforcing themselves over time. A parent of African descent describes the latter dynamic:

[Q21] If you make it.. mostly, it's due to the children. If kids are friends, their parents will meet, by default. If you then foster these friendships, get in touch with each other.. you create a safety zone.. those people are your friends, and they have friends, too.. and if you live in a certain part of town and spend most of your time there, then you are protected in this space..

untrained and thus overwhelmed by the task they faced in predominantly immigrant multiethnic classrooms:

[A67] Well, I am sure there are many good and highly motivated teachers around, but I think that sometimes they are very ill-prepared for the situation they face at school, with sometimes eighty percent kids with a mother tongue other than German. I think they have no clue at all how to deal with that, and then they are quickly overwhelmed.

On the positive side, school was also mentioned as an ideal venue to address migration and discuss its history, repercussions, challenges and benefits and thus reshape the *pictures in peoples' heads* from the ground up:

[C13] Migration needs to be a topic in school. Address the issue, so that the pictures in people's heads of foreigners as guest workers who will leave Germany eventually, those pictures need to slowly change...and be replaced by an image of immigrants as citizens who are here for good, and that this is a positive thing..

Although several suggestions were offered on how racism could be addressed successfully, they are rather abstract, and were not further elaborated. Raising host society *awareness* regarding their behavior was mentioned as a way to counter racism, as well as by *enlightening* people, and *deconstructing* their entrenched negative views of immigrants:

[M29] [...]Racism is the deepest, most entrenched and profound [attitude] . [...]We need to educate people, enlighten people, over and over. We have to help them see and deconstruct the theories they have in their heads. They are in there, even if people are not consciously aware of them. They just picked them up in the course of their lives. Most people have them not because of ill will. I firmly believe that. If they say certain things, it is not because they are malicious, but because they really believe it. They learned those things at some point and they still believe they are true.

In that respect, my interviewees were more optimistic regarding the malleability of the human psyche than Esser, who deemed appeals for more societal openness ineffective in changing engrained belief systems, as outlined in Section 2.2.2. Esser also differs from my interviewees in where he believes the effect of discrimination first stumps the integration process. Whereas Esser sees it at the placement stage, where immigrants enter

the job market and gain positional rights through employment, my interviewees emphasized the school environment as a prime venue in which discrimination frequently occurs, and in their view often seriously interferes with immigrant children's skill acquisition.

Still, a comparison of the causal inferences made in Figure 25 to the corresponding linkages shown in Figure 7 reveals some common ground between the effects of discrimination as seen by immigrants to how Hartmut Esser framed them. Both see discrimination as a factor that can lead to segregation, when those frequently targeted by host society discrimination retreat into ethnic communities. The physical and emotional withdrawal, and the loss of (unstructured) interethnic contact it entails, can also hamper an otherwise (more) successful language acquisition process for those who are still catching up language-wise, and thus seriously impair their chances at successful economic assimilation in the mainstream society. Discrimination and racism, however, also affect those who are in fact both linguistically and culturally perfectly integrated, such as, arguably, the vast majority of second generation immigrants in Germany. In this respect, my interviewees confirm Esser's suggestion that perceived discrimination and prejudice are powerful barriers to identificational assimilation. As relates a college graduate government employee naturalized German citizen of Afghan ethnic origin:

[M26] There is this rift, I often think. One is German, I am German, and there is nothing else I am. Never in my life have I lived in another country. What else could I be if not German? But truly, well, no, I am not truly German, not really, not 100 percent. That's my reaction to the rejection I encounter. I react to this... frankly... I am peeved. Having a German passport just isn't enough for integration. Not at all. That's pretty secondary to most people I know.

Arguably, decelerating or completely frustrating the integration process by discrimination can have costly consequences at any stage of integration for both immigrants and host society alike. Younger and more recent immigrants stand to lose more immediately, when the lack of unstructured contact to the host society slows language acquisition, and hinders subsequent access to higher education and better employment. Germany stands to lose from such processes as well. Every immigrant child

(and adult, for that matter) denied access to education and/ or employment according to his or her full potential will eventually contribute less to the host economy. In fact, recent studies estimate the economic losses due to inadequate education and placement of people with migration background in Germany at a staggering 11.8 to 15.6 billion Euro a year.⁴¹⁹ The country also stands to lose when perfectly educated immigrants who are fully assimilated economically eventually decide to resettle in other countries in which they feel more accepted. Although even interviewees who bemoaned the lack of ultimate acceptance and spoke of their difficulties to thus fully identify with Germany did not mention an intention to leave. Yet one could imagine that the few who may consider leaving and have the qualifications and means to actually do it are exactly those with the kinds of extensive skill sets Germany should like to keep.

Fear: What matters to the second generation?

As we have seen, fear was the concept most frequently deemed detrimental in the interviews overall. A closer look at its perceived role as both dependent and independent variable within the context of integration thus seems worthwhile. As Figure 26 shows, among the concepts mentioned as directly causally related to *fear*, only one positively affects fear, namely *enlightenment*, which, coincidentally, was also one of the few ways deemed feasible to alleviate *racism* as mentioned and illustrated above. Fear was also mentioned as curtailing ones' *range of activities* and propensity to *speak*. The remaining connections fall in two groups. One involves palpable *conflict*, such as *assaults*, and *terrorism*, whereas the other describes instances in which information, in the form of *reports in newspapers* and on *TV* stir fear:

[N26] If all you have in your head are weird pictures from newspapers or TV... where foreigners are made to be a threat... and you know nothing else, then you conclude that they are a threat. Then comes the fear, and next comes hate. Hate is

⁴¹⁹ See Tobias Fritschi and Ben Jann, *Gesellschaftliche Kosten unzureichender Integration von Zuwanderinnen und Zuwanderern in Deutschland: Welche gesellschaftlichen Kosten entstehen, wenn Integration nicht gelingt?* (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2008), p.9

mostly generated by fear. And when I am scared of someone, that someone is then scared of me, too.

Consequently, fear, it was suggested, could be alleviated by encouraging a reporting style that is more conducive to smoothing rather than hampering integration, and a code of conduct in reporting which reflects the tremendous influence the media has on majority perceptions:⁴²⁰

[N31] I really wish that the newspapers and the entire media in general would stop emphasizing the citizenship of a perpetrator in their reports. I think this is wrong, it leads to prejudice. They always write: the Turk such and such has perpetrated this that or the other crime... or the Poles ..I ask myself: Why the heck do they do that? Why do they stress nationalities?

Moreover, physical distance between host and immigrant society again is deemed to matter, and is, arguably, a variable that could be manipulated through policies or incentives encouraging greater residential integration:

[N27] Feeling separated, and anything you don't understand is what causes fear. If people were more mixed up, if they would grow up together, I think the problem would be smaller.

Enlightenment, as challenging a goal it may seem, is held to be among the most effective weapons against fear and racism and all the detrimental effects they entail:

[J23] We have to educate people, more than ever before, in this political climate, with terrorism and all that. Educate people to take away their fears. Because fearing other people leads to conflict. [...] people somehow need to dare reaching out to each other. The venues and contexts in which enlightenment may occur are endless. Institutions such as the media, TV, or schools can contribute to this

⁴²⁰ A qualitative study among Turkish residents in North Rhine Westphalia similarly found that immigrants and their descendants are hurt by the way German media and political discourse portray them. See Zentrum für Türkeistudien, "Kurzfassung der Studie zu Wahrnehmung von Fremdenfeindlichkeit, Rassismus und Diskriminierung in der türkischen Bevölkerung in Nordrhein-Westfalen," (Zentrum für Türkeistudien, Essen, 1998) as mentioned in Goldberg, Halm, and Sauer, *Migrationsbericht des Zentrums für Türkeistudien 2002*, p.37-38. In a similar vein, the most recent report on planned activities of the International Organization for Migration outlines the need to counteract common misperceptions among European host societies about the immigrants they receive by providing accurate information. See International Organization for Migration, *Migration initiatives 2008* (Geneva: IOM, 2008), p.112

detrimental pictures in people's heads, perhaps the very engrained belief systems Esser deemed so intractable, could be altered (while learning and interacting with each other) in school and in the work environment.

German TV and print media were also seen to have a direct effect on how immigrants and host society perceive each other. While they currently stir fear and drive groups apart, they could also, and should, indeed, use their tremendous influence on the integration process more responsibly by adopting an objective and neutral reporting style.

Chapter 6 Conclusion and policy implications

How to best integrate immigrants into the societies they join has become of growing interest to all societies admitting sizeable shares of new residents to their countries. Germany is not alone in this regard, yet has only recently acknowledged the importance of the issue. Assuming that language skills are the main catalyst for success, and that immigrants need and are reluctant to acquire them, German government devised an integration strategy centered on compulsory German language acquisition. My findings cast doubt on these assumptions in several respects. Those who speak the language at native level still stumble over a highly stratified and poorly funded school system, which essentially blocks their access to education and subsequent employment commensurate to their potential. I was equally unable to find evidence for the notion that immigrants are reluctant to engage with the host society, more generally. Cultural, social, and identificational integration levels are high for the second generation immigrants, who also did not appear to see their integration efforts hampered by a lack of tolerance and permissiveness by the host society overall, as I initially suspected.

Nonetheless, my research has implications for both theory and practice. I will outline them in turn, sorting practical implications into those relevant for economic, cultural, social, and identificational assimilation, respectively.

As far as theory is concerned, we need to tackle conceptual imprecision which unnecessarily clouds issues and stokes the fire in public perception and debate. Most notably, they concern the meaning of assimilation. Despite common belief, assimilation is a natural and inescapable process of adapting to a new living environment. Moving from Hamburg to München involves adjusting to the differences in average local dialect and mentality, as does moving from the German countryside to a city. In the same vein, any time spent abroad typically involves learning a language, and getting to know new

customs, institutions, and lifestyle. If it did not, experience abroad would hardly deserve mention, let alone be considered an asset on any curriculum vitae.

Nonetheless, assimilation does not entail unconditional renunciation of all things associated with one's place of origin. In fact, any German resident with attributes of non-German provenance – be it rudimentary Italian language skills, a genuine affinity to Buddhism, Japanese cuisine, French red wine or a preference for Jewish Klezmer over German oompah music, has assimilated, mostly by way of casual exposure within or outside Germany, features of non-German provenance. A thus acquired soft spot for spaghetti may or may not displace an existing fondness for sauerkraut. At least in the culinary domain, integration in fact seems natural, entirely unproblematic and even enriching.

All of the second generation immigrants I interviewed wholeheartedly acknowledged that some form of adaptation to the host society is necessary. Some voiced this stance while emphatically rejecting the need to assimilate, as the term is commonly, if erroneously, used and understood. As the results of both survey and qualitative interviews show, ties to both immigrant and host culture are genuinely treasured. The seeming contrast between host society politicians, media, and public expecting the willingness to assimilate and immigrants emphatically rejecting it is thus rooted in conceptual imprecision. Clarifying meanings both in academic literature and, in turn, the popular perceptions it informs, is thus sorely needed.

Policy relevant results of this research can be divided into those pertaining to economic, cultural, social, and identificational assimilation. For economic assimilation, my research suggests that the leverage of language skills is considerable. Immigrants who bring or acquire host language skills stand a much better chance at obtaining lucrative employment in Germany, and the income that goes with it. By comparison, the impact of physical appearance on the degree of economic integration is, as far as currently available data suggests, negligible.

Educational achievement, however, trumps the significance of language skills in this regard. Successfully placing immigrants in the host society job market hinges, for them

as for others, upon acquired human capital, including but not limited to host language skills. Recent studies have exposed the German school system's notorious effectiveness in reproducing social class.⁴²¹ It thus systematically disadvantages children of lower socioeconomic strata, among them sizeable shares of children with migration background.⁴²² Strides in economic integration for immigrant children could thus be made by alleviating this effect.

Concrete strategies are, strictly speaking, beyond the scope of this dissertation.⁴²³ Still, in the qualitative part of my research, immigrants themselves confirm the perception of systematic disadvantages for immigrant children, and suggest ways to improve equal access to education. Drawing on their own experience, they suggest that preschool attendance, preferably one with an adequate mix of native and immigrant children, at an early age can jumpstart language acquisition and provide valuable time for socialization prior to starting compulsory education.⁴²⁴ Some of my interviewees also suggested making preschool attendance more affordable, to alleviate the financial burden for less affluent immigrant families associated with sending several children to preschool simultaneously. Reflecting on their education experience thereafter, my interviewees unanimously mentioned experiencing teachers being understaffed, untrained and thus

⁴²¹ See Franz Hamburger, *Pädagogik der Einwanderungsgesellschaft* (Frankfurt: Cooperative Verlag, 1994)

⁴²² Among the most prominent studies were PIRLS (Progress in International Reading Literacy Study) and PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment). Whereas PIRLS, an international assessment of student reading skills in fourth grade, found the German school system to largely reproduce existing social discrepancies regardless of a student's actual potential, PISA, an internationally standardized assessment of school performance of 15-year-old students in some four dozen mostly OECD countries, clearly showed that immigrants fare much worse compared to their native peers in German schools. The German school system in fact turned out to be exceptionally good at discriminating children of immigrant background as compared to other countries. See Wilfried Bos and others, *Erste Ergebnisse aus IGLU: Schülerleistungen am Ende der vierten Jahrgangsstufe im internationalen Vergleich* (Münster: Waxmann, 2003); OECD, *Where immigrant students succeed - A comparative review of performance and engagement in PISA 2003* (Paris: OECD, 2006)

⁴²³ They are also amply described elsewhere. See, for instance, Klaus J. Bade and Michael Bommers, *Migration-Integration-Bildung: Grundfragen und Problembereiche* (Osnabrück: Institut für Migrationsforschung, 2004); Georg Auernheimer, *Schieflagen Im Bildungssystem: Die Benachteiligung der Migrantenkinder* (Wiesbaden: vs Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006)

⁴²⁴ The value of preschool for later school success has been documented empirically. See Birgit Becker, "Der Einfluss des Kindergartens als Kontext zum Erwerb der deutschen Sprache bei Migrantenkindern," *Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 35, no. 6 (2006)

overwhelmed by the task they faced, particularly in predominantly immigrant multiethnic classrooms. In that respect, they also reiterated the importance of ‘the right mix’ between immigrant and ethnic German children at school.

Aside from making the school system more meritocratic and breaking the link between social class and educational attainment in general, three policy implications directly suggest themselves from the insights we gained in this study. First, preschool attendance should be free of charge for children whose families fall below certain income thresholds. Although this measure does not guarantee to boost attendance among children of lower socioeconomic strata (including but not limited to those with migration background), it may tip the balance towards sending children to preschool in families who are generally open to exposing their youngsters to peer interaction at an early age yet lack the means to do so.⁴²⁵

Second, the number and training of teachers should be augmented to reflect and adequately meet the challenges of multiethnic classrooms.

Third, students should be routinely allocated to preschools and schools so as to ensure an adequate mix of ethnic German and immigrant children. Wealthier parents of ethnic German children often frown upon that idea. If sufficient resources are brought in to meet the needs of all children, however, enforcing an adequate ratio of immigrant to native children should not entail the lowered educational standards they generally fear. German society can simply not afford to accommodate the quasi-élitist orientation of upper class German parents to the detriment of a sizeable share of its lower-class resident youth. In the end, the costs associated with denying children access to education and subsequent employment to their fullest potential is simply too high.⁴²⁶

⁴²⁵ There is evidence suggesting that immigrants are highly motivated to learn German, and generally eagerly support attempts of their children in that respect. See Martin Spiewak, "Grammatik und Schnitzeljagd: Kinder ausländischer Eltern sind die großen Verlierer im deutschen Bildungssystem. Bremen bietet Grundschulern aus Problemstadtteilen erstmals besonderen Unterricht in den Sommerferien an," *Die Zeit*, August 12, 2004. Lowering financial barriers to early preschool attendance may thus well lead to the desired attendance boost among children who stand to benefit most from a more structured early childhood education and unstructured interaction with ethnic German peers.

⁴²⁶ As mentioned before, the economic losses due to inadequate education and employment of immigrants in Germany are estimated to exceed ten billion Euros a year. See Tobias Fritschi and Ben Jann, *Gesellschaftliche Kosten unzureichender Integration von Zuwanderinnen und Zuwanderern in Deutschland*:

As far as cultural and social assimilation are concerned, my results suggest that we really do not have much to worry about. For the most part, we merely need to stay out of the way and let the process unfold naturally. Cultural assimilation, for the most part, happens naturally. Patience and trust in the process is all we need. Differences in lifestyle and value orientations, as we have seen, do not significantly affect acculturation as measured by our indicators. Nor does, for that matter, acculturation obliterate lifestyle and value differences. In the eyes of immigrants, such differences persist, yet do not infringe upon their adaptation to their new host society. If the results of our survey and interviews are any indication, social assimilation of second generation immigrants in Germany has been a success story. There is no indication that immigrants remain within their own ethnic communities and voluntarily forego the kinds of host society interactions deemed crucial for integration success.

Results suggest, however, that, -- whether we like it or not, -- integration, in John Berry's sense of the term, is much more prevalent as German theorists want us believe. It is, in fact, the preferred and most frequent adaptation path. Immigrants and their descendants cherish their ties to both German and their ethnic community of origin. The good news is that perceived national and ethnic affiliations are much less zero-sum than imprecise academic and incendiary political and public debates suggest. Very few aspects of culture and ethnicity are truly incompatible, and even those (like, some may argue, practicing Islam and having a girlfriend), are, in real life, subject to continuous reevaluation and change. The fact is that having real or imagined ties to more than one cultural realm has become reality for a growing share of earthlings. Among them, incidentally, are not only immigrant foreign residents in Germany, but also less visible and problematized groups such as émigré Germans in Switzerland or Australia, and, most likely the majority of the highly regarded German diplomatic corps. The phenomenon is not particular to Germany either. It is a natural side effect of increasing mobility of people around the world. We can fear, sanction, frown upon, regret, grudgingly

Welche gesellschaftlichen Kosten entstehen, wenn Integration nicht gelingt? (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2008), p.9

acknowledge, tolerate, quietly accommodate, officially recognize, or welcome and celebrate this reality. What seems clear is that, whatever reaction we choose, the reality is here to stay. Denial, while unlikely to change empirical reality, pushes people who feel attached to and appreciate living in Germany into the defensive. Continuous attacks on the legitimacy of their emotional state make them unduly question their existing affiliation to Germany. We cannot, as a society, want this to happen.

Our best bet, then, is to celebrate the presence of German residents who feel attached to and at ease in more than one cultural realm. After all, they bring with them valuable assets which can benefit society if they are able and allowed to use their skills and experience to their fullest potential. The affiliation to the culture and society in which they spend less time may fade over time. It may also persist for some who manage to maintain equally strong ties to both communities over longer periods of time. It does not really matter. Our results suggest that emotional affiliation to two countries resembles, in the eyes of immigrants, much more that to two children than to two spouses in a Christian context. While loving and caring for two kids may at times be more challenging than having a single one, most parents feel that in the end, their juggling act paid off and the results are genuinely rewarding.

Three policies would be exceptionally effective in conveying to immigrants genuine appreciation and acceptance of their bidimensional emotional orientation and the assets they embody. The first two concern all immigrants, while the last one particularly targets second generation immigrants. First, dual nationality should be universally condoned. Concurrent heated debates and threats to revoke German citizenship from people who illegally regained their non-German passports after naturalization overshadowed my attempt to collect data on immigrant dual nationality and their motives to acquire or forego German citizenship. Existing studies on this question suggest, however, that immigrants decide to naturalize for reasons other than superior emotional attachment to their new place of residence. They more typically do so to secure their residency status,

and acquire voting privileges.⁴²⁷ Conversely, not all immigrants who voluntarily forego naturalization lack emotional attachment to their new country of residence. Most are merely reluctant to relinquish rights associated with the citizenship they would currently have to surrender when gaining German nationality. Some also see their continuous emotional attachment to their country of origin as a contraindication for naturalization in Germany.⁴²⁸ Particularly after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in September 2001, some also fear an impending backlash against immigrants from predominantly Muslim countries in Germany, and retain their foreign passports to have access to a safe haven of last resort if and when it happens.⁴²⁹

Clearly, however nativist academics or politicians see dual nationality, the reality is much more pragmatic. Among immigrants, and, arguably, native Germans alike, to some, the country which issued their passports means more than any other, to others, it does not. As with the prevalence of integration mentioned above, chastising the facts does not change reality. It merely repulses those who feel wrongly accused. A sweeping permission of dual nationality would show immigrants that they are welcome to formally join German society despite of or precisely because of their ampersand identity.

Second, antidiscrimination laws should be adopted and strictly enforced. As we have seen, despite universally high degrees of cultural, social, and identificational integration, immigrants who perceive themselves to differ from ethnic Germans across a wide range of intrinsic cultural attributes doubt that they are given equal opportunities to reach their life goals. Reliable antidiscrimination laws would give immigrants who perceive themselves as victims of discrimination the option to take legal action against

⁴²⁷ In a survey of motives for and against naturalization among Turkish residents in Germany, some three quarters of the sample indicated to have sought German citizenship to stabilize their residency status in Germany and gain political rights. About seven percent mentioned having close emotional ties to Germany, and less than 5 percent indicated not having ties to Turkey any longer. See Martina Sauer, "Die Einbürgerung türkischer Migranten in Deutschland: Befragung zu Einbürgerungsabsichten und dem Für und Wider der Einbürgerung," in *Migrationsbericht des Zentrums für Türkeistudien 2002*, ed. Andreas Goldberg, Dirk Halm, and Martina Sauer (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2002), p.205

⁴²⁸ See Sauer, p.217

⁴²⁹ See Werner Schiffauer, "Verwaltete Sicherheit: Präventionspolitik und Integration," in *Migrationsreport 2006: Fakten - Analysen - Perspektiven*, ed. Michael Bommers and Werner Schiffauer (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2006)

perpetrators, rather than withdraw into their ethnic communities. It would also, with time, reshape societal consciousness on acceptable behavior, and lessen the frequency of actual discrimination in the process.

Third, immigrant children should be given full credit for whichever foreign language skills they have in secondary school, and offered a choice of which language they systematically acquire or perfect as part of their secondary foreign language education. Primary education should (as it presently does) focus on the acquisition of written German language skills. In secondary school, however, youngsters should be given, if they so desire, credit for the foreign language skills they have on par with the ones that are currently part of secondary school curricula.⁴³⁰ If space constraints or efficiency considerations prohibit offering desired foreign language instruction within the formal school setting, alternative settings should be made available and accepted as substitutes.

As the qualitative part of my study indicates, most second generation immigrants highly value their non-German language skills, and most likely may have welcomed getting credit for it starting precisely at the transition between primary and secondary school in which some of them currently struggle. Moreover, our results suggest that the current deficits in German language skills of some second generation immigrants, although they seem much less prevalent than politicians at times make them out to be, have to do with inadequate opportunities to learn German, and are unrelated to the degree to which they maintain the language of their ethnic non-German parents. Instituting these policies will in time convey the even-eyed acceptance and appreciation of immigrants which is necessary for sustainable identificational integration.

The endeavor, of course, is far from easy. It requires determination and unanimous support from theorists, politicians and the media. They all need to transcend short-term

⁴³⁰ Similarly commenting on the peculiar discrepancy between valuing some foreign language skills but not others in the German school system, Franz Hamburger suggests that bilingualism is systematically devalued in primary school to boost the status of ethnic German children and thwart immigrant children's aspiration towards upward mobility. It is precisely this impression a change in policy would eradicate. See Franz Hamburger, *Pädagogik der Einwanderungsgesellschaft* (Frankfurt: Cooperative Verlag, 1994), p.60-61

opportunism in their support of policies which will be resisted by reluctant natives who are just beginning to perceive theirs as a country of immigration.

The reward, however, of successful immigrant integration will transcend aggregate monetary gain. As sociologist Edward Shils remarked thirty years ago, the mind of a society which receives immigrants is extended in the passage of years, it becomes more capacious. The mental cosmos of a society expands, over many obstacles and resistances and over much harsh judgment, by the presence and accomplishments of immigrants.⁴³¹

⁴³¹ See Edward Shils, "Roots -The sense of place and past: The cultural gains and losses of migration," in *Human migration: patterns and policies*, ed. William H. McNeill and Ruth S. Adams (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1978), p.419

Appendices

Correlation table for the statistical analysis

	<i>1st generation</i>	<i>2nd generation</i>	<i>EthSim</i>	<i>Eth Europe</i>	<i>EthNon Europe</i>	<i>Eth Poland</i>	<i>Eth Frmr Yugo</i>	<i>Eth Italy</i>	<i>Eth Other EU</i>	<i>Eth FrmrSov Union</i>	<i>Eth Half German</i>	<i>Eth Turkey</i>	<i>Eth Othr World</i>	<i>East West</i>	<i>Gender</i>	<i>Education</i>
<i>1st gen</i>	<i>1</i>															
<i>N</i>	451437															
<i>2nd gen</i>	-.050**	<i>1</i>														
<i>N</i>	451437	451437														
<i>EthSim</i>	-.689**	-.502**	<i>1</i>													
<i>N</i>	447928	447928	475623													
<i>EthEurope</i>	.565**	.328**	-.302**	<i>1</i>												
<i>N</i>	447928	447928	475623	475623												
<i>EthNon Euro</i>	.557**	.418**	-.865**	-.052**	<i>1</i>											
<i>N</i>	447928	45343	475623	475623	475623											
<i>EthPoland</i>	.278**	.076**	-.024**	.415**	-.022**	<i>1</i>										
<i>N</i>	447928	447928	475623	475623	475623	475623										
<i>EthFrmrYugo</i>	.231**	.172**	-.082**	.442**	-.023**	-.009**	<i>1</i>									
<i>N</i>	447928	447928	475623	475623	475623	475623	475623									
<i>EthItaly</i>	.146**	.197**	-.111**	.357**	-.019**	-.007**	-.008**	<i>1</i>								
<i>N</i>	447928	447928	475623	475623	475623	475623	475623	475623								
<i>EthOtherEU</i>	.403**	.203**	-.302**	.688**	-.036**	-.014**	-.015**	-.012**	<i>1</i>							
<i>N</i>	447928	447928	475623	475623	475623	475623	475623	475623	475623							
<i>EthRussFed</i>	.332**	.059**	-.267**	-.023**	.441**	-.010**	-.010**	-.008**	-.016**	<i>1</i>						
<i>N</i>	447928	447928	475623	475623	475623	475623	475623	475623	475623	475623						
<i>EthHalfGerm</i>	-.019**	-.013**	-.272**	-.019**	-.021**	-.008**	-.009**	-.007**	-.013**	-.009**	<i>1</i>					
<i>N</i>	447928	447928	475623	475623	475623	475623	475623	475623	475623	475623	475623					
<i>EthTurkey</i>	.272**	.433**	-.588**	-.035**	.672**	-.015**	-.016**	-.013**	-.024**	-.017**	-.014**	<i>1</i>				
<i>N</i>	447928	447928	475623	475623	475623	475623	475623	475623	475623	475623	475623	475623				
<i>EthOthrWorld</i>	.369**	.155**	-.572**	-.030**	.566**	-.012**	-.013**	-.011**	-.020**	-.014**	-.012**	-.021**	<i>1</i>			
<i>N</i>	447928	447928	475623	475623	475623	475623	475623	475623	475623	475623	475623	475623	475623			
<i>EastWest</i>	-.095**	-.077**	.119**	-.086**	-.087**	-.033**	-.043**	-.035**	-.055**	-.020**	-.033**	-.074**	-.045**	<i>1</i>		
<i>N</i>	451437	451437	475623	475623	475623	475623	475623	475623	475623	475623	475623	475623	475623	479414		
<i>Gender</i>	0.002	-.011**	.010**	0	-.008**	.009**	0.003	-.016**	.004**	.006**	-0.002	-.010**	-0.007	-0.002	<i>1</i>	
<i>N</i>	451437	451437	475623	475623	475623	475623	475623	475623	475623	475623	475623	475623	475623	479414	479414	
<i>Education</i>	-.073**	-.140**	.064**	-.018**	-.074**	.007**	-.042**	-.043**	.019**	-.004*	.022**	-.122**	.018**	.082**	-.051**	<i>1</i>
<i>N</i>	365725	365725	388533	388533	388533	388533	388533	388533	388533	388533	388533	388533	388533	391821	391821	391821

Original survey instrument



Integration in Deutschland Wie funktioniert das? Sagen Sie uns Ihre Meinung !

- Sind Sie in Deutschland geboren oder leben seit Ihrem 6. Lebensjahr hier?
- Haben Sie Eltern nicht-deutscher Abstammung?
- Sind Sie über 18 ?

Dann helfen Sie mit, die Lebensbedingungen und Integrationserfahrungen von Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund in Deutschland aufzudecken.

Beteiligen Sie Sich an der folgenden Umfrage, die im Rahmen eines Dissertationsprojekts in Politikwissenschaften am amerikanischen Massachusetts Institute of Technology (M.I.T.) durchgeführt wird.

Ihre Teilnahme an der Befragung ist freiwillig. Sie können einzelne Fragen nicht beantworten und Ihre Teilnahme jederzeit abbrechen. Die Beantwortung der Fragen dauert etwa 20 Minuten. Alle Ihre Angaben werden streng vertraulich behandelt und nur anonym ausgewertet, und danach vernichtet.

Vielen herzlichen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme. Bitte wenden Sie sich bei Fragen an [Email address] oder telefonisch an [Telephone number]. Eine Zusammenfassung der Ergebnisse dieser Umfrage wird nach Beendigung des Projektes allen Teilnehmern auf Anfrage zugesandt.

1.	Sind Sie in Deutschland geboren?
<input type="checkbox"/>	Ja [Weiter mit Frage 3]
<input type="checkbox"/>	Nein [Fragebogen beenden]

2.	Abgesehen von Urlaub im Ausland von bis zu 8 Wochen im Jahr, leben Sie in Deutschland seit Ihrem 6. Lebensjahr?
<input type="checkbox"/>	Ja [Weiter mit Frage 4]
<input type="checkbox"/>	Nein [Fragebogen beenden]

3.	Abgesehen von Urlaub im Ausland von bis zu 8 Wochen im Jahr, leben Sie seitdem in Deutschland?
<input type="checkbox"/>	Ja
<input type="checkbox"/>	Nein [Fragebogen beenden]

4.	Wie alt sind Sie? [Wenn unter 18, Fragebogen beenden]
	<input type="text"/>

An unserer Umfrage können Sie leider nur teilnehmen, wenn

- Ihr Vater oder Ihre Mutter (oder beide) nicht-deutscher Abstammung sind
- Sie in Deutschland geboren sind oder seit Ihrem 6. Lebensjahr hier leben
- Sie mindestens 18 Jahre alt sind

Wenn Sie diese Kriterien nicht erfüllen können Sie leider nicht teilnehmen. Wir möchten uns trotzdem herzlich für Ihre Bereitschaft bedanken, an dieser Umfrage teilzunehmen. Wenn Sie sich für die Ergebnisse dieses Projekts interessieren, schicken wir Ihnen gerne auf Anfrage nach Beendigung des Projekts eine Zusammenfassung zu.

Die folgenden Fragen betreffen die Abstammung und den schulischen Werdegang Ihrer Eltern.

5. In welchem Land wurde Ihre Mutter geboren? Bitte kreuzen Sie das entsprechende Kästchen an.

- | | | | |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> | Bulgarien | <input type="checkbox"/> | Schweiz |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | Deutschland | <input type="checkbox"/> | Slowakei |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | Frankreich | <input type="checkbox"/> | Staaten der ehemaligen Sowjetunion |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | Griechenland | <input type="checkbox"/> | Spanien |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | Großbritannien oder Nordirland | <input type="checkbox"/> | Thailand |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | Italien | <input type="checkbox"/> | Tschechische Republik |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | Libanon | <input type="checkbox"/> | Tunesien |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | Marokko | <input type="checkbox"/> | Türkei |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | Niederlande | <input type="checkbox"/> | Ungarn |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | Österreich | <input type="checkbox"/> | USA |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | Polen | <input type="checkbox"/> | Vietnam |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | Portugal | <input type="checkbox"/> | Staaten des ehemaligen Jugoslawien |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | Rumänien | | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | Schweden | <input type="checkbox"/> | In einem anderen Land, und zwar: |

6. Wie würden Sie die Schulbildung Ihrer Mutter beschreiben? Bitte kreuzen Sie das Kästchen an, das am ehesten zutrifft.

- Sie ist nicht zur Schule gegangen.
 Sie ist etwa 4 Jahre zur Schule gegangen.
 Sie ist etwa 9 Jahre zur Schule gegangen.
 Sie ist etwa 12 Jahre zur Schule gegangen.
 Ich weiss nicht.

7. In welchem Land wurde Ihr Vater geboren? Bitte kreuzen Sie das entsprechende Kästchen an.

- | | | | |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> | Bulgarien | <input type="checkbox"/> | Slowakei |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | Deutschland | <input type="checkbox"/> | Staaten der ehemaligen Sowjetunion |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | Frankreich | <input type="checkbox"/> | Spanien |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | Griechenland | <input type="checkbox"/> | Thailand |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | Großbritannien oder Nordirland | <input type="checkbox"/> | Tschechische Republik |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | Italien | <input type="checkbox"/> | Tunesien |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | Libanon | <input type="checkbox"/> | Türkei |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | Marokko | <input type="checkbox"/> | Ungarn |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | Niederlande | <input type="checkbox"/> | USA |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | Polen | <input type="checkbox"/> | Staaten des ehemaligen Jugoslawien |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | Portugal | <input type="checkbox"/> | Ich weiss nicht. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | Rumänien | | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | Schweden | <input type="checkbox"/> | In einem anderen Land, und zwar: |

8. Wie würden Sie die Schulbildung Ihres Vaters beschreiben? Bitte kreuzen Sie das Kästchen an, das am ehesten zutrifft.

Er ist nicht zur Schule gegangen.

Er ist etwa 4 Jahre zur Schule gegangen.

Er ist etwa 9 Jahre zur Schule gegangen.

Er ist etwa 12 Jahre zur Schule gegangen.

Ich weiss nicht.

9. Wie würden Sie Ihre eigenen deutschen Sprachkenntnisse beschreiben? Bitte kreuzen Sie in jeder Reihe das zutreffende Kästchen an.

	Sehr gut	Gut	Es geht	Nicht sehr gut	Überhaupt nicht
Ich verstehe Deutsch	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ich spreche Deutsch	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ich lese Deutsch	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ich schreibe Deutsch	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Die folgenden Fragen betreffen Ihren eigenen schulischen und beruflichen Werdegang.

10. Sind Sie jemals in Deutschland in den Kindergarten gegangen?

Ja.

Nein.

11. In welchem deutschen Bundesland /deutschen Bundesländern sind Sie zur Schule gegangen? Bitte kreuzen Sie alle zutreffenden Kästchen an.

<input type="checkbox"/> Baden-Württemberg	<input type="checkbox"/> Niedersachsen
<input type="checkbox"/> Bayern	<input type="checkbox"/> Nordrhein-Westfalen
<input type="checkbox"/> Berlin	<input type="checkbox"/> Rheinland-Pfalz
<input type="checkbox"/> Brandenburg	<input type="checkbox"/> Saarland
<input type="checkbox"/> Bremen	<input type="checkbox"/> Sachsen
<input type="checkbox"/> Hamburg	<input type="checkbox"/> Sachsen-Anhalt
<input type="checkbox"/> Hessen	<input type="checkbox"/> Schleswig-Holstein
<input type="checkbox"/> Mecklenburg-Vorpommern	<input type="checkbox"/> Thüringen

12. Wie würden Sie ihre Schulbildung beschreiben? Bitte kreuzen Sie das entsprechende Kästchen an.

Ich habe die Schule ohne Abschluss beendet.

Ich habe den Hauptschulabschluss oder die Polytechnische Oberschule mit Abschluss der 8. oder 9. Klasse.

Ich habe Realschulabschluss / mittlere Reife / polytechnische Oberschule mit Abschluss 10. Klasse.

Ich habe Abitur oder erweiterte Oberschule mit Abschluss der 12. Klasse (Hochschulreife).

Ich habe einen Meister-, Techniker- oder gleichwertigen Fachschulabschluss

Ich habe Fachhochschulabschluss (Abschluss einer Fachhochschule).

Ich habe Hochschulabschluss / ein Studium abgeschlossen

Ich bin noch Schüler / Schülerin.

Ich bin noch Student / Studentin

Ich habe einen anderen Schulabschluss, und zwar: _____

13. Welchen beruflichen Ausbildungsabschluss haben Sie? Bitte kreuzen Sie das entsprechende Kästchen an.

<input type="checkbox"/>	Ich habe keinen beruflichen Ausbildungsabschluss.
<input type="checkbox"/>	Beruflich-betriebliche Anlernzeit mit Abschlusszeugnis, aber keine Lehre.
<input type="checkbox"/>	Teilfacharbeiterabschluss.
<input type="checkbox"/>	Abgeschlossene gewerbliche, kaufmännische oder landwirtschaftliche Lehre.
<input type="checkbox"/>	Berufliches Praktikum, Volontariat.
<input type="checkbox"/>	Ich bin noch in der Ausbildung.
<input type="checkbox"/>	Anderer beruflicher Ausbildungsabschluss, und zwar _____

14. Sind Sie zur Zeit berufstätig? Bitte kreuzen Sie das entsprechende Kästchen an.

<input type="checkbox"/>	Ja. Ich arbeite ganztags (35 Wochenstunden oder mehr).
<input type="checkbox"/>	Ja. Ich arbeite halbtags (10 bis 35 Wochenstunden).
<input type="checkbox"/>	Ja. Ich arbeite weniger als halbtags (weniger als 10 Wochenstunden)
<input type="checkbox"/>	Nein. Ich bin zur Zeit arbeitslos. [weiter mit Frage 23]
<input type="checkbox"/>	Nein. Ich bin nicht berufstätig / bin Hausfrau/ Hausmann [weiter mit Frage 23]
<input type="checkbox"/>	Ich gehe noch zur Schule / bin in der Ausbildung. [weiter mit Frage 23]

15. Wie würden Sie Ihre hauptberufliche Tätigkeit beschreiben?

<input type="checkbox"/>	Ich bin selbständig.
<input type="checkbox"/>	Ich bin angestellt. [weiter mit Frage 19]

16. Bitte beschreiben Sie Ihre selbständige Berufstätigkeit näher.

<input type="checkbox"/>	Ich bin in einem akademischen freien Beruf tätig (z.B. Berufsmusiker, Arzt mit eigener Praxis, Rechtsanwältin) [weiter mit Frage 18]
<input type="checkbox"/>	Ich bin Selbständiger in Handel, Gewerbe, Industrie oder im Dienstleistungssektor. [weiter mit Frage 18]
<input type="checkbox"/>	Ich bin mithelfender Familienangehörige/r. [weiter mit Frage 22]
<input type="checkbox"/>	Ich bin selbständige/r Landwirt/in.
<input type="checkbox"/>	Andere Stellung, und zwar: _____ [weiter mit Frage 18]

17. Wie gross ist die von Ihnen genutzte landwirtschaftliche Fläche ungefähr?

<input type="checkbox"/>	Unter 10 Hektar.
<input type="checkbox"/>	10 Hektar bis unter 20 Hektar.
<input type="checkbox"/>	20 Hektar bis unter 50 Hektar.
<input type="checkbox"/>	50 Hektar und mehr.

18. Wieviele Mitarbeiter beschäftigen Sie?

<input type="checkbox"/>	Niemanden. Ich arbeite allein. [weiter mit Frage 29]
<input type="checkbox"/>	Ich habe eine/n Mitarbeiter/in. [weiter mit Frage 29]
<input type="checkbox"/>	Ich habe 2 bis 9 Mitarbeiter/innen. [weiter mit Frage 29]
<input type="checkbox"/>	Ich habe 10 bis 49 Mitarbeiter/innen. [weiter mit Frage 29]
<input type="checkbox"/>	Ich habe 50 oder mehr Mitarbeiter/innen. [weiter mit Frage 29]

19. Bitte beschreiben Sie Ihr Angestelltenverhältnis näher.

Ich arbeite im öffentlichen Dienst.

Ich arbeite in der freien Wirtschaft.[weiter mit Frage 21]

Ich arbeite in der Industrie.[weiter mit Frage 22]

20. Bitte beschreiben Sie Ihr Beamtenverhältnis näher.

Ich bin Beamte/r im einfachen Dienst (bis einschl. Oberamtsmeister).
[weiter mit Frage 29]

Ich bin Beamte/r im mittleren Dienst (Assistent bis einschl. Hauptsekretär /
Amtsinspektor). [weiter mit Frage 29]

Ich bin Beamte/r im gehobenen Dienst (Inspektor bis einschl. Oberamtmann /
Oberamtsrat) [weiter mit Frage 29]

Ich bin Beamte/r im höheren Dienst, Richter (vom Regierungsrat aufwärts).
[weiter mit Frage 29]

21. Bitte beschreiben Sie Ihr Angestelltenverhältnis in der freien Wirtschaft näher. Kreuzen Sie das Kästchen an, das am ehesten zutrifft.

Industrie- und Werkmeister/in im Angestelltenverhältnis [weiter mit Frage 29]

Angestellte mit einfacher Tätigkeit (z.B. Verkäufer, Kontoristin, Stenotypist)
[weiter mit Frage 29]

Angestellte/r, die/der schwierige Aufgaben nach allgemeiner Anweisung selbständig
erledigt (z.B. Sachbearbeiterin, Buchhalter, technische Zeichnerin) [weiter mit Frage 29]

Angestellte/r, der/die selbständige Leistungen in verantwortungsvoller Tätigkeit erbringt
oder begrenzte Verantwortung für die Tätigkeit anderer trägt (z.B. wissenschaftlicher
Mitarbeiter, Prokuristin, Abteilungsleiter) [weiter mit Frage 29]

Angestellte/r mit umfassenden Führungsaufgaben und Entscheidungsbefugnissen
(z.B. Direktor, Geschäftsführerin, Vorstand größerer Betriebe und Verbände) [weiter mit
Frage 29]

22. Bitte beschreiben Sie Ihre Arbeitertätigkeit näher. Kreuzen Sie das Kästchen an, das am ehesten zutrifft.

Ich bin ungelernter Arbeiter/in. [weiter mit Frage 29]

Ich bin angelernter Arbeiter/in. [weiter mit Frage 29]

Ich bin gelernter Arbeiter / Facharbeiter/in. [weiter mit Frage 29]

Ich bin Vorarbeiter/in, Kolonnenführer/in, oder Brigadier/in. [weiter mit Frage 29]

Ich bin Meisterin, Polier. [weiter mit Frage 29]

Ich bin Genossenschaftsbauer/in. [weiter mit Frage 29]

23. Wären Sie gegenwärtig oder in Zukunft gerne berufstätig? Bitte kreuzen Sie das entsprechende Kästchen an.

Ja.

Nein. [weiter mit Frage 29]

Ich weiss nicht.

24. Sind Sie zur Zeit auf Arbeitssuche? Bitte kreuzen Sie das entsprechende Kästchen an.

Ja.

Nein. [weiter mit Frage 29]

25. Wie gut schätzen Sie Ihre Chance ein, eine Arbeit zu finden? Bitte kreuzen Sie das entsprechende Kästchen an.

Sehr gut. [weiter mit Frage 27]

Eher gut. [weiter mit Frage 27]

Eher schlecht.

Sehr schlecht.

26. Warum schätzen Sie Ihre Erfolgchancen bei der Arbeitsuche eher schlecht ein? Bitte wählen Sie aus der folgenden Liste die Gründe aus, die auf Sie zutreffen und ordnen Sie sie nach Wichtigkeit. Geben Sie dem Grund, den Sie für am wichtigsten halten die niedrigste Nummer, und dem am wenigsten wichtigen der auf Sie zutreffenden Gründe die größte Nummer.

Die wirtschaftliche Lage ist nicht sehr gut und Arbeitslosigkeit hoch.

Meine Sprachkenntnisse sind nicht gut genug um eine Arbeit zu finden.

Mir fehlt die Schulbildung, die die meisten Arbeitgeber verlangen.

Arbeitgeber stellen nicht gerne Frauen mit Kindern ein.

Arbeitgeber stellen nicht gerne Menschen ein, die nicht deutsch aussehen.

27. Wie wichtig ist Ihnen persönlich in Arbeit und Beruf: [Bitte kreuzen Sie in jeder Zeile das entsprechende Kästchen an]

Wie wichtig ist Ihnen	Sehr wichtig	Wichtig	Weder noch	Nicht wichtig	Gar nicht wichtig
Eine sichere Berufsstellung?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ein hohes Einkommen?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Aufstiegsmöglichkeiten?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Eine interessante Tätigkeit?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Eine Tätigkeit, bei der man selbständig arbeiten kann?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ein Beruf, bei dem man anderen helfen kann?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ein Beruf, der für die Gesellschaft nützlich ist?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Eine Stelle, bei der man die Arbeitszeiten oder Arbeitstage selbst festlegen kann?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

28. Was haben Sie in den letzten 12 Monaten unternommen, um Arbeit zu finden?

	Nein	Ja, ein- oder zweimal	Ja, mehr als zweimal
Ich habe mich arbeitslos gemeldet.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ich habe mich bei einer privaten Arbeitsagentur registriert.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ich habe mich auf Stellenanzeigen beworben.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ich habe selbst in einer Zeitung oder Zeitschrift eine Suchanzeige aufgegeben.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ich habe mich direkt bei Arbeitgebern beworben.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ich habe Verwandte, Freunde oder Kollegen um Hilfe bei der Arbeitssuche gebeten.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

29. Angenommen Sie wollten sich einer Bekanntschaft Ihres eigenen Geschlechts am Telefon beschreiben. Welche Merkmale würden Sie erwähnen, und wie wichtig finden Sie diese Merkmale an sich? Bitte kreuzen Sie in jeder Zeile ein Kästchen an.

	Eher wichtig	Eher weniger wichtig
Ihr Alter?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ihr Beruf?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ihr Wohnort?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Der Beruf Ihres Vaters?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ihre Staatsbürgerschaft?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Die Sprache(n) die Sie sprechen?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Die Höhe Ihres Einkommens?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ihre Hautfarbe?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ihre Religion?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ihre Hobbies?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ihre Körpergrösse?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ihre Essgewohnheiten?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Das Land/ die Länder, aus der Ihre Eltern stammen?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ihre Haar- oder Augenfarbe?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

30. Fallen Ihnen andere Merkmale ein, die Sie einer solchen neuen Bekanntschaft mitteilen würden? Wenn ja, bitte nennen Sie sie hier.

31. Wie gleich oder verschieden **fühlen Sie sich** in den folgenden Lebensbereichen von in Deutschland lebenden Menschen Ihres Alters und ihrer sozialen Zugehörigkeit? Bitte kreuzen Sie in jeder Zeile ein Kästchen an.

	Völlig gleich	Sehr ähnlich	Ähnlich	Eher anders	Sehr verschieden
Lebensgewohnheiten allgemein	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Werte	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Kenntnis der deutschen Kultur	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Stellenwert der Religion	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Essgewohnheiten	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Freizeitgestaltung	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Kenntnis der deutschen politischen Institutionen	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Lebensziele	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Chancen, sie zu erreichen	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

32. Wie gleich oder verschieden **glauben Sie**, von in Deutschland lebenden Menschen Ihres Alters und ihrer sozialen Zugehörigkeit **empfunden zu werden**? Bitte kreuzen Sie in jeder Zeile ein Kästchen an.

	Völlig gleich	Sehr ähnlich	Ähnlich	Eher anders	Sehr verschieden
Lebensgewohnheiten allgemein	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Werte	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Kenntnis der deutschen Kultur	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Stellenwert der Religion	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Essgewohnheiten	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Freizeitgestaltung	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Kenntnis der deutschen politischen Institutionen	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Lebensziele	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Chancen, sie zu erreichen	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

33. Wie gleich oder verschieden **fühlen Sie sich** in den folgenden Lebensbereichen vom in Deutschland lebenden Menschen Ihres Alters und ihrer sozialen Zugehörigkeit? Bitte kreuzen Sie in jeder Zeile ein Kästchen an.

	Völlig gleich	Sehr ähnlich	Ähnlich	Eher anders	Sehr verschieden
Kleidung	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Augenfarbe	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Aussprache / Akzent	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Haarfarbe	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Hautfarbe	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Name	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

34. Wie gleich oder verschieden **glauben Sie** von in Deutschland lebenden Menschen Ihren Alters und Ihrer sozialen Zugehörigkeit **empfunden zu werden**? Bitte kreuzen Sie in jeder Zeile ein Kästchen an.

	Völlig gleich	Sehr ähnlich	Ähnlich	Eher anders	Sehr verschieden
Kleidung	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Augenfarbe	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Aussprache / Akzent	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Haarfarbe	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Hautfarbe	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Name	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

35. Haben Sie versucht, dieses Bild der anderen zu beeinflussen in den Bereichen in denen das möglich war (wie evtl. Akzent oder Kleidung) ?

- Nein, nie. [weiter mit Frage 37]
- Ja, eine Zeit lang.
- Ja. Ich tue es immer noch.

36. Haben Ihre Versuche nach Ihrer Einschätzung dazu beigetragen, die Wahrnehmung Ihrer Mitmenschen zu ändern?

- Ja, sehr.
- Ja, ein bisschen.
- Nein, nicht wirklich.
- Nein, gar nicht.

Angenommen, Sie hätten die Möglichkeit, Ihre Person und Ihre Umgebung nach Belieben zu beeinflussen (was natürlich in Wirklichkeit nicht geht). Welche der folgenden Merkmale würden Sie an sich und/oder Ihrer Umgebung ändern, um die jeweils genannten Ziele zu erreichen.

37. Angenommen, Sie wollten **mehr Kontakt zu Menschen, die von deutschen Eltern abstammen**. Welche Änderungen wären hilfreich um dieses Ziel zu erreichen? Bitte ordnen Sie die, die Ihnen geeignet erscheinen nach ihrer Tauglichkeit. Geben Sie der Änderung, mit der Sie Ihrer Meinung nach das Ziel am schnellsten erreichen könnten die kleinste Nummer, und der am wenigsten effektiven Änderung die größte Nummer.

Ich würde meinen sozialen Status verbessern.	<input type="text"/>
Ich würde meinen Akzent / meine Aussprache verändern.	<input type="text"/>
Ich würde meine deutschen Sprachkenntnisse verbessern.	<input type="text"/>
Ich würde mein Aussehen verändern.	<input type="text"/>
Ich würde meinen Namen verändern.	<input type="text"/>
Ich würde mir den deutschen Pass aneignen.	<input type="text"/>
Ich würde meine Religionszugehörigkeit verschweigen.	<input type="text"/>
ODER Ich glaube dass keine der genannten Veränderungen hilfreich wären.	<input type="text"/>
ODER Das trifft auf mich nicht zu. Ich will nicht mehr Kontakt.	<input type="text"/>

38. Angenommen, Sie **wollten eine bessere Wohnung**. Was wäre hilfreich um dieses Ziel zu erreichen? Bitte ordnen Sie die, die Ihnen geeignet erscheinen nach ihrer Tauglichkeit. Geben Sie der Änderung, mit der Sie Ihrer Meinung nach das Ziel am schnellsten erreichen könnten die kleinste Nummer, und der am wenigsten effektiven Änderung die größte Nummer.

Ich würde mein Einkommen erhöhen.	<input type="text"/>
Ich würde meinen Akzent / meine Aussprache verändern.	<input type="text"/>
Ich würde meine deutschen Sprachkenntnisse verbessern.	<input type="text"/>
Ich würde mein Aussehen verändern.	<input type="text"/>
Ich würde meinen Namen verändern.	<input type="text"/>
Ich würde die Angebotslage auf dem Wohnungsmarkt verbessern.	<input type="text"/>
Ich würde sagen, ich sei kinderlos.	<input type="text"/>
Ich würde mir den deutschen Pass aneignen.	<input type="text"/>
ODER: Ich glaube dass keine der genannten Veränderungen hilfreich wären.	<input type="text"/>

39. Angenommen, Sie wollten **mehr Erfolg bei der Arbeitssuche**, eine bessere Arbeitsstelle oder bessere berufliche Aufstiegschancen. Welche Änderungen wären hilfreich um dieses Ziel zu erreichen? Bitte ordnen Sie die, die Ihnen geeignet erscheinen nach ihrer Tauglichkeit. Geben Sie der Änderung, mit der Sie Ihrer Meinung nach das Ziel am schnellsten erreichen könnten die kleinste Nummer, und der am wenigsten effektiven Änderung die größte Nummer.

Ich würde meine beruflichen Qualifikationen verbessern

Ich würde meinen Akzent / meine Aussprache verändern.

Ich würde mein Geschlecht wechseln.

Ich würde meine deutschen Sprachkenntnisse verbessern.

Ich würde mein Aussehen verändern.

Ich würde meinen Namen verändern.

Ich würde die Angebotslage auf dem Arbeitsmarkt verbessern.

Ich würde sagen, ich sei kinderlos.

Ich würde mir den deutschen Pass aneignen.

ODER: Ich glaube dass keine der genannten Veränderungen hilfreich wären.

40. Angenommen, Sie wollten **von Deutschen im Alltag besser behandelt werden** (beim Einkaufen, bei Freizeitaktivitäten etc). Welche Änderungen wären hilfreich, um dieses Ziel zu erreichen? Bitte ordnen Sie die, die Ihnen geeignet erscheinen nach ihrer Tauglichkeit. Geben Sie der Änderung, mit der Sie Ihrer Meinung nach das Ziel am schnellsten erreichen könnten die kleinste Nummer, und der am wenigsten effektiven Änderung die größte Nummer.

Ich würde meinen Akzent / meine Aussprache verändern.

Ich würde meine deutschen Sprachkenntnisse verbessern.

Ich würde mein Aussehen verändern.

Ich würde meinen Namen verändern.

Ich würde mir den deutschen Pass aneignen.

Ich würde meine Religionszugehörigkeit verschweigen.

ODER: Ich glaube dass keine der genannten Veränderungen hilfreich wären.

ODER: Das trifft auf mich nicht zu. Ich werde immer gut behandelt.

Die folgenden Fragen betreffen Ihre gegenwärtige Wohnsituation.

41. Bewohnen Sie Ihre gegenwärtige Wohnung

als Wohneigentümer/in

als Mieter/in

42. Welche Faktoren spielten bei der Wahl Ihrer gegenwärtigen Wohnung eine Rolle? Bitte kreuzen Sie in jeder Zeile das zutreffende Kästchen an.

	War gar nicht wichtig	War etwas wichtig	War sehr wichtig
Die Miete ist erschwinglich.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Die Wohnung liegt nah an meiner Arbeitsstelle.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Meine Freunde wohnen in der Nähe.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Meine Familie wohnt in der Nähe.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ich hatte keine anderen Wohnungsangebote.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Die Wohnung ist gut mit öffentlichen Verkehrsmitteln zu erreichen.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

43. Womit ist Ihre gegenwärtige Wohnung ausgestattet? Bitte kreuzen Sie alles zutreffende an.

<input type="checkbox"/> Küche	<input type="checkbox"/> Keller	<input type="checkbox"/> Zentralheizung
<input type="checkbox"/> Bad/ Dusche	<input type="checkbox"/> WC in der Wohnung	<input type="checkbox"/> Balkon / Terrasse
<input type="checkbox"/> Garten	<input type="checkbox"/> Warmwasser, Boiler	<input type="checkbox"/> Telefon
		<input type="checkbox"/> Internet

44. Wie zufrieden sind Sie mit Ihrer gegenwärtigen Wohnsituation? Bitte kreuzen Sie das entsprechende Kästchen an.

Völlig zufrieden	Sehr zufrieden	Ziemlich zufrieden	Weder noch	Ziemlich unzufrieden	Sehr unzufrieden	Völlig unzufrieden
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

45. Leben nach Ihrem Empfinden in Ihrer Wohnumgebung überwiegend [Bitte kreuzen Sie das entsprechende Kästchen an.]

Deutsche

Menschen Ihrer nicht-deutschen Abstammung

Menschen anderer nicht-deutscher Abstammung

Menschen deutscher und nicht-deutscher Abstammung zu etwa gleichen Teilen

ODER: Kann ich nicht sagen

46. Würden Sie sich in Ihrer Wohnumgebung mehr Kontakt wünschen zu

	Eher ja	Eher nein
Deutschen	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Menschen ihrer nicht-deutschen Abstammung	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Menschen anderer nicht-deutscher Abstammung	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Die folgenden Fragen drehen sich um Ihre besten Freunde oder Freundinnen. Wir meinen dabei nicht Ihren Lebenspartner oder Ihre Lebenspartnerin und auch nicht Angehörige Ihrer Familie, sondern andere Personen, denen Sie sich sehr nahe fühlen.

47. Welcher Abstammung sind Ihre drei besten Freunde oder Freundinnen? Bitte kreuzen Sie jeweils für jede der drei FreundInnen das zutreffende Kästchen an. Wenn Sie weniger als drei beste FreundInnen haben lassen Sie die entsprechende(n) Spalte(n) einfach leer.

	1. Freund/in	2. Freund/in	3. Freund/in
Deutscher Abstammung	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Meiner nicht-deutschen Abstammung	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Einer anderen nicht-deutschen Abstammung	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Gemischt (d.h. die Eltern sind verschiedener Abstammung)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

ODER: Ich habe zur Zeit gar keine besten Freunde oder Freundinnen.
[weiter mit Frage 49]

48. Wie oft haben Sie mit Ihren besten FreundInnen (persönlichen, brieflichen, Email-, oder telefonischen) Kontakt?

	1. Freund/in	2. Freund/ in	3. Freund/ in
Täglich	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Etwa 2 bis 4 Mal pro Woche	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Etwa 1 Mal pro Woche	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Etwa 1 Mal im Monat	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Weniger häufig	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

49. Könnten Sie sich vorstellen [Bitte kreuzen Sie in jeder Zeile das zutreffende Kästchen an.]

	Auf jeden Fall	Möglicherweise	Eher nicht	Auf keinen Fall
einen Partner ihrer (nicht-deutschen) Abstammung zu haben?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
einen deutschstämmigen Partner zu haben?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
einen Partner anderer nicht-deutscher Abstammung zu haben?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

50. Wie oft haben Sie in den folgenden Lebensbereichen Kontakt zu Deutschen?

	Täglich	Etwa 2 bis 4 Mal pro Woche	Etwa 1 Mal pro Woche	Etwa 1 Mal im Monat	Weniger häufig
In der Nachbarschaft	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Am Arbeitsplatz	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unter Freunden / Bekannten	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
In Familie / Verwandtschaft	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Die folgenden Fragen drehen sich um Ihre emotionale Bindung an Deutschland und an das Land, aus dem Ihr Vater und/oder Ihre Mutter stammen.

51. Wo fühlen Sie sich heimisch? Bitte wählen Sie aus der folgenden Liste nur aus, was auf Sie zutrifft und ordnen Sie diese Orte nach Wichtigkeit. Geben Sie dem Ort, an dem Sie sich am ehesten heimisch fühlen die niedrigste Nummer, und dem, an dem Sie sich am wenigsten heimisch fühlen die größte Nummer.

- | | |
|---|----------------------|
| In Deutschland | <input type="text"/> |
| Im Herkunftsland meiner Mutter/ meines Vaters | <input type="text"/> |
| In beiden Ländern gleichermassen | <input type="text"/> |
| In der Stadt / Gemeinde in der ich lebe | <input type="text"/> |
| Überall | <input type="text"/> |
| Nirgendwo | <input type="text"/> |

52. Haben Sie vor, für immer in Deutschland zu bleiben? Bitte kreuzen Sie das zutreffende Kästchen an.

- Eher ja.
 Eher nein.
 Ich weiss nicht.

53. Wohnen Sie: [Bitte kreuzen Sie das zutreffende Kästchen an]

- In einer Großstadt
 Am Rande oder in den Vororten einer Großstadt
 In einer Mittel- oder Kleinstadt
 In einem ländlichen Dorf
 In einem Einzelgehöft oder einem alleinstehenden Haus auf dem Lande

54. Wenn Deutschland gegen das Heimatland Ihres Vaters /Ihrer Mutter im Endspiel der Fussballweltmeisterschaft stehen würde, welcher Mannschaft würden Sie eher die Daumen drücken? Bitte kreuzen Sie das zutreffende Kästchen an.

- Deutschland
 Dem Heimatland meiner Mutter / meines Vaters
 Wer gewinnt wäre mir egal

55. Wie lange waren Sie in den letzten zwei Jahren insgesamt im nicht-deutschen Herkunftsland Ihres Vaters und /oder Ihrer Mutter? Bitte kreuzen Sie das zutreffende Kästchen an.

- Nie
 Bis 3 Wochen
 1-3 Monate
 4-6 Monate
 Länger

56. Haben Sie in den letzten deutschen Bundestags- und Landtagswahlen gewählt?

Nein. Ich habe kein Wahlrecht in Deutschland weil ich kein Staatsbürger bin.

Nein, ich war noch unter 18 und konnte deshalb nicht wählen.

Nein. Ich hätte zwar wählen können, aber das ist mir nicht so wichtig.
[weiter mit Frage 58]

Ja. Ich habe in einer der beiden Wahlen gewählt. [weiter mit Frage 58]

Ja. Ich habe in beiden Wahlen gewählt. [weiter mit Frage 58]

57. Hätten Sie gewählt, wenn Sie das Wahlrecht gehabt hätten? Bitte kreuzen Sie das zutreffende Kästchen an.

Ja, auf jeden Fall.

Möglicherweise.

Eher nicht.

Auf keinen Fall.

58. In welcher/n Sprache/n nutzen Sie die folgenden Medien regelmässig (mindestens ein Mal pro Woche)? Bitte kreuzen Sie in jeder Zeile das entsprechende Kästchen an.

	deutsch	In meiner nicht-deutschen Mutter- / Vatersprache	Englisch	Ich nutze diess Medium nicht regelmässig / gar nicht
Fernsehen	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Radio	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Tageszeitung	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Wochenzeitung	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Internet	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sonstige	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

59. Finden Sie sich nach Ihrer Einschätzung in Deutschland zurecht? Bitte kreuzen Sie das zutreffende Kästchen an.

Ja.

Eher Ja.

Eher nein.

Nein.

Die folgenden Fragen betreffen Ihre Staatsbürgerschaft(en). Ihre Antworten auf diese Fragen werden streng vertraulich behandelt. Sie werden unter keinen Umständen anderen Personen zur Verfügung gestellt. Ihre Antworten auf alle Fragen sind freiwillig. Wir möchten Sie dennoch ermutigen, Sie zu beantworten, weil unser Projekt wichtige Erkenntnisse liefert, die die politische Debatte um doppelte Staatsbürgerschaft in Deutschland beeinflussen könnten.

60. Haben Sie die deutsche Staatsbürgerschaft? Bitte kreuzen Sie das zutreffende Kästchen an.

- Ja, ausschliesslich. [weiter mit Frage 68]
- Ja, und auch die eines anderen Landes / anderer Länder. [weiter mit Frage 67]
- Nein. Ich habe eine andere / andere Staatsbürgerschaften.
- Nein. Ich besitze keine Staatsbürgerschaft, ich bin staatenlos.

61. Erfüllen Sie die Voraussetzungen für die deutsche Staatsbürgerschaft?

- Ja.
- Nein. [weiter mit Frage 67]
- Ich weiss nicht.

62. Haben Sie vor, die deutsche Staatsbürgerschaft zu beantragen?

- Ja. In jedem Fall
- Eher ja.
- Eher nein. [weiter mit Frage 64]
- Nein. Auf keinen Fall [weiter mit Frage 64]

63. Warum haben Sie vor, die deutsche Staatsbürgerschaft zu beantragen? Bitte kreuzen Sie in jeder Zeile das zutreffende Kästchen an.

	Sehr zutreffend	Eher zutreffend	Eher nicht zutreffend	Trifft überhaupt nicht zu
Rechliche Vorteile / Aufenthaltssicherheit	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ich möchte politische Rechte haben (Wahlrecht)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Weil meine Kinder Deutsche geworden sind	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ich werde mein Leben hier verbringen.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ich fühle mich als Deutsche/r und / oder eng mit Deutschland verbunden	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ich habe keine Bindung (mehr) an das Heimatland meiner Mutter / meines Vaters	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

64. Warum haben Sie nicht die Absicht, die deutsche Staatsbürgerschaft zu beantragen? Bitte kreuzen Sie in jeder Zeile das zutreffende Kästchen an.

	Sehr zutreffend	Eher zutreffend	Trifft eher nicht zu	Trifft überhaupt nicht zu
Ich möchte meine andere(n) Staatsbürgerschaft(en) nicht aufgeben.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> [weiter mit Frage 67]	<input type="checkbox"/> [weiter mit Frage 67]
Die Einbürgerung ist zu teuer.	<input type="checkbox"/> [weiter mit Frage 67]	<input type="checkbox"/> [weiter mit Frage 67]	<input type="checkbox"/> [weiter mit Frage 67]	<input type="checkbox"/> [weiter mit Frage 67]
Ich befürchte, den Sprachtest / Einbürgerungstest nicht zu bestehen.	<input type="checkbox"/> [weiter mit Frage 67]	<input type="checkbox"/> [weiter mit Frage 67]	<input type="checkbox"/> [weiter mit Frage 67]	<input type="checkbox"/> [weiter mit Frage 67]
Ich verspreche mir von der deutschen Staatsbürgerschaft keine Vorteile.	<input type="checkbox"/> [weiter mit Frage 66]	<input type="checkbox"/> [weiter mit Frage 66]	<input type="checkbox"/> [weiter mit Frage 67]	<input type="checkbox"/> [weiter mit Frage 67]
Der bürokratische Aufwand ist zu hoch.	<input type="checkbox"/> [weiter mit Frage 67]	<input type="checkbox"/> [weiter mit Frage 67]	<input type="checkbox"/> [weiter mit Frage 67]	<input type="checkbox"/> [weiter mit Frage 67]

65. Warum möchten Sie Ihre andere(n) Staatsbürgerschaft(en) nicht aufgeben?

	Sehr zutreffend	Eher zutreffend	Trifft eher nicht zu	Trifft überhaupt nicht zu
Ich fühle mich mit dem Land meiner gegenwärtigen Staatsbürgerschaft mehr verbunden als mit Deutschland.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Es würde die Einreise in das Land meiner gegenwärtigen Staatsbürgerschaft erschweren.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ich möchte erst abwarten, wie sich die rechtliche Lage Eingebürgerter im Land meiner gegenwärtigen Staatsbürgerschaft entwickelt.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ich befürchte, im Land meiner gegenwärtigen Staatsbürgerschaft nichts erben zu können.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ich möchte in das Land meiner gegenwärtigen Staatsbürgerschaft zurückkehren können.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ich möchte einen Zufluchtsort haben, wenn Ausländerfeindlichkeit in Deutschland zu schlimm wird.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

66. Warum versprechen Sie sich von der deutschen Staatsbürgerschaft eher weniger Vorteile? Bitte kreuzen Sie in jeder Zeile das zutreffende Kästchen an

	Sehr zutreffend	Eher zutreffend	Trifft eher nicht zu	Trifft überhaupt nicht zu
Ich werde auch als Ausländer gesehen wenn ich einen deutschen Paß habe.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ich fühle mich nicht als Deutsche(r).	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
In Deutschland wählen zu können ist nicht so wichtig für mich.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ich bin EU-Bürger, und genieße ohnehin fast alle Rechte eines deutschen Staatsbürgers.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

67. Welche Staatsbürgerschaft(en) haben Sie? Bitte kreuzen Sie das oder die zutreffenden Kästchen an.

- | | |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Bulgarien | <input type="checkbox"/> Slowakei |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Deutschland | <input type="checkbox"/> Staaten der ehemaligen Sowjetunion |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Frankreich | <input type="checkbox"/> Spanien |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Griechenland | <input type="checkbox"/> Thailand |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Großbritannien oder Nordirland | <input type="checkbox"/> Tschechische Republik |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Italien | <input type="checkbox"/> Tunesien |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Libanon | <input type="checkbox"/> Türkei |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Marokko | <input type="checkbox"/> Ungarn |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Niederlande | <input type="checkbox"/> USA |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Österreich | <input type="checkbox"/> Vietnam |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Polen | <input type="checkbox"/> Staaten des ehemaligen Jugoslawien |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Portugal | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Schweden | <input type="checkbox"/> Anderes Land, und zwar: |

68. Welche Staatsbürgerschaft(en) hat Ihre Mutter? Bitte kreuzen Sie das oder die zutreffenden Kästchen an.

- | | |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Bulgarien | <input type="checkbox"/> Slowakei |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Deutschland | <input type="checkbox"/> Staaten der ehemaligen Sowjetunion |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Frankreich | <input type="checkbox"/> Spanien |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Griechenland | <input type="checkbox"/> Thailand |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Großbritannien oder Nordirland | <input type="checkbox"/> Tschechische Republik |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Italien | <input type="checkbox"/> Tunesien |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Libanon | <input type="checkbox"/> Türkei |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Marokko | <input type="checkbox"/> Ungarn |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Niederlande | <input type="checkbox"/> USA |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Österreich | <input type="checkbox"/> Vietnam |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Polen | <input type="checkbox"/> Staaten des ehemaligen Jugoslawien |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Portugal | <input type="checkbox"/> Ich weiss nicht. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Rumänien | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Schweden | <input type="checkbox"/> Anderes Land, und zwar: |

69. Welche Staatsbürgerschaft(en) hat Ihr Vater? Bitte kreuzen Sie das oder die zutreffenden Kästchen an.

<input type="checkbox"/>	Bulgarien	<input type="checkbox"/>	Slowakei
<input type="checkbox"/>	Deutschland	<input type="checkbox"/>	Staaten der ehemaligen Sowjetunion
<input type="checkbox"/>	Frankreich	<input type="checkbox"/>	Spanien
<input type="checkbox"/>	Griechenland	<input type="checkbox"/>	Thailand
<input type="checkbox"/>	Großbritannien oder Nordirland	<input type="checkbox"/>	Tschechische Republik
<input type="checkbox"/>	Italien	<input type="checkbox"/>	Tunesien
<input type="checkbox"/>	Libanon	<input type="checkbox"/>	Türkei
<input type="checkbox"/>	Marokko	<input type="checkbox"/>	Ungarn
<input type="checkbox"/>	Niederlande	<input type="checkbox"/>	USA
<input type="checkbox"/>	Österreich	<input type="checkbox"/>	Vietnam
<input type="checkbox"/>	Polen	<input type="checkbox"/>	Staaten des ehemaligen Jugoslawien
<input type="checkbox"/>	Portugal	<input type="checkbox"/>	Ich weiss nicht.
<input type="checkbox"/>	Rumänien		
<input type="checkbox"/>	Schweden	<input type="checkbox"/>	Anderes Land, und zwar:

70. Sind sie:

Männlich

Weiblich

71. Wie hoch ist Ihr eigenes monatliches Nettoeinkommen in Euro ungefähr (die Summe, die nach Abzug der Steuern und Sozialversicherungsbeiträge übrig bleibt)? Bitte kreuzen Sie das zutreffende Kästchen an.

Unter 500 Euro

Von 500 bis 999 Euro

Von 1000 bis unter 1500 Euro

Von 1500 bis unter 2500 Euro

Von 2500 bis unter 5000 Euro

Über 5000 Euro

72. In welchem Bundesland wohnen Sie? Bitte kreuzen Sie das entsprechende Kästchen an.

<input type="checkbox"/>	Baden-Württemberg	<input type="checkbox"/>	Niedersachsen
<input type="checkbox"/>	Bayern	<input type="checkbox"/>	Nordrhein-Westfalen
<input type="checkbox"/>	Berlin	<input type="checkbox"/>	Rheinland-Pfalz
<input type="checkbox"/>	Brandenburg	<input type="checkbox"/>	Saarland
<input type="checkbox"/>	Bremen	<input type="checkbox"/>	Sachsen
<input type="checkbox"/>	Hamburg	<input type="checkbox"/>	Sachsen-Anhalt
<input type="checkbox"/>	Hessen	<input type="checkbox"/>	Schleswig-Holstein
<input type="checkbox"/>	Mecklenburg-Vorpommern	<input type="checkbox"/>	Thüringen

73. Haben Sie Anregungen oder Kritik zum Thema dieser Umfrage oder zu diesem Fragebogen?
Wenn ja, würden wir uns freuen, wenn Sie sie hier mit uns teilen würden.

74. Hätten Sie Interesse daran, Ihre Erfahrungen in einem streng vertraulichen persönlichen Interview näher zu beschreiben?

- Ja
 Nein [Fragebogen beenden]

75. Wie könnten wir Sie zwecks Terminabsprache am besten erreichen?

- Am besten per email.
 Am besten telefonisch.
 Am besten brieflich.
 Meine (Email)Adresse / Telefonnummner ist:

Vielen herzlichen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme.

Bitte wenden Sie sich bei Fragen an [Email address] oder telefonisch an [Telephone number].
Eine Zusammenfassung der Ergebnisse dieser Umfrage wird nach Beendigung des Projektes allen Teilnehmern auf Anfrage zugesandt.

Original interview guide

Können Sie kurz beschreiben, woher Ihre Eltern kommen, vielleicht wie sich kennegelernt haben und seit wann Sie in Deutschland leben?

*Welche Rolle spielt die Herkunft Ihrer Eltern in Ihrem Alltag in Deutschland?
Welche Erfahrungen machen Sie da mit den Leuten?*

Welche Vorstellungen kommen Ihnen in den Sinn wenn Sie an Integration denken?

Wie haben Sie persönlich Integration in Deutschland erlebt?

Was könnte ihrer Meinung nach helfen, dass Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund sich in Deutschland wohl fühlen?

Stellen Sie sich vor Sie könnten die deutsche Integrationspolitik bestimmen. Welche Massnahmen sollte es geben, um welche Veränderungen herbeizuführen?

Möchten Sie noch etwas hinzufügen?

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