On a Lower Bound for the Redundancy of Reliable Networks with Noisy Gates

Nicholas Pippenger[†], George D. Stamoulis[‡], and John N. Tsitsiklis[‡]

Abstract

We provide a proof that a logarithmic redundancy factor is necessary for the reliable computation of the parity function by means of a network with noisy gates. This is the same as the main result in [1], except that the analysis therein seems to be not entirely correct.

† Department of Computer Science, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia V6T 1W5, Canada. Research supported by the NSERC under Grant OGP-0041640.

[‡] Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass. 02139, USA. Research supported by the NSF under Grant ECS-8552419, with matching funds from Bellcore Inc. and Du Pont, and by the ARO under Grant DAAL03-86-K-0171.

1. INTRODUCTION

Computation of Boolean functions by means of noisy gates is a topic that started attracting the attention of researchers in the early '50s. The first related work was that of von Neumann [4] in 1952. The problem defined there is as follows: Suppose that the gates available for the computation of a Boolean function are not completely reliable; in particular, each one of them fails with probability $\varepsilon < \frac{1}{2}$, independently of the other gates. Given the values of its input bits, a gate is said to "fail" if it produces the complement of the output bit that it would have produced if it were completely reliable and its <u>inputs were the same</u>. Is it possible under these assumptions to build, for any given function f, a network that computes f(x) correctly with <u>high probability</u> for <u>every</u> input vector x?

Von Neumann proved in [4] that computations may be done reliably for all sufficiently small $\varepsilon > 0$. In his construction, each intermediate result is computed several times and its value is determined by majority voting. One then obtains a probability of error $\eta(\varepsilon)$ for the final result, where $\eta(\varepsilon) < \frac{1}{2}$ for all sufficiently small $\varepsilon > 0$. Unfortunately, this procedure for constructing reliable networks results in an unacceptably large number of gates.

Almost 25 years after von Neumann introduced the problem, Dobrushin and Ortyukov [1] claimed that there are cases where a considerable increase in complexity is <u>necessary</u> for reliable computation. Indeed, let L(f) be the number of gates of a <u>minimal</u> noise-free network that computes some Boolean function f; these authors stated the following result: there exists some function f^* (namely, the parity function) such that any network that computes f^* with probability of error $p < \frac{1}{3}$ must contain $\Omega(L(f^*) \ln L(f^*))$ gates; i.e., the <u>order of magnitude</u> of the number of gates in any such reliable network is at least $L(f^*) \ln L(f^*)$. Thus, reliable computation of f^* requires at least <u>logarithmic redundancy</u>. The proof of this claim in [1] contains two questionable arguments; moreover, there does not seem to be any obvious modification that could result in a correct proof. In this paper, we present a new proof of the result stated above. Our analysis follows steps similar to those in [1]; however, our approach to the questionable points in [1] is completely different. Moreover, our proof extends the validity of the claim in [1] to all $p \in (0, \frac{1}{2})$, which is the broadest acceptable range for the probability of error.

It is worth noting that for all Boolean functions there exist reliable networks with logarithmic redundacy; this result was proved by Dobrushin and Ortyukov in [2]. Moreover, as was proved by Pippenger [5], a rather broad class of Boolean functions may be computed reliably by networks that involve only constant redundancy. Thus, the logarithmic lower bound for the redundancy factor is <u>tight</u> only in the the <u>worst</u> case.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In \$2, we present an outline of the analysis in [1] and we state a result that implies the logarithmic lower bound on the redundancy factor. In \$3, we give our proof of this auxiliary result. Finally, in \$4, we present some concluding remarks.

2. AN OUTLINE OF THE ANALYSIS IN [1]

In this section, we use a notation similar to that of [1]. First, we give some of the definitions therein.

We consider a finite and complete basis Φ ; the maximum fan-in of the gates in Φ is denoted by $n(\Phi)$. All networks considered in the analysis are assumed to consist only of gates belonging to this basis Φ . In the presence of noise, the gates available are assumed to fail according to the model presented in §1; the probability ε of failure is taken to be fixed. Let f be a Boolean function and \mathcal{M} be a network over Φ . Moreover, let $\xi(x,\varepsilon)$ be the output of \mathcal{M} , where x is some assignment of the values of the input bits of \mathcal{M} ; of course, $\xi(x,\varepsilon)$ is a random variable. The network \mathcal{M} is said to compute the function f with probability of error p if the following holds:

$$\Pr[\xi(x,\varepsilon) \neq f(x)] \le p, \text{ for all } x; \qquad (1)$$

 $p \in (0, \frac{1}{2})$ is a given scalar. Let $L_{p,\epsilon}(f, \Phi)$ be the <u>minimum</u> number of gates in a reliable network that computes the function f in such a way that (1) is satisfied. Similarly, $L_{0,0}(f, \Phi)$ denotes the number of gates in the <u>minimal</u> network that computes f in the absence of noise.

The redundancy factor $R_{p,e}(N, \Phi)$ for the basis Φ is defined as follows:

$$R_{p,\epsilon}(N,\Phi) = \max_{\{f: L_{0,0}(f,\Phi)=N\}} \frac{L_{p,\epsilon}(f,\Phi)}{L_{0,0}(f,\Phi)},$$

i.e. it equals the maximum of the required redundancy factor over all functions f that are computable in the absence of noise with the same minimum complexity N. The main result in [1] is given in Theorem 2.1 of that article; we repeat it below, in simplified notation.

Proposition 1: For any $p \in (0, \frac{1}{2})$, the redundancy factor $R_{p,\epsilon}(N, \Phi)$ is $\Omega(\ln N)$; that is, there exists some function h(N) such that $R_{p,\epsilon}(N, \Phi) \ge h(N)$ and $\lim_{N\to\infty} \frac{h(N)}{\ln N} = h^* > 0$.

The expression for the function h(N) mentioned in Proposition 1 is of no particular importance; what is important is that h(N) is asymptotically linear in $\ln N$. Henceforth, we mainly focus on arguments involving orders of magnitude rather than giving detailed expressions.

Proposition 1 may be established by proving that some specific function f^* satisfies

$$L_{p,\epsilon}(f^*, \Phi) = \Omega(L_{0,0}(f^*, \Phi) \cdot \ln(L_{0,0}(f^*, \Phi)))).$$
(2)

In particular, the authors of [1] considered the parity function $f^*(x) = x_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus x_n$, i.e. the sum modulo 2 of x_1, \ldots, x_n . (Note that \oplus is the symbol for the XOR operation.) The choice of this function makes intuitive sense, because, when the value of one of the x_i 's is reversed, the value of $f^*(x)$ changes; in some sense, $f^*(x)$ is a "sensitive" function.

For this sensitivity of the function f^* to be exploited, a new model for noise is introduced in [1]. Under the new model, each of the <u>wires</u> fails with probability δ , independently of all other

wires and gates; failure of a wire results in transmission of the complement of the input bit-signal. Consider now some gate that receives j binary input bits τ_1, \ldots, τ_j and computes the function $\phi(\tau)$. Due to failures of the input wires, the vector $\tau = (\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_j)$ may be different than the vector $t = (t_1, \ldots, t_i)$ of the bits that the gate should have received. Moreover, given the distorted input vector τ , the gate may not produce $\phi(\tau)$; this is assumed to occur with probability $P(\tau, \delta)$, independently of all other gates. However, since the output of the gate in the absence of noise would have been $\phi(t)$, the gate is considered to fail if it does not produce $\phi(t)$. It is established in Lemma 3.1 of [1] that, given some $\delta \in [0, \varepsilon/j]$, there exists a unique vector of malfuction probabilities $(P(\tau,\delta))_{\tau\in\{0,1\}^j}$ such that the overall probability that the gate does not produce $\phi(t)$ is equal to ε (for all t), as was the case in the original model. Though technically complicated, the underlying idea is clear: failures of gates may be visualized as not caused only by noisy computation, but also by noisy reception of the inputs. The parameters of this new model for noise can be selected in such a way that each gate still fails with probability ε . In this case, the state-vector of the network has the same statistical properties as originally, which is intuitively clear. This is established in Lemma 3.2 of [1], by using induction on the depth of the network; this result holds for all $\delta \in [0, \frac{\varepsilon}{n(\Phi)}]$. Thus, as far as reliability is concerned, the two types of networks are equivalent. On the other hand, under the new model for failures, wires also are unreliable, which suggests that the number of wires plays a key role in reliability; this was not that clear under the original model for noise. Since the function f^* is the most sensitive in the noisy transmission of inputs, it is expected that the redundancy involved in its reliable computation is of the worst possible order of magnitude.

So far, we have discussed the preliminary part of the analysis in [1], where the original problem was transformed in an equivalent one. Henceforth, we are only dealing with the newly introduced problem.

It is well-known that, in the absence of noise, f^* may be calculated by using a tree of XOR gates. Thus, if the basis Φ includes the gate for $x_1 \oplus x_2$, then we have $L_{0,0}(f^*, \Phi) \leq n-1$; if not, then we have $L_{0,0}(f^*, \Phi) \leq C(\Phi)(n-1)$, where $C(\Phi)$ is the complexity of the noise-free network over Φ that computes $x_1 \oplus x_2$. (Notice that $C(\Phi)$ is finite, because Φ is a finite and complete basis.) On the other hand, it is straightforward that $L_{0,0}(f^*, \Phi) \geq \frac{n}{n(\Phi)}$. Therefore, proving (2) is equivalent to proving that $L_{p,\epsilon}(f^*, \Phi)$ is $\Omega(n \cdot \ln n)$. (Recall that n is the number of input bits.)

We consider a reliable <u>minimal complexity</u> noisy network \mathcal{N} for the function f^* . We denote by m_i the number of wires of \mathcal{N} over which the input bit x_i is transmitted, for $i = 1, \ldots, n$. Thus, \mathcal{N} has at least $\sum_{i=1}^{n} m_i$ wires, which implies that

$$L_{p, \varepsilon}(f^*, \Phi) \geq rac{\sum_{i=1}^n m_i}{n(\Phi)}$$
 .

It follows from the above discussion that in order to prove (2) (which implies Proposition 1), it suffices to prove the following result:

Proposition 2: The total number $\sum_{i=1}^{n} m_i$ of input wires in any reliable network that computes

 f^* with probability of error p is $\Omega(n \cdot \ln n)$ for all $p \in (0, \frac{1}{2})$.

In [1], this result is dealt with in Theorem 3.1 and in its auxiliary Lemma 3.3. This part of the analysis in [1] seems not to be correct; we comment on this in the Appendix. In the next section, we present our proof of Proposition 2.

It is worth noting that Theorem 3.1 of [1] would hold for several Boolean functions that are "sensitive" under some particular assignment of the input bits [e.g., the AND function, which is "sensitive" for x = (1, ..., 1)]. On the contrary, Proposition 2 holds only for the parity function.

3. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2

We fix some $p \in (0, \frac{1}{2})$. Moreover, we fix some $\delta \in (0, \frac{\epsilon}{n(\Phi)}]$; note that such a δ satisfies $\delta < \epsilon < \frac{1}{2}$. Henceforth, we assume that the input bits X_1, \ldots, X_n are independent <u>random variables</u> and that $\Pr[X_i = 0] = \frac{1}{2}$ for $i = 1, \ldots, n$. We use the notation (x_1, \ldots, x_n) to denote some particular <u>value</u> of the random vector (X_1, \ldots, X_n) . Under this assumption, we shall prove that the <u>average</u> (over all possible inputs) probability of an erroneous output for the noisy network for f^* must be greater than p, unless $\sum_{i=1}^n m_i$ is $\Omega(n \cdot \ln n)$. This implies that if $\sum_{i=1}^n m_i$ is not $\Omega(n \cdot \ln n)$, then there exists at least one input assignment for which the probability of an erroneous output exceeds p; this statement is equivalent to Proposition 2.

After introducing the assumption of equally likely input assignments, any noisy network for f^* may be visualized as a device for estimating the binary parameter $f^*(X) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} X_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus X_n$. The decision is to be based on the values of the signals communicated by the input wires. Notice that such a decision-making device employs randomization due to the presence of noise. We denote by \vec{Y} the random vector $(Y^{(1)}, \ldots, Y^{(n)})$, where $Y^{(i)} = (Y_1^{(1)}, \ldots, Y_{m_i}^{(i)})$ is the vector of binary random variables corresponding to the output signals of the input wires for X_i (see Figure 1). The <u>value</u> $y^{(i)} = (y_1^{(i)}, \ldots, y_{m_i}^{(i)})$ of $Y^{(i)}$ is a vector of <u>distorted</u> copies of the *i*th input bit X_i , for $i = 1, \ldots, n$. Thus, the data on which estimation is based is contained in the vector $\vec{Y} = (Y^{(1)}, \ldots, Y^{(n)})$. Clearly, we have $\Pr[f^*(X) = 0] = \Pr[f^*(X) = 1] = \frac{1}{2}$. Therefore, the decision-making device that has the minimum average probability of error is the one based on the <u>Maximum Likelihood</u> (ML) test. Hence, in order to prove Proposition 2, it suffices to prove the following result:

Proposition 3: If the average probability of error for the device based on the Maximum Likelihood rule does not exceed p, then $\sum_{i=1}^{n} m_i$ is $\Omega(n \cdot \ln n)$.

Proof: We fix some index $i \in \{1, ..., n\}$. We denote by w_i the number of entries of the observed vector $y^{(i)}$ that equal 0. Recalling that wires fail with probability δ and independently of each other, it follows that the ML rule for estimating X_i is equivalent to the majority-voting test:

$$w_i \overset{\hat{x}_i:=0}{\underset{\substack{<\\ \hat{x}_i:=1}}{\overset{>}{\frac{m_i}{2}}}} \frac{m_i}{2}$$

If $w_i = \frac{m_i}{2}$, then the tie may be broken arbitrarily.

We denote by Z_i the Boolean random variable indicating whether the ML estimate of X_i is correct or not; that is, we have $Z_i = 1$ if and only if $\hat{X}_i \neq X_i$. If all copies of the input bit X_i are communicated erroneously, then we have $Z_i = 1$; this implies that

$$\Pr[Z_i = 1] \ge \delta^{m_i} . \tag{3}$$

Because of the fact that wires fail independently of each other and because different input bits are independent, the random vectors $Y^{(1)}, \ldots, Y^{(n)}$ are independent conditioned on any given X. The parameter to be estimated is the parity among the input bits; thus, it is intuitively clear that the ML estimate of $f^*(X)$ should be equal to $\hat{X}_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus \hat{X}_n$, where \hat{X}_i is the ML estimate of X_i . This is proved formally in Lemma 5; first, we state the following auxiliary result (also see [3]), whose proof we include for completeness:

Lemma 4: There holds

$$1 - 2\Pr[Z_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus Z_n = 1] = \prod_{i=1}^n (1 - 2\Pr[Z_i = 1]).$$

Proof: We denote by $\phi_i(\cdot)$ the moment generating function of the Boolean random variable Z_i for i = 1, ..., n. We have $\phi_i(t) = E[e^{tZ_i}] = 1 - \Pr[Z_i = 1] + t \Pr[Z_i = 1]$. Since $Z_1, ..., Z_n$ are independent, the moment generating function $\varphi(\cdot)$ of the random variable $\sum_{i=1}^n Z_i$ can be expressed in the following product form:

$$\varphi(t) = \prod_{i=1}^{n} \phi_i(t) \,. \tag{4}$$

Clearly, we have

$$\frac{\varphi(1)-\varphi(-1)}{2}=\sum_{\text{odd }k}\Pr\left[\sum_{i=1}^n Z_i=k\right]=\Pr[Z_1\oplus\cdots\oplus Z_n=1].$$

This together with (4) and the fact that $\varphi(1) = 1$ establishes the lemma. Q.E.D.

Next, we prove the result on the ML estimate of $f^*(X)$.

Lemma 5: The ML estimate of $X_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus X_n$ is $\hat{X}_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus \hat{X}_n$, where \hat{X}_i is the ML estimate of x_i .

Proof: Let V be some Boolean random variable, with $\Pr[V=0] = \Pr[V=1] = \frac{1}{2}$. Assume that V is to be estimated based on the observation of some data vector \vec{U} . Then, the Boolean random variable \hat{V} is the ML estimate of V given \vec{U} if and only if the following is true:

$$\Pr[\hat{V} \neq V \mid \vec{U} = \vec{u}] \le \frac{1}{2}, \forall \vec{u}.$$
(5)

Thus, in order to prove the lemma, it suffices to show that

$$\Pr[\hat{X}_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus \hat{X}_n \neq X_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus X_n \,|\, \vec{Y} = \vec{y}\,] \le \frac{1}{2}\,,\,\forall \vec{y}\,. \tag{6}$$

(Recall that $X_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus X_n$ takes the values 0 and 1 with probability $\frac{1}{2}$.)

Since Z_i takes the value 1 if and only if $\hat{X}_i \neq X_i$, we have $\hat{X}_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus \hat{X}_n \neq X_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus X_n$ if and only if $Z_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus Z_n = 1$, that is if and only if an odd number of the input bits are estimated erroneously. Therefore, we have

$$\Pr[\hat{X}_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus \hat{X}_n \neq X_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus X_n | \vec{Y} = \vec{y}] = \Pr[Z_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus Z_n = 1 | \vec{Y} = \vec{y}].$$
(7)

Reasoning similarly as in proving Lemma 4, we obtain

$$1 - 2\Pr[Z_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus Z_n = 1 | \vec{Y} = \vec{y}] = \prod_{i=1}^n \left(1 - 2\Pr[Z_i = 1 | \vec{Y} = \vec{y}] \right).$$
(8)

Since \hat{X}_i is the ML estimate of X_i given \vec{Y} , it follows from (5) that

$$\Pr[Z_i = 1 | \vec{Y} = \vec{y}] = \Pr[\hat{X}_i \neq X_i | \vec{Y} = \vec{y}] \le \frac{1}{2}, \forall \vec{y}.$$

Combining this with (8), we obtain

$$\Pr[Z_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus Z_n = 1 | \vec{Y} = \vec{y}] \leq \frac{1}{2}, \forall \vec{y}.$$

This together with (7) proves (6).

We now complete the proof of Proposition 3.

We have already argued that the event $Z_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus Z_n = 1$ coincides with the event that the ML estimate of $f^*(X)$ is erroneous. Thus, we have

$$\Pr[Z_1\oplus\cdots\oplus Z_n=1]\leq p\,,$$

by assumption. This together with (3) and Lemma 4 implies that

$$1-2p\leq\prod_{i=1}^n(1-2\delta^{m_i}).$$

Using the inequality between arithmetic and geometric means, we obtain

$$1 - 2p \leq \left(\frac{1}{n}\sum_{i=1}^{n}(1 - 2\delta^{m_i})\right)^n = \left(1 - \frac{2}{n}\sum_{i=1}^{n}\delta^{m_i}\right)^n.$$

Again using the inequality between arithmetic and geometric means, followed by the inequality $1 - \alpha \leq \exp(-\alpha)$, we obtain

$$1-2p\leq \left(1-2\delta^{\frac{1}{n}\sum_{i=1}^{n}m_{i}}\right)^{n}\leq \exp\left(-2n\delta^{\frac{1}{n}\sum_{i=1}^{n}m_{i}}\right),$$

 $\mathbf{Q}.\mathbf{E}.\mathbf{D}.$

which implies that

$$\sum_{i=1}^n m_i \ge n \frac{\ln(2n) - \ln \ln(\frac{1}{1-2p})}{\ln(\frac{1}{\delta})} \,.$$

The above result holds for all $\delta \in (0, \frac{\epsilon}{n(\Phi)}]$; taking $\delta = \frac{\epsilon}{n(\Phi)}$, we obtain

$$\sum_{i=1}^n m_i \ge n \frac{\ln(2n) - \ln \ln(\frac{1}{1-2p})}{\ln(\frac{n(\Phi)}{\epsilon})};$$

clearly, this proves that $\sum_{i=1}^{n} m_i$ is $\Omega(n \cdot \ln n)$.

4. CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this paper we have proved a lower bound for the redundancy involved in constructing reliable networks by means of noisy gates. In particular, we have established that a redundancy factor logarithmic in n is necessary for reliable compution of the parity (i.e., the sum modulo 2) of n bits. This result was first stated by Dobrushin and Ortyukov in [1]. As we have argued in the Appendix, we believe that the proof given in [1] is not entirely correct. We have established the result by following the same steps as Dobrushin and Ortyukov and by replacing the questionable part of their analysis with entirely new arguments. Nevertheless, formulating the lower bound problem and introducing a suitable problem transformation has proved to be a valuable contribution of [1].

References

- [1] R.L. Dobrushin and S.I. Ortyukov, "Lower bound for the redundancy of self-correcting arrangements of unreliable functional elements," *Prob. Inf. Trans.* 13, 1977, pp. 59–65.
- [2] R.L. Dobrushin and S.I. Ortyukov, "Upper bound for the redundancy of self-correcting arrangements of unreliable functional elements," *Prob. Inf. Trans.* 13, 1977, pp. 203-218.
- [3] R.G. Gallager, Low-Density Parity-Check Codes, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1963.
- [4] J. von Neumann, "Probabilistic logics and the synthesis of reliable organisms from unreliable components," In Automata Studies, C.E. Shannon and J. McCarthy Eds., Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1956, pp. 329-378.
- [5] N. Pippenger, "On networks of noisy gates," In Proc. of the 26th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, IEEE, 1985, pp. 30-36.

8

Q.E.D.

APPENDIX

In this appendix we discuss the proofs of Theorem 3.1 and of Lemma 3.3 in [1]. First we consider the latter, which we present below.

Lemma 3.3 of [1]: Let $p \in (0, \frac{1}{3})$ and $\delta \in (0, \frac{1}{2})$. Moreover, let $(H_l)_{l \in Q}$ be independent events satisfying the following:

$$\Pr[H_l] \geq \delta^{m_l} , \, \forall l \in Q$$

and

$$p \geq (1-p) \Pr\left[\bigcup_{l \in Q} H_l
ight],$$

where $\bigcup_{l \in Q} H_l$ is the event that <u>exactly one</u> of the events $(H_l)_{l \in Q}$ has occured. Then,

$$\sum_{l \in \mathcal{Q}} m_l \geq rac{|\mathcal{Q}|}{\ln(1/\delta)} \ln\left(rac{|\mathcal{Q}|(1-3p)}{p}
ight).$$
 $lacksquare$

This lemma seems to be incorrect. Indeed, consider the simple case where $\Pr[H_l] = \delta^m$ for all $l \in Q$. We fix some m > 0 and some $p \in (0, \frac{1}{3})$. Notice that

$$\Pr\left[ilde{\bigcup}_{l\in \mathcal{Q}}H_l
ight] = |Q|\delta^m(1-\delta^m)^{|\mathcal{Q}|-1}$$

Thus, according to the lemma, the inequality

$$p \ge (1-p)|Q|\delta^m (1-\delta^m)^{|Q|-1}$$
 (A.1)

implies that

$$m \geq rac{1}{\ln(1/\delta)} \ln\left(rac{|Q|(1-3p)}{p}
ight).$$
 (A.2)

However, this is seen to be false, because (A.1) holds for all sufficiently large |Q| whereas (A.2) fails to hold for all sufficiently large |Q|. (Notice that the right-hand quantity in (A.1) tends to 0, as $|Q| \to \infty$, whereas the right-hand quantity in (A.2) tends to ∞ , as $|Q| \to \infty$.)

Lemma 3.3 is crucial for the proof of Theorem 3.1 of [1]. Thus, it does not seem that the proof of Theorem 3.1 can be fixed. Also note that at some point of that proof (namely, Eq. (3.30) of [1]), the authors seem to use the property that the inequalities $\Pr[\Gamma | \Delta_1] \ge 1 - p$ and $\Pr[\Gamma | \Delta_2] \ge 1 - p$ imply

$$\Pr[\Gamma \mid \bigcup_{l=1,2}^{\tilde{}} \Delta_l] \geq 1-p.$$

However, this property is not generally valid. Indeed, taking $\Gamma = \Delta_1 \bigcap \Delta_2$, we have

$$\Pr[\Gamma \mid \bigcup_{l=1,2}^{\tilde{}} \Delta_{l}] = 0.$$

These observations lead us to doubt that the analysis in [1] can be corrected by local modifications.




Figure 1