THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL COALITIONS ON THE DECISION - MAKING

PROCESS IN THE CITY OF CAMBRIDGE, 1960 to 1975

by

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ABSTRACT

This study seeks to establish and elaborate the existence
and role of political coalitions as they influence the policy
process in the city of Cambridge. Utilizing a methodology
which combines aggregate data analysis and participant-
observer case studies, it initially examines the operation of
political coalitions in the city's school committee and city
council elections. Subsequently, it explores the behavior of
these factions in the community's municipal bureaucracies and
on its school committee and city council.

During the fifteen-year period of this study, two
coalitions, the more liberal, upper and middle class CCA
(Cambridge Civic Association) and the more traditional,
working class Independents, dominated electoral and
legislative politics in the city of Cambridge. In addition,
these two groups served to limit the scope and initiatives of
the superintendent of schools and the city manager. Operating
to define issues, the two coalitions effectively minimized
conflict by limiting it to those areas in which the CCA and
the Independents were in direct opposition.

From 1960 to 1975, the key issues over which the two
coalitions fought were the appointments of the superintendent
of schools and city manager. Controlling both the allocation
of patronage and the initiation and implementation of

educational policy, these positions were critical to the attainment of the two coalitions' transcendent goals. However, this conflict was the exception rather than the rule: For the most part, the nature of the groups' goals -- namely control of policy and patronage -- enabled them to achieve both with a minimum of strife and conflict in all three political arenas in the city of Cambridge.

"Cantabrigians...think of their city as a battlefield. They do not necessarily say it in so many words, but that is the impression they give. At the slightest provocation the city seems to divide itself like an amoeba into neighborhoods, income brackets, special-interest factions or ethnic groups. The battle lines shift unpredictably. During the emotional fight over the proposed John F. Kennedy library and museum in the middle 1970's, some privileged folk who occupy gracious homes north and west of Harvard Square and who did not want the memorial built near the Square found unexpected allies in another part of the city, Cambridgeport ... Then there is the perpetual rivalry between the university world and most of the people who call Cambridge home. Asked if Cambridge had ever achieved something resembling unanimity on any issue, one knowledgeable citizen furrowed her brow and replied, 'Yes, Beano!' Even that may not be entirely correct.

None of this is new. The town was founded by dissenters, and dissent has always had an honorable reputation in Cambridge. People have been quarreling there since 1631 when Governor John Winthrop and Deputy-Governor Thomas Dudley fell out over the building of houses. Cambridge has always been a place where strong opinions are expressed openly and with conviction...."

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CHAPTER I

A SYSTEMIC APPROACH TO POLITICAL COALITIONS

Introduction

For more than thirty years, politics in the city of Cambridge have been dominated by two competing and equally powerful coalitions: the Cambridge Civic Association (CCA) and the Independents. Each coalition has been able to win consistently half of the seats on both the city council and the school committee. However, the balance of power is sufficiently volatile that the control of both legislative bodies has oscillated between the two coalitions, depending upon the nature of the issues involved and their perceived impact on particular segments of the population. Thus, 5-4 and 4-3 splits on the city council and school committee respectively have been the norm in the city, ensuring considerable instability and uncertainty in the city's major decision arenas: its legislative and bureaucratic agencies.

Although the dominance and impact of coalitions may be greater in the city of Cambridge than in other communities, their existence and operation are hardly unique. In two-party cities, such as St. Louis, competing interests have organized along partisan lines.[1] In other nominally non-

partisan or de facto single party cities, such as Boston or Chicago, coalitions form along interest or machine lines, dedicated to particular political goals or personalities.[2] In both instances, these aggregations or interests into coalitions or parties reflect social class, ethnic, racial and religious divisions in the community and incorporate various political, social and economic associations, such as labor unions and business and professional organizations. Thus, where formal mechanisms exist, interests are incorporated into political parties or machines. However, where there are no regular or formal aggregations of interests, informal coalitions, no less stable or cohesive, frequently emerge. This has been the case in the city of Cambridge.

It would appear that political coalitions have evolved as institutional responses to specific community needs. Thus, much like their more formally organized counterparts, coalitions exist to perform functions critical to the maintenance of democratic decision-making.[3] These include the articulation and aggregation of the desires and preferences of particular segments of the population; the establishment and maintenance of group consensus on issues that pertain to its political social or economic well-being; and the focussing of political conflict with regard to the definition of group priorities and the attainment of their goals. To provide insight into the ways in which political coalitions influenced

the decision-making process and its outcomes at various stages and in different political arenas -- electoral, legislative and bureaucratic -- is the goal of this research effort. More specifically, this study will assess the role and impact of political coalitions: in school committee and city council elections, in the deliberations of these legislative bodies, and in the school department's and the city government's responses to its clients.

In the last three decades, political scientists have witnessed, and shared in, the considerable substantive and methodological expansion of their field. Beginning in 1951 with David Truman's ground-breaking analysis of interest groups, political scientists have sought to examine, more or less systematically, the informal political processes and their outcomes. Research efforts prior to these had concentrated on the formal procedural and institutional aspects of governmental decision-making. Despite the profusion of recent studies of political attitudes, behavior, and institutions, these analyses have typically focussed on particular facets of the policy process viewed as isolated and fragmented phenomena.[4] For example, forces influencing the voting behavior of elected representatives have been examined with little or no notice made of the problems involved in the implementation of their legislative mandates and of their potential impact on affected client or constituent groups.

Exceptions to this lack of analytical comprehensiveness for the most part have been studies of the distribution of power in local communities. Even here, however, the focus has generally been more limited and more circumscribed than the political process, in actuality, entails. Thus, although political scientists have engaged in a lengthy debate regarding the structure and use of power in local communities, considerably less attention has been paid to how decisions are made in public arenas and how they are implemented by the appropriate public service bureaucracies. Simply stated, the community power theorists have been more concerned with "Who governs?" than "How?" and, even more importantly, "What difference does it make?". This study seeks to address the latter two questions. In the city of Cambridge, who governs very much determines how decisions are made, both stylistically and substantively; which groups are most affected; whose needs are met; and to whom the legislative and bureaucratic agencies in the cities are most likely to respond.

In addition to this concern with the implementation, as well as the initiation, of public policy, this study is unique for its systemic comprehensiveness and its comparative focus. As such, it represents a significant effort to elaborate and operationalize the systems model of political decision-making developed by David Easton.[5] That such an undertaking has not

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been attempted before is understandable: To trace an issue from its emergence in a political campaign through legislative action to bureaucratic implementation is a task of considerable complexity and subtlety, a task beset with potential pitfalls, both theoretical and methodological. At a basic level, one is presented with difficulties in both conceptualizing and subsequently operationalizing the complex network of relationships within and among the various actors and institutions involved in local political decisions. For example, how should one go about measuring or assessing the impact of electoral results on a city councillor's or a school committee member's subsequent behavior as an elected representative? And, assuming that one could do this, how might one determine the impact of electoral and legislative pressures on a bureaucrat's actions? More generally, how would one assess the cumulative impact of all these activities and relationships on the initiation and implementation of public policy?

In view of the seemingly insoluble problems of conceptualization and measurement, it is hardly surprising that previous efforts to explore these complex interrelationships should have focussed, for the most part, on either electoral processes and outcomes or on internal bureaucratic decision-making. Moreover, earlier attempts to relate the two have tended to concentrate on the association

between electoral and policy outcomes as measured by expenditure levels and have, with few exceptions, looked primarily at state and Federal processes and outcomes. Thus, utilizing a systemic and comparative framework of analysis, this research deviated from these earlier studies both in scope and focus. First, it relates electoral activities and outcomes to policy decisions in both the executive and legislative arenas. Second, it examines these activities as they operate at the local level.

Toward a Theory of Political Coalitions

To undertake a comprehensive study of the policy process at the local level, what is needed is an analytical construct -- such as a political coalition -- which cuts across arbitrary institutional boundaries and specifies the various linkages among a community's political actors, activities and agencies. In addition to facilitating an examination of formal institutional linkages, this construct would also encompass the more informal procedures and relationships which influence policy outcomes in local communities. Consequently, this study will first establish the existence of political coalitions and will then elaborate their role and influence in the formulation and implementation of public policy in the city of Cambridge. Its initial focus will be the documentation and categorization of cleavages and

coalitions in the community and their impact on school committee and city council election results. Subsequently, it will explore the operation of these coalitions on the city's school committee and city council and within its public service bureaucracies. As such, the utilization of empirically determined and defined political coalitions will provide an analytical tool for exploring the complex interrelationship operating within the community and upon its elected officials and its bureaucracies.

Although utilization of the concept of political coalitions would facilitate the assessment of municipal decision-making in the community, its use in structuring this analysis poses a number of substantive and methodological problems, not the least of which is that of definition. Specifically, just how might one define a political coalition? In what ways do coalitions differ from factions, political parties and interest groups in terms of their roles, composition and organization? How do coalitions, as defined and differentiated here, operate in the various political arenas included in this study: electoral, legislative, and bureaucratic? And, lastly, how might one empirically validate their existence and impacts on these different political arenas and issue domains? The subsequent discussion will deal with these predominantly analytical and conceptual problems. Beginning with a definition of political coalitions and a

brief comparison of coalitions with other forms of political groupings, this analysis will be extended to include the development and elaboration of a model of coalitional linkages and impacts and a presentation of the research strategies to be utilitzed in the attainment of this study's objectives.

In the most general terms, coalitions may be viewed as collections of groups or individuals united, formally or informally, for some common purpose or action.* As defined here, political coalitions are not limited to constituent or electoral bodies. Rather, they are to be found in all areas of political activity, albeit their composition, numbers, strategies of organization and interaction, and roles and impacts may be a function of the electoral, legislative and bureaucratic arenas in which they operate. Moreover, such alliances for joint action may be temporary or more permanent. And, indeed, coalitional longevity and potential for success depend on a number of factors, such as: Member characteristics, preferences and needs; the salience and intensity of issues and members' perceptions of the difficulties involved in achieving stated objectives; the

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*In reality, political coalitions are dynamic, organic entities. Over time, they experience fluctuations in organizational structure and direction, leadership style, member characteristics and political efficacy. In the interests of simplification, however, this discussion depicts coalitions at some arbitrary static point in their development.

degree of organizational structure and formality; and, perhaps most importantly, the interpersonal sensitivities and political skills and instincts of leaders.

Exploration of how these factors influence coalitional stability and cohesiveness reveals that they are complex and interrelated. Numerical size, for instance, cuts both ways. Larger coalitions tend simultaneously to exhibit more political clout and to experience greater difficulty in establishing and maintaining group consensus with regard to organizational goals, priorities and strategies. Conversely, although smaller numerical size may facilitate the establishment and maintenance of coalitional cohesiveness, smaller coalitions frequently find it more difficult to retain their members due to a shared sense of political inefficacy and frustration due to their inability to attain group goals. Here, the critical factor appears to be the degree to which coalitional consensus is maintained with increasing size and typically greater political effectiveness. Thus, to be successful politically, coalitions need not only be sufficiently large to influence political outcomes at various stages in the policy process, but they must also be sufficiently unified with regard to goals, priorities, and strategies to maximize their potential impact and increase the likelihood of their success in achieving stated objectives.

Similarly, these coalitional characteristics are closely

related to the salience, intensity and controversiality of the issues around which coalitions have formed and mobilized and the perceived difficulty of attaining the group's positions in these matters. If coalitions see themselves as under attack from other groups or to be "up against" seemingly insurmountable odds, there is a greater tendency toward cohesiveness and solidarity. This is particularly true with regard to the degree of difficulty anticipated in the favorable resolution of issues viewed as especially salient, controversial or important to the members of the coalition. In turn, members' socio-economic characteristics frequently influence their perceptions of, and stances on, these issues and shape their views of the strategies most appropriate to the attainment of coalitional goals.

Conversely, in the absence of external threats and pressures, particularly successful and secure coalitions have experienced trouble in arousing their members' interest and involvement in political activities, save for the most controversial issues and in matters of the most immediate concern and impact. In this situation of lower issue intensity and reduced involvement, social class, ethnic and racial attachments and affiliations also determine whether participation in political coalitions is viewed by members as a civic obligation which transcends the more transient aspects of issue salience and controversiality or whether such

participation is viewed as a means of achieving tangible benefits for themselves and their families. More specifically, upper class groups generally appreciate the necessity of maintaining an active role in their political organizations if they are to achieve desired, and more universalistic policy goals, while ethnic members of coalitions frequently seek more personalistic patronage goals.[6]

Similarly, the relationship between coalitional structure and formality and organizational solidarity, cohesiveness and stability is not as simple as one might expect. By definition, coalitions encompass various factions, formal associations and interest groups who share common goals and are joined in the pursuit of these goals. It is, therefore, hardly surprising that coalitions differ considerably in organizational structure and formality. For the most part, political coalitions are diffuse aggregations of equally diffuse interests or factions. As such, the impact of coalitions on the political system parallels that of the more diffuse interests and factions described by Bentley and Truman.[7] In this case, organizational boundaries, membership criteria, and group goals are loosely defined. This has the advantage of permitting maximum flexibility for encompassing the widest possible range of groups and individuals, who, for some period of time, however limited, share the superordinate

goals of the coalition and seek to join in its efforts to achieve its objectives.

Not surprisingly, these diffusion aggregations of interests pose considerable difficulties for the coalition's leadership. Generally lacking the positional authority of leaders of more formally organized political groups, coalitional leaders are compelled to influence group consensus-making by persuasive rather than coercive means. Organizational incentives are the shared social and psychological benefits of coalitional membership, especially the sense of community and efficacy engendered by the group's shared values and goals and by its ability to influence the policy process and the distribution of whatever tanglible rewards the organization is able to attain for its members.[8] Since membership and participation in coalitional political activities is largely voluntary, the leadership is compelled to manipulate these incentives in the absence of formal executive powers and organizational sanctions against errant members or factions. As a result, leaders of more diffusely organized coalitions require considerable interpersonal and political skills and sensitivity if their organizations are to remain viable, cohesive, and effective.[9]

Over time, coalitions tend toward greater or lesser degrees of organizational formality and structure, as changes in internal and external conditions require. As noted

earlier, coalitions are, for the most part, diffuse aggregations of interest groups and factions. However, certain situations, such as the absence of parties and associations, may encourage the establishment and maintenance of more formally structured political coalitions. In general, the presence or absence of organizational structure is not the primary factor in determining coalitional effectiveness or ineffectiveness in influencing political outcomes. Rather, these organizational characteristics are reflections of the existence and efficacy of more formal political organizations in the community. In their absence, coalitions emerge to satisfy essential political and social needs of the community.* In this capacity, they function much like political parties, serving to articulate and aggregate diverse interests, to establish and maintain group consensus, and to focus political activity and conflict on issues most critical to its members.[10]

To achieve these objectives, coalitional cohesion and

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*A major exception to this pattern appears to be the political machine. Like parties and formal associations, it is an aggregation of interest groups and factions, and hence is, by definition, a coalition. In some instances, the political machine is synonymous with the political party (for example, the Cook County Democratic Committee under Chicago's Mayor Daley). However, there are other situations in which the formal political party and the political machine are distinct, and frequently competing, entities with different members, leaders, goals and orientations. In this case, a highly organized and structured coalition, namely the political machine, co-exists with the formally defined political party.

stability are essential. One means of insuring coalitional stability and solidarity is the institutionalization or formalization of group membership rolls, organizational goals, rules of order and leadership functions and perogatives. Although this rigidity may limit the coalition's flexibility with regard to the inclusion of new factions and interest groups as members, and, hence, its long term viability and political clout, the establishment of more formal organizational boundaries, goals and strategies provides needed stability and direction. Similarly, by defining formal leadership activities and prerogatives, the coalition enhances the legitimacy of its leaders and expands the members' influence in shaping organizational goals and strategies. In turn, this allows the leader to utilize more coercive techniques, albeit judiciously, in obtaining member compliance and commitment to coalitional goals. Obviously, in such a situation, a politically astute and skillful leader can maximize coalitional effectiveness in influencing the policy process. Conversely, a weak and ineffectual leader can more rapidly undermine the efficacy of more highly organized, and generally more visible, political coalitions.[11]

As has been demonstrated, any attempt to define a concept as illusive as political coalition runs serious risks. On the one hand, there is the tendency to be so general as to be almost meaningless; on the other hand, there is an equally

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compelling pressure to be so arena or issue specific as to lose critical comparative utility. The preceding definition and its elaboration seek to avoid both extremes. It is sufficiently general to be comparative but, at the same time, it is specific in its identification of those factors, both internal and external to the coalition, which operate differentially in various political arenas and with regard to particular municipal issues. As noted in the preceding discussion, coalitional stability and cohesion would appear to be a function of numerical size; member characteristics and interests; organizational structure, formality and boundedness; level of issue salience, intensity, and controversiality; and the perceived difficulty of goal attainment. Since these characteristics differ by political arena and over time, one might further anticipate that coalitional membership and behavior would also vary in municipal elections, among elected officials and within public service bureaucracies during the fifteen years covered by this study. Thus, a more specific definition is neither possible nor desirable if one is to assess over time the roles and impacts of coalitions across a range of issues and political arenas.

Differentiating coalitions from political parties, factions and interest groups poses similar and equally complex problems. Here, too, the choice in the development of

analytical categories lies between excessive precision and extreme generality. To resolve this dilemma, it seems advisable to contrast these different types of political alliances on two seemingly critical dimensions: Their organizational characteristics and their social and political functions. Thus, if coalitions were located along an organizational continuum, they would typically be more formal, stable, cohesive and bounded than factions and less so than political parties (although, at times, these distinctions might appear to be minimal or non-existent).

From another perspective, one which combines notions of numerical size and the ability to aggregate different interests, it is possible to view the relationships between factions, coalitions and political parties as somewhat analagous to a collection of Chinese boxes. Here, factions may be viewed as subgroups of coalitions, and coalitions, subgroups of formal associations and political parties. Thus, under certain conditions, for example shared superordinate goals, factions do, indeed, unite to form coalitions. In turn, coalitions serve as critical subunits of political parties, enabling them to build and maintain viable and effective organizations. These relationships appear to hold save for those situations in which formal parties do not exist; then coalitions act, in effect, as political parties and are similar to them both organizationally and

functionally.

Interest groups are more difficult to categorize and hence to map in relation to the other types of political organizations. In large part, this difficulty is the result of multiple usage of this designation by political scientists. For some social scientists, interest groups are diffuse aggregations of constituents with shared needs, perceptions and values, both implicit and explicit;[12] for others, they are more formal associations of persons sharing common and generally explicit values, goals and needs.[13] Using the former definition, interest groups are much like factions in both their functional and organizational characteristics while the latter are more similar to political parties, trade unions, and professional, business and community organizations such as the Chamber of Commerce, the American Medical Association, the Rotary Club and the like. Obviously, these two very different types of interest groups represent two extremes with respect to the other previously defined and differentiated forms of political organizations.

Although it is important to maintain these potentially significant and useful analytical distinctions, it is equally imperative, for the purposes of simplification, to develop a nomenclature for interest groups which reflects the wide-ranging conceptual differences implicit in the divergent usages of this term. In this study, therefore, the more

formally organized interest groups will be referred to as formal associations or simply associations. Organizationally, they are perceived as being more formally structured and bounded than political parties, typically with fixed criteria for membership and the payment of dues as a minimum requirement for participation. The more diffusely aggregated interest groups will be lumped with factions and designated, interchangeably, as either factions or interests. This latter designation recognized the similarity of political factions and interest groups of this type, both organizationally and functionally.

Although coalitions, factions, interest groups and political parties have been depicted as differing with regard to their organizational and membership characteristics, these differences would appear to be largely of degree rather than of substance. Functionally, however, distinctions of considerable substantive import may be noted. In the most general terms, these various forms of political organization perform two major functions: system maintenance and conflict management. More specifically, political factions and loosely organized interest groups reflect, aggregate and articulate the needs, values and perceptions of various individuals and groups in a community. Obviously, the larger or more heterogeneous the community, the greater the potential for cleavages along various social, economic, ethnic, racial and

policy dimensions and, concomitantly, the greater the need for, and the likelihood of, the proliferation of factions in the body politic. Conversely, smaller or more homogeneous communities might be expected to demonstrate a lesser need for political sub-groups to form for the purpose of articulating divergent views. Coalitions, political parties, and formal associations, on the other hand, with their typically larger size, their more variegated composition and their claims of greater representativeness, attempt to bridge and to encompass the divisions present in the more general population. As such, they seek to effect unity via compromise, in many cases defining organization goals in terms sufficiently general to accomodate as many divergent factions as possible.

Briefly, then, factions serve to aggregate and reflect and, as a result, to concentrate and intensify, divisions within a community while coalitions, political parties and formal associations serve to minimize the impacts of these cleavages and to forge alliances among subgroups in the community for the pursuit of commonly agreed upon superordinate or transcendent goals. As such, factions legitimate societal divisions and conflicts, while coalitions, parties and associations legitimate political compromise and cooperation. It should be noted, however, that, in this complex process of conflict reduction and resolution, coalitions serve a unique role: For the most part, coalitions

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are simultaneously the building blocks of parties and associations and the articulators of their members' frequently conflicting orientations, values and goals. Thus, within political parties and associations, coalitions might be perceived initially as divisive agents, when, in actual fact, they are the bargaining agents which serve to facilitate and maintain group cohesiveness and solidarity within the larger and more heterogenous political parties and formal associations. In a pluralist democracy, particularly in large or heterogenous communities, both functions must be performed if subgroup needs are to be articulated effectively and if political agreements are to be fashioned which incorporate these frequently divergent demands.[14]

Internally, the establishment and maintenance of coalitional consensus around particular goals is of primary importance. In their dealings with other political groups and organizations, however, greater emphasis is placed on a coalition's ability to articulate and represent effectively its members' interest and needs. In turn, the definition and articulation of group goals minimizes inter-coalitional confrontations, save in those situations in which these objectives overlap and conflict. In Cambridge, for example, the two dominant and competing coalitions have very different goals and orientations: The CCA seeks to influence the city's policy process and its outcomes, while the Independents seek

to obtain tangible patronage benefits for its members. In this case, inter-coalitional conflict is most likely to occur over the appointments of the city manager and superintendent of schools, positions which simultaneously control patronage allocations and policy outcomes. In other instances, the definition of group goals serves to channel and, hence, to reduce conflict between the community's two dominant political groups.

A coalition's success in achieving its objectives, however, is very much related to its perceived strength in particular political arenas: electoral, legislative and bureaucratic. In turn, this perception of political efficacy is related to a coalition's ability to establish and maintain consensus on particular issues. Moreover, the emergence of deviant factions and splinter groups, both within existing coalitions and in the body politic, is likely to inflame politically volatile situations. Conversely, inter-coalitional conflict is minimized when organizational membership is cohesive, stable and well-disciplined. Thus, by representing group interests and managing conflict, political coalitions facilitate system maintenance at all levels and in all spheres of governmental decision-making. In a pluralist democracy, if the political system is to survive and to respond effectively to the needs of its constituents and clients, both minority and majority views must be articulated

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and represented; consensus established and maintained; and conflict limited to a few particularly critical, salient and controversial issues.[19] As such, performance of these all-important political functions by coalitions is especially critical.

Obviously, the political organizations and groups described here represent ideal types. In practice, their functions and organizational characteristics do not fall into such neat categories. Rather, overlap, duplication and ambiguity of role and definition are more frequently observed. To accomodate the fact that reality is not accurately represented by such precise demarcations, every attempt has been made to define coalitions, parties, factions and interest groups in relation to each other and not to some absolute or arbitrary standard and to locate these relationships along a continuum which reflects their varying degrees of organizational formality and boundedness. In addition, rather broadly defined social and political functions were used to categorize their roles and activities, again in relation to each. By the same token, however,it is important that one keep in mind these definitional limitations and distinctions when assessing the existence and impact of political coalitions on a local community's decision-making process. Thus, it will not be the goal of this study to attempt precise measures or assessments of the roles, characteristics or

memberships of political coalitions in the various public
policy arenas in the city of Cambridge. Rather, the notion of
political coalitions will be used to provide an analytical and
conceptual framework within which it will be possible to
examine more carefully and comprehensively the linkages
between the community, its elected representatives and its
public service bureaucracies and to trace the coalitions'
impacts on the policy process and its outcomes.

A Model of Coalitional Linkages and Impacts

Although necessarily somewhat imprecise, the comparative
and functional definition of coalitions elaborated in the
preceding section is an essential prior step in the
development and explication of a model of the potential roles,
linkages and impacts of coalitions in local politics. In the
body politic, the existence of coalitions and factions has
been affirmed and acclaimed by commentators from Madison
through Bentley and Truman.[16] For these analysts, factions
and coalitions are the agents, or brokers, in the political
process, especially when viewed from a pluralist perspective.
As such, these groups serve to articulate the needs of
particular segments of the population and to provide
sufficient unity to exert pressure on the system to insure
that their demands will be met. However, coalitions are not
limited to operating solely in constituent bodies. Rather,

coalitions and factions may be found in all social, task and political groups. Indeed, the existence and operation of coalitions at all levels of organization and in all types of legislative bodies have been amply documented by such political and organizational theorists as Thompson, Tullock and Buchanan, and Riker.[17]

As the preceding discussion indicates, coalitions would appear to be, potentially, a most satisfactory analytical tool for examining political outcomes at various stages in the policy process and in the different arenas in which local level governmental decision-making occurs. In particular, the assessment of the role and impact of political coalitions would enable one to explore the nature of the linkages between and among the various actors and institutions involved in the policy process and its outcomes. In so doing, it would also permit the testing of some basic and critical assumptions implicit in democratic, and more specifically, pluralist theories of government. Key here would be those assumptions regarding the accessibility, openness, and responsiveness, of the political system, particularly to active, articulate and organized interests in the community. Obviously, the relative influence of political coalitions in the various policy arenas and issue areas would provide considerable insight into the validity of these claims, especially as they pertain to local community decision-making. More specifically, it would be

possible to address such questions as: Are elected officials and public bureaucracies differentially responsive to particular subgroups in the community? If so, to which groups are the members of the local legislative bodies and the public service bureaucracies more likely to respond and why? Do organized interests, as manifested in the community's factions and coalitions, have an advantage in pressing their demands? Again, if so, why?

To facilitate a discussion of the complex and multiple political networks operating, formally and informally, within and upon actors and institutions in local communities, an attempt has been made to develop a model which specifies the nature of these coalitional impacts and linkages. As the schematic representation in Exhibit I-1 shows, political coalitions, as defined here, serve as informal mediators in local governmental decision-making, impacting directly and indirectly on the community's more formal electoral, legislative and bureaucratic institutions and processes. More specifically, this model suggests that electoral coalitions emerge in response to the realities of elective office: First to be elected, a candidate needs a specified minimum number of votes; and, second, for a particular subgroup to effect policy or to control the allocation of municipal jobs, it must elect a majority of the representatives to the appropriate legislative body.

Exhibit I-1

Sytemic Representation of Coalitional
Linkages and Impacts in Local Communities

Community
- Selects Representatives to Local Legislative Bodies
- Assesses Quality of Public Services Provided

Electoral Coalitions
- Factions reflect cleavages in community
- Factions unite to form coalitions for the purpose of:
  (1) Electing candidates to public office
  (2) Obtaining majority of offices on legislative bodies.

Local Legislative Bodies
- Legislates Policy
- Makes and Approves Bureaucratic Appointments

Legislative Coalitions
- Composition reflects coalitions and factions in community
- Representatives of factions unite to form coalitions which provie majority number of votes needed for passage of legislation

Public Service Bureaucracies
- Implements Policies
- Provides Services to Community

Bureaucratic Coalitions
- Factions represent and reflect interests, values, goals and needs of various subgroups in the bureaucracy.
- Factions unite to:
  (1) Inhibit or facilitate implementation of policies
  (2) Attain individual or subgroup goals and/or maintain power.

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Thus, factions reflecting the various divisions in the community perceive the need to unite with other groups sharing some common goals in order to obtain the requisite number of votes, electorally and legislatively. In turn, the presence of coalitions in the electorate influences the voting behavior of elected officials who seek to retain the backing of particular coalitions or factions in the community. As such, coalitional formation, maintenance and linkages in the legislative arena are, in part, a function of perceived constituent pressures and the representative's desire to be re-elected and, in part, a function of the rules of parliamentary procedure which typically call for a majority as the critical minimum number of votes in the passage of legislation. Consequently, the effectiveness of electoral coalitions in achieving their goals is linked to the level of skills demonstrated by their elected representatives as they seek to establish and maintain minimum winning coalitions in their legislative forums.

The linkages between legislative and bureaucratic coalitions are more tenuous and less well-defined vis-a-vis external reference groups. Rather, coalitions operating in bureaucratic arenas tend to be more organizationally defined and orientated, reflecting the goals, needs, values, positions and sources of power of individuals and subgroups within the bureaucracy. This is not to say that bureaucratic alliances

are not influenced by legislative and electoral coalitions. It merely poses that, via the selection and promotion of personnel and the establishment of key policies, these external groups affect, subtley and indirectly, the composition and behavior of subgroups whose basis for alliance is more directly and explicitly related to other, typically organizationally defined factors. Similarly, the existence, composition and functions of bureaucratic coalitions have considerable potential impact on the implementation of legislatively defined policies. Thus, they affect the quality of services provided to the community whose residents are simultaneously members of various electoral factions and coalitions and consumers of the goods and services being provided by the public bureaucracies. Obviously, satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the nature of these services and their delivery may influence the ability of factions and coalitions to mobilize electoral support for their positions in particular issue areas and with regard to certain policies, such as education and health care.

Whatever the peculiarities of specific policies and issues, the complex roles and linkages of political coalitions depicted in this model represent the informal aspects of governmental decision-making. They operate sequentially and interactively, within and parallel to, the more formal institutions and processes which are charged with

the responsibility for the development and implementation of public policy. Admittedly, the present system is far from perfect on these dimensions. Indeed, it may be safely concluded that without the intervention of such informal mediating groups, it is highly unlikely that the democratic processes of the government would be able to function as effectively or as responsively as they do.

Why Cambridge

Any study that focuses on the political behavior of one specific community will necessarily be shaped and influenced by the unique characteristics of that environment. It is fair to assume that no two cities are exactly alike in their political make-up, and thus the present study will necessarily bear the strong imprimatur of Cambridge, Massachusetts. At the same time, however, the goal of any such study is to draw conclusions and develop theories that extend beyond the immediate environment and have broader relevance in describing the American political system. Thus, the local community, though inevitably sui generis to some degree, must exhibit characteristics that are applicable to more general political observations.

Cambridge seems an appropriate choice for a number of reasons:

1. The community's population of approximately 100,000 is sufficiently diversified vis-a-vis age, income, ethnicity, race and education. It is also clustered spatially according to these demographic characteristics thus facilitating contextual and electoral analyses.

2. In local political activities, relatively stable and polarized factions do exist which appear to cleave along particular dimensions of policy preference and of ethnic, racial or social composition.

3. The community utilizes the proportional representation form of preference voting which, theoretically, should:

> (a) more readily allow for the representation of minority interests on the city council and school committee, and,

> (b) more visibly reflect shifts in electoral coalitions in response to specific, and especially controversial, issues.

4. Institutionally, the city charter (Plan E) provides for a weak council-strong manager form of government. Again, theoretically, this should provide for the more efficient administration of the city's services while permitting its citizens maximal impact on, and control over, policy outcomes via their elected representatives who must select the city manager and approve all ordinances, appropriations and executive guidelines prior to their implementation. A similar and equally explicit relationship exists between the elected school committee and their appointed executive, the superintendent of schools.

Most importantly, however, since 1945, politics in Cambridge have been dominated by two powerful coalitions, the Cambridge Civic Association (CCA) and the Independents. During this period, each coalition has consistently won approximately half the seats on both the city council and the school committee, and the balance of power has been

sufficiently volatile that control of these legislative bodies has oscillated between the two coalitions. The political landscape has thus been institutionally stable yet highly volatile, especially during vigorously contested elections and in more polarized, politicized periods.

As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, these coalitions differ in organizational format and style: the CCA is more formally organized, campaigning on a group platform and candidate slate; the Independents are a loose confederation of candidates united by their opposition to the CCA and its policies. Interestingly, the CCA's superior organizational skills and capability enabled a group in a numerical minority to elect -- on several occasions -- a majority on both the city council and school committee. Thus, according to the definitions developed here, and as will be demonstrated in later chapters, both the CCA and the Independents behave as coalitions albeit at different ends of the organizational continuum. Further, their behavior varies with the political arena in question. Thus, the Independents appear to act more like factions in the electoral arena but to coalesce more tightly in the legislative and bureaucratic arenas. For the CCA, an inverse relationship holds: They are more cohesive and better organized in the electoral and legislative arenas and less so in bureaucratic arenas.

As will be demonstrated, the reasons for this seemingly

assymetric coalitional alignment derive from a number of factors such as: The historical evolution of the coalitions; the composition of the two coalitions; and the disparate goals of the two groups. The CCA was explicitly established as a formal political organization with an explicit mandate to develop a campaign platform, to endorse candidates who supported its goals, to prepare and distribute campaign materials for the coalition and, perhaps, most importantly, to encourage slate voting on the part of its supporters. The Independents, on the other hand, with one exception, campaigned individually and encouraged their supporters to "bullet vote." The heterogeneity of their supporters and the ethnic bloc aspect of Independent electoral support argues for greater competition than collaboration on the part of Independent candidates.

Once elected, both groups realized that intra-group cooperation was critical to the achievement of their goals: Control over policy initiatives (CCA) and control over patronage benefits (Independents). Indeed, as will be demonstrated later, intra-group solidarity was greatest in those areas in which the two groups clashed: Namely, over the appointment of key personnel, such as the superintendent of schools and the city manager, who simultaneously controlled both the initiation and implementation of policy and the allocation of patronage benefits.

The effect of the coalitions on the chief executives was largely a function of their perceived electoral and legislative solidarity and the compliance of their bureaucratic subordinates. Here, the pyramidal structure of bureaucracies resulted in the largest number of employees, generally in the lower level ancillary position, being less educated ethnics. Not too surprisingly, they tended to have the values, goals and aspirations of their fellow workers and the Independent candidates and elected officials. This contributed to the greater solidarity of the Independents coalition within the public service bureaucracies and made even more difficult the task of the CCA and its appointees to top level positions as they sought to implement coalitional policy initiatives. These points will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters and models will be developed to elaborate the impact of electoral and legislative coalitions on executive decision-making in the city of Cambridge.

In summary, then, the unique mixture of community cleaveages, political institutions and electoral arrangements make Cambridge an ideal location in which to explore coalitional linkages to, and differential impacts on, the community's policy processes and their outcomes.

Issues and Methodology

As noted in the preceding section, this study will focus

on the political system in Cambridge as reflected through the function and organization of the two dominant coalitions. However, a more general goal will be to study political decision-making from the appearance of "issues" in the political environment to the generation of discrete policy outcomes. More specifically, this study will try to examine: (1) how issues and issue-differences contribute to the formation of coalitional alliances; (2) how issue differences play a key role in the electoral strategies of the coalitions; (3) how coalitional majorities follow through by attempting to implement issue policies in the legislative arenas; (4) how issues affect the role and function of the city manager, the superintendent of schools, and the various public bureaucracies.

To achieve these research goals, this study uses a variety of methodological techniques, including the following:

1) case studies

2) aggregate electoral data

3) roll call and other legislative voting data

4) in-depth interviews

5) participant observation

6) historical and contemporary documents and newspapers.

The type of research techniques used vary with the topic under investigation. Electoral and legislative behavior, for

example, was amenable to a variety of empirical statistical techniques which help verify a number of formal observations and conclusions. However, as in any study of political behavior, much of the subject under consideration cannot be quantified in simple numbers. For example, in assessing coalitional views on various political issues, legislative voting behavior was not a totally accurate litmus of political views. In effect, much of the legislative political process took place in negotiations outside the formal council chambers. Thus, interviews and observer participation often provided more telling results than an assessment of formal role call behavior.

At the same time, however, a broader and more quantitative picture of Cambridge was provided by an analysis of the recent demographic and socio-economic trends. The data base for this analysis was two-fold:

1. Census data for Cambridge from 1940 to 1975. Included is data on median family income, education, occupation, racial and ethnic composition, age, sex, and measures of population change and density.

2. Electoral results for the following elections: 1949, 1951, 1959, 1961, 1969, 1971, 1973, and 1975.

This combination of research strategies and data bases provides a more accurate description of the Cambridge political process. There are, of course, some areas of

information and research that could not be investigated because of the limited resources available for this study. In general, however, statistical and empirical analysis is used in areas where it produces the most useful results, while case studies, interviews, participant observation, and research are used in areas where statistical information is likely to provide an incomplete or biased view of the policy process in the city of Cambridge.

Structure and Scope of Study

In summary then, this study has set out to answer the following questions concerning the political system in Cambridge, Massachusetts:

1) What is the nature of the local political environment, including boundaries; interest groups; relevant political actors; social, racial and ethnic divisions; and political organizations?

2) What is the nature, role, and function of the two dominant political coalitions in Cambridge?

3) How did issues affect the electoral campaign strategies and successes of the Cambridge coalitions?

4) How do elected representatives to the city's legislative bodies carry out their functions? In particular, how frequently do they attempt to implement the issues that they advance in city elections, and what factors and

constraints influence these decisions?

5)   How are policy decisions made in Cambridge city
government?   What roles do the legislative bodies, the chief
executive officers,   and the city bureaucracies play in
defining and influencing the formulation and implementation of
public policy?   What are the constraints on each political
actor and institutional body?   To what extent is there
"feedback" between the various decision-makers and the larger
environment, including interest groups and voters?

To answer these and other corollary questions, this study
has been structured in what might be termed "chronological"
order.   Essentially, this study begins by defining the
political environment and then proceeds in a manner that
approximates the sequence of development of public policy from
its initiation to its implementation.   Consequently the
chapters will be organized as follows:

Chapter II describes the historical and demographic
factors that help define the community's formal institutions
and its informal political structure.   This includes,
demographic, economic, ethnic and racial characteristics of
its residents, and the role these divisions play in the
political process.

Chapter III describes the existence and nature of the
Cambridge political coalitions, including the groups that make
up the core membership of each coalition, and other important

groups that participate in the political process. This chapter examines the issue differences and goals of various groups, and how the various groups develop channels of input and influence, both within and without the coalitional structure.

Chapter IV analyzes the campaign platforms of political candidates and the two coalitions from 1960-1975, to identify the role that issue-differences play as the coalitions seek to influence decision-making processes and outcomes. In effect, the chapter seeks to establish who votes for which candidates, why, and how the coalitions respond in terms of campaign strategies.

Chapter V examines the voting records of legislative members, to demonstrate the existence and strength of voting coalitions. It also examines whether the coalitional members do in fact attempt to implement the issues upon which they campaign in the general elections.

Chapter VI examines the role of the superintendent of schools in the formulation and implementation of educational policy. The goal is to see how and whether the superintendent is responsive to the political inputs of the coalitions, the electorate, and the general environment.

Chapter VII examines the roles of the city manager in the formulation and implementation of public policy. The issues addressed include how the city manager influences the

formulation and implementation of policy, and the constraints placed on these decisions by the larger political system.

Chapter VIII contains some general models that summarize how policy decisions are made in the city of Cambridge. These models alter the systems approach proposed by Easton to show the various mechanisms that direct and control political policy decisions. These models are then examined in light of specific case studies that illustrate the mechanisms developed in the models.

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CHAPTER II

THE CITY OF CAMBRIDGE:

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT

Introduction

If one word could describe Cambridge, it would be "diverse." Although often perceived as an intellectual center because of the presence of Harvard and MIT, the city actually includes residents with a wide range of educational, occupational and ethnic backgrounds. The city's ethnic communities bounded on the south by the Charles River and surrounded by Watertown, Somerville, Arlington and Belmont, Cambridge has 100,000 residents in its six square miles -- making it the tenth most densely populated city in the country and second most dense in the state, after Somerville.

The city's ethnic communities, varying in flavor from "old world" to "middle American," include significant numbers of recent Portuguese, Puerto Rican and Italian immigrants. Its sizeable black population includes a number of the city's longest-standing residents. The population has a disproportionate number of young adults and elderly persons, while children and middle-aged adults are under-represented.

Family households represent an unusually small percentage of all households, indicating, in addition to the obviously large number of single students, a substantial population of single adults. Traditionally, Cambridge has been comprised of diverse economic and social groups -- including a large number of blue-collar workers employed in local industry, university students, faculty and staff, white-collar workers and professionals. Similarly, various income groups are well represented in the community, with no group particularly dominant.

Given Cambridge's cultural and economic divisions and their importance in the composition of the city's two dominant coalitions, it is useful to trace both the development of these cleavages and the evolution of the community's political institutions and policies. Thus, this chapter will begin with a history of Cambridge's social development. Then we will: (1) elaborate the demographic and socio-economic changes that have occurred in Cambridge, particularly over the last three decades; (2) explore the impact of these developments on the social and economic structure of the community; and (3) assess the implications of these changes for the city's political institutions.

The Historical Context: Cambridge, 1630 to 1975

In 1630, the Massachusetts Bay Company sent a group of

Puritans under Governor John Winthrop to found a settlement farther up the Charles River from Boston. This new settlement, called 'Newe Towne', was intended to be a seat of government that would be less vulnerable to sea attack than Boston. Although the idea of establishing a seat of government in Newe Towne was eventually abandoned, the city thrived because of its central location.

In 1636, a minister named Thomas Sheppard opened a seminary in the Newe Towne and changed the town's name to Cambridge, in honor of his alma mater. He named the seminary after "one Mr. John Harvard," who left half his fortune and all his books to the new school. In the beginning, the college was run by the state, and every family owed twelvepence annually, or a peck of corn, or its value in wampum, to support the school. However, New Englanders soon came to regard Harvard as a family affair, and within 70 years more than half of its revenues came from private sources. By its second centennial, Harvard did not receive a penny from the state.

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Cambridge flourished, both as a trading center and as the foremost center of learning in the New World. The power center of the colonial Cambridge was the Congregational Church, for every man had to be a church member in order to vote. However, a conflict developed between the secular intellectual pursuits

of Harvard and the religious values of the dominant members of Cambridge society. This struggle adumbrated what would eventually become the "town/gown" conflict between the city's universities and its residents.

During the Revolutionary War, Cambridge's wealthy gentry supported the Tory cause while the tradesmen supported the Revolution. Afterwards, the old gentry fled and a new gentry class moved into the beautiful old houses, many of which still stand on Brattle Street. For a while, Cambridge was content to be a sedentary city whose primary occupation was educating the young men of New England. However, as the eighteenth century drew to a close, the land in Boston grew scarce, and real estate speculators began to cast a covetous eye on the college town on the opposite side of the Charles, particularly the open farm land east of the university.

The initial economic development of eastern Cambridge was amied at making it a trading center, and to this end a bill was passed by the United States Congress making "Cambridgeport" a legal port of entry. However, few ships were willing to desert the excellent dock facilities of Boston for the dangerously shallow canals of the Charles, and the Cambridgeport project was a failure. Similarly, the railroads flirted with the idea of making Cambridge a mail center, but for various reasons this was also unsuccessful. With little bargaining power, and few alternatives, Cambridge settled for

a particularly noisome industry --soap-making.   In the early 1800s, Cambridgeport reeked with the malodorous effluvia of 13 soap factories.

The reaction of Old Cambridge to this industrial development was condescension, which quickly turned into outright antagonism as the two groups began to vie for political power. When the old meeting house proved too small, the Cambrigeport residents won the right to build the new Town Hall in Central Square, which was the Cambridgeport counterpart to Harvard Square. This marked a shifting of political power away from the old-time residents in West Cambridge to the industry-oriented people in Cambridgeport. An enduring socio-economic division had begun.

While Cambridge and Cambridgeport wrangled over political power, an entrepreneur named Andrew Craigie began secretly to plan the development of land farther east, at Lechmere Point. Noting how quickly Cambridgeport had bloomed after the development of West Boston Bridge, Craigie built a private bridge connecting Lechmere Point to Boston. Thereupon, he shrewdly offered Middlesex County the gift of a courthouse -- land, materials, and labor -- which was accepted. Old Cambridge watched the removal of its courts and records to the east with resentment, while Craigie pioneered what soon became a flourishing industrial area.

As Cambridge began to swell in size in the mid-nineteenth

century, the vacant land between Old Cambridge, East Cambridge, and Cambridgeport began to disappear. However, despite the growing ties of streets and businessess, the three areas remained socially and emotionally distinct. For Old Cambridge, life revolved around Harvard College and Harvard Square. The residents of East Cambridge and Cambridgeport, meanwhile, did not go to Harvard Square, but across the Charles River bridges to Boston. In 1842, Old Cambridge attempted to secede and form a separate municipality, but the other two areas resisted the proposal and after long efforts it was dropped. When the city of Cambridge was incorporated four years later, it was strictly a marriage of convenience, with little love shared among the partners.

Throughout the mid-nineteenth century, the Old Cambridge society people stayed aloof from the "Pointers and Porters," as the residents of East Cambridge and Cambridgeport were known. Indeed, when a public high school was opened for Cambridge in 1846, only one Old Cambridge student enrolled, and she was the mayor's daughter. Politically, however, the burgeoning strength of the industrial sections could not be ignored, and, when the city was incorporated in 1846, the two groups were in sharp and almost equal antagonism. Throughout the remainder of the century, Cambridge expanded economically, upgrading its public facilities and services while undergoing rapid urbanization and industrialization. In the fifty years

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between 1840 and 1890, the population of Cambridge increased by a factor of five.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, Cambridge had become a major industrial city, manufacturing engine boilers, steel bridges, printing, brick-making, cabinet-making, soap-making, and pork-packing. At the same time, political power, which earlier had shifted from clergy to gentry, and then from gentry to businessmen, now shifted from businessmen to immigrant leaders, who headed the large contingent of ethnics involved in the work force. The Irish immigrants elected their first Irish mayor in 1901, and over the next four decades they would completely dominate Cambridge electoral politics. The old-line Yankee families of Old Cambridge became disheartened with politics, effectively abdicating and letting the Irish construct a Democratic machine, shored up by generous patronage prerogatives.

During the first four decades of the twentieth century, Cambridge continued to evolve at the forefront of American urban development. Streetcars, electric street lights, and other modern municipal services were developed and provided. Meanwhile, almost every available square foot of land in the city was now in use, and the rapid urban expansion that had characterized Cambridge for 100 years had come to an end. MIT moved to Cambridge in 1916, further enhancing the city's reputation as a foremost intellectual center.

With the arrival of the Great Depression, hard times came to Cambridge. Because of inefficiency and outright incompetence in the Cambridge government, taxes rose even as services plummeted. Businesses began to leave, and by 1938 Cambridge had gained a reputation as one of the worst-run cities in Massachusetts. Although almost everyone blamed the problems on fiscal mismanagement by the Irish-American politicians who controlled city hall, it seemed virtually impossible to dislodge them from positions they had held for nearly 40 years.

To counter the entrenched machine power of the Irish, the Cambridge Yankees and their allies began to advocate the so-called "Plan E," which allowed for proportional representation. Under proportional representation, each voter ranks candidates by preference. Proportional representation would offer Cambridge reformers and other minorities a chance to be heard. Plan E also allowed for a council-city manager arrangement that presumably would professionalize and depoliticize the city's chief administrative officer.

The machinations used by both sides in the battle over Plan E soon took on comic-opera qualities, and included attempts by the Irish to declare Harvard a "separate city" as part of their effort to brand Plan E a plot by "Harvard Communists." Although a referendum on Plan E was defeated by a narrow margin in 1938, the continuing mismanagement of

Cambridge government by the Irish politicians caused increasing resentment, and in the 1940 elections Plan E was approved by a 59 percent majority. Although the reformers won only four of the nine council seats under the first Plan E government, their cohesiveness enabled them to enact many of the reforms necessary to put Cambridge on a sound financial footing. Thus, the purpose of Plan E -- to take power away from the Irish machine and distribute it to other groups -- was achieved.

After the introduction of Plan E, divisions that exist to the present day began to evolve. On the one hand, there were the reformer groups, identified with Harvard University and encompassing the Old Cambridge Yankees, the increasingly powerful middle- and upper-middle-class professional groups, and also certain minority groups, which were beginning to filter into Cambridge in small but significant numbers. On the other hand, there were the ethnic groups, identified with the Cambridgeport and East Cambridge areas and dominated at the outset by the Irish, but with increasing input from Italian, Portuguese and other ethnic groups that were beginning to replace the Irish in the lower strata of American society.

In 1945, the Harvard/reformer elements combined to form the Cambridge Civic Association (CCA),

"A political association dedicated to

> promoting honest and efficient local
> government through the support of the
> council-manager plan, working for and
> supporting competency in the office of
> the city manager, working for and
> improving the school system of the
> city, and freeing the school system
> from all influences other than those
> which will provide the best possible
> education for the children of
> Cambridge, and seeking and supporing
> the candidacy of competent men and
> women in public office. [1]

During the late 1940s and the 1950s, Cambridge remained a somnolent place, enjoying the fruits of the post-war economic prosperity that extended to all of America. Although Harvard was temporarily sullied by the attacks of Joseph McCarthy, the cool response of President Nathan Pusey led it to emerge with even greater stature when the red-baiting senator was discredited. Then, in the early 1960s, the impact of the civil rights movement and growing social activism was felt very heavily in Cambridge, where the disporportionately large numbers of young people and students were the vanguard of these movements.

In 1965, Harvard University became one of the first campuses at which students actively opposed the war in Viet Nam. Soon, Cambridge became the informal capital of the anti-war activities in the Northeast, as national protest organizations began to open offices in or near Harvard Square. In local politics, the CCA aligned largely with the anti-war protesters, while the ethnic groups -- now known as the

Independents -- were largely pro-war.   In 1967, a referendum

in Cambridge found a majority of residents endorsed the war;

by the early 1970s, the city was overwhelmingly opposed to the

war.

During the late 1960s, protests became violent, with

bloody confrontations in Harvard Yard and later in Cambridge

Common.   While larger cities could handle such shocks, the

impact   on Cambridge was profound.   A huge chasm developed

between the two political coalitions.   The acrimony generated

by the national policy on Viet Nam poisoned relations in other

areas and made it more difficult for the two groups to agree

on important local issues.

Harvard had always been a factor in Cambridge, but in the

past its effects on the city had been subtle, describable in

words like "aura" or "atmosphere."   The real power always lay

elsewhere.   Then, during the 1950s and 1960s, Harvard and MIT

emerged as the most powerful economic forces in the city.

There had been little cause for conflict between Cambridge and

Harvard until the waning years of the nineteenth century when

land for development became scarce.   President Eliot heard the

first timid sounds of protest and explained them away with

elegance.   He appeared to have been sensitive to   the

possibility that Harvard had responsibilities in Cambridge.

But his successor, A. Lawrence Lowell, fretted, discouraged

MIT from moving into town, and bought more Cambridge land for

Harvard. By the mid-twentieth century, the two universities were growing at full speed while Cambridge's population decreased and old industries moved to cheaper locations out of town, where they could build efficient one-story and two-story buildings with adequate parking.

The rapid expansion of Harvard and MIT during the 1950s and 1960s was a response to the national increase in the college-age population and an abundance of funds from private foundations and the federal government. By the mid-sixties there was no question that, together, the two universities constituted the most potent economic influence in town. In 1974, the two universities owned 428 of Cambridge's 4,000 acres -- approximately half and half. Their properties occupied much of the riverbank between the Longfellow and the Larz Anderson bridges. As a result of its extensive land-holdings in the city, MIT was Cambridge's third largest taxpayer (by virtue of owning more taxable real estate than Harvard) and Harvard the fourth. In addition, both institutions made voluntary in-lieu-of-taxes payments, which totalled $800,000 in fiscal year 1974-75.

Moreover, if Harvard and MIT were considered together, they were the largest employer in town. One-fifth of Cambridge's labor force was employed by the two universities. In 1974, the universities' payroll to Cambridge residents amounted to $37,200,000. This did not include the laborers

who built the dormitories, laboratories, and libraries, on which the institutions spent millions, particularly during the 1960s.

The Universities also enhanced the economy indirectly. Students were voracious consumers, spending vast sums of money in Cambridge on retail merchandise. The universities also attracted droves of visitors. MIT and Harvard estimated that, in 1974, students and visitors spent $16 million in the city. Meanwhile, the universities spent $11.9 million for goods and services in Cambridge.

At still another level of economic impact were the research-and-development firms that located in Cambridge to be near the universities. These corporations opened up thousands of jobs for white-collar, professional and technical workers. Moreover, they arrived just in time to rescue the city's tax base. Edward Crane, who was mayor during the early sixties, worked hard and skillfully to convince such firms to locate their offices in the city rather than on lower-cost suburban sites. He enlisted the assistance of James Killian, chairman of the MIT Corporation. MIT acted as co-developer with Cabot, Cabot and Forbes in the building of a new commercial office and research center called Technology Square, which was one of the biggest taxpayers in the city and which acted as a magnet for other firms.

Many of the new businesses' employees wanted to live in

Cambridge but could not find satisfying quarters in the dilapidated three-family and four-family houses dating back to the turn of the century. The alternative, the single-family houses near Harvard Square, were too large and expensive. Developers responded to the demand with high-rise, high-rent apartment buildings. At this time, students also found it increasingly desirable to live off-campus. Groups of five for six students were willing to pay high prices for a few rooms in an old building, so some landlords charged them accordingly. As a result, between 1960 and 1970 the average rent of a Cambridge apartment increased by nearly 90 percent.

The research and development offices contributed to a more attractive, healthier environment than the old industries. It was hard to be nostalgic about slaughterhouses and soap houses. However, blue-collar laborers had trouble finding jobs. It was estimated that between 1967 and 1971, Cambridge lost 5,000 manufacturing jobs -- almost a quarter of all such jobs in the city. Cambridge also suffered a great disappointment when the federal government cancelled its plans to build a huge research complex for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) near Kendall Square. Factories had been moved, land cleared, and two buildings constructed before the project was scrapped, leaving empty renewal land and the problem of developing it. Moreover, although some desperately needed housing was built,

skyrocketing rents strained the budgets of middle-income families, the poor and those who depended on fixed incomes, such as Social Security checks. Civic activists complained that, as usual, Cambridge improvements came at the expense of those least able to afford them.

Harvard and MIT were still less involved in civic affairs than their most forceful critics would have liked. However, the universities had become far more responsive to Cambridge's civic problems than in the past. Both gave more in money and services than ever before. More importantly, Harvard and MIT had learned to tread gently and to consult with community groups on development plans likely to affect them. Such negotiations were delicate operations, for, in the mid-1970s, much of Cambridge still looked upon the universities with hostility -- although probably less so than at the end of the 1960s. And, after a decade of turmoil and hostility, the universities accepted the inevitability of friction between town and gown. Harvard remained more vulnerable to attack than MIT. And, even more significantly, unlike MIT, whose expansion had tended to take place in blighted industrial areas, Harvard's physical growth had disturbed more residents.

In recent years, residents have become more politically active, sometimes with impressive results. In 1963, when the Massachusetts Department of Public Works wanted to chop down the handsome sycamores along Memorial Drive to build an

underpass at the Larz Anderson Bridge (where the "Great Bridge" had been in the old days), Cantabrigians defended their trees in force, posted "minutemen" to guard them against axes and buzzsaws, and shouted the cry of "Save the Sycamores" through the city. (In characteristic style, Harvard botanists pointed out that the sycamores were not sycamores at all, but specimens of _Platanus acerifolia_, the London plane tree. But the campaign had been launched to the cadence of sycamores, and there it stayed.) The "sycamores" were saved.

When the state proposed building an eight-lane highway through the city it threatened people, not just trees. This so-called Inner Belt had first been proposed by the Massachusetts Department of Public Works in 1948 as a means of directing trucks and other traffic through Boston but bypassing its core. A section of the highway's path lay in Cambridge. However, the city's arteries had not been designed to handle large volumes of high-speed traffic. Although the proposal had not been implemented, it remained very much in favor with the Department of Public Works. The plan called for a huge thoroughfare to slice through Cambridgeport from south to north, crossing from Boston at the Boston University Bridge, up Brookline Street, and continuing north to Somerville. It looked impressive on paper and may well have been a traffic manager's dream, but it was a Cambridge resident's nightmare. No system of underpasses, overpasses

and ramps could alter the certainty that the Inner Belt would divide the city into equal parts, encourage high-speed traffic, create additional hazards for the already overwrought Cambridge pedestrian and constitute an eyesore. Much worse, it would force 4,500 people out of their homes and leave others stranded on the unlovely fringes of the highway. Most of these people had moderate incomes or were very poor. Some of them had lived in Cambridgeport all their lives.

When the Inner Belt project was revived in earnest during the 1960s, it was embellished by proposals to provide low-cost housing for those whom the road would displace. The highway was now wrapped in fancy words and designated an "urban renewal package." The people whose houses were at stake were not impressed. Said one, "I wouldn't want low cost housing even if they did build it. The very name 'low cost' indicates to me that it would be crowded with no privacy."[2] A woman expressed her doubts succinctly: "If they took me, who says I'd end up in a better neighborhood? I'd end up worse off."[3] Cambridgeport residents -- largely those who owned homes in the highway's tentative path -- began to band together to challenge it.

When the state proposed an alternative route along the railroad right-of-way behind MIT, the Institute acted swiftly to kill it because it would have cut through MIT properties and, they said, traffic would have caused vibrations

interfering with the sensitive work in the laboratories. The state reverted to the earlier proposal. Clergymen, business leaders and the Cambridge Civic Association supported the Cambridgeport residents. The only Cambridge supporters of the Inner Belt were a few members of the Chamber of Commerce, who saw it as a good trucking route, and the city planning director.

Politically, the Belt was poison. Cambridge refused to look kindly upon any of the routes the Department of Public Works proffered. The project had no champions in the City Council, and two Cambridge representatives in the State House -- Senator Francis X. McCann and Representative John J. Toomey of anti-Plan E fame -- fought it fiercely. This was one of these rare causes which brought the city together, and together the city triumphed. The Inner Belt died.

This cohesiveness disintegrated during the squabble over the John F. Kennedy Library and Museum. This was an intricate tale. It began in 1965 when the Kennedy family, acting through a special corporation created for this purpose, proposed to locate the Kennedy Library at Harvard. A 12-acre site was designated west of Boylston Street and north of Memorial Drive, where the huge facilities for repairing and maintaining subway trains and trolleys had existed since 1912. Harvard's Kennedy School of Government was also to be located on the site. The Kennedy Foundation sponsored an

architectural competition and I.M. Pei was selected. Pei
interviewed the appropriate parties and met with members of
the community, whom he charmed. However, his first design
raised numerous objections, aesthetic and otherwise; he went
to work on revisions.

Meanwhile, some people in the vicinity of Harvard Square
had doubts about the whole idea. They raised objections
concerning the appropriateness of the design, but their main
concern was the likelihood that the Kennedy Memorial would
attract hordes of tourists. They feared that this would
generate further traffic and parking problems in Harvard
Square and might produce a honky-tonk atmosphere that could
spill over into residential areas. The project stalled while
an environmental impact study was made and lawsuits were
threatened. The Kennedy family indicated a willingness to
split up the memorial and put the library and museum on
separate sites. Alternative locations were proposed in the
metropolitan Boston area. Harvard declared for the library
but remained quiet about the museum. Meanwhile, down in
Texas, the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library had already
been completed.

A Harvard committee was ostensibly examining the
environmental study when the Kennedys pulled the project out
of Cambridge altogether in November 1975. The entire Kennedy
Memorial went to the Boston campus of the University of

Massachusetts. Reactions to the withdrawal were mixed. The opponents were delighted, although some of them would have liked to have seen the library in Cambridge. Harvard was disappointed to lose the library. Interestingly, knowledgeable observers reported that if there had ever been a referendum on the question, Cambridge citizens would most likely have voted overwhelmingly in favor of both the museum and the library, as did a majority of the city council.

With the resolution of the Kennedy Library dispute, the political turmoil and institutional instability of the previous decade diminished considerably. By the mid-seventies, many in Cambridge welcomed the new-found calm and tranquility, a serenity somewhat akin to that of the 1950s and the early 1960s. In certain areas, the protest efforts, both nationally and locally, had achieved their objectives: an end to the war in Vietnam, the adoption of rent control ordinances, and a halt to the construction of the Kennedy Library and the Inner Belt in Cambridge.

Regardless of their efficacy, these protests polarized the community on a range of issues: housing, education, zoning, law enforcement, health and welfare, employment and the like. This growing inter-group political conflict caused instability in the city's public institutions. From 1965 to 1975, the 5-4 and 4-3 majorities on the city council and the school committee oscillated between the two dominant

coalitions, the CCA and the Independents, almost from two-year term to two-year term. Serving at the pleasure of the city council and the school committee, respectively, the city manager and the superintendent of schools were under constant threat of removal from office because the two groups could not establish and maintain enduring coalitions. As a result, between 1965 and 1975, Cambridge had five city managers and five superintendents of schools. Other agencies witnessed similar turnover among their appointed personnel, to the detriment of their ability to function.

By the 1975 municipal elections, however, candidates and voters appeared more moderate. Not surprisingly, this shift toward moderation increased the stability of the city's public-service bureaucracies and reduced conflicts over the selection and tenure of the city manager and the superintendent of schools. Moderation may have diminished inter-group conflicts, but it did not eliminate them. As in the past, Cambridge politics continued to be an amalgam of personalities, factions, and interests. These were determined in large measure by the sectional, class, ethnic and racial grouping of its residents and were reflected, since the 1940s, in the composition and agendas of the city's two political coalitions, the reform-oriented CCA and the more traditional Independents.

Demographic Trends and Characteristics:

Cambridge's population has been changing drastically for more than two decades. (Exhibits II-1 and 2) For several decades, the population declined, as it did in many older cities in the Northeast. Families moved to the suburbs and remaining families became smaller as birthrates dropped. However, in Cambridge the substantial number of dwelling units dampened what otherwise would have been a larger population decrease, and, in fact, new housing construction was so heavy in the early 1970s that the city's population began to increase.

For the most part, single persons and unrelated individuals living in one household moved into these new units. The increase in these "non-family" households was phenomenal: from about 4,000 in 1950 to over 18,000 in 1975. There were almost as many "non-family" households as there were families (22,500). The number of family households dropped 25 percent between 1950 and 1975 and by 1975 constituted only 53 percent of all households. In contrast, 78 percent of the households in the nation were family households. Persons living in families constituted 62 percent of the population in 1975, down from 83 percent in 1950.

The loss of families may be viewed as part of a general redistribution within the metropolitan area, away from the core cities and toward outlying areas where the availability

EXHIBIT II-1: DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS
OF THE CITY OF CAMBRIDGE, 1950 TO 1975

DEMOGRAPHIC:	1950(1)	1960(1)	1970(1)	1975(2)
Total Population	120,740	107,716	100,361	102,096
Percent Change	--	-10.8	-6.8	+1.7

SOCIAL:				
Percent Black	4.3	5.3	6.8	9.6
Percent Foreign Born	16.9	15.2	15.4	15.4
Percent French Canadian	5.0	10.5	7.2	9.2
Percent Irish	3.0	8.4	5.6	3.0
Percent Italian	2.4	6.3	5.3	6.9
Percent 65 and Over	9.1	11.7	7.8	9.9

ECONOMIC				
Median Family Income	$2,705	$5,923	$9,815	$11,300
Percent Below Poverty Level	N/A	N/A	8.6	12.8
Median School Years Completed	10.7	12.0	12.5	N/A
Median Value of Homes	N/A	$13,800	$24,200	N/A
Percent Owner Occupied	21.5	21.8	18.6	17.2

Sources: (1)   U.S. Census of Population and Housing, 1950, 1960
and 1970.

(2)   Cambridge Mid-Century Census Survey, 1975.

EXHIBIT II-2: DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS
OF CAMBRIDGE RELATIVE TO BOSTON SMSA AND NATIONAL
STATISTICS, 1970

	Cambridge	Boston SMSA	U.S.
Population Change (1960 to 1970)	-6.8	+7.9	+13.2
Percent Black	6.8	4.6	10.9
Percent Foreign Born	15.4	9.9	4.7
Percent French Canadian	7.1	7.8	8.4
Percent Irish	4.9	5.3	2.6
Percent Italian	4.2	6.9	10.5
Percent 65 or Over	7.8	4.2	9.8
Median Family Income	$9,815	$11,449	$9,867
Percent Below Poverty Level	8.6	6.1	12.6
Median School Years Completed	12.5	12.4	12.2
Median Value of Homes	$24,200	$23,800	$17,000
Percent Owner Occupied	18.6	50.4	58.1
Percent in Workforce			
Professionals	34.2	20.0	15.4
Managers	5.3	9.0	4.7
Service	11.7	11.9	16.0
Blue Collar (Operatives, crafts, laborers)	20.5	27.6	17.9
Clerical and Sales	27.2	10.0	40.7
Private Household	1.1	0.7	3.4

Source: U.S. Census of Population and Housing, 1970.

of new homes and mortgage financing were greatest and where industry was also developing. Many cities in the Boston area, including Boston, Chelsea, Everett, and Somerville -- as well as core cities in other metropolitan areas -- experienced much the same phenomenon as Cambridge in this respect.

Moreover, during this period, the size of family households decreased from an average of 3.5 persons per household in 1950 to 3.3 in 1975. This accounts for as much as 19 percent of the decline in population living in family households. Thus, at least 80 percent of the loss of family population must be traced to the widespread departure of families from Cambridge. In many instances, it is likely that departing families were replaced by smaller and younger families, thereby contributing to both the decline in family size and the loss of family population recorded by the Census. Since some families were replaced by other families, it is impossible to determine the number of families that left Cambridge during this period.

However, the average size of non-family households did not increase accordingly; rather, between 1960 and 1975, the size of non-family households fell from 1.8 persons per household to 1.6. Growth in the number of non-family households living in Cambridge was so strong between 1950 and 1975 that the city experienced a modest net increase in the number of households at the same time that the population

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dropped markedly -- a statistic that bears heavily on the city's housing shortage.

The changes in the composition of Cambridge's population did not occur uniformly throughout the city. (Exhibit II-3) The Harvard Square area lost many family households --as much as 57 percent in one census tract. Some of these losses can be explained by Harvard's building program in the 1960s and Harvard's enrollment increases, both of which abated in the 1970s. Similarly, Harvard Square's appeal to younger single people also contributed substantially to the loss of families in this area. For example, throughout the Riverside neighborhood, with the single exception of Census Tract 39, the loss of family households from 1950-1970 was more than 40 percent. The increase in family households in Census Tract 39 can be directly attributed to the construction of 500 units of housing for married students at Peabody Terrace. A similar situation prevails at the eastern end of the city where MIT built Eastgate and Westgate for married students.

In Census Tract 24 (East Cambridge), a combination of the Technology Square and Kendall Square Urban Renewal Projects in the 1960s caused the number of family households to decline by over 40 percent. Generally, the city's older neighborhoods in the middle and eastern sections that showed the largest declines in family households. Some family losses, particularly in the eastern part, resulted from the departure

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EXHIBIT II-3
CHANGE IN THE NUMBER OF FAMILIES RESIDING
IN THE CITY OF CAMBRIDGE, 1950-1970

LEGEND

Percentage Decrease   Percentage Increase

Under 25%   25.0 - 33.3%   33.4 - 39.9%   40.0 - 57.0%   35.0 - 40.1%

of industries employing Cambridge blue-collar workers. Although no data can conclusively explain why families left Cambridge, the most significant single factor appears to be the desire of families living in older parts of Cambridge to find modern housing in a more open environment. This housing simply was not being built in Cambridge. Rather, it was being built in suburban communities where land was plentiful. Older areas in other parts of the Boston metropolitan area experienced an emigration of families comparable to Cambridge's. In some areas in the Boston Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area, immigrating black families tended to replace white females moving to the suburbs. Similarly, in East Cambridge, Model Cities and Riverside, some loss of family population was offset by the influx of black, Spanish, and Portuguese families.

A steady and sometimes astounding increase in non-family households paralleled this decrease in family households, particularly in residential areas near Harvard Square. Between 1960 and 1975 the non-family population in two census tracts in Riverside increased 566 percent.

In the western part of the city, the decline of family population was much less than it was in the middle and eastern sections, especially as the distance from Harvard Square increased. Census Tract 49 in North Cambridge showed an increase in the number of families by more than 35 percent as

a result of the construction of two major publicly subsidized developments, one in the early 1950s and the other in the late 1960s. Generally, the western parts of the city were, in terms of housing and environment, in better condition than the eastern sector. University and public redevelopment were also concentrated in the central and eastern parts of Cambridge. Thus, it is not surprising that more families moved from the older eastern and central sections of the city.

Overall, the areas where the greatest decline of family population occurred had the lowest percentage of families in the city by 1975. Thus, the census tracts covering Harvard Square had a family concentration of less than 50 percent. If the concentration of families is viewed as an indicator of stability, the residential section of East Cambridge ranks high. Although the five census tracts three have fewer families than do many other tracts, they represent an extremely high proportion (two-thirds) of the total households in that neighborhood.

Corresponding to the reduction in family households and household size was a decline in the city's residential density, from 72 persons per residential acre in 1960 to 65 persons in 1970. There remained, nevertheless, great variations in the range of densities in different parts of the city, from a low of 21 persons per residential acres to a high of 210. Higher population densities were found in the eastern and central areas,

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though net residential acreage was greatest in the eastern
sections. But just as the decrease in household size produced
lower population densities in residential neighborhoods, the
addition of new units in multifamily apartment buildings
increased dwelling-unit density from 26 dwellings per acre in
1960 to 28 in 1970. To wit, Cambridge became increasingly a
city of fewer people and smaller households but more dwelling
units for a growing number of households.

An examination of the changes in the age composition
brings into sharper focus the nature of the changes in the
city's population. All age groups except 18-34 experienced
significant declines. The number of children under 18 dropped
32 percent between 1950 and 1975. Adults in the 35-54 age
bracket -- parents in middle-aged families -- declined 53
percent. On the other hand, the number of individuals between
18-34 jumped 33 percent and, in 1975, constituted 53 percent
of the city's population. The young adult group, which grew
so rapidly in the 1960s, did not result from the natural
increase of Cambridge residents but instead was the product of
migration. In the 1960 Census, the population aged 10-14 was
6,600. By 1970, ten years later, there were 19,400 persons
aged 20-24, almost triple the number aged 10-14 in 1960.

In 1958, 2,368 babies were born to Cambridge residents.
In 1972, the number was 1,043, a decrease of more than 50
percent. In view of the sharp decline in the number of

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families, the decline in births may not seem surprising; however, the 1970 Census reported that even married women in Cambridge were having fewer children than married women in the state as a whole. In fact, married Cambridge women in childbearing years (15-44) averaged only 64 percent as many children as their counterparts throughout the state. Among the younger women (15-24), the rate was 55 percent of that for the state. Furthermore, in Cambridge the number of children under 5 years of age per 1,000 women of childbearing years was 232, compared with the Boston metropolitan area's rate of 359.

These figures illustrate lifestyle differences. Women between 18 and 34 years old living in Cambridge seemed to marry later and, if married, had fewer children at this stage of life. Since the 1960s, such women have moved to the city in large numbers. At the same time, women in the late childbearing years (35-44), who traditionally had more children, have been leaving the city. Not surprisingly, the decline in the Cambridge birthrate was accompanied by a drop of more than 30 percent in the city's preschool age population. In addition, the school age population (5-17) declined almost 20 percent. Moreover, in the 1960s, as a result of the post-war baby boom, 17 year olds became the largest age group in the nation. During this same period, however, the number of 16 and 17 year olds in Cambridge declined 15 percent. Thus, it is unlikely that the decline in

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birthrates will be reversed in the foreseeable future.

The migration of families out of Cambridge in the 1950s and 1960s -- attracted by new opportunities for housing and jobs in the suburbs -- left a vacuum, which was filled by non-families, a great proportion of whom were young and single, students, workers, and professionals attracted by the cultural atmosphere of the major universities. Similar trends have been observed in Boston and other communities, but, unlike Boston, where blacks tended to replace a portion of the departing white middle class, Cambridge underwent a substantial growth in its population of non-families. Had this not happened it is likely that Cambridge's black population would have grown far more than it did.

Another factor that contributed to the loss of family population in Cambridge, particularly in the mid and late 1960s, was the expansion of Harvard and MIT. Between 1960 and 1970, Harvard alone acquired more than 750 dwelling units to convert to university use, compared with its acquisition of 120 dwelling units between 1929 and 1960. While comparable figures are not available for MIT, most of MIT's expansion was in nonresidential areas, which caused the displacement of jobs rather than housing units. It is impossible to determine the number of families that left Cambridge as a result of housing or job displacement by one of the universities. But university growth must have been a considerable impetus for

immigration of non-university people as well as persons attending or working at institutions. Public and private redevelopment projects in the late 1960s also displaced numerous dwellings and jobs. These events took place during a period when virtually no family-type of housing, public or private, was being built in Cambridge.

Socioeconomic Trends and Characteristics

Between 1950 and 1970, Cambridge families did not share in the nation's growing economic prosperity. Between 1950 and 1960, median family income in Cambridge rose 77 percent; and, by 1970, it had gained another 66 percent to $9,815. However, these increases were less than those of the Boston metropolitan area, where median income increased 90 and 71 percent respectively in 1950-60 and 1960-79, and the median family income in 1970 was $11,500. The number of low- and moderate-income families remained high. In 1970, nearly half of Cambridge families earned less than $10,000; nearly 25 percent earned less than $6,000. In contrast, 40 percent of metropolitan area families earned less than $10,000, and 17 percent less than $6,000.

Cambridge had 2,300 fewer families in 1970 than in 1960. In which income groups were the families that left the city? Many -- approximately 500 to 800 -- were in the $7,000-to-$11,000 range (based on 1970 incomes); this group might be

labeled "moderate income." But the largest group was the $11,000-to-$16,000 group; about 1,300 to 1,600 such families left the city. Thus, more so-called "middle-income" families left than the moderate-income group.

Between 1960 to 1970, few low-income families moved out of the city. Or, more precisely, those who left were replaced by other poor families. The idea of low-income families moving into Cambridge during the 1960s is perhaps surprising. One explanation, undoubtedly, is the large numbers of Portuguese and Puerto Rican families who immigrated to Cambridge during this period. The construction of low- and moderate-income housing was not a factor in maintaining the size of the low-income population. Before the 1970 census, most of this housing had not been occupied. In any case, this data appears to support the theory that increasing rents did not force poor families to leave the city since lower-priced alternative housing was not available outside Cambridge. Instead, poor families were compelled to pay a higher proportion of their incomes for housing.

The income of single persons in the Cambridge population seems to be as high or higher than the median incomes of the families they displaced (excluding the student population, of course). In the $10,000-to-$15,000 income bracket, unrelated individuals residing in Cambridge were numerically equal to their metropolitan area counterparts. However, individuals

with annual incomes over $15,000 comprised 3.5 percent of the single population in Cambridge, as opposed to only 2.9 percent of the unmarried population in the Boston metropolitan area.

Population changes thus produced a city that was becoming both richer and poorer. Those at the low end of the income scale have found themselves, in the face of rising rent, with no alternative but to remain and pay a higher proportion of their income for housing. On the other hand, those in a good financial position could afford to remain in or move into Cambridge. Thus, the moderate-to-middle-income group constituted those families who chose to leave the city for economic reasons. Cambridge families have fared poorly in the face of inflation and high unemployment. In 1970, 8.6 percent of families were below the poverty level; in 1975, the figure rose to 12.8 percent.

Cambridge has a large and complex economy with a number of roles within the larger metropolitan economy. The city is not only an educational center, but also a service, manufacturing, retail and wholesale center. This diversity is the result of an historical process in which two cities grew simultaneously within the same space: The university city and the traditional manufacturing city. The result has been an economy twice as large as might be expected in a city of 100,000 people: $1.5 billion gross product, $1 billion in payrolls and more than 83,000 jobs. In addition, the city's

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economic diversity has made its economy more resistant to
changes and trends in the national economy. Unfortunately,
the economic well-being of Cambridge has been as dependent on
the health of the metropolitan area's economy as on the city's
economy. Many residents dependent on manufacturing and other
nonprofessional jobs have become victims of a rapidly
declining regional economy. Thus, between 1970 and 1975, the
Cambridge unemployment rate rose from 4 percent to around 10
percent.

Population size and composition are determined, in large
part, by the available job base. While this theory holds true
for economic regions, such as eastern Massachusetts, it does
not apply to a particular locale within regions, such as
Cambridge. Changes in Cambridge's job base will not
necessarily cause changes in its population. If a factory
moves from Cambridge to another location within the region,
Cambridge workers would not lose their jobs. Another
dimension is that regional economic trends are not necessarily
accurately reflected in the Cambridge job base. Between 1970
and 75, unemployment in Cambridge tripled, as it did in the
region as a whole. On the other hand, despite the continued
decline in the prospects for blue-collar employment in the
region, the shift in the Cambridge population from blue-collar
workers to professionals seems to have ceased during the past
five years. At the same time, growth in the number of

professional workers has slowed. The decline in semi- and unskilled white-collar employees may have reflected the shift of such workers into the ranks of unemployed (Exhibit II-4).

Although the number of jobs based in Cambridge declined from 1970 to 1975, the number of Cambridge residents working in Cambridge remained at 22,500. Increased employment in government and services compensated for heavy losses in manufacturing, wholesale trade, and finance/insurance/real estate. During this five-year period, total employment declined by 4,000. Only jobs in government, education, health and research increased significantly (Exhibit II-5). However, it should be noted that, in fact, nearly all the loss in manufacturing occurred in 1970-71; after that date manufacturing employment remained stable. An examination of "participation rates" - the percentage of Cambridge jobs held by Cambridge residents - illustrates a shift to lower paid jobs: Retail and services #1 (hotels, personal services, and recreation) increased, while manufacturing and wholesale trade decreased. Perhaps this indicates that better-paid blue-collar workers continue to leave the city and are replaced by persons taking less attractive "blue-collar" jobs, such as waitressing, janitorial work and hotel work.

Cambridge's large employment base gives the city a strong tax base, which is needed to support the heavy demands put on city government by a diverse population. Despite some job

EXHIBIT II-4:   CHANGES IN THE JOB BASE, 1960 to 1975: SKILL LEVELS OF CAMBRIDGE RESIDENT WORKERS


BLUE COLLAR

WHITE COLLAR

EXHIBIT II-5:   CAMBRIDGE EMPLOYMENT AND JOB BASE TRENDS BY SECTOR, 1960-1975

		Agricul-ture & Mining	Contruc-tion	Manufac-turing	Transporta-tion, Com-munications, Utilities	Whole-sale Trade	Retail Trade	Finance, Insurance, Real Estate	Services #1	Services #2	Govern-ment	Total
Cambridge Based Jobs	1970	110	3,395	22,249	3,689	6,634	11,403	2,383	8,630	25,037	3,967	87,497
	1974	99	2,928	18,325	3,147	4,881	10,766	2,389	7,772	28,311	4,616	83,234
	Percent Change	(10.0)	(13.8)	(17.6)	(14.7)	(26.4)	(5.6)	0.3	(9.9)	13.1	16.4	(4.9)
Cambridge Resident Employment in Cambridge	1971	18	333	4,461	916	625	3,012	955	2,008	8,000	1,981	22,487
	1975	0	475	2,763	700	323	3,456	353	2,693	8,525	3,263	22,551
	Percent Change	(100.0)	37.2	(38.1)	(23.6)	(48.3)	14.7	(63.0)	34.1	6.6	64.7	(0.3)
Participa-tion (Percent)	1970-71	16.4	9.8	20.0	24.8	9.4	26.4	40.1	23.3	31.9	49.4	25.7
	1974-75	0	16.2	15.1	22.2	6.6	32.1	14.8	24.7	30.1	70.7	27.1

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EXHIBIT II-5 (continued)

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		Agriculture & Mining	Contruction	Manufacturing	Transportation, Communications, Utilities	Wholesale Trade	Retail Trade	Finance, Insurance, Real Estate	Services #1	Services #2	Government	Total
	1960	NA	1,227	12,058	2,519	1,376	4,784	2,711	2,377	11,929	2,439	46,278
Total Cambridge Residents Working in Industry Here and Elsewhere	1970	102	1,235	8,021	2,035	1,617	4,408	2,707	3,159	21,323	3,123	47,133
	Percent Change	–	(0.7)	(33.5)	(19.2)	17.5	(7.9)	(0.1)	32.9	78.7	28.0	1.8
	1975	90	927	6,339	1,734	359	6,698	1,884	5,053	17,880	5,801	46,165
	Percent Change	(11.7)	(24.9)	(21.0)	(14.8)	(77.8)	52.0	(30.4)	60.0	(16.1)	85.8	(2.05)

losses, the fact that Cambridge has maintained a strong and varied economy explains its relative financial health in comparison to nearly every other city in the Boston metropolitan core. However, it should be noted that its major employers are exempt from property taxes.

The educational levels of city residents are closely related to the occupational make-up of its resident labor force. Not surprisingly, Cambridge is a highly educated city. In 1970, fully 30 percent of residents older than 25 had completed four years of college. This was triple the figure for the city of Boston and nearly double the Boston SMSA's figure of 15.8 percent. These differentials were even more striking when one examined the data for those who had completed five years of college. Here, the figures were 20.1, 5.3 and 7.6 percent respectively.

This change in the educational level of Cambridge residents illustrates the shift in the composition of the city's population. In 1950, only 13.8 percent of residents older than 25 had completed four years of college; by 1975, this figure had increased to 38 percent. Interestingly, this change occurred largely in the last fifteen years. From 1950 to 1960, the number of individuals over 25 years of age who had completed four years of college increased only 13 percent. However, in the period from 1960 to 1975, the number of college graduates living in Cambridge rose from 11,327 to

20,791, nearly 84 percent -- clearly supporting the conclusion that young, well-educated professionals have been moving into the city in growing numbers.

At the same time, one must recognize the distortions imposed on the city's educational picture by the large university community. Despite its unusually high proportion of college graduates, the city's median educational level of 12.5 years was only slightly higher than that of the metropolitan area (12.4 years). Furthermore, in the 1970s, 37.0 percent of Cambridge residents 25 years and older had not finished high school versus 34.6 percent for the Boston SMSA.

Ethnic Characteristics

Cambridge's diversity is most noticeable in the ethnic mix of its residents. Among the foreign-born and first- and second-generation ethnic populations, French Canadians are present in the largest numbers, with the Irish and Italians immediately following. Although Cambridge's total foreign-born population has ranked considerably above the national average, two of its three major ethnic groups, the French Canadians and the Italians, have been underrepresented in the city relative to national norms. This anomaly results from the Census definition of "foreign stock" as persons who are foreign-born or have a foreign-born parent. In the established ethnic groups, a much lower proportion of the

population is likely to fit that definition: The flow of immigrants has declined and the exodus of acculturated ethnics has accelerated. In these communities, the ethnic character is strong, but the Census data does not reflect their numbers.

Contrary to popular belief, ethnic groups do not generally concentrate en masse in a specific section of the city. Instead, they scatter throughout the community, with economic level rather than ethnic background being the decisive factor in determining where people live. (Exhibit II-6) Except for aggregations of French Canadians and Irish in North Cambridge and of Italians and Portuguese in East Cambridge, Cambridge's ethnic population is dispersed throughout the city, especially in the northern and eastern sections, which are predominantly middle- and working-class areas. Nevertheless, a distinctive flavor pervades some neighborhoods. Thus, the section around Notre Dame de Pitie is as undeniably French Canadian as East Cambridge is Italian.

Interestingly, the patterns of residence, association and behavior of the large settlement of Italians in East Cambridge differ from those patterns observed among other ethnic groups in the community. For the most part, the Italians living in East Cambridge are more homogeneous with regard to level of educational attainment, median family income and occupation, and display greater social and familial solidarity than do the other ethnic groups in Cambridge. This may be attributed to

EXHIBIT II-6: ETHNIC AND RACIAL GROUPS, CITY OF CAMBRIDGE 1970

= More Than 10% French Canadian, 1970

= More Than 10% Black, 1970

= More Than 10% Irish, 1970

= More Than 10% Italian, 1970

= More Than 10% Portuguese, 1970

Ethnic Groups in Cambridge
(By Census Tract, 1970)

the fact that the Italians were among the latest immigrant groups to migrate to the United States in large numbers and, as a result, are among the least assimilated, socially and economically.

At best, however, this is only a partial explanation. Among the general foreign-born population and among specific ethnic groups, only the Italian population had a statistically significant pattern of both lower socio-economic status and sharp declines in population. The Irish, the French Canadians and the composite foreign-born population show neither a consistent nor a statistically significant relationship to social class or population decline.

As Dahl and Wolfinger point out in their study of ethnic politics in New Haven, socioeconomic homogeneity is generally found in the earliest stage of ethnic assimilation. In subsequent stages, occupational mobility produces a population increasingly heterogeneous in its social and economic composition. Later, residential mobility reduces overall social and familial cohesiveness while simultaneously reinforcing the cohesiveness and homogeneity of those who remain.[4] As Wolfinger noted, ethnics who stay in lower-income areas tend to be too poor to move or too attached to family and national social ties to leave.[5]

In Cambridge, with the exception of French Canadians united by Notre Dame de Pitie, their national parish church,

the non-Italian ethnic groups appear to be in the final stages of socioeconomic assimilation. Lacking the intense family and social networks of the Italians, these other ethnics have experienced the full impact of geographic and occupational mobility. This is not to say that these groups have lost their ethnic consciousness or awareness, but rather that residential patterns, and perhaps political behavior and attitudes, are more compatible with the lifestyles they are currently experiencing than with those of their fellow ethnics.

Although in the final stages of assimilation, the Italian population in East Cambridge is still relatively unassimilated both socially and culturally.[6] Living in areas with the sharpest decline in population and the lowest socioeconomic status, the Italian community has become more cohesive as its more affluent and less closely affiliated members have moved to other areas. It is difficult to say whether the Italian community in East Cambridge is at the "mobilization point" described by Wolfinger.[7] However, if one were to use his primary criteria, middle class socioeconomic status, then East Cambridge is decidedly not at the mobilization point. Instead, it is more likely at one or both of Parenti's pre-assimilation phases.[8] Needless to say, it will be interesting to test the various hypotheses pertaining to patterns of ethnic voting, especially as they relate to the different

stages of assimilation.   Indeed, the diversity of Cambridge's
ethnic populations should provide an opportunity to examine
the impact on election outcomes of ethnic voting during the
different periods in the assimilation process.

Racial Characteristics

        During the past thirty-five years, the black population
in Cambridge has increased almost 60 percent, with the bulk of
this change occurring since 1950.   Although these trends
reflect the national patterns of black migration to northern
industrial cities, previously reported by Duncan and Taeuber
and Taeuber,[9] the proportion of blacks in Cambridge has
remained   below the national average.   In addition   to
increasing in number, blacks in Cambridge have clustered in
particular areas, most notably in North and West Cambridge,
Kendall Square,   and Cambridgeport,   and the number   of
neighborhoods with blacks exceeding the national average of 10
percent rose steadily during the 1960-75   period.   An
examination of blacks' socioeconomic and occupational status
shows that the black population in Cambridge is diverse.   The
city's black population can be divided into four categories:
(1) native blacks, some of whose ancestors have lived in
Cambridge since the Civil War; (2) "island blacks," who have
migrated to the United States from Jamaica and the West
Indies; (3) early migrants from southern and inner-city areas;

and (4) recent (post-1955) migrants from these same areas.

Within these subgroups are considerable differences in lifestyles, expectations, occupations and settlement patterns. These variations are analogous to those reported in Taeuber and Taeuber's comparative analyses of black migration to northern cities.[10] In their study, Taeuber and Taeuber found, with regard to the earliest black migrants, that:

> "although the newcomers were lower in status than the urban residents, they were drawn from the higher status segment of the population of origin. Woodson, for example, lists Negro politicians and educated persons as being more likely to leave the South than certain business classes and poorer people, though 'the largest number of Negroes who have gone North during this period ... belong to the intelligent laboring class.[11]"

In Cambridge, the native, the island and the early migrant black populations tended to fit this description. For the most part, they settled in the more stable lower-middle and working-class areas in north and west Cambridge and along the Charles River in the Cambridgeport section. Indeed, among the various ethnic groups, more blacks own their homes, proportionately, than do whites. The latest wave of migrants, from primarily southern non-metropolitan regions and inner-city ghettos, were considerably poorer than their predecessors and were forced to live in the lowest income areas around Kendall Square.

Overall, however, the black population in Cambridge can best be described as lower-middle and working-class. This assessment is by no means unchanging. As the numbers of recent migrants have increased, the overall socioeconomic status of the black population has begun to decline relative to the rest of the population. At the same time, this heavy influx of lower-class blacks has increased racial tensions in the city. Indeed, the older black residents, unable to understand fully the militancy of these younger and poorer blacks are likely to share whites' resentment toward the new immigrants, blaming them for the rising tensions, hostilities, and reprisals, a pattern by no means unique to Cambridge.[12]

Housing in Cambridge

The housing market has worked against the needs of large portions of the population, particularly families and those with low to moderate incomes. Much of the city's housing stock is old and deteriorating. However, because housing is so central to the lives of everyone, the city has responded to housing problems more actively than perhaps any other public issue. Numerous zoning changes have added protection to neighborhoods; much publicly-assisted housing has been constructed; rent control has been enacted; and extensive rehabilitation programs have been initiated.

Much of the housing problem stemmed directly from the

strong attraction of Cambridge for the young. Non-family households -- single persons and unrelated individuals living together -- increased dramatically, from 4,281 in 1950 to about 18,000 in 1975. While the typical exodus of families to the suburbs originally provided room for this influx, demand for housing began exceeding supply in the 1960s, and the result has been greatly increased rents, higher land values and land speculation, construction of high-density, small-unit apartments, conversion of larger units to smaller ones, a decrease in home ownership, and increased deterioration of the older housing stock.

The housing pressures on the resident population in the 1960s precipitated an unprecendented publicly assisted housing development effort on the part of public agencies, the universities, nonprofit groups and private developers. Between 1970 and 1975, more than 2,800 such units were built -- an achievement of major proportions. Yet this production has not matched precisely the needs of the population. More than half the units are for the elderly. Of the family units, only 113 are for low-income families; and only 273 contain three or more bedrooms. On the other hand, it is estimated that there are perhaps 2,500 large families who qualify for subsidized housing.

In the 1960s the median household rent in Cambridge increased by about 70 percent -- more than double the median

increase for the Boston metropolitan area. Low- and moderate-income residents were forced to leave the city or to spend an excessive proportion of their incomes on rent. In response, public housing was built and rent control was adopted. After six years on the books, rent control became an integral part of the city's housing market. However, the excessive demand for housing that precipitated the crisis in the first place was still present and rent control remained controversial.

Land use Analysis

Since nearly all human endeavor requires space, land use analysis is central to the denominator with the complexity of activities that comprise the urban experience.*

The mid 1950s marked the culmination of a hundred-year process of industrial development and housing construction. Vacant land was almost nonexistent. There had been little "recycling" of developed land to other uses. Industrial employment was at a peak. A large proportion of the city's residents were part of traditional families.

The process began in the 1850s when improved transportation -- led by the railroads -- sparked rapid

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*"Land Use" is most simply defined as the principal activity on a given area of land. However, many other characteristics may enter into the definition of land use: ownership (private, nonprofit, governmental), size, and type of structure (high rise versus low rise), and operating characteristics such as noise, vibration, odor, and aesthetics.

industrialization. By the depression of the 1930s, nearly all of the city had been developed, and the few remaining vacant areas, in West Cambridge, were developed after World War II. In sum, Cambridge's first growth period produced essentially an industrial city, with speculatively developed housing for the labor force. Land was at a premium: Lots were small, structures were dense and crowded. Perhaps a quarter of the city was constructed on filled tidal flats and marshes. And, significantly, the city was almost fully developed before the advent of effective land use regulation (zoning) in the 1920s.

But Cambridge's development as an industrial city differed from that of similar cities in one important respect: Within the city's boundaries were two world-renowned educational institutions. Harvard (since 1636) and MIT (since 1912) grew and evolved, along with their respective institutional communities, almost independently of the industrial Cambridge around them. Not until the 1950s, when enrollments began to grow significantly and physical expansion space became more scarce, did the "Industrial City" and the "University City" find that their futures were irrevocably entwined.

The 1950s saw the beginning of trends common to all older industrial cities. Middle-income families began moving to suburbia. The older housing stock started showing serious problems of deterioration. Industrial firms began an exodus.

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At the same time, however, Cambridge was becoming uniquely attractive to the young, single persons, professionals, and small or childless families. As the institutions grew, the institutional community grew more rapidly. High-technology industry, research and development activity, and professional services were attracted to the changing Cambridge environment. As these trends blossomed through the sixties, it became clear that the city was undergoing a fundamental reorientation.

Over the past twenty years, about 250 net acres have changed from one land use to another -- nearly 8 percent of the city's non-street acreage. This figure itself indicates a significant change in the city's land-use pattern, with former industrial land providing the increases in institutional and residential sectors and in the inventory of vacant land (Exhibit II-7). In addition, the concentration of these areas of land-use change in the Kendall Square, West Cambridge and Harvard Square/Riverside areas reflects major alterations in these neighborhoods.

Land use in Cambridge showed a mixed pattern by 1975. Rather than forming large blocks of homogeneous activity, for the most part, the major land-use categories were intertwined.

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EXHIBIT II-7:   LAND USE, CITY OF CAMBRIDGE 1957-1975

	1975 Acres	Percent	Changes in Land Use (1957-1975)
Residential	1258	38.6	+33.0%
Commercial	246	7.6	-2.0
Institutional	444	13.6	+63.0
Industrial	504	15.5	-217.0
Government	490	15.0	-42.0
Vacant/Parking	316	9.7	+152.0
TOTAL	3258	100.0	

The city's strong neighborhood structure was, to a large extent, defined by the pattern of nonresidential uses. This pattern created land-use conflicts both in terms of activity and building scale. Compared with similar cities, Cambridge had a relatively small amount of residential land (about 40 percent). The city had significant industrial and commercial sectors. And, of course, institutions were a major component of the city. The amount of vacant land, contrary to conventional wisdom, was sizeable and had doubled between 1960 and 1975. However, while a land shortage did not exist in absolute terms, problems of cost, location, and availability could be just as serious as a land shortage itself.

The City's Finances

Cambridge spends more per capita for local government than the average for cities of the same size. Exhibit II-8 compares expenditures for three basic services with the averages for different types of cities. Police costs are lower than normal, and refuse collection is close to the norm. The large difference is in fire protection -- characteristic of northeastern cities which are densely developed with woodframe structures; in addition, the widely recognized quality of the city's fire department no doubt derives from the greater expenditure the city makes for fire protection. The cost of education on a per-pupil basis -- over $2,300 in fiscal 1976 -- is among the highest in Massachusetts. However, since Cambridge has proportionately fewer students than most other communities, per-capita expenditures are less out of line.

On the revenue side, nationwide data show that for 1970 the Cambridge per-capita property tax was three times higher than the average for cities its size and was approximately equal to the average rate for cities over one million in population. The high property tax burden is common to Massachusetts cities and towns. In sum, however, there appear to be no obvious areas for significant expenditure cuts: Few basic services are extravagant. Part of the problem is the generally high cost of living in the Boston area; another

EXHIBIT II-8: CITY GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES PER CAPITA, 1974 CAMBRIDGE
COMPARED TO AVERAGES FOR DIFFERENT TYPES OF
MUNICIPALITIES

Key: Police: Refuse:

            Fire:

basic cause is the nature of the city itself -- diverse and complex, with an aging physical plant and a high level of activity.

From 1960 to 1975 the city budget each year rose an average of 6 percent more than inflation. Education, hospital, employee benefits, and debt service charges contributed to most of the increase. From 1973 to 1975, cost increases were held to near the inflation rate -- a welcome change from the 6 percent rate. The published city budget contains many distortions in the picture of how much money the city spends on various functions. Exhibit II-9 translates the budget into a "Gross Functional Budget," compares this with gross revenues, and shows precisely what "discretionary revenues" -- mostly property tax -- pay for. "Gross Functional Budget" attributes such items as debt service, employee benefits and cherry sheet charges to the various service areas. Worthy of note is the fact that while property taxes cover less than $60 million of a total budget of $100 million, nationally property taxes finance only about one-third of local expenditures. Exhibit II-10 delineates precisely for what property taxes pay. Not surprisingly, educational expenditures accounted for 33.5 percent of the property tax revenues in fiscal 1976.

EXHIBIT II-9:   ANNUAL REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES, THE CITY OF CAMBRIDGE, 1976

Published City Budget By Department:

$100 General Allocations
Cherry Sheet

90 MBTA
Debt Service
Current Capital Expenditures

80
Employee Benefits
General Government

70 Departmental Allocations
Miscellaneous Departmental
Allocations

60 Public Works

50 Health and Hospitals

40
Fire Department

30 Police Department

20 School Department

0

 # Millions

Gross Functional Budget:
MBTA
General Government
Other
Traffic/Parking
Library
Employment/Human Services
Recreation
Water/Sewer
Other Public Works
Health
Fire
Police/Crime
Education

Gross Revenues By Source:
User Fees/Categorical Aid
Other External
Cherry Sheet Revenue
Misc. Revenues
Hospital
Discretionary Revenues
General Revenue Sharing
Miscellaneous
Reserves & Interest
Lieu of Tax Payments
Property Tax

Net Functional Expenses:
MBTA
Gen. Gov't.
Misc.
Public Works
Health
Fire Protection
Police/Crime
Education

Published City Budget   Gross Functional   Gross Revenues   Net Functional
By Department   Budget   By Source   Expenses

EXHIBIT II-10: USE OF PROPERTY TAXES, CITY OF CAMBRIDGE, 1976

Category	Amount ($ Millions)	Percent
Education	19.8	33.5
Police/Crime	7.3	12.3
Fire	6.4	10.9
Health/Hospitals	4.5	7.7
Recreation	2.8	4.8
Trash	2.8	4.7
Water/Sanitary Sewer	1.2	2.0
Library	1.1	1.9
Human Services	1.1	1.9
Street Cleaning/Snow Removal	0.8	1.3
Storm Sewers	0.6	1.0
Other City Functions	2.1	3.5
General Government	5.4	9.2
MBTA	3.5	6.0
TOTAL	$59.0	100.0

The Universities' Impact on the City

The city's major educational institutions (MIT, Harvard, Radcliffe and Lesley), through both their existence per se and the image they project on the city as a whole, have been perhaps the principal contributors to the physical and socioeconomic transition which the city has experienced during the past twenty years. Undeniably, the universities have been a strong determinate of the "character" of Cambridge, providing charm, interest, and vitality, as well as a variety of direct and indirect economic benefits. At the same time, however, there have been a range of costs and disadvantages associated with the universities. In recent years, these have erupted into volatile political issues, which can be

summarized into four major areas of concern: tax-exempt status; impact of university expansion; impact on local housing market; and the influence of the universities in changing the economic and social mix of the city.

Most of the real estate owned by the universities is exempt from any form of taxation under the provisions of the Massachusetts Constitution (Harvard) and state statutes (all nonprofit educational institutions). The universities own in Cambridge 308 acres of tax-exempt land, plus 125 acres on which real estate taxes are paid. The tax-exempt acreage is 8 percent of the city's total land area (including streets) and 17 percent of the tax-exempt land in Cambridge. The total valuation of the universities' tax exempt property is $157 million, or about two-thirds of the total tax-exempt property valuation in the city. (It must be emphasized, however, that tax-exempt property is typically assessed at a higher proportion of full value than taxable property.) The central issue is the extent to which direct city costs generated by the universities must be covered by other Cambridge taxpayers.

Over the years, Harvard and MIT have made payments to the city in-lieu-of-taxes, which are intended, in theory, to cover costs to the city generated by these institutions. Under a new formula negotiated several years ago, these in lieu of tax contributions by Harvard and MIT reached about $850,000 in 1974-75. No other major universities in the United States

make comparable payments to their communities. Current evidence suggests that such payments have fallen short of covering the costs to the city which can be attributed to the universities. A detailed cost-revenue study published by the Department of Community Development in 1976 concluded that university-related services cost $3,902,000. The total revenue (taxes and in-lieu-of-tax payments) from the universities is $1,368,000, for a net cost to the city of $2,534,000. However, these figures should not be read to imply a specific "deficit" that should be covered by increased university contributions. Cost-revenue analysis is far from being an exact science. Further, indirect costs and benefits of the universities were not considered in the figures.

As noted earlier, Harvard, MIT and Lesley have experienced steady growth in enrollment over the past 25 years. While enrollment increases have not been spectacular, as has been the case at many other educational institutions, total enrollment has reached over 23,000 -- a 58 percent increase since 1950. In addition to simply accommodating larger numbers of students, however, the universities have been forced to expand facilities to house an increasing array of ancillary activities and research functions. Since 1960, this growth has resulted in nearly 5.5 million square feet of new construction. While a good deal of this construction has occurred within the accepted perimeters of the campuses (in

1960), perhaps 50 acres of land has been added to the campuses.

Harvard, surrounded by residential areas, has sought expansion space by converting predominantly residential property in Mid-Cambridge, Riverside, Agassiz and Neighborhood 9 (the Peabody School area). Such physical impingement has four major impacts: the erosion of neighborhood stability; the eventual removal of properties from the tax rolls; increased speculation and real estate prices; and aesthetic conflicts between new, large-scale institutional buildings and the prevailing three-story residences. MIT's growth has been largely into receding industrial areas, which avoids direct impact on residential neighborhoods, but which nevertheless may contribute to speculation, higher land prices and increased pressures on remaining industrial firms.

Harvard and MIT house almost 60 percent of their students. This is an impressive accomplishment in comparison to all large universities in the country. Nevertheless, about 5,000 of all remaining 8,000 seek market housing in Cambridge. (They are joined by another 10,900 students who attend educational institutions outside Cambridge but are attracted to the Cambridge environment.) This increased load on the city's housing market -- exacerbated by the inclination of students to "double-up" -- translates into both higher rents and a decrease in larger units available to families. The

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city's largely low- and moderate-income family population thus finds it increasingly difficult to compete for housing in the Cambridge market.

In addition to their impressive efforts to house their own students, the institutions have been direct catalysts in the development of more than 1,100 units of publicly assisted housing. This contribution notwithstanding, the role of the universities in all aspects of the city's housing supply must undergo re-evaluation. Large subsidized housing prospects are no longer perceived as desirable. New graduate student housing -- most undergraduates are presently institutionally housed -- will no doubt "free up" market units; but these are likely to be occupied in turn by additional outsiders moving into the city.

The two universities also have a significant impact on the community workforce. MIT and Harvard are the city's first and second largest employers, with 6,935 and 6,189 employees respectively. An estimated 24 percent of these are Cambridge residents. The universities, together with the research and development companies, consulting firms, and similar employers they attract, have been the major catalysts in the growth of the white-collar employment sector, now 80 percent of the city's work force. This growth has undoubtedly benefitted Cambridge in the face of regional trends that reflect a strong decline in manufacturing jobs. However, the young,

professional work force attracted by university and related employment represents additional pressure on the low- and moderate-income population of the city. Transiency, while often an over-worked simplification, is nonetheless a reality in Cambridge. The large university community is by its nature very mobile. The presence of 25,000 students in Cambridge, in and of itself, cannot help but have major impact upon social stability and neighborhood cohesiveness.

In sum, the universities were the major catalyst for the social, economic and physical transition taking place in Cambridge. During the period of this study, the benefits of their presence were generally evident. The challenge to the city and the institutions was to moderate the trends that undermined the physical and social identity of Cambridge and caused undue hardship for many of its residents.

Summary and Conclusions

During the last several decades, Cambridge has increasingly become the home of the single, the young, the childless, the wealthy and the poor. The forces contributing to the rapid transformation of the city's population were numerous and originated from different sources. For Cambridge, the marked decline in the number of middle-income families was not solely attributable to reasons traditionally cited for urban flight -- increased crime, deteriorating

public services and housing stock, higher taxes, and the influx of lower-income minority groups. Rather, in Cambridge, the factors were more complex and largely economic. A strong argument however, can be made that one factor, university expansion, transcended all others as an underlying cause of the changes in the city's residential population.

The declining residential property tax base was further weakened when NASA proposed locating a major research facility in Kendall Square and then scrapped the plan. Businesses that had been removed from this area to provide room for the research center chose not to return, due to a rising tax rate and increasing commercial property value and building rents. To make matters worse for Cambridge and other Boston area communities, universities are tax-exempt. And, although Harvard and MIT have made voluntary payments to the city, these "voluntary contributions" are considerably less than the land would yield were it taxed. As the residential tax base declined, the demand for public services and the cost of providing them increased. As a result, property taxes continued to rise during this period, forcing still more middle-income families to leave the city.

This has altered the socioeconomic composition of the city. Those who remained were: (1) too poor to leave; (2) had sufficiently deep familial and social ties to stay, despite the rising living costs; or (3) had enough income to afford

the increased expenses of living in Cambridge. Typically, the departing middle-income residents have been replaced by higher-income, smaller families and single persons, widening the gap between higher- and lower-income residents. For instance, the more densely populated eastern sector of Cambridge has become increasingly lower class and Italian, and the western section, increasingly upper class and professional.

In 1970, 15 percent of Cambridge families were living in poverty, 4 percent more than in the greater Boston area. In a community that boasts a galaxy of Nobel Prize winners, some of the most powerful intellects in the nation and two of the country's best universities, 37 percent of the residents have not completed high school. And, in a city where millions are lavished on magnificent new buildings designed by the world's most celebrated architects, more than 5,500 families live in rundown houses, many with no central heat or inside plumbing. Middle-class flight has created two Cambridges: One geared to the goals and techniques of contemporary society, the other antiquated, out-of-step and desperately in need of restoration.

Although Cambridge's ethnic groups, for the most part, are dispersed throughout the city, some have concentrated in certain neighborhoods. In 1970, the Irish and the French Canadians were concentrated primarily in North Cambridge,

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while East Cambridge was Italian and Portuguese. For the most part, Cambridge's longer-term ethnics have enjoyed a higher socio-economic status than their more recently arrived counterparts and so have more choices of where to live and work. Recently arrived and less acculturated groups -- such as the Italians, the Portuguese and the Puerto Ricans -- have settled and remained in more tightly knit ethnic enclaves. For these groups, economic disadvantages have been reinforced by language barriers and cultural differences, hindering their social, geographic and economic mobility.

For Cambridge's black population, similar patterns have been observed. Depending on socioeconomic factors, especially the availability of public housing, blacks have aggregated in certain sections of the community. Like newly arrived ethnic groups, the city's recent black immigrants have generally been of lower socioeconomic status than longer-term residents. The resultant variations in lifestyles, aspirations and experiences of the newer black settlers have contributed to cleavages within the black community.

Although the black population has increased markedly from 1940 to 1975, black immigration to Cambridge has not been as great as in other cities in the Boston area. This is because in other cities, blacks have replaced the middle class, while in Cambridge single professionals, students, and high-income families with few or no children filled the gap.

Later chapters will explore the political implications of these social, economic, and demographic changes, particularly the formation and make-up of the city's electoral coalitions. Do the coalitions mirror the socio-economic, ethnic, racial and religious cleavages in the community? How extensive and pervasive are these divisions? What impact, if any, do these cleavages have on the initiation and implementation of public policy by the city's legislative and bureaucratic agencies?

Although a source of excitement and attraction, the community's diversity presents potential obstacles to the efficient and effective management of the city and the public schools. It also makes it more difficult to deliver equitably the municipal and educational services needed for the city's changing population. In highly polarized and politicized periods, clashes of interests and needs have been frequent, intense and bitter. In subsequent chapters, the role of political coalitions will be examined as they operate in electoral, legislative and bureaucratic arenas to influence the policy process and its outcomes in the city of Cambridge and its public bureaucracies.

FOOTNOTES

[1]*Cambridge Chronicle,* July 30, 1945.

[2]*Boston Globe,* December 18, 1965.

[3]*Ibid.*

[4]Dahl, *op. cit.,* especially Chapter 4 and Wolfinger, *op. cit.,* especially Chapter 3.

[5]Wolfinger, *op. cit.,* Chapter 3.

[6]Parenti, *op. cit.,* pp. 725-726.

[7]Wolfinger, *op. cit.,* p. 49.

[8]Parenti, *op. cit.,* pp. 725-726.

[9]Otis Dudley Duncan and Beverly Duncan, *The Negro Population of Chicago: A Study of Residential Succession,* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957; and Taeuber and Taeuber, *op. cit.*

[10]Taeuber and Taeuber, *op. cit.*

[11]*Ibid.,* p. 127.

[12]*Ibid.,* p. 126.

[13]Sam Bass Warner, Jr., *Streetcar Suburbs,* New York: Atheneum, 1970.

CHAPTER III

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ELECTORAL COALITIONS IN THE CITY OF CAMBRIDGE

Introduction

For nearly forty years, the Cambridge Civic Association
(CCA) and the Independents have dominated the political scene
in Cambridge. Differing in style and composition, these two
groups have sought to influence public policy to achieve their
goals and meet the needs of their supporters. That factions
and coalitions try to influence political decisions is hardly
surprising or unique to the city of Cambridge. Analysts and
commentators who have studied political factions and
coalitions[1] have found that their membership is based on
shared perceptions, needs, lifestyles and values that stem
from professional, ethnic, racial, religious, familial and
social affiliations and attachments.[2]

Needless to day, documenting the composition of political
coalitions is essential to a subsequent assessment of their
role and impact in the policy process. However, defining
coalitional membership and impacts is not a trivial endeavor.
To do this, we have examined the voting behavior of various
sub-groups in the community over the past twenty-five years.
Consequently, this chapter will first determine the

socioeconomic, racial and ethnic characteristics of the city's
political coalitions and then explore their electoral
stability and cohesiveness. Later chapters, building on this
data base, will examine how the coalitions establish and
maintain consensus on key policy issues among their members
and how they influence the political process.

Ethnicity, Race and Social Class in Local Politics: A Review of the Literature

The existence, composition and function of social,
economic and political cleavages in urban communities have
been the subjects of numerous studies, the most noteworthy of
which are Dahl's and Wolfinger's analyses of New Haven. In
his classic study, Who Governs, Dahl examines the ethnic and
social class bases for political factions. Outlining three
stages in the political assimilation of ethnic groups, Dahl
asserts that "political homogeneity... is a function of socio-
economic homogeneity."[3] Increasing socioeconomic
heterogeneity within various ethnic groups has tended to
lessen the impact of ethnic consciousness on voting behavior.
In his view, "ethnic politics...is clearly a transitional
phenomenon"[4] and, with most of New Haven's ethnics in the
final states of assimilation, it is only a question of time
before social class becomes the dominant factor in the city's
politics.

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In a companion study of New Haven, Raymond Wolfinger, one
of Dahl's students, retreats somewhat from this position.
Wolfinger found that, in the northern and eastern United
States, the role of ethnicity in political behavior persists
beyond the final stages of assimilation.[5] To account for this
phenomenon, Wolfinger formulated a "mobilization theory" of
ethnic voting:

> The strength of ethnic voting depends
> on both the intensity of ethnic
> identification and the level of ethnic
> relevance in the election. The most
> powerful and visible sign of ethnic
> political relevance is a fellow
> ethnic's name at the head of the
> ticket, evident to everyone who enters
> the voting booth. Middle-class status
> is a virtual prerequisite for
> candidacy for major office; an ethnic
> group's development of sufficient
> political skill and influence to
> secure such a nomination also requires
> the development of a middle class.
> Therefore ethnic voting will be
> greatest when the ethnic group has
> produced a middle class, in the second
> and third generations, not in the
> first. Furthermore, the shifts in
> party identification will persist
> beyond the election in which they
> occurred.[6]

Although Wolfinger is careful not to postulate ethnicity
as the primary factor in electoral political behavior, he does
assert that "ethnic voting is more likely when other cues to
guide the voter's decision are weak or absent."[7] However, his
mobilization theory minimizes a number of factors, such as

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occupational and residential mobility, which mediate the influence of ethnicity on political behavior. It ignores the cross-pressures experienced by upwardly mobile ethnics whose economic interests are frequently inconsistent with ethnic voting and who come into contact with a more socially heterogeneous environment that tends to dilute ethnic influence. Indeed, it is precisely these pressures, perceptions, and experiences that may account for the differences observed between Cambridge's major ethnic groups -- the Irish and the Italians who demonstrate ethnic voting, and the French Canadians who do not.

The evidence suggests that ethnic voting is stronger in the central cities than in the suburbs.[e] This may be due to the cross-pressures identified previously or to the impact of selective migration. It is highly probable, for example, that ethnics who move from the central city are less closely bound to the customs and culture of their national groups. Further, the exodus of higher-income ethnics tends to leave behind an even more homogeneous lower- and lower-middle-income population that is under minimal pressure to change ethnically based values and customs. As a result, selective out-migration could produce comparatively higher levels of ethnic awareness and ethnic voting.

As Michael Parenti points out, however, both Dahl and Wolfinger, regardless of their modifications, subscribe to the

basic assumptions of the assimilation theorists: Both view ethnic voting as a transitory phenomenon. Parenti, on the other hand, raises a more basic issue and one that questions the very assumptions of assimilation theory: Are ethnic groups becoming more "Americanized"? Parenti claims they are not, maintaining instead that a distinction should be made between cultural and social systems and rates of asssimilation.[9] Citing primarily impressionistic evidence, Parenti asserts that an ethnic group may become:

> 'Americanized' in much of its cultural practices, but this says little about its social relations with the host society. In the face of widespread acculturation, the minority still maintained a social substructure encompassing primary and secondary group relations composed essentially of fellow ethnics.[10]

Parenti also claims that these ethnic social networks resist pressures from both occupational and geographic mobility. Thus, the diverse political behaviors and attitudes exhibited by Cambridge's ethnic groups, coupled with its substantial residential and occupational mobility, provide an opportunity to test not only Parenti's hypotheses but also the assumptions of assimilation theory generally and as amended by Wolfinger.

Although ethnicity has been an important factor in the establishment and maintenance of American urban political coalitions, it is not the sole determinant of either political

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cleavages or their concomitant factions. Equally important have been considerations of race and social class. Since 1910, the distribution of the black population in the United States has shifted dramatically, from predominantly southern and rural to predominantly urban and northern or western.[11] As with the early immigrants, this massive migration has produced considerable social and political tensions and upheavals, especially in the major industrial areas where blacks, seeking employment, choose to settle. Moreover, these tensions have manifested themselves in the electoral and political behavior of both the migrant blacks and their white predecessors.

Early black political behavior, if voting or participation was encouraged or allowed, was similar to that of ethnic groups. Faced with the immediate issues of survival, these groups were more concerned with employment, housing, and food than with governmental reform and politics. However, unlike the ethnics, many black leaders viewed government policies that promote racial equality and the redistribution of goods and services as the most effective means of obtaining access for blacks to jobs, housing and the ballot box. Indeed, until civil rights legislation reaffirmed and enforced the right to vote for blacks, the usefulness of the ballot, so important to ethnic groups, was minimal.

For large numbers of blacks, the habit of voting, so

ingrained in the ethnic tradition, was absent from their experience. This, along with the limited benefits derived from such participation, resulted in fewer blacks voting.[12] Keeping these differences in mind, it would still be interesting and useful to compare the black electoral experience with those of the major ethnic groups. Here, Wolfinger's definition of ethnic voting provides an operational basis for making this comparison. According to Wolfinger, ethnic voting manifests itself in two ways:

> (1) Members of an ethnic groups show an affinity for one party or the other that cannot be explained solely as a result of other demographic characteristics...(2) Ethnic group members will cross party lines to vote for or against a candidate belonging to a particular group.[13]

From the New Deal to the present, blacks have, with few exceptions, supported the Democratic party in national, state and partisan local elections. Having roots in the New Deal and the Depression, this partisan allegiance has derived primarily from economic rather than ideological considerations.[14] Thus, from the perspective of partisan politics, blacks appear to have behaved much like ethnic groups. At the same time, increased participation by blacks and their strong support for black candidates has resulted in the election of a number of black candidates to various

municipal, state, and national legislative positions and the defeat of racist candidates and groups, thus satisfying Wolfinger's second criterion.

Of special relevance to this discussion of electoral coalitions in Cambridge is Davidson's comparisons of black and white voting patterns in Houston's local level, nonpartisan elections.[15] Here, he found that when the "racial liberal" (or "moderate") candidate is an economic conservative, or when he and his opponent do not bring economics into the campaign, there is a greater likelihood of ("upper-class") cooperation with blacks at the ballot box. However, on issues deemed economically liberal, lower-class whites are more likely to cooperate with blacks, mirroring the Democratic coalitions in national campaigns.[16] Thus, he contradicts Wilson's claim that blacks and upper-class whites will be more likely to form electoral coalitions in nonpartisan local elections.[17]

The basic issue for Davidson is whether coalitions involving racial minorities are based on class or ideology. Indeed, assimilation theory assumes that these cleavages are class-dependent. As noted earlier, it postulates that as ethnics become occupationally and residentially mobile, shifts in political orientations are more likely to occur.

Surprisingly, with the exception of several studies of the outcomes of referenda in local communities, there have been no analyses of the results of municipal elections and the

impact of voters' socioeconomic, ethnic and racial identifications on their electoral choices. However, fairly sophisticated political opinion studies have been conducted at Columbia University's Bureau of Applied Social Science and at the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center. The common concern of the two most important voting studies by the Columbia group, The Peoples's Choice and Voting, is the impact of social and environmental factors on individual voting choices in national elections.[18] In contrast, the two Michigan studies, The Voter Decides and The American Voter, link voting behavior and party preferences to the individual's interpretation of candidates, events and issues associated with particular elections.[19] Essentially, the Columbia group has stood outside of the individual to relate what he does to his social characteristics while the Michigan group has looked at the political world through the voter's eyes.

In terms of overall analytical style, The People's Choice is highly descriptive, while Voting, The Voter Decides and The American Voter have each aimed at a progressively more generalized and analytical interpretation of political behavior. All four studies regard the behavior they examine, principally voting turnout and candidate preference, as caused by some set or sets of antecedent or "independent variables." Both The People's Choice and Voting suggest that turnout and partisan choice are dependent on the social characteristics of

voters, such as age, sex, ethnic background, and residence. As Lazarsfeld and his colleagues put it: "A person thinks, politically, as he is socially. Social characteristics determine political preference."[20] In contrast, the SRC studies accord much greater influence to factors such as partisan attitudes and loyalties "which intervene between the external events of the voter's world and his ultimate behavior."[21]

There were also significant differences in research technique between the two groups. The Columbia research is confined to community studies in a single election. The People's Choice deals with the 1940 presidential election in Erie County (Sandusky), Ohio, and Voting with the 1948 presidential election in Elmira, New York. The Michigan group relied, instead, on a nationwide population selected by probability sampling. While the Columbia group interviewed voters three to six times during the campaigns, the Michigan researchers interviewed only twice, immediately before and directly after the November elections. The Columbia group favored structured interviews, while the Michigan group emphasized the open-ended interview.

The findings of these two groups have been useful in elucidating the major social and psychological determinants of voter turnout and candidate preferences in national elections. However, by their very nature, presidential elections place

greater emphasis on the individual voter's partisan identification and issue orientation, which are shaped largely by early familial and cultural socialization processes. Both the Michigan and Columbia research teams reported that racial, ethnic, religious and class attachments influence voters' electoral preferences and behavior. In The American Voter, the Michigan's SRC demonstrated that union members, blacks, Jews, and, to a lesser extent, Catholics, are considerably more Democratic than one would expect from the individual's other social characteristics, such as urban-rural residence and region.[22] However, for the SRC, these secondary group memberships are less important in explaining variations in voting behavior than are partisan attachments and individual attitudes on particular issues. In their research, the SRC found that the stronger a group's belief in the legitimacy of its involvement in politics and the stronger the individual's identification with the group, the greater the impact of the groups' standards on its individual member's voting behavior and preferences.[23]

The voting studies from the Bureau of Applied Research at Columbia, on the other hand, found that racial, religious, ethnic and class affiliations explained most of the differences observed in individuals' political opinions and electoral choices.[24] In addition, like the SRC group, the Lazarsfeld team found that the influence of these group

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affiliations is modified by multiple membership in groups with potentially conflicting values, perceptions and lifestyles, such as upper-class ethnics or white-collar Catholics. For these people, the cross-pressures experienced in elections tend to increase their anxiety, to delay their voting decisions and to increase the likelihood of their voting contrary to standard partisan alignments.[25]

The Columbia and Michigan studies suggest that in smaller, more homogeneous communities there is a greater likelihood of stronger secondary group attachments. As a result, membership in particular socioeconomic, religious, racial and ethnic groups would be expected to exert greater influence on voting behaviors in local communities than in the more diffuse and more heterogeneous national political system. In addition, the impact of cross-pressures on group members would be considerably greater in municipal elections.

Are race and ethnicity surrogates for social class? In the past, both ethnicity and race were almost synonymous with lowest income and social status due primarily to the fact that the poorest, least educated persons tended to be black or immigrant. However, as ethnics, and to a lesser extent blacks, have attained higher levels of occupational status and education, the correlation between socioeconomic status and race or ethnicity has tended to decline. Thus, while ethnicity is, for the most part, no longer a surrogate for

social class, the same cannot be said of race. For blacks, institutionalized racism has limited their occupational, residential, educational and social mobility. As a result, the high correlation observed between social class and race has persisted, with a higher proportion of blacks in less skilled, lower-paid occupations and less desirable neighborhoods.

It will be interesting to observe whether the relationship between race, ethnicity and social class has changed during the last twenty-five years. This study provides an opportunity to compare the complementary hypotheses of Wolfinger and Dahl, which posit the gradual decline in impact of ethnicity on the political process, with the contradictory theories formulated by Parenti. He asserts that the social and cultural assimilation of ethnics is far from complete and ethnic identification persists in influencing elections. In addition, this research effort enables one to study the differences observed in the three major ethnic groups in Cambridge -- the Irish, the Italians, and the French Canadians -- and to contrast their behavior with that of the community's black population, especially in terms of social class.

Discussion of the impact of social class on political behavior is complicated by the ambiguity inherent in the speaking of social class in a society with few explicit status

differentials. This ambiguity is not limited to political analysts and social commentators; most people have trouble identifying their own class.[26] Thus, although most observers would recognize extreme differences in social status resulting from diverse levels of education, types of employment, and places of residence, it would be very difficult to define precisely the impact of these variations on a person's values, attitudes and behavior. Social scientists have developed composite indices including the formerly noted socioeconomic characteristics to define social class.[27] These schemes have then been used to categorize, describe or explain the political behavior, and attitudes and values exhibited by the various sub-groups in society.

Several studies provide potentially useful insights into the composition and motivation of coalitions as manifested in their political behavior. These include: Litt's discussion of the four political cultures in Massachusetts and their influence on state political outcomes; Salisbury's analysis of the composition and role of factions in St. Louis municipal politics; and Banfield and Wilson's formulation and revision of their political ethos theory which relates social class characteristics to policy goals.[28] In their controversial work, Banfield and Wilson conclude that socioeconomic status and its associated lifestyles and values best explain an individual's policy preferences. Thus, lower-class

individuals and ethnic groups tend to support policies Banfield and Wilson define as "private regarding" (or "individualistic"), while their upper-class Anglo-Saxon counterparts support policies categorized as "public regarding" (or "unitaristic"). Although one could dispute the assumptions underlying, and the explanations derived from, their research, the Banfield and Wilson studies provide documentation for the existence and composition of social class cleavages and some measure of their impact on political decisions.[29]

Classifying groups by occupation, Edgar Litt discusses the evolution of political coalitions in terms of changes in the state's social and economic environment. These changes are reflected in the development of successive identifiable subcultures -- yeoman, worker, Brahmin, and managerial -- that individually and collectively vie for control of the state's elective offices and a voice in the initiation and implementation of policy. Litt's latter three categories, especially his concept of the newly emerging and rapidly growing managerial subculture, will be useful in analyzing the composition, goals and activities of political coalitions in Cambridge. Here, the Brahmin and managerial cultures seem to merge into one, sharing common interests in reform and efficient delivery of public services. His worker category, however, may prove too broad to analyze the diverse and

complex motives and actions of the city's ethnic and black populations.[30]

In his analysis of the interplay between the structure of local government and the role of factions in urban political conflicts, Salisbury found that:

> Two broad interest groupings in St. Louis, each composed of rather loosely allied groups and each pursuing different sets of goals in the political arena, are enabled to live under the same party label by the fact that each grouping can control one segment of the governmental structure and from that control secure the portion of its goals most vital to it. Neither group gains complete satisfaction thereby, but the consequence is that the two groups are not forced into the full range of sharp competition that a more centralized and monolithic structure might require.[31]

Within the party in power, two general groups could be observed: The more progressive elements of the community, the so-called newspaper wards and larger business groups; and the politicians who represented a medley of lower-income, labor, small-business, and minority groups. The former group concerns itself primarily with issues of policy while the latter is more interested in the distribution of individual benefits, jobs, contracts, and the like. With the exception of occasional clashes over the extension of civil service reforms, conflict between these two groups is minimal. Of

equal importance in St. Louis is the manifestation of these social and economic cleavages in the structure of the city's municipal and county offices.[32]

From the preceding analysis, certain patterns have emerged. The evidence strongly suggests that race and ethnicity are significant factors in the formation and maintenance of political coalitions, particularly in nonpartisan municipal elections. Although highly correlated, it is unlikely that social class is a surrogate for race and ethnicity. As racial and ethnic groups become increasingly occupationally mobile, this association is likely to be reduced. The composition of political coalitions is based largely on shared goals and values. These derive from similar subcultural orientations, experiences and lifestyles and, as such, frequently mirror racial, socioeconomic, and ethnic cleavages and hostilities. An examination of how these conclusions relate to the composition and maintenance of electoral coalitions and their impact on decision-making in Cambridge will be the primary focus of the remaining sections of this chapter.

Political Institutions

The city has eleven wards, fifteen school districts, thirty census tracts, thirteen official neighborhoods, and 44,623 voters in 1970. Its form of government is Plan E, a professional city manager and an elected council, and its method of election is proportional representation (PR). Although nonpartisan locally, the registration for state and national elections is overwhelmingly Democratic.

Every two years, a council of nine members is elected at large on a nominally nonpartisan ballot. It, in turn, elects a mayor from among its members. The council sets policies, adopts ordinances, votes appropriations, and hires or fires the manager. The manager hires or fires the administrative staff, carries out the policies of the council, prepares the budget and supervises Cambridge affairs. Exhibit III-1 presents the organization of the city government.

The Cambridge School Committee is composed of six members, elected at large by means of proportional representation voting, and the mayor of the city, who serves exofficio as chairman of the school committee. Like the council, its six members are elected at large and serve two-year terms. The primary responsibilities of the school committee include: the establishment of school department policies; the appropriation of school department funds; and the appointment of all administrative personnel, including the

EXHIBIT III-1: CAMBRIDGE CITY GOVERNMENT

Voters of Cambridge

Council - Mayor

School Committee

LEGISLATIVE

City Clerk

Clerk of Committees

Election Commission

City Manager

ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCE

Auditor

Assessors

Treasurer

Budget Personnel

Purchasing

Retirement

Law

HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

Housing Development

Rent Control

Housing Auth.

Redevelopment Auth.

Historical Comm

HUMAN SERVICES AND EDUCATION

Health - Hospital

Veteran's Benefits - Services

Youth Resources Bureau

Recreation

Library

Community Schools

School Dept

PUBLIC WORKS AND FACILITIES

Electrical

Engineering

Public Works

Traffic and Parking

Water

PUBLIC SAFETY AND SERVICE

Police

Fire

Building

Sealer-Weights & Measures

License Comm.

superintendent.

In addition to these formal institutional arrangements, there are the two dominant coalitions: The Cambridge Civic Association (CCA) and the Independents. Both groups compete in the community's electoral and legislative arenas. In addition, they seek to influence the decision-making process in the city's public service bureaucracies directly, by controlling the personnel appointments, policy guidelines, and indirectly, by "winning over" various members of the bureaucracy to their side by the promise of personal and ideological rewards and benefits.

The Cambridge Civic Association

In the 1930's, a group of Cambridge citizens felt the need to reform and reorganize the city government, which was perceived as corrupt and inefficient. Thus, in 1938, the Plan E Association was established for the purpose of changing the city government from Plan B, an elected city council-elected mayor format (Plan B under the Massachusetts state charter) to Plan E, with a strong city manager appointed by the city council. The Plan E Association succeeded in this endeavor. Its members, however, perceived this merely as a necessary first step. To insure the election of more responsive and responsible persons to the city council and the school committee and the more efficient, honest and equitable

delivery of municipal services, the Plan E Group set up the Cambridge Civic Association (CCA), as an ongoing, voluntary political and campaign organization. Not surprisingly, the battle over the adoption of the Plan E form of government with proportional representation had revealed deepseated rifts in the community. The formation of the CCA and the consequent emergence of the Independents institutionalized these cleavages and hostilities.

Since its inception in 1945, the CCA has broadened its scope of interests and activities. However, its primary goal remains the election of candidates it considers best qualified to represent the citizens of Cambridge. The CCA endorsed candidates who would support the election platform formulated and approved by the CCA executive committee and its advisory board and/or candidates who had previously demonstrated their commitment to these goals. Although Cambridge elections are nonpartisan locally, the CCA-endorsed candidates have come to represent the reform party in city politics. However, the candidates' commitments to the CCA platform varied substantially and, once elected, candidates frequently deviated from the CCA platform objectives. The only recourse open to the CCA was to remove its endorsement from a candidate when he ran for reelection. Depending upon the source of the candidate's support, the lack of the CCA endorsement could seriously impede his reelection. The impact of the CCA

endorsement or the absence of it will be discussed in greater detail in the analysis of local election results.

Initially, the CCA was a broad-based reform organization with explicitly defined political roles for its members. Each ward and precinct had its own "captain," who was responsible for organizing CCA support in his or her district. In the 1950s, the positions of ward and precinct "captain" gradually disappeared and a more centralized organization was adopted. By the mid-1960s, the membership of the CCA had atrophied to a narrowly defined group of middle- and upper-income professionals and academics concerned about the efficient and equitable delivery of municipal services. Although the CCA continued to elect officers, much of the organization's work was performed by a full-time paid executive director and his small staff. This pattern continued through the 1970s.

During the late 1940s and early 1950s, the CCA ward and precinct workers arranged meetings with candidates, distributed campaign literature, recruited new members, and encouraged its supporters to vote on election day. Tactically, the CCA patterned its early activities on the operations of political machines, but without the promise of tangible, personal rewards for services rendered. For the reform-oriented CCA and its more altruistic supporters, the efficient and equitable delivery of municipal services were simultaneously the coalition's goals and its rewards.

To achieve these goals, the CCA prepared coalitional promotional and campaign materials for distribution by its supporters, particularly around election time. These group-oriented campaign activities were designed to augment but not supplant the individual campaigns of its candidates. Along with its emphasis on voting for the entire slate of candidates the CCA's identification of a common campaign platform and a group of endorsed candidates served to magnify its effectiveness in the electoral arena.

Independents

The Independent coalition does not have the formal organizational structure of the CCA and, instead, is a loosely confederated group of candidates whose central organizing principle is a shared opposition to CCA initiatives. Following the formation of the CCA in 1945, the Independents emerged as a practical legislative alliance between representatives for the working class and lower middle class ethnic constituents. Later, the Independents came to include college-educated members of ethnic groups, who, despite upward mobility, retained an outlook and values consonant with the Independent coalition.

Most Independent candidates mirrored their constituents: They were primarily Irish or Italian and usually lived in ethnic neighborhoods in the east or north areas of Cambridge.

Although the Independents did run as a formal slate in the 1971 election -- encouraging transfer votes among themselves -- a more typical practice was for the candidates to run separate campaigns and to encourage "bullet" voting -- a #1 vote for the candidate and no transfer votes. The Independents were a recognizable coalition primarily because they shared common outlooks and objectives, and they entered into cooperative legislative arrangements that usually focused on a policy initiative generated by the CCA. In a real sense, the creation of the CCA as a formally organized coalition marked the development of the Independents as a recognizable "counter" coalition; although it did not have the organizational structure to advance broad-based policy initiatives, the Independents could in many respects use the organizational focus of the CCA as a starting point for their own cooperative efforts.

Although the Independents did not advance a formal electoral agenda in most elections, one could identify a broad range of issues and policies that Independent candidates "stood for." These concerns were "breadbasket" issues such as providing jobs, maintaining low property taxes, and maintaining safety on the streets. In general, the Independent candidates were less concerned with ideological policy stances and more concerned with specific, tangible issues affecting their constituents. Independent candidates

ran a more personalized and social political campaign: Attending funerals and weddings and helping constituents with a variety of problems, such as getting a job or getting a street repaired. Their political style was personal and individualistic and was not particularly suited for a cooperative, slate-type campaign.

As an extention of this particularism, and unlike the CCA which encouraged its supporters to vote for its entire slate of candidates, the Independents ran separate campaigns and encouraged their supporters to "bullet vote", i.e., to cast only #1 votes for their candidate of choice. Consequently, the Independent coalition had fewer transfer votes to distribute among its candidates than did the CCA. Indeed, it was this strength at the transfer vote level which enabled the CCA with consistently only 40% of the total #1 votes cast, to elect half, and in several instances, a majority of the members on the school committee and the city council. Further, this somewhat individualistic voting strategy and its concomitant consistuent response were so engrained that they served to undermine the Independents' sole effort at slate voting in the 1971 municipal elections.

That the Independents did not develop a more formal organizational structure had considerable implications for the policy process and its outcomes. Two reasons may be offered to explain this lack of formal organization. First, for the

Independents and their supporters, the desires to control the allocation of patronage benefits fostered an individualistic orientation on the part of candidates and supporters. To quote Al Vellucci: "We all have to eat out of the same pot." Thus, the need to "divide the sports" limited their desire to cooperate -- particularly in the electoral arena. At the same time, and somewhat paradoxically, it facilitated legislative cooperation since majority votes were needed to allocate jobs and contracts. Second, and related to the above, the very ethnic heterogeneity of the underlying coalitional elements made it difficult for the Independents to unite around more broadly based policy initiatives -- save perhaps their almost visceral opposition to the CCA. Not surprisingly, the Independents' opposition to the CCA derived from their perception that the CCA's implementation of their policy initiatives required them to control key positions in the bureaucracies -- posts also essential to the distribution of patronage benefits. As such, the Independents' inability to organize formally related to their more individualistic concerns as contrasted with the CCA's more universalistic goals.

In summary then, it is reasonable to suggest that the Independents existed as a coalition solely because the CCA existed: If the CCA had for some reason disbanded, the Independents would have ceased to exist in a formal sense.

However, the CCA did exist in a formal, highly-structured sense, and the Independents did present a loose confederation in opposition to it. Although the Independents did not present formal slates, policies, or cooperative strategies in most elections, they existed as an informal opposition whose structure reflected their role as a reflexive or defensive political aggregation.

Proportional Representation Voting

Cambridge is the only community in the United States that elects its representative by proportional representation. Essentially, this means that the voter ranks the candidates running for office in order of preferences. To be elected, the candidate must receive at least one vote more than the total number of votes cast divided by the number of positions to be filled. These votes can either be number 1 votes, indicating the candidate is the first choice of these voters, or transfer votes from other candidates who did not receive a sufficient number of transfer votes to remain viable candidates.*

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*This method of determining the number of votes necessary to elect a candidate in a given election, referred to as the Hare method after its originator, may be expressed mathematically as follows: $V/R + 1 = N$; where V equals the total number of votes cast; R equals the number of positions or offices to be filled from among this group of candidates; and N equals the number of votes, either number ones or tranfers, needed by a candidate to be declared elected.

The rationale behind proportional representation voting is that it allows for the representation of minority interests. However, this assumes an organized effort by these minority groups or block-voting along ethnic, national, racial, and religious lines. In the first instance, the effectiveness of the organizational efforts by various interest groups appears to be the predominant factor in determining the distribution of representation. In the latter case, there appears to be some disagreement among sociologists and political scientists regarding the efficacy, the permanence and the desirability of ethnic, racial, religious or other block-voting. At present, there does appear to be evidence of block-voting along ethnic lines in the working-class Irish and Italian wards. However, a variety of different factors, including the CCA endorsement, have a greater influence on the voting behavior and electoral preferences of upper- and upper-middle-income professionals. With this group of voters, ideological or social issues often form the basis for the organization of interest groups and the focus of their efforts to elect members to the city council and the school committee to represent their views.

Electoral Analysis

During the past twenty-five years, the majority coalitions on the city council and school committee in

Cambridge have frequently, and with no apparent periodicity, oscillated between the CCA and the Independents. Generally, these have been one person pluralities, with 5-4 and 4-3 split votes being commonplace. As a result, the political situation in the city appears at first glance to be relatively unstable. However, a closer examination indicates that there are definite and predictable cleavages that are manifest in the outcome of local elections, the votes of elected representatives, and the behavior of the city's bureaucrats. This section will focus on the definition of these electoral coalitions, the analysis of their stability over time and their cohesiveness in any given election. To facilitate this analysis, candidates' supporters will be examined to ascertain their age, residence, occupation, income, education, race, ethnicity and socioeconomic status.

CCA-endorsed candidates, for both school committee and city council, lost some voter support during the period of this study. The decline was greater for candidates running for the city council than for school committee. Independents have won a majority of the seats in five of the nine city council elections studied. (Exhibits III-2 and III-3) This appears to be reversing an earlier trend in which support was greater for city council candidates endorsed by the CCA and, most likely, is a function of such variables as: The salience of particular issues; the personalities and perceived ethnic

EXHIBIT III-2: CITY OF CAMBRIDGE: OVERALL ELECTION RESULTS FOR SCHOOL
COMMITTEE, 1941 TO 1975

	1941(1)	1949	1951	1959	1961
Total Number of Candidates	28	16	15	21	16
Number of Candidates Endorsed by CCA	6	5	5	6	6
Number of CCA Candidates Elected	2	3	2	3	2
Majority Coalition (4)	IND/4	CCA/3+1	IND/4	IND/3+1	IND/4
Percent CCA Votes (of total votes cast)	34.4	39.9	39.9	39.4	40.9
Percent Independent Votes (of total votes cast)	65.6	60.1	60.1	60.6	59.1
Turnout: Percent of registered voters	68.1	70.8	67.3	70.5	67.1
Invalid Votes: Percent of total votes cast	2.9	4.2	3.5	3.4	3.1

	1969	1971(2)	1973(2)	1975
Total Number of Candidates	15	22	26	18
Number of Candidates Endorsed by CCA	5	6	7	7
Number of CCA Candidates Elected	4	3	3	3
Majority Coalition (4)	CCA/4	CCA/3+1	IND/3+1	IND/3+1

EXHIBIT III-2 (continued)

Percent CCA Votes
(of total votes cast)   48.7   44.2   41.6   46.4

Percent Independent
Votes (of total
votes cast)   51.3   55.8   58.4   50.5

Turnout:
Percent of
registered voters   60.2   68.1   55.2   61.7

Invalid Votes:
Percent of total
votes cast   3.4   3.4   2.7   3.0

Notes:

(1)   Candidates endorsed by Plan E Association, precursor of the CCA.
       Additionally, 1941 was the first year in which Plan E charter,
       mandating at-large as opposed to ward elections, was in effect.

(2)   Five of CCA-endorsed candidates for School Committee in 1971 and
       all of CCA-endorsed candidates for School Committee in 1973
       supported and ran on Common Slate or platform.

(3)   In 1975, all CCA-endorsed school committee candidates campaigned
       as part of Convention '75.

(4)   City Council elects the Mayor who serves ex officio as chair-
       person of the School Committee. When CCA and Independents split
       the number of positions on the school committee evenly, the
       majority on the School Committee is generally determined by the
       coalitional affiliation of the Mayor and is indicated here by
       IND/3+1 or CCA/3+1

EXHIBIT III-3:   CITY OF CAMBRIDGE: OVERALL ELECTION RESULTS FOR CITY
COUNCIL, 1941 TO 1975

	1941(1)	1949	1951	1959	1961
Total Number of Candidates	83	40	27	31	23
Number of Candidates Endorsed by CCA	11	9	9	9	6
Number of Candidates Endorsed by GRO(5)	-	-	-	-	-
Number of CCA Candidates Elected	4	5	5	4	4
Number of GRO Candidates Elected	-	-	-	-	-
Majority Coalition (4)	IND/5	CCA/5	CCA/5	IND/5	IND/5
Percent CCA Votes(of total votes cast)	37.2	47.3	47.0	46.5	43.4
Percent GRO Votes(of total votes cast)(5)	-	-	-	-	-
Percent Independent Votes (of total votes cast)	62.8	52.7	53.0	53.5	56.6
Turnout: Percent of Registered Voters	68.1	70.8	67.6	70.5	67.1
Invalid Votes: Percent of Total Votes Cast	1.9	3.8	3.2	2.7	2.5

	1969	1971(2)	1973(2)	1975
Total Number of Candidates	26	36	35	27
Number of Candidates Endorsed by CCA	6	11	6	8

EXHIBIT III-3 (continued)

Number of Candidates Endorsed by GRO(5)	-	-	6	-
Number of CCA Candidates Elected	5	5	3	4
Number of GRO Candidates Elected	-	-	1	-
Majority Coalition (4)	CCA/5	CCA/5	IND/5	IND/5
Percent CCA Votes(of total votes cast)	36.6	39.2	26.2	39.2
Percent GRO Votes(of total votes cast)(5)	-	-	11.9	-
Percent Independent Votes (of total votes cast)	63.4	60.8	61.8	58.7
Turnout: Percent of registered voters	60.2	68.1	55.2	61.7
Invalid Votes: Percent of total votes cast	2.5	2.5	1.8	2.1

Notes:

(1) Candidates endorsed by Plan E Association, precursor of the CCA. Additionally, 1941 was the first year in which Plan E charter, mandating at-large as opposed to ward elections in effect.

(2) Five of CCA-endorsed candidates for School Committee in 1971 and all of CCA-endorsed candidates for School Committee in 1973 supported and ran on Common Slate or platform.

(3) In 1975, CCA-endorsed candidates for School Committee and City Council campaigned as part of Convention '75.

(4) City Council elects the Mayor who serves ex officio as chair-person of the school committee. When CCA and Independents split the number of positions on the school committee evenly, the majority on the school committee is generally determined by the coalitional affiliation of the mayor and is indicated here by IND/3+1 or CCA/3+1

(5) Saundra Graham's votes represent 75.2% of the GRO total and 8.9% of the total votes cast.

or racial identification of specific candidates; and the hostility resulting from internal conflicts in both coalitions for control over an important territory or organization. These factors, especially important in local elections, are not easily quantified and as a result do not often emerge in the quantitative analysis of data.

These electoral outcomes, although critical in determining who will set policy for city agencies and the school departments, do not reveal the changes in the patterns of support during this period. For example, the number of areas in which CCA-endorsed candidates have polled more than sixty percent of the vote has declined markedly in elections for city council. By 1975, the primary and most reliable CCA support came from the four areas in west Cambridge contiguous to Brattle Street, with considerable secondary support deriving from the wards including, and just to the north of, Harvard Yard. Independent support, on the other hand, comes primarily and most dependably from non-black populations in the Kendall Square and Cambridgeport areas. Exhibit III-4 shows those areas that have consistently given more than sixty percent of their votes exclusively to either CCA or Independent candidates for both city council and school committee in each of the nine elections analyzed in this study. They represent the durable core of support for both coalitions in any particular election as well as over time.

EXHIBIT III-4A: CITY OF CAMBRIDGE; CITY COUNCIL ELECTIONS, 1949-1975

Areas Traditionally CCA, i.e.,
≥ 60% of Number One Votes Cast

Areas Traditionally Independent,
i.e., ≥60% of Number One Votes Cast

EXHIBIT III-4B: CITY OF CAMBRIDGE: SCHOOL COMMITTEE ELECTIONS, 1949-1975

FRESH POND

Areas Traditionally CCA, i.e.,
≥ 60% pf Votes Cast

Areas Traditionally Independent,
i.e., ≥ 60% of Votes Cast

Despite the apparent decline in CCA electoral support, as shown by percent of #1 votes cast, the CCA has managed to elect majorities to the city council in 1969 and 1971. In part, this can be attributed to two key campaign strategies adopted by the CCA and its supporters. First as noted earlier, the CCA endorsed a slate of candidates, encouraged its supporters to vote for its _entire_ slate of candidates and distributed campaign literature citing its endorsement and elaborating the group's campaign platform. The most important of these, from a tactical point of view, was its insistence on slate voting. This was reflected in their garnering a disproportionate share of transfer votes. Further, this imbalance increased during the same time period in which the CCA's share of #1 votes cast declined. The Independents, on the other hand, stressed "bullet voting" and individual campaigning. This pattern was so engrained in the Independents and their supporters that the coalition's only attempt at slate voting was unable to alter this behavior pattern -- on the part of both its candidates and their supporters.

Second, the CCA consciously sought to increase ethnic electoral support by endorsing so-called "marginal ethnic" candidates. The "marginal ethnic" candidates were the typical upwardly mobile ethnics, better educated than their peers and appearing to be more amenable to CCA goals (albeit, often not

fully committed to the entire CCA platform). These
candidates lacked sufficient electoral support to be elected
on their own. With the CCA's campaign support, particularly
the transfer votes which derived from its stress on slate
voting, these candidates managed to be elected to the "swing
seats" on the city council and the school committee. In so
doing, they combined ethnic and CCA electoral support to win.
Not surprisingly, once elected, the "marginal ethnic"
candidates frequently defected from the CCA on key votes in
which the CCA stance conflicted with the interests of their
natural supporters, their ethnic constituents.

CCA Profile

CCA support derives high-income groups and Independent
support from predominantly lower- and middle-class ethnics.
(Exhibit III-5) Further, the evidence suggests that these
cleavages are stable, and reflect a high degree of
polarization in the Cambridge community. Indeed, variations
in these patterns of support occur, almost exclusively, when
black or ethnic candidates are endorsed by the CCA. In
addition, defections from the CCA-endorsed platform and its
goals are most frequent among these atypical CCA candidates,
such as Fantini, DeGuglielmo, Coates, and Owens.

The CCA coalition is generally very cohesive, closely
united in specific elections and across a range of issues,

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with both constituents and candidates ideologically committed to the goals of governmental reform and efficiency. Over twenty-five years, (1950-75) occupational status alone accounted for more than 50% of the variance observed in the total number of votes cast for CCA candidates. As Exhibit III-6 indicates, the higher the socioeconomic status (SES) of a neighborhood, the greater the number of votes likely to be cast for CCA-endorsed candidates. The composition of the CCA coalition, therefore, can best be characterized as white, Anglo-Saxon, upper income, and highly educated professionals and managers, moderately liberal or progressive in their political orientations. Candidates typically endorsed by the CCA are similar to their constituents in background, social status and education and, as such, share their political orientation, values, and goals.

Over time, the cohesiveness and stability of the CCA coalitions, as illustrated by Exhibit III-7, have been comparable for both the city council and the school committee. The exceptions to this pattern are the ethnic and black candidates endorsed by the CCA whose primary bases of support are the generally non-CCA ethnic and black wards. In these instances -- which are more frequent in school committee elections than in city council contests -- either the candidates or their supporters do not share the goals of the

EXHIBIT III-5A: CITY OF CAMBRIDGE, RACIAL AND ETHNIC COMPOSITION, 1940


Percent Black ≥ 10%:

Percent Foreign Born: 20-25%

≥ 25.1%

EXHIBIT III-5B: CITY OF CAMBRIDGE, RACIAL, ETHNIC AND CLASS COMPOSITION, 1970


SES: Low
Medium
High

Percent Black ≥ 10%:
Percent Foreign Born ≥ 15%:

EXHIBIT III-6: CROSSTABULATION OF PERCENT NUMBER ONE VOTES CAST FOR
CCA CANDIDATES BY COMPOSITE SOCIO-STATUS OF
CONSTITUENTS, 1949 AND 1975, CAMBRIDGE SCHOOL COMMITTEE
AND CITY COUNCIL ELECTIONS

CITY COUNCIL ELECTIONS

1949

N row pct. col. pct	SESINDEX Low	High	
Percent #1 Votes Cast for CCA Candidates ≤40.0	8 88.9 47.1	1 11.1 7.77	9 30.0
40.1 to 59.9	3 60.0 17.6	2 40.0 15.4	5 16.7
≥60.0	6 37.5 35.3	10 62.6 76.9	16 53.3
	17 56.7	13 43.3	30 100.0

Significance = .045

1975

N row pct. col. pct	SESINDEX Low	Medium	High	
Percent #1 Votes Cast for CCA Candidates ≤40.0	6 33.3 75.0	11 61.1 84.6	1 5.6 11.1	18 60.0
40.1 to 59.9	2 33.3 25.0	2 33.3 15.4	2 33.3 22.2	6 20.0
≥60.0	0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0	6 100.0 66.7	6 20.0
	8 26.7	13 43.3	9 30.0	30 100.0

Significance = .0006

EXHIBIT III-6 (continued)

SCHOOL COMMITTEE ELECTIONS

1949

N row pct. col. pct	SESINDEX		
	Low	High	
Percent #1 Votes Cast for CCA Candidates ≤40.0	7 77.8 41.2	2 22.2 15.4	9 30.0
40.1 to 59.9	10 71.4 58.8	4 28.6 30.8	14 46.7
≥60.0	0 0.0 0.0	7 100.0 53.8	7 23.3
	17 56.7	13 43.3	30 100.0

Significance = .002

1975

N row pct. col. pct	SESINDEX			
	Low	Medium	High	
Percent #1 Votes Cast for CCA Candidates ≤40.0	6 60.0 75.0	4 40.0 30.8	0 0.0 0.0	10 33.3
40.1 to 59.9	2 16.7 25.0	8 66.7 61.5	2 16.7 22.2	12 40.0
≥60.0	0 0.0 0.0	1 12.5 7.7	7 87.5 77.8	8 26.7
	8 26.7	13 43.3	9 30.0	30 100.0

Significance = .0002

CCA. That there are more "marginal ethnic" CCA candidates for school committee may be due to the use of the position as a stepping stone to higher elective and appointive offices. As such, it is the first elective office for most of the candidates, whose real views and loyalties have not yet been tested. By the time a person runs for city council, constituents generally, and CCA members in particular, have a better sense of whether a person truly subscribes to the goals and values of the CCA.

The elections in the early 1970s, particularly those for school committee, reflected a major shift in campaign strategy for the CCA. Rather than continuing to extend their electoral base among reform-oriented middle-class ethnic voters, the CCA attempted instead to solicit support from the "radical" and working-class groups in the city who shared their political goals and values. This attempt to build an ideologically based coalition of candidates and supporters was a reaction to the defection by nontraditional CCA-endorsed members of the city council and school committee, particularly with regard to the appointment of city managers and superintendents of school. To achieve their electoral objectives, CCA-endorsed candidates for school committee organized to run on a "Common Slate" in the 1971 and 1973 elections and as "Convention '75" in the 1975 election. This served to reinforce and increase

EXHIBIT III-7: FACTOR ANALYSIS OF 1949 AND 1975 SCHOOL COMMITTEE AND CITY COUNCIL ELECTION RETURNS

CITY COUNCIL

1949

Candidates: CCA:	#1	#2	#3	#4
Crane	.888*	.084	.053	.166
Pill	.792*	-.180	-.280	-.283
DeGuglielmo	-.017	-.181	.831*	.186
Swan	.725*	-.067	.365	.311
Higley	.566*	-.202	-.214	.040
Independents:				
E. Sullivan	.140	-.285	-.729*	.384
Foley	-.051	.960*	-.003	.099
McNamara	-.102	-.182	.001	-.920*
Lynch	-.154	.936*	-.010	.085

Factor	Pct. of Variance	Cum. Pct. Variance
1	29.3	29.8
2	21.2	51.0
3	16.2	67.2
4	11.5	78.7

1975

Candidates: CCA:	#1	#2	#3	#4
Ackermann	.945*	=.091	.230	.075
Clem	.923*	.330	.072	-.928
Duehay	.788*	-.335	.282	.098
Graham	.398	.448*	-.273	.050
Independents:				
Clinton	-.236	.611*	.232	-.352
Danehy	-.208	-.033	-.291	.154
Russell	-.181	.168	-.092	.609*
Sullivan	.110	.901*	-.030	.134
Vellucci	-.510*	.128	.818*	.192

Factor	Pct. of Variance	Cum. Pct. Variance
1	47.2	47.2
2	25.7	73.9
3	16.5	90.5
4	9.5	100.0

EXHIBIT III-7 (continued)

SCHOOL COMMITTEE

1949

Candidates:

CCA:

	#1	#2	#3
Amory	-.905	.204	.209
Mahoney	-.946*	-.062	-.114
Wise	-.918*	.071	-.057

Independents:

	#1	#2	#3
Cassidy	-.300	-.536*	-.727*
Fitzgerald	.328	.455*	-.646*
McCrehan	.133	-.834*	.169

Factor	Pct. of Variance	Cum. Pct. Variance
1	46.2	46.2
2	20.4	66.6
3	17.2	83.8

1975

Candidates:

CCA:

	#1	#2
Berman	.922*	-.077
Koocher	.957*	.074
Wolf	.781*	-.253

Independents:

	#1	#2
Fantini	-.183	.972*
Fitzgerald	-.064	.645*
Maynard	.004	.398

Factor	Pct. of Variance	Cum. Pct. Variance
1	64.5	64.5
2	35.5	100.0

the importance of the CCA-endorsement and to maximize the ideological cohesiveness of the CCA groups.

The call for ideological consistency among the Common Slate candidates was able to succeed, in the short term, because of the high degree of polarization in the community. Convention '75, however, did not fare as well, particularly in the city council elections. Lowered political intensities and expectations reduced the turnout among the more transient radical groups in the community, thus negating CCA attempts to expand its electoral base and to reinforce its ideological consistency. As a result, the CCA membership dropped to pre-1971 levels. Once again, the core members of the CCA and its more successful candidates were typically white, middle and upper-middle class professionals, largely Protestant and Jewish; they were moderate, progressive or liberal in their policy goals and orientations.

Even before the 1975 election, however, it was apparent that CCA attempts to ally themselves with radical and working-class groups in the community were not succeeding. The formation, in 1973, of the Grass Roots Organization (GRO) signaled a split between the young radicals and the working-class, on the one hand, and the moderate progressives and liberals within the CCA, on the other. Although the radical GRO failed to achieve its political objectives (electing only Saundra Graham, a first term, previously CCA-endorsed city

councillor), this schism among liberal and radical candidates and supporters demonstrates the difficulty encountered by the CCA in its efforts to incorporate groups supporting radical policies and platforms into anything more than an uneasy and transitory political alliance.

CCA attempts to incorporate the working class into its coalition likewise failed. Lacking, for the most part, a radical, or even a liberal, tradition, the relatively conservative working-class in Cambridge has manifested a longstanding allegiance to the Independents. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the CCA has not been able to fashion an effective coalition from all three groups: radicals, workers, and upper-class reformers. As a result the emerging "top-bottom" coalition predicted by Burnham[33] and reported by Dickson[34] in his analysis of the 1971 City Council election in Cambridge, proved to be illusory. Viewed over time, the 1971 City Council elections seem to fit the previously noted pattern of elections in which marginal ethnic candidates are endorsed by the CCA who, by virtue of their atypicality, derive their primary support from a constituent base significantly different from the CCA's.

Independent Profile

In contrast to the closeknit CCA coalition, the Independents are a loose confederation of candidates and their

supporters, generally acting alone or, in some instances, forming dyadic alliances based on some shared goal or common constituent base. Examples of the nature and strength of the links between various Independent candidates, as compared with those manifested by CCA candidates, are found in Exhibit III-8, which presents the correlations obtained when the bases of support for winning candidates in the 1949 and 1975 city council and school committee elections are analyzed. Further, as indicated in Exhibit III-9, the Independent alliance can best be described as poorer and less educated than their CCA counterparts.

Predominantly ethnic and low- to middle-class, Independent candidates reflect the values and needs of the upwardly mobile lower middle class and the lower-income individuals. Their primary concerns are jobs, contracts, rents, property values and taxes, and, in schools, the preparation of their children to obtain secure, well-paying jobs or admission to professional training programs upon their graduation.

Of special interest here is the composition and behavior of the Independents' ethnic supporters and candidates. Generally speaking, the Irish and French Canadians are relatively heterogeneous socioeconomically and occupationally, and, with the exception of the small group of French Canadians in North Cambridge and the slightly higher proportion of

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CITY COUNCIL

1949 City Council:

CCA   Independents

1975 City Council:

EXHIBIT III-8 (Continued)

<u>SCHOOL COMMITTEE</u>

<u>1949 School Committee:</u>

CCA   Independents

<u>1975 School Committee:</u>

CCA   Independents

EXHIBIT III-9: CROSSTABULATION OF PERCENT NUMBER ONE VOTES CAST FOR
INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES BY COMPOSITE SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS
OF CONSTITUENTS, 1949 AND 1973 CAMBRIDGE CITY COUNCIL AND
SCHOOL COMMITTEE ELECTIONS

CITY COUNCIL ELECTIONS

1949
SESINDEX

	N row pct. col. pct	Low	High	
Percent #1 Votes Cast for CCA Candidates	≤40.0	6 37.5 35.3	10 62.5 76.9	16 53.3
	40.1 to 59.9	3 60.0 17.6	2 40.0 15.4	5 16.7
	≥60.0	8 88.9 47.1	1 11.1 7.7	9 30.0
		17 56.7	13 43.3	30 100.0

Significance = .045

1975
SESINDEX

	N row pct. col. pct	Low	Medium	High	
Percent #1 Votes Cast for CCA Candidates	≤40.0	0 0.0 0.0	1 12.5 7.7	7 87.5 77.9	8 26.7
	40.1 to 59.9	2 16.7 25.0	8 66.7 61.5	2 16.7 22.2	12 40.0
	≥60.0	6 60.0 75.0	4 40.0 30.8	0 0.0 0.0	10 33.3
		8 26.7	13 43.3	9 30.0	30 100.0

Significance = .0002

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EXHIBIT III-9 (Continued)

SCHOOL COMMITTEE ELECTIONS

1949
SESINDEX

	N row pct. col. pct	Low	High	
Percent #1 Votes Cast for CCA Candidates	≤40.0	0 0.0 0.0	7 100.0 53.8	7 23.3
	40.1 to 59.9	10 71.4 58.8	4 28.6 30.8	14 46.7
	≥60.0	7 77.8 41.2	2 22.2 15.4	9 30.0
		17 56.7	13 43.3	30 100.0

Significance = .002

1975
SESINDEX

	N row pct. col. pct	Low	Medium	High	
Percent #1 Votes Cast for CCA Candidates	≤40.0	0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0	6 100.0 66.7	6 20.0
	40.1 to 59.9	2 33.3 25.0	2 33.3 15.4	2 33.3 22.2	6 20.0
	≥60.0	6 33.3 75.0	11 61.1 84.6	1 5.6 11.1	18 60.0
		8 26.7	13 43.3	9 30.0	30 100.0

Significance = .0006

French Canadians and Irish in north and west Cambridge, both are fairly uniformly dispersed throughout the City. The Italians, on the other hand, still cluster in East Cambridge, where they comprise the lowest-income and least-educated group in the community. Using Wolfinger's classification,[35] it would seem that the Irish and French Canadians are in the third and final stage of socioeconomic assimilation, while the Italians in East Cambridge are in the second stage of assimilation. As noted earlier, this may be the result, in part, of the departure of Italians who had become occupationally mobile. Wolfinger claimed that ethnics at the third stage of assimilation who have attained middle-class status are more likely to manifest ethnic voting.[36]

In Cambridge, however, this is not what happens. Controlling for residence, socioeconomic and occupational status, one finds evidence of substantial levels of ethnic voting on the part of both the Irish and the Italians, despite their differing levels of assimilation. Exhibit III-10 illustrates the cohesiveness and stability of electoral support for Independent candidates on the part of Cambridge's Italian voters. Since the data used in this study is aggregated by neighborhood and since the Irish are less geographically and socioeconomically cohesive, similar cross-tabular analyses yield comparable, albeit statistically insignificant results. However, the French Canadians,

although supporting candidates from their home precincts, thus demonstrating "friends and neighbors" voting patterns, do not generally vote as a block.

Although there are substantial numbers of Irish and Italians employed in the local municipal agencies, there are comparatively few French Canadians occupying these positions and, as a result, decisions involving patronage do not affect the French Canadians. The Irish and the Italians, on the other hand, are directly affected by issues pertaining to the distribution of jobs and contracts. In addition, the vast majority of the candidates running as Independents are identifiably Irish or Italian in their social-group behavior. Ethnic candidates endorsed by the CCA generally live in the upper-class areas around Brattle Street and identify with the ideological goals and values of the professional and managerial classes to which they belong.

Differences between the socioeconomic characteristics of the two major ethnic groups supporting the Independent coalition -- the Irish and the Italians -- lead one to reconsider the viability of Wolfinger's mobilization theory of ethnic political assimilation[37] and to question at what point in the process do ethnics become fully acculturated, socially, politically and economically. In Cambridge, it would appear that upper-class ethnics identify with other members of their socioeconomic peer group in their support of CCA candidates

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EXHIBIT III-10: CROSSTABULATION OF PERCENT NUMBER ONE VOTES CAST FOR INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES BY PERCENT OF CONSTITUENTS OF ITALIAN NATIONALITY/DESCENT, 1949 AND 1975 CAMBRIDGE CITY COUNCIL AND SCHOOL COMMITTEE

CITY COUNCIL ELECTIONS

1949
Percent Italian

N row pct. col. pct.	≤ 1.5	≥ 1.6	
Percent #1 Votes Cast for Independent Candidates ≤ 40.0	10 62.5 66.7	6 37.5 40.0	16 53.3
40.1 to 59.9	1 20.0 6.7	4 80.0 26.7	5 16.7
≥ 60.0	4 44.4 26.7	5 55.6 33.3	9 30.0
	15 50.0	15 50.0	30 100.0

Significance = .23

1975
Percent Italian

N row pct. col. pct.	≤ 4.0	≥ 4.1	
≤ 40.0	6 100.0 35.3	0 0.0 0.0	6 20.0
Percent #1 Votes Cast for Independent Candidates 40.1 to 59.9	4 66.7 23.5	2 33.3 15.4	6 20.0
≥ 60.0	7 38.9 41.2	11 61.1 84.6	18 60.0
	17 56.7	13 43.3	30 100.0

Significance = .03

EXHIBIT III-10 (Continued)

SCHOOL COMMITTEE ELECTIONS

1949
Percent Italian

N
row pct.
col. pct.

	≤1.5	≥1.6	
≤40.0	7 100.0 46.7	0 0.0 0.0	7 23.3
Percent #1 Votes Cast for Independent Candidates 40.1 to	7 50.0 46.7	7 50.0 46.7	14 46.7
≥60.0	1 11.1 6.7	8 88.9 53.3	9 30.0
	15 50.0	15 50.0	30 100.0

Significance = .002

1975
Percent Italian

N
row pct.
col. pct.

	≤4.0	≥4.1	
≤40.0	8 100.0 47.1	0 0.0 0.0	8 26.7
40.1 to 59.9	7 58.3 41.2	6 41.7 38.5	12 40.0
≥60.0	2 20.0 11.8	8 80.0 61.5	10 33.3
	17 56.7	13 43.3	30 100.0

Significance = .003

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rather than with members of their national group, at least during local elections. For national and state elections, Cambridge is so overwhelmingly Democratic as to elicit little regular support for Republicans among all social classes, save for a relatively small pocket of traditional upperclass WASPs living along Brattle Street, the "Brattle Street Brahmins."[38] Thus, neither Wolfinger nor Parenti[39] sufficiently account for the seemingly atypical behavior of upper class ethnics in Cambridge.

For the lower- and middle-income ethnics, the importance of their common national origins does not diminish in intensity or cohesiveness in subsequent generations as they reach the second and third stages of assimilation, as Wolfinger would assert.[40] Rather, with modification to account for differences in social class, Parenti's claim that ethnic groups have not yet been truly assimilated appears to have validity and relevance in Cambridge.[41] Thus, the predominantly middle-class Irish, although culturally assimilated, do not appear to be totally assimilated socially, while the lower-class Italians appear to be neither socially nor culturally assimilated into the Cambridge community. As noted earlier, for both groups, ethnic salience and identity remain critical criteria in predicting how they will vote. Thus rather than acting as surrogates for class voting, ethnic patterns of electoral support serve, instead, to reinforce it,

providing positive groups supports and identification for the lower- and middle-class ethnics and a negative reference point for upper-class ethnics. As such, both class and ethnic voting, operating through stable and defined coalitions combine to influence electoral outcomes in Cambridge. Thus, Parenti's observations that ethnic salience and identification remain important variables in the determination of political behavior is borne out by the Cambridge experience.[42]

Black Electoral Profile

One major group in Cambridge that has not yet developed a strong and persistent allegiance to either the CCA or the Independent coalition is the city's black population. Instead, the black vote in Cambridge has become a swing factor in the municipal elections, oscillating between support for various Independent candidates, especially the Sullivan brothers, and allegiance to black candidates supported by the CCA. These frequent shifts in allegiance are rooted in the social and economic cleavages present in the black community.

Over the past twenty-five years, three electoral factions have emerged within the Cambridge black population: (1) the elite, better-educated and higher-income blacks, who, like their ethnic counterparts, share the lifestyles and values of their socioeconomic group; (2) the conservative longer-term black residents, including the "island blacks" and migrants to

the city before 1955; and, (3) the liberal, frequently radical blacks, generally among the most recent migrants from the South and the inner city, but also including children of earlier black residents.

Members of the black elite tend to be liberal. They are likely to view the CCA as the best vehicle for achieving their goals, perceiving institutional reform and policy initiation and redirection as a means of achieving racial equality. These black professionals, managers, and academics frequently live in the upper-income areas of Cambridge, where they participate only minimally in the local political scene, limiting their participation to such token activities as belonging to the CCA, serving on its advisory board, and endorsing candidates. Their political perspective is more cosmopolitan and directed to national and state campaigns and projects.

The leadership for the local black community comes not from the elite but from professionals, owners of small businesses, ministers, and community organizers whose interests are community-directed. It is from this group that the CCA recruits candidates. However, their identification with the black community frequently provides the seeds for their differences and subsequent breaks with the CCA. When given a choice between allegiance to the black community or to the CCA, the black councilor or school committee member

usually chooses to vote in what he perceives to be the best interest of his constituents, the majority of whom are from lower-income, working-class sections of the city.

By far, the largest and most conservative segment of the black population is its less-educated, lower-income working class who, as noted above, provide the basic support for black candidates for school committee and city council. Before Gustave Solomons decided to run for school committee, no black had sought elective office in Cambridge. As a result, and given the control over municipal jobs and contracts exercised by the Sullivan family, it is hardly surprising that blacks in this socioeconomic strata, whose primary concerns are food, housing and job security, voted in large numbers first for Michael Sullivan and later, for his sons, Edward and Walter. However, like ethnic voters, once provided with an opportunity to vote for a black candidate, the lower- and middle-income black population switched their allegiance to the CCA, which had endorsed and supported non-conservative blacks, beginning with Solomons' candidacy. As with the ethnics, their allegiance was linked to increased racial solidarity and consciousness rather than partisan identification. As a result, when these black candidates broke with the CCA after their election, usually over some issue that would affect their constituents, their lower- and middle-income supporters for the most part continued to vote for them when they ran for

reelection as Independents.

The relationship between the city's black population and the CCA is a complex one deriving from the needs, goals and strategies of these two groups. For the CCA, endorsement of black candidates derived from their generally liberal ideological orientation and their "do-good" social impulses, while blacks have voted primarily for black candidates. When no black candidates were seeking election to either the city council or the school committee, black voters split among CCA and Independent candidates. Thus, the liberal black elite tended to support the CCA-endorsed candidates; the moderate and conservative lower- and middle-class blacks turned to the Independents; and, in the early 1970s, the radical blacks supported the radical candidates endorsed by the CCA and the GRO. In the past, a black candidate could run for reelection without the CCA endorsement and still stand a good chance of winning, relying upon unified support from the black community. However, the rapid influx of poorer blacks into the city and the concomitant and intensified social, economic and political cleavages in the black community, have turned CCA support for black candidates, previously the surplus cushion of victory, into a swing factor for these candidates.

The role of the CCA as a swing factor in the election of black candidates reversed a previous pattern in which the support of liberal blacks often spelled the difference between

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victory and defeat for marginal CCA candidates. At the same time, along with the increased divisions in the black community, CCA supporters have begun to differentiate among the black candidates and to align themselves with those blacks closest to their own political orientation. For some black candidates, the support of CCA liberals has provided the margin for victory, given the fragmentation in the black community, especially among those left of center in their political leanings. Indeed, the lack of CCA support and endorsement in 1973 contributed to the defeat of Henry Owens, a moderate black candidate caught in the cross-fire between radical and moderate black candidates and their supporters. Comprising 10 percent of the city's population, the black community, if united, can, at best, elect one representative to the city council and the school committee under the proportional representation system unless blacks can forge coalitions with other groups. This strategy worked in the past when blacks comprised less than 10 percent of the population. However, the increased size and fragmentation of the black population and the greater polarization within the CCA coalition made such a strategy simultaneously more crucial and more difficult to establish.

In the early 1970s, militant blacks joined with the radical minority among lower-income whites and upper-middle-class intellectuals, first, to elect Saundra Graham to the

city council and, later, to form their own political group, the Grass Roots Organization (GRO). This latter coalition was unstable and short-lived. As the radical movement diminished in intensity and cohesiveness, candidates like Saundra Graham and their supporters were forced to retreat from extreme positions and to ally themselves with more moderate organizations such as Convention '75. However, the more militant blacks, lower-income whites and upper-middle-class intellectuals continue to form a significant faction with the CCA and its campaign groups and serve to shift the coalition to the left on many issues, particularly those of importance to the black community. At the same time, the typically ephemeral nature of these alliances has inhibited the achievement and maintenance of stable and cohesive coalitions in both the school committee and city council elections. Moreover, the left-of-center political orientations of these alliances also served to further weaken the CCA's working coalition.

The more electorally stable and cohesive segments of the black population -- its lower-and middle-income, predominantly working-class members -- has provided the essential base of support for moderate black candidates. But, unlike the ethnics, blacks have not established an alliance with either the Independents or the CCA.

Significantly, the black voters in the city have not

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established a coalition with upper-class whites against lower-
and middle-class whites.   Rather,   the black vote   has
predictably   followed   moderate black candidates   as   they
alternated   between   running   with   the CCA   endorsement   and
seeking   reelection as Independents.   Thus,   when these black
candidates   were   endorsed   by the CCA,   generally   in   their
initial campaigns, blacks voted for the black candidate almost
exclusively.   Their   support for the black candidate did   not
translate into support for other candidates on the CCA slate.

It would appear,   therefore,   that the black experience in
Cambridge is analogous to that reported by Davidson.[43]   In his
refinement of Wilson's[44] reported coalition between blacks and
upper-class   whites in Atlanta,   Davidson sought to   ascertain
whether   such   coalitions   were   issue-specific.   As   noted
earlier,   he   found   that blacks and upper-class   whites   were
likely   to   cooperate on social issues and blacks   and   lower-
class   whites to unite on economic issues.   The situation   in
Cambridge   appears to fit the pattern observed by   Davidson:[45]
on economic issues,   the interests of the blacks are   parallel
to   those of lower- and middle-income white ethnics,   but,   on
social issues, the CCA's liberal stance is compatible with the
blacks' goals.

Summary and Conclusions

As   has   been   shown   in   the   preceding   discussion   and

analysis, two coalitions, the Independents and the CCA, dominate the electoral stage in the city of Cambridge. Diametrically opposed in their orientations and goals and possessing distinctive and predictable memberships, both groups seek to influence the initiation and implementation of policies consistent with their constituents' needs and objectives. Exhibit III-11 presents a summary tabulation of the composition and characteristics of the CCA and the Independent coalitions and their supporters. The cleavages in Cambridge fall along social class, ethnic, racial and occupational lines. These observations lend considerable support to the findings reported earlier by the Michigan and Columbia voting research teams regarding the influence of secondary-group membership on an individual's electoral preferences and behavior.[48] The most loyal, persistent and cohesive members of the CCA coalition are its upper-income, highly educated professionals, managers and academics. Primarily white, Anglo-Saxon, and Protestant, the CCA also includes upper-income blacks and ethnics. It is hardly surprising, given its higher levels of occupation and education, that the CCA is better organized, with a formal structure, endorsement process and set of goals and objectives.

The Independents, on the other hand, are a loose federation of predominantly lower- and middle-class ethnics.

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EXHIBIT III-11: COMPOSITION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF MAJOR POLITICAL
COALITIONS IN THE CITY OF CAMBRIDGE

CCA: "POLICY AND REFORM"

COALITION:
- formal organization, platform, and endorsement procedure
- stable and cohesive, especially with respect to core or typical
  CCA candidates
- ideologically committed candidates and supporters
- goals include governmental reform and efficiency

SUPPORTERS:
- upper class
- highly educated
- managers, professionals, and academics
- WASP's and upper class ethnics and blacks
- more liberal on social issues

INDEPENDENTS: "PATRONAGE AND PERSONALITY"

COALITION:
- loose confederation of candidates and supporters
- no formal organization, platform or endorsement procedure
- non-cohesive; relatively stable constituent bases for individual
  candidates
- concerned about availability and distribution of individual
  benefits, i.e., jobs, contracts.
- ethnic, familial, and social ties critical

SUPPORTERS:
- lower and middle classes, especially working class
- ethnic, especially Irish and Italian
- less educated
- concerned about immediate problems of jobs, housing, et al.
- more conservative on social issues

EXHIBIT III-11 (Continued)

Votes for CCA	<--------"SWING FACTION"-------->	Votes for Independents
	- lower and middle income blacks, primarily working class - concerned about immediate problems of jobs, housing, et al.	
when black candidates running endorsed by CCA	- moderate in political orientations (conservative on economic issues; liberal on social issues)	when black candidates are running without CCA endorsement or when no blacks are running for office

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They lack the organization and cohesion of the CCA both during campaigns and immediately after, with each faction and representative seeking a larger share of individual benefits, such as personal power and municipal jobs and contracts. However, the loyalty of their supporters, based on shared needs, lifestyles, and values, and reinforced by a complex network of social, familial and ethnic ties, is as intense and enduring as the relationship between the CCA and its constituents. The city's black population acts as a swing faction in the city's elections and in the deliberations of its city council and school committee. Subsequent sections will explore how these groups influence decision-making in the school department and in the school committee.

FOOTNOTES

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[2] Robert Dahl, Who Governs?, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1961; Raymond E. Wolfinger, The Politics of Progress, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974; Nathan Glazar and Daniel P. Moynihan, eds., Ethnicity, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976; Harry A. Bailey, Jr. and Ellis Katz, Ethnic Group Politics, Chandler Davidson, Biracial Politics, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1972; James Q. Wilson, Negro Politics, New York: Free Press, 1966; Edgar Litt, The Political Cultures of Massachusetts, Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1965; Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, The American Voter, New York: Wiley and Sons, 1960; and Bernard Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William McPhee, Voting, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954.

[3] Dahl, op. cit., p. 35.

[4] Ibid., p. 34.

[5] Wolfinger, op. cit.

[6] Ibid., p. 49

[7] Ibid., p. 56.

[8] Robert A. Lorinskas, Brett W. Hawkins, and Stephen D. Edwards, "The Presistence of Ethnic Voting in Urban and Rural Areas: Results from the Controlled Election Method," and Scott Greet, "Catholic Voters and the Democratic Party," both in the Ethnic Factor in American Politics, edited by Robert A. Lorinskas and Brett W. Hawkins, Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1970, pp. 124-143, and 618-613, respectively.

[9]Michael Parenti, "Ethnic Politics and the Persistence of Ethnic Identification," _American Political Science Review_, 61, (September 1962), pp. 717-726.

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[11]Karl E. Taeuber and Alma F. Taeuber, _Negroes in Cities_, Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1965, Introduction and Chapter 1.

[12]Anthony Downs, _An Economic Theory of Democracy_, New York: Harper & Row, 1957.

[13]Wolfinger, _op. cit._, p. 30.

[14]Walter Dean Burnham, _Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics_. New York: Borton, 1970.

[15]Chandler Davidson, _Biracial Politics: Conflict and Coalition in the Metropolitan South_, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1972.

[16]_Ibid._, Chapter VII.

[17]James Q. Wilson, "The Negro in Politics" in _The Negro American_, Talcott Parsons and Kenneth Clark, eds., Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1966, pp. 427-428.

[18]Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson and Gazel Gaudet, _The People's Choice_, New York: Columbia University Press, 1948, and Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, _op. cit._, 1954.

[19]Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin and Warren Miller, _The Voter Decides_, New York: Harper and Row, 1954 and Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, _op. cit._, 1960.

[20]Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, _op. cit._, p. 27.

[21]Campbell, Gurin and Miller, op. cit., pp. 85-86.

[22]Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, op. cit., pp. 295-332.

[23]Ibid., p. 306 and p. 322.

[24]Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, op. cit. and Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, op. cit.

[25]Ibid.

[26]Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, op. cit., Chapter 12.

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[29]Banfield and Wilson, op. cit., 1964 and 1971.

[30]Litt, op. cit.

[31]Salisbury, op. cit., 1960, p. 498.

[32]Salisbury, op. cit., 1960 and 1961.

[33]Burnham, op. cit., pp. 158-165.

[34]Donald E. Dickson, Jr., "Realignment, Radicalism, and Ethnic Voting: The Case of Cambridge," 1972, unpublished manuscript.

[35]Wolfinger, op. cit., pp. 34-56.

[36]Ibid.

[37]Ibid.

[38]Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, op. cit., and Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, op. cit.

[39]Wolfinger, op. cit., and Parenti, op. cit.

[40]Wolfinger, op. cit.

[41]Parenti, op. cit.

[42]Ibid.

[43]Davidson, op. cit., Chapter VII.

[44]Wilson, 1966, op. cit., pp. 427-428.

[45]Davidson, op. cit., Chapter VII. Also noted by Brunham, op. cit., pp. 158-165 and Dickson, op. cit., pp. 51-53.

[46]Banfield and Wilson, op. cit., 1964 and 1971.

[47]Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, op. cit.; Campbell, Gurin and Miller, op. cit.; Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Baudet, op. cit.; and Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, op. cit.

APPENDIX III-A

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

To study the existence, durability and cohesiveness of
political coalitions in local decision-making, election
returns over the past twenty-five years for city council and
school committee in Cambridge were analyzed with respect to
selected demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of its
residents. Special attention was paid to those elections
which bracketed census years, such as 1949, 1951, 1959 and the
like, to minimize the impact of changes in the population
between enumerations. As a result, the data base for this
part of this study was twofold: (1) census data for the city
of Cambridge from 1950 to 1970. Included here was data on:
median family income, education, occupation, racial and ethnic
composition, age, sex and measure of population change and
density; (2) electoral results by ward and precinct for the
following city council and school committee elections: 1949;
1951; 1959; 1961; 1969; 1971; 1973 and 1975. In addition,
information regarding a candidate's endorsement by the
Cambridge Civic Association (CCA), a citizen reform group, and
the candidate's home precinct were also included.

The data thus collected posed a major problem: there
were thirty (30) Census tracts and fifty-five (55) precincts.
It was necessary to undertake correlation analyses of both

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sets of data so that analytic areas could be constructed reflecting somewhat homogeneous demographic and political neighborhoods over time. This resulted in the creation of thirty analytic areas, similar to those developed by Dixon, which were used to relate electoral outcomes of candidates and the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the population.[1] However, using these artificially created areas potentially limited the analytical sensitivity and precision of this study. Implicit in the development of these analytical areas was the assumption that ethnic, racial and social class groups in the community resided, more or less uniformly, in particular sections of the community. Not surprisingly, this was not entirely accurate. To minimize errors and distortions inherent in the use of this data base, care was taken to construct analytical units that reflected the variations in residential patterns and accentuated the natural aggregations of residents of similar social class, ethnic and racial identification. Thus, the units encompassed relatively homogeneous sub-groups in the community.

The aggregate data analysis performed was fairly extensive and included frequency distributions, cross-tabulations, correlations, multiple regression and factor analysis. All of these statistical techniques were used to analyze the winning candidates and the socioeconomic characteristics of their constituency in the thirty analytic

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areas previously constructed. However, studies of _all_ the candidates seeking election (based on the 55 precincts) were more restricted and were limited to correlational and factor analyses.

To facilitate visual comprehension of these analytic areas and their comparison with actual geopolitical units and census tracts in Cambridge, a map outlining these thirty areas is shown in Exhibit III-A1. In addition, Exhibit III-A2 provides a summary tabulation of the analytic areas and their relation to specific political wards and precincts and reflects the aggregation of these analytic units relative to particular neighborhood identities.

EXHIBIT III-A1: CITY OF CAMBRIDGE, UNITS OF ANALYSIS

EXHIBIT III-A2: CITY OF CAMBRIDGE: ANALYTICAL AREAS AND THE CENSUS
TRACTS COMPOSING THEM

Location (N=30)	Precincts (N=55)	Tracts (N=30)
1. East Cambridge (1)	1-1,1-3	21,23
2. East Cambridge (2)	1-2	22
3. Harrington School (east)	1-4,1-5	26,1/3 of 27
4. Harrington School (west)	3-1	1/3 of 27,3/4 of 28
5. Inman Square (1)	3-2	1/3 of 27
6. Inman Square (2)	3-3,3-4,3-5	1/4 of 28,29
7. Kendall Square	2/3 of 2-3,2/3 of 2-4	24
8. Model Cities	2-2,1/3 of 2-3,1/2 of 2-1	25
9. Central Square	1/2 of 2-1,4-3	30
10. Mass. Ave. & MIT	2-5,1/3 of 2-4	31
11. Cambridgeport (east)	5-1,5-4	32
12. Cambridgeport (west)	5-2,5-3,1/2 of 5-5	33
13. Pleasant-Western Ave.	1/2 of 5-5,1/2 of 4-1,1/4 of 6-5	34
14. Western Ave.-King School	1/2 of 4-1,3/4 of 6-5, 1/4 of 6-4	35
15. Harvard Street	4-2,4-4,4-5,1/2 of 6-1	38
16. Harvard Yard	1/2 of 6-1,1/2 of 6-2,2/3 of 6-3	37, 1/2 of 39
17. Banks Street	3/4 of 6-4	1/2 of 39
18. Mass. Ave. to Beacon	1/2 of 6-2,7-2,7-1,1/3 of 6-3	36
19. Brattle Street	8-3,8-4	41
20. Chauncy Street	7-5,8-5	40
21. Linnean to Upland	7-3,7-4	45
22. Mt. Auburn & Brattle St.	8-1,8-2	2/3 of 42
23. Tobin School	9-1,9-2	44
24. Fresh Pond (east)	9-3,9-4	1/3 of 42
25. Fresh Pond (south)	9-5	43
26. Concord Avenue	10-4,10-5	46
27. Rindge Avenue	11-3,11-4	49
28. Mass. Avenue	1/2 of 10-1, 11-2	48
29. North Cambridge	11-1,11-5	50
30. Porter Square	1/2 of 10-1,10-2,10-3	47

FOOTNOTES

[1]Donald E. Dickson, Jr., "Realignment, Radicalism and Ethnic Voting: The Case of Cambridge," 1972, unpublished manuscript. As might have been anticipated, with few exceptions, Dickson's analytic areas were found to be comparatively stable and homogeneous in the period from 1949 to 1975.

CHAPTER IV

CAMBRIDGE MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS: ISSUES AND OUTCOMES

Introduction

The preceding chapter established the social, ethnic,
racial, and class bases of electoral coalitions in the city of
Cambridge and the durability of these "partisan" attachments
and affiliations over the years.   The observations reported
here are both a corroboration of the fact that social group
membership and identification are important determinants of a
community's voting behavior, and an extension of these earlier
findings to encompass local electoral choices.   However, one
might ask: Are these social and psychological factors the
sole determinants of membership in political coalitions in
local communities?   Specifically, do Cambridge's competing
coalitions, the Independents and the CCA, differ on particular
issues and, if so, on what issues and to what extent do they
differ?   Not surprisingly, these questions raise even more
fundamental concerns, namely: How issue-oriented are voters
and how rational are their electoral choices?

The last chapter has suggested that a patronage-policy
split reflects the political and social divisions in the
community and may be the basis for membership in the city's

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competing political coalitions. To analyze the differing ideological orientations and policy preferences of the two coalitions, campaign pledges and platforms of Independent and CCA-endorsed candidates and slates will be examined. Subsequently, an effort will be made to assess the impact of particular issues on the campaign strategies of the two groups and on the outcome of elections to the school committee and city council. However, before proceeding to a discussion of the policy differences between the coalitions, we will review the literature pertaining to issue or policy voting in the United States.

The Role of Issues in Electoral Politics: A Review of the Literature

Despite our substantial knowledge about voting behavior, scholars are not in agreement on the role that policy issues play in elections. Many scholars reject the notion that election results reflect the public's response to policy issues discussed during the campaign. For example, the authors of The American Voter, undoubtedly the single most influential book on voting behavior, offer the following conclusion:

> We have...then, the portrait of an
> electorate almost wholly without
> detailed information about decision
> making in government. A substantial

portion of the public is able to
respond in a discrete manner to issues
that might be the subject of
legislative or administrative action.
Yet it knows little about what
government has done on these issues or
what the parties propose to do. It is
almost completely unable to judge the
rationality of government actions;
knowing little of particular policies
and what has led to them, the mass
electorate is not able to appraise
either its goals or the
appropriateness of the means chosen to
serve these goals.[1]

The comparatively minor role of issue voting in the
period from 1948 through 1964 has been well described in the
research on public involvement with policy questions.[2]
Political scientists have found voters to have limited
interest in politics, to be strongly attached to their
traditional parties and social groups, and to lack
ideologically coherent views of political issues.[3] Of
particular concern here is the electorate's perception of
issues, of coherent ideologies, and of the links between issue
preferences and partisan preferences. Much voting research
has indicated that these perceptions are cloudy. Large
proportions of voters have "no opinion" or "don't know" their
opinion on specific policy issues.[4] Only 12 percent of the
citizenry has been found to hold an ideological view of the
parties.[5] The links between issue preferences and party
choice are weak. Party identification was found in The
American Voter to have little relation to general ideology,[6]

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and McClosky, dealing with the same period, found "that substantial differences of opinion exist among the electorate on only five of the twenty-four issues" he examined.[7] The Michigan study also reported that there was little belief among the electorate that the parties differ on particular issues and little agreement on the nature of whatever differences were perceived.[8]

In the 1950s, the rarity of issue voting was thought to be a function partly of a low level of public information and partly of the closely related low level of public interest in politics. Immediately after the 1958 congressional elections, for example, almost half the voters who had just chosen between two congressional candidates reported that they had not read or heard anything about either candidate. As for issues, only 3 percent, including those who were guessing, could name a single legislative position that had been taken by their congressional representative.[9] Public opinion on specific issues was often unstable, so unstable that many expressions of attitude were better classified as obliging but meaningless responses to researchers' questions. Interviewers often were actually collecting "non-attitudes" instead of real opinions.[10] Furthermore, opinions that did show some stability were seldom structured into coherent, consistent patterns of political thought or connected to the abstract principles that characterize political ideologies.

There is danger, however, in carrying the "voters are fools" argument too far, because the political sophistication of voters varies widely. At the bottom of the scale is a sizeable fraction of the public almost entirely devoid of political interest or knowledge and who seldom vote. People who do vote make their electoral choices from a variety of motivations. Some are influenced by candidate "images" and personalities as they are portrayed in advertisements in the news media. Others are able to judge past performances of government leaders -- rewarding the incumbent party when its policies seem to work and punishing it when they appear to fail. At the top of the scale are voters who choose candidates from a consideration of their offering of policy choices for the future. Since some voters are influenced by the candidates' policy offerings, this minority's views carry some weight in the outcome of elections, thus adding an element of rationality to the process.

The late V. O. Key, Jr. took strong exception to the conclusion that the American public was incapable of issue voting. In his last publication, The Responsible Electorate, he argued that in any given election, about 12 to 20 percent of the voters switch from the political party they voted for in the last election and also that about 15 to 20 percent of the electorate are new voters facing their first presidential election. Thus, as much of as 40 percent of the electorate

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will not vote the same as they did in the previous election.

Furthermore, Key gave evidence that both the standpatters

(those voting again for the same party) and the switchers seek

consistency between their vote and their attitudes on

important issues. While Key was able to demonstrate a certain

consistency in the electorate's choices, he could not prove a

causal connection. However, Key's work, along with Arthur

Goldberg's,[11] did bring a renewed emphasis on the analysis of

policy preferences to electoral studies. Although somewhat

overstated, the argument pointing toward rationality in

electoral decisions has been made by V.O. Key:

> In American presidential campaigns
> of recent decades the portrait of the
> electorate that develops from the data
> is not one of an electorate
> straightjacketed by social
> determinants or moved by subconscious
> urges triggered by devilishly skillful
> propagandists. It is rather one of an
> electorate moved by concerns about
> central and relevant questions of
> public policy, of government
> performance, and of executive
> personality.[12]

In recent years there have been a number of independent

reappraisals of The American Voter's finding that the

electorate is ideologically unaware. One set of authors

argues that mass ideological awareness has always been present

to a greater degree than found by Campbell, Converse, Miller

and Stokes, but that appropriate methods have not been

employed to observe this awareness. Thus, focusing on local concerns, Luttbeg found considerable "constraint" or coherence, in mass attitudes.[13] Similarly, using a series of prepared statements, Brown found no difference in ideological awareness between political articulates and inarticulates.[14] Most notable is the work of Lane, who was able to discern a developed ideology among New Haven workers through lengthy interviews.[15] These strands suggest that previous studies demonstrated not the absence of ideology, but the absence of the ability to articulate it.[16]

Another criticism is that the findings of The American Voter are timebound. Because of the excellence of the Michigan studies' methodology, there has been a tendency to overestimate their applicability. Because voters of the Eisenhower period did not respond to the parties in ideological terms, observers often concluded that they could not respond in such terms. Yet, as Key observed: "(T)he voice of the people is but an echo... The people's verdict can be no more than a selective reflection from among the alternatives and outlooks presented to them."[17] If the parties do not emphasize issues, or do not present distinct and clear positions, the voters are unlikely to invent party programs. When there are party positions and differences, the voters can perceive them. Key concluded: "In the large the electorate behaves about as rationally and responsibly as we

should expect, given the clarity of the alternatives presented to it and the character of the information available to it."[18]

Replicating the Michigan study for the 1964 election, in which ideology was emphasized, Field and Anderson found a substantial increase in ideological awareness. In the Goldwater-Johnson contest, a third of the respondents are classified as ideological, more than double the proportion of 1956 voters and nearly three times the proportion of the total sample in the earlier study.[19] Using three measures of ideological awareness derived from Survey Research Center, instead of only one, Pierce also tested the change in awareness over time.[20] A greater proportion of the sample was classified as ideological under the three-pronged analysis, and the proportion was found to have increased considerably from 1956 through 1964. Confirming the evidence is found in the work by David E. RePass. Using responses to open-ended questions, RePass finds considerable mass concern for issues, an increase in issue awareness from 1960 to 1964, a close relationship between issue position and partisanship, and a significant partial correlation between issue partisanship and vote, controlling for candidate image and party identification.[21]

The 1968 presidential election offered a unique opportunity to assess the impact of issue voting, as Governor George Wallace made a strong third party campaign for the

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presidency on the basis of several explicit positions. A study of this election finds the greatest loss to the Democratic party between the 1964 victory and the 1968 loss came from a decline in positive reactions to the 1968 presidential candidate rather than the issues of the campaign or Wallace's third party effort.[22] The Wallace voters, however, were clearly issue motivated. Interestingly, the old and the more partisan proved least amenable to the Wallace appeal, indicating that political-party identification and its stability over time greatly dampens the influence of issues on the campaign. But clearly analysis of the 1972 election shows that public impressions of the candidates themselves (candidate image) are most important in accounting for how people vote, and many solely vote their partisan loyalty.[23]

From the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, ideological conflict was resurrected and consensus severely disrupted. Major issues were raised and the electorate showed itself able to comprehend and respond to such policy conflicts.[24] These changes have highlighted perhaps the major fault of the Michigan studies -- their neglect of the political environment as an independent variable. The influences of these external political events and actors upon the respondents have been studied only indirectly, through voters' personal perceptions and actions.[25] But the voters are affected by their environment. Similarly, it is necessary to examine the

response of voters to stimuli from the political parties and other electoral actors. If these stimuli are issueless and static, as they largely were in the 1950s, the citizenry is likely to respond in the manner described in The American Voter. If these stimuli are more ideological and dynamic, as evidenced in the 1964, 1968 and 1972 elections,[26] different perceptions and behaviors might be expected.

Thus, the most cautious view of how policy issues affect elections is that candidate policy stances are one of many determinants of election outcomes. If it were true that each voter selects the candidate who best represents his own policy views, then elections would be decided by the fact that a majority of voters preferred the policy views of the winning candidate to those of the loser. But because policy issues only influence some voters, and then in conjunction with other motivating forces, the candidate whose policy views are closest to those of the voters (or even to those of the most issue-oriented voters) cannot be sure of winning his election bid. For example, he might lose because he is less "well-known" than his opponent, because he lacks a favorable "image" in his television appearances, or especially, if his party is the minority party in his area. For a candidate to win when his party is in the minority requires massive defections from the stronger opposition party, a difficult task.

For voters to be influenced by policy issues when they

cast their ballots, two conditions must be met. First, the voter must know the differences among the policy views of the candidates. In addition, the voter who understands the candidate stances must vote for the candidate whose views are closest to his own. Naturally, voters are most likely to be influenced by a policy issue when the divergence between the candidate stances is strong and the issue is of considerable importance to the electorate.

The studies reported here deal almost exclusively with national, and especially presidential, elections and their outcomes. One might ask: What are the implications of these findings for school committee and city council elections in Cambridge? To begin with, issues viewed as important in the national electoral arena can become the political context in which local campaigns are conducted. Through the early 1960s, foreign policy and economic issues, perceived as the most serious problems facing the nation, had a minimal impact on local election campaigns. More recently, however, national issues have had considerable spillover into local political arenas. In particular, issues of race, justice and social discontent have had a direct and substantive impact on the environment in which local governments and their public service bureaucracies operate. As will be demonstrated, this was especially true for Cambridge's public service agencies and its elected school committee.

One might question the applicability of the research findings cited here to Cambridge's nonpartisan elections. In view of the importance attributed to party identification in national elections, it is important to delineate and to emphasize the partisan activities which the Independents and the CCA (but most especially the latter) have undertaken since their formation. Sorauf described the functions of political parties:

> Political parties...are political structures mobilizing or aggregating political influence. Or if one prefers, they are agents of representation, bridging the political distance between individual citizens and small groups on the one hand and the institutions of government on the other. They organize and mobilize political resources for the achievement of political goals, and this they do through three main groups of activities.
>
> They select candidates and contest elections (or they offer themselves and their symbols in election contests). They organize (or attempt to organize) the elected decision-makers of government. They attempt to win converts to their ideology or issue positions.[27]

Without a doubt, both coalitions have performed these critical partisan functions in Cambridge's local elections.

In this chapter, we will assess the roles and effectiveness of the two coalitions in defining their stances

on political issues, articulating group needs, aggregating support for their positions, and channeling, if not reducing, conflicts. Subsequent chapters will examine the coalitions' ability "to organize...elected decision-makers" and to bridge the separation of powers in city government—the gap between Cambridge's elected legislative bodies and its public departments.

Coalitional Orientations, Goals and Policies--An Overview

In Cambridge, the ideological dimensions of policy decisions were defined by the goals, activities, and composition of the city's political coalitions. These coalitions represented discrete and well-defined subgroups within the community, and the allegiances of these subgroups to the coalitions was stable and long-term. The binding forces among the various groups comprising the coalitions were common policy objectives, ethnicity, and class – although these forces are not necessarily independent. In sum, basic policy and issue differences were the dominant distinguishing characteristic of the two coalitions; the dynamic role that these issue differences played shall be the focus of the ensuing discussion.

Because of their differing approaches on both issues and organization, the two coalitions employed differing electoral strategies. The CCA approved a relatively small number of

candidates in any given election and used the proportional representation voting system to their advantage by keeping transfer votes within the coalition. This approach meant that the close issue and organizational ties between the candidates would have a strongly beneficial electoral impact. By contrast, a larger number of candidates tended to run as Independents in a given election and did not have the organizational coherence to take advantage of the voting system. Thus, the CCA regularly managed to split the city electoral offices with the Independents despite the fact that they only drew an average of about 40% of the number 1 votes in an election.

Because of the social, economic and ethnic differences between the groups that made up the competing coalitions, the cleavage between the coalitions was long-standing and deep-rooted. There were, however, marked variations in the intensity of this conflict. As one would expect, periods of hostility were marked by broad and important issue differences, while periods of quiescence were marked by issues that were less pervasive or intense. During all periods but especially during periods of high tension and conflict, the issues assumed a highly visible position in the elections, and often produced significant shifts in campaign strategies.

As noted earlier, 1965 to 1975 was a decade of considerable instability within local communities and their

public service agencies. In Cambridge, this instability was evidenced by the high turnover in the community's two top appointed posts: City manager and superintendent of schools. Of these, the selection and retention of the superintendent of schools was an especially dominant issue in school committee elections. During the period of high tensions, a close reading of school committee platforms and candidate announcements shows that the issue stances were sharply drawn, and the tone of the campaigns was strident, extreme, and non conciliatory.

The CCA had initially been a progressive, reform-oriented political coalition, in which moderate Republicans like Robert Moncreif and Mary Newman felt comfortable. However, during this period of polarization and instability, it became more liberal, almost radical, in its political and philosophical orientations. Similarly, the Independents increasingly felt threatened by attacks on their traditional values and institutions, attacks which they viewed as class-based. Thus, in this decade both coalitions adopted more extreme positions, with the CCA turning toward the left, flirting with radicalism, and with the Independents becoming more conservative, in some instances bordering on the reactionary.

Internal organizational factors also contributed to the increased tension and hostility between the two coalitions. For example, during the fifteen-year period under examination,

five individuals held the post of superintendent of schools and five, the post of city manager. Each brought a different set of personal and professional skills and ideologies to the position. Most significantly, these men differed in their perceptions of the need for reforms in programs. As might have been expected, their values, orientations and goals determined the extent of their compatibility with the coalitions. This compatibility was reflected in their different bases of support among the members of the school committee and the city council, first with regard to their selection and later with respect to approval of their programmatic initiatives. Thus, reform-oriented superintendents and city managers could anticipate support from the CCA, particularly if their proposals paralleled its campaign platforms. More traditional superintendents and city managers, on the other hand, could count on the Independents to support their efforts to preserve the status quo.

School Committee Election Issues and Campaign Platforms

The Cambridge School Committee elections from 1959 to 1975 demonstrated that concrete ideological differences existed between the Independent and CCA coalitions. In general, the fundamental issues raised in the area of education seemed to form a sharp cleavage between the supporters of the two groups. This was to be expected, since

education and more importantly attitudes toward education are one of the major socioeconomic differences between the upper-middle-class groups that traditionally supported the CCA and the working-class ethnic groups that traditionally supported the Independents.

By the nature of educational issues, the campaign platforms of the two coalitions tended to reflect coherent ideologies that were diametrically opposed in almost every respect. The CCA, taking what can be termed a strongly "liberal" stance toward education, supported a wide variety of policy initiatives and reforms that reflected their perception of the purposes of an educational system. The Independents, on the other hand, consistently advocated a more conservative or traditional approach to education and often strenuously opposed the policies espoused by the CCA, even when such policies were likely to benefit Independent supporters and their children. Thus, the school committee elections showed a strong pattern of intracoalitional unity and intercoalitional conflict.

In the early 1960s, the differences between the two coalitions were very clear, but the level of conflict was comparatively low. This was because the superintendent of schools, John Tobin, was so deeply entrenched that he became a third and in many ways a dominant factor in the political balance. Thus, the conflict between the coalitions was often

subsidiary to the confrontation between the superintendent of schools and and the school committee. In general, Tobin was so effective in his political dealings that he regularly managed to divide his opposition and consolidate his support on the school committee. Even when the school committee managed to present a strong opposing front, Tobin's obstinacy and tenure enabled him to weather these challenges without surrendering his power or autonomy to the political process.

In the late 1960s, however, this dynamic equilibrium was changed by Tobin's retirement and the pressures of national events. With a weaker, untenured superintendent, the school committee began to flex previously unused muscles and thus control of the committee became a more significant issue. At the same time, issues such as civil rights and Viet Nam filtered into the school system in a variety of ways, so that highly emotional issues began to emerge. The policy conflicts between the coalitions began to take on a greater intensity, and, as a result, the issue differences and campaign platforms became more vivid and pronounced. The issue differences had always existed between the two groups, but now the level of emotion and identification was heightened.

During this period, the campaign platforms and electoral strategies developed five basic areas of conflict between the competing coalitions. These five areas were: (1) personnel policies and practices; (2) programmatic content; (3) plant

maintenance and renovation; (4) citizen participation; (5) and management practices. These five areas will be examined in detail in the discussion below.

Personnel Policies and Practices: The control of personnel policies and practices was probably the major area of dissention and conflict between the two coalitions. While the Cambridge city charter gave the school committee the right to set policy, as a practical matter educational policy was usually determined by the school bureaucracy, and especially by the superintendent. At the same time, the school bureaucracy offered a large number of attractive jobs that could be dispensed, and the school budget offered a large number of contracts that could be let to local supporters. Thus, by controlling the school bureaucracy a coalition could both set educational policy for the school system and at the same time distribute tangible spoils to its supporters.

The CCA position on personnel practices was that the superintendent and the majority of the teachers and administrative people should be "professionals." This amorphous concept was buttressed by a concomitant CCA policy of seeking to hire "outsiders," who were devoid of local contacts and thus would run the school system in an appropriately professional and unbiased way. The CCA often demonstrated liberal attitudes towards education by recruiting

"progressive reformers" to fill vacant administrative slots and by attempting to involve the Harvard Graduate School of Education in the development and implementation of educational programs.

The Independents, by contrast, wanted above all else to fill the positions in the local school system with local people. They saw the CCA's emphasis on "professionalism" as an attempt to deprive Independent supporters of steady, well-paying jobs. Given the importance of the superintendent in setting school policy, the Independents were naturally chary about selecting an "outsider" whose values and viewpoints did not coincide with their own. Ultimately, the Independents needed a type of education that was profoundly different from the one that the CCAS advocated, and so they distrusted both the people and the ideas that the CCA attempted to introduce.

The most important issue in the school committee elections was the control of the office of the superintendent of schools. The structure of the superintendent's office and the practical limitations on the effectiveness of the school committee meant that the superintendent made many of the key policy decisions that were formally within the powers of the school committee. Thus, the coalition that controlled the office of superintendent had a strongly entrenched advantage over its opponent.

Of course, the superintendent himself became a third

factor in the conflict, and, once he obtained tenure (after three years), the control exercised by the school committee was severely curtailed. For much of the period under consideration, however, the superintendent was untenured, and, as a result, school committee battles for control of this office constituted a major portion of the political conflicts between the coalitions.

In 1968, after Tobin's retirement, Edward Conley, a relatively "neutral" superintendent, was appointed. However, the political tensions that had been growing and simmering in the latter part of the 1960s suddenly erupted in anti-war protests and racial tensions, and Conley quit his position after one year. With this resignation, the coalitions entered a period of intense conflict for control of these key administrative appointments.

In 1969, the CCA ran a campaign in which a major issue was opposition to the appointment of Acting Superintendent Frank Frisoli to the permanent superintendent position. This campaign produced a 4-3 CCA majority in the school committee. However, two of the CCA committeepersons, both "marginal ethnics," switched sides when the issue came to a vote, and Frisoli was appointed on a permanent basis.

In the next election, 1971, the CCA put together a united front against the Frisoli appointment and again won a majority in the school committee. Frisoli was immediately forced out

of office, and a CCA-chosen successor, Alflorence Cheatham, was installed. Conflicts over support and opposition to Cheatham continued between the coalitions, and, in several instances, the independent will of the superintendent came to the fore. Cheatham, though chosen by the CCA, began to swing to a more neutral position between the coalitions in order to consolidate his personal power. This produced a situation in which both coalitions were sniping at the superintendent, a debilitating three-sided skirmish that ultimately exhausted Cheatham and led to his resignation.

Finally, in 1975, the CCA put together a school committee majority (with one Independent) to appoint William Lannon, an educator who shared many of the CCA's values and beliefs, but who also tried to accommodate the Independents. Lannon proved a skillful superintendent and, with the dimunition of political strife, has remained in office through 1983.

In addition to the superintendent's office, however, the two coalitions also struggled for control over the other important offices in the school system, especially those that dispensed patronage and contracts. The key offices included the assistant superintendents for business and education (elementary and secondary), the director of personnel and the chief custodian. Interestingly, although these positions were subordinate to the superintendent, the people holding them frequently had an allegiance to one of the two coalitions. In

effect, the three major powers in the area of education -- the two coalitions and the superintendent -- often vied for the loyalties and control of these employees.

During the early 1960s, the Independents were in strong control of the key subordinate positions in the school department. However, much of their influence derived from their relationship with Tobin, who wielded extraordinary power over the department, commanding for himself the first loyalty of the personnel. After Tobin retired, the conflict for control of these positions was part of the larger conflict for control of the superintendent's office.

Educational Programming: Another major area of coalition conflict was in the substance and content of educational programming. The coalitions differed greatly in their approaches to education and in their perception of the schools' purpose. The CCA, in keeping with its white-collar constituency, perceived education as the key to upward mobility, and thus it advocated creative, innovative programs that would be of benefit to college-bound pupils. By contrast, the Independents perceived the educational system as a socializing agent that provided children with fundamental skills, while at the same time teaching them the discipline that would prepare them for working life. As such, the Independents stressed the "three R's" and were staunch

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supporters of discipline in the schools.

In keeping with this pattern, the CCA was the initiator of almost all new programs and program proposals. During the period in question, the CCA proposed programs such as the following:

> The Pilot School - This was a special high school-level program designed to provide 100 randomly selected students with a special four-year curriculum. Originally created under Conley, the Pilot School was designed by the Harvard School of Education and was intended to provide less structured, individually focused instruction to children.
>
> CAPS - This was similar in aim and content to the Pilot School, but was instituted at the elementary school level.
>
> Guidance Programs - The CCA wanted to introduce guidance programs that would help students make proper academic choices in preparing for their careers. The guidance program was also intended to help special needs students with learning disabilities and emotional/behavioral problems.
>
> Black Studies Program - The CCA wanted to introduce a significant curriculum of black studies for the benefit of Cambridge's growing black school population.
>
> Vocational Education - The CCA wanted to upgrade the curriculum of vocational education programs so that the students could learn skills relevant to the modern job market, such as computer keypunch.

The Independent response to these programmic initiatives was normally a knee-jerk opposition. In most cases, the opposition was based on the differences in the Independents needs and their perceptions of the goals of a public school education. In the case of the vocational education reforms, however, they tended to oppose the innovations despite the fact that their children would probably gain the most from the reforms. This opposition was inspired partly by a distrust of the CCA and partly by a disinclination to spend money on additional programs, no matter how useful.

Plant Maintenance and Renovation: Another major issue — at least in terms of the expenditure of money — was the renovation and maintenance of Cambridge school facilities. In general, both coalitions acknowledged the importance of plant up-keep and the need to renovate unsafe and outmoded facilities. However, the CCA generally took the active stance of initiating renovation proposals and also tended to press for more extensive programs of renovation and building. The Independents, on the other hand, were quite willing to support maintenance and renovation of schools in their neighborhoods but tended to oppose any building or maintenance expenditures that would not benefit their constituents directly.

The principal areas of coalitional conflict centered on where to build new schools, whether to maintain specific

existing schools, and how to award the contracts involved. These issue areas were the most likely to bring into direct conflict the CCA desire for a "professional" decision versus the Independent desire to control patronage and expenditures. However, the issue of where to locate replacement facilities was highly sensitive, and, because it directly impinged on particular neighborhoods, it often divided supporters within a coalition.

For example, an important issue in 1974 was whether to renovate the existing high school facilities or to move them to a new location in North Cambridge. From a "professional" standpoint there were important advantages to the new site. However, the social and political opposition was strong. In particular, the residents of North Cambridge did not want an invasion of high school students or the disruption resulting from a major construction project; at the same time, other residents did not want to send their children to this more remote location. Thus, despite the lobbying of Al Cheatham, the superintendent of schools, relocation of the high school to the North Cambridge area was unanimously defeated.

The plant maintenance and renovation issues, though very important, did not necessarily conform to strict coalitional lines. The issues often consolidated support on a neighborhood basis, with every neighborhood — whether CCA or Independent — generally opposing the building of a new school

in that neighborhood, favoring the renovation of a neighborhood school, and (particularly in the case of the Independents) opposing expenditures on a school outside their neighborhoods.

Citizen Participation: During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the issue of citizen participation in school committee decisions became increasingly visible and important. The political awareness sparked by the civil rights movement, the Viet Nam War, and other national issues translated into a broad distrust and scrutiny of the power wielded by all governmental institutions, including the local public schools. Many community groups, particularly those who had been previously disenfranchised from the policy process, began to demand an expanded role in the initiation and implementation of policy.

In Cambridge, there was a long-standing tradition of drawing citizens into the educational decision-making process, particularly through ad hoc advisory committees and through a very active PTA. However, these mechanisms had traditionally been dominated by middle or upper-middle class individuals, and thus these groups tended to reflect a comparatively narrow segment of the overall community. Those who participated in the PTA and the ad hoc advisory committees were almost invariably CCA supporters and thus "citizen participation" was

seen by both sides as increasing CCA input and threatening Independent control. Given the history of such citizen groups, this viewpoint was more than justified.

Because of its historical dominance in citizen participation and because of its overall ideology, the CCA supported the move to increase citizen participation in the late 1960s. The CCA tried to broaden the base of citizen participation to include blacks and other excluded minorities and, in doing so, introduced groups to the political arena who were likely to support CCA objectives. The Independents, on the other hand, abhorred citizen participation as an awkward and often unworkable approach to the governance of the public school system. Part of this abhorrence was based on genuine opposition to allowing "amateurs" to take over school decisions; part of the opposition, on the other hand, was based on the fact that citizen participation would increase the vigilance of the community and would make it more difficult for Independent insiders to distribute benefits to their supporters.

Citizen participation was at its greatest in 1970-71, after the CCA school committee victory in the 1969 elections. The CCA was forming an increasing number of citizen advisory boards, and this trend culminated in the creation of a citizens' advisory group to screen applications for the superintendent's office vacated by Edward Conley. Through

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various political dealings, however, the Independents managed to co-opt two of the CCA's "marginal ethnic" supporters on the school committee. This co-optation enabled the Independents to ignore an established citizen advisory group and to appoint Frank Frisoli the permanent superintendent. The backlash from the community against this tactic contributed to the convincing CCA victory in the 1971 elections.

After the 1971 victory, the CCA continued to press for citizen participation in the major areas of school policy. However, as political enthusiasm began to wane in the 1970s, popular support from citizen groups declined and it became more difficult to justify inclusion of a citizenry that seemed apathetic. Thus, while the CCA attempted to introduce formal citizen participation into the policy-making process, their success was largely eroded when the Independents reestablished their dominance in subsequent school committee elections.

Management Practices: Both coalitions advocated reducing costs and increasing organizational efficiency and effectiveness. However, the two coalitions differed on how to achieve these objectives. The CCA generally tried to advance management changes that were consonant with, and a counterpoint to, their programmatic initiatives. The Independents, on the other hand, were motivated by the more personal considerations, including maintaining control in the

hiring of personnel and the letting of contracts.

During the period of 1959 to 75, there were three major efforts to reorganize the Cambridge School Department. Although the debate over these issues was often heated, the ultimate impact of the changes was comparatively small. Generally, the CCA would advocate the creation of a new administrative position, usually designed to implement or enhance a liberal reform policy. Although the Independents originally tended to oppose these reorganizational efforts, they soon learned that the more successful strategy was to back the reorganization effort and then strive to fill the newly created position with their own supporters. Because the Independents were generally successful in filling the new position, the "reforms" tended to have little impact, and more effort was spent battling over the right to fill the position than in making it genuinely useful.

The first two reform efforts came under the administration of Tobin and involved the creation of new positions: First, the deputy superintendent; and, later, the business manager. The CCA initially proposed the reforms, and the Independents quickly joined in and managed to place staunch Independent supporters in these positions. Significantly, the first appointment to the position of business manager was Edmond Murphy, a man with strong political ties and weak managerial skills. This appointment

underscored the fact that the Independent coalition placed the highest priority on controlling the system and only secondary importance on the efficient operation of the school department.

The third reform effort was the creation of curriculum directors. The reform was again initially proposed by the CCA as an innovative improvement in the quality of education. As usual, the Independents opposed the proposals as "too costly," "unnecessary duplication" and "a waste of the taxpayer's money." However, once it became clear that the Independents could not block this programmatic initiative, they moved swiftly and efficiently to ensure control of these appointments.

The CCA tried to fill the curriculum directors' positions through a nationwide search for the most qualified candidates. The Independents preferred to promote people within the system, an approach that was naturally preferred by school employees. The battle over appointment of curriculum directors was exceptionally bitter and eventually produced a compromise in which the two groups split the appointments in half.

City Council Election Issues and Campaign Platforms: 1959-1975

In contrast to the school committee elections, where the key political issues tended to be discrete, limited in number,

and interrelated, the city council elections tended to cover a broader spectrum of issues and thus tended to present a more complicated scenario in terms of coalitional campaign platforms. In general, positions on school issues usually derived from a fundamental attitude towards education, and consequently there was a strong correlation between an individual's view on one issue and his view on other issues. Thus, it was predictable that the coalitions and the voters tended to conform to well-defined positions in almost every situation. By contrast, the city council elections covered a more diverse group of issues, so that the possibility of division between a voter's issue preferences and the issue positions of the two coalitions was much greater. Specifically, a voter might agree with the CCA position on one issue but agree with the Independent position on another. Thus, one might find the phenomenon of "value balancing," wherein the voter chooses to support the coalition that agrees with him most often on the issues of greatest perceived importance.

The city council election platforms from 1969 to 1975 showed ideological differences between the competing coalitions that were comparable to the differences and conflicts involved in the school committee elections. Naturally, the conflict between the coalitions varied in tone and intensity, and the substance of the debate frequently

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mirrored the larger political and social changes occurring in the national electorate. Many of the national issues filtered down in one form or another and became a political focal point at the local level. For example, the civil rights issue surfaced in school protests, racial problems and demands from the black community for new and better services. Similarly, Viet Nam left its mark on local politics in the form of community protests, a non-binding referendum, and ultimately a resolution by the city council opposing the war.

The two coalitions went from a relatively quiescent and limited competition in the early 1960's to radical conflict at the end of the decade and then slowly back to a more limited competition as the 1970's progressed. The CCA, which had been sufficiently moderate to attract progressive Republicans in the early '60's, stopped trying to expand its coalitional base to include marginal ethnics and, instead, concentrated on organizing more tightly its traditional base of liberals and blacks. The issue positions taken by the CCA in this period tended to be traditional liberal stances, including efficiency in government, fair housing, equal opportunity, rent control, and improved services to the poor and elderly.

By contrast, the Independents swung to the opposite extreme in the late 1960's, advocating a staunchly conservative philosophy and implementing it with the appropriate issue positions. Significantly, the motive for

the Independent positions seemed to be rooted more in opposition to the CCA programs than in advocacy of a discrete conservative agenda. In general, the Independents were less ideological in their approach to city politics, and their political positions was always more a reflection of what they opposed than what they advocated. Thus, the interactive dynamic was for the CCA to press for liberal initiatives against the conservative opposition of the Independents.

The campaign platforms and electoral strategies of the two coalitions during the 1959 to 1975 period can be divided into five general categories. These were: city administration and city government; urban renewal and city development; traffic and transportation; housing and rent control; and municipal services. Each of these five categories will be examined in detail in the discussions below.

City Administration and City Government: The main issue in the management of Cambridge city government was the struggle for control. The two coalitions saw the city government as serving fundamentally different purposes, and these purposes were inseparably intertwined in the office of city manager. The fact that the two coalitions had broad areas of agreement was not acknowledged, and, even in the quiescent periods, the group goals were perceived as mutually exclusive. In general,

attitudes concerning the nature and purpose of city government were rooted in voter's background, education and political philosophy.

The CCA's perception of city government, based on the values of white collar professionals, was that the city government should be run in a "professional" manner, with a highly trained city manager capable of making key decisions for the betterment of the entire community. Naturally, the CCA felt that such a person should probably be an "outsider," someone who would exercise powers in a neutral manner and would not be constrained by obligations to the local political factions. Of course, the CCA recognized that the city manager's decisions were inherently political, but they tended to de-emphasize the political nature of the job emphasizing "professionalism."

The Independents, by contrast, saw city government as a bureaucracy to be used and exploited for the betterment of those who controlled it. The city's departments provided valuable employment for many Cambridge residents, and necessary municipal services could be contracted to supporters and friends in the local community. Since Cambridge had a rule that all public contracts worth over two thousand dollars had to be advertised and awarded to the lowest bidder, an Independent-controlled city manager could divide contracts into smaller projects and award them in a patronage fashion.

Although the Independents were not opposed to the slogans of better government, they saw government as serving the public servants as well as the general public.

Significantly, these conflicts between the CCA and Independents could be -- and on occasions were -- reconcilable. The CCA wanted control of city policy and was willing to give the Independents control over the patronage where doing so did not impede efficiency. The Independents, by contrast, were obsessed with protecting their patronage prerogatives but were willing to accept CCA policy initiatives that did not impinge on matters crucial to their coalitions. Thus, in many situations it would have been practical for the coalitions to compromise their positions and gain for themselves that which mattered most. However, the cultural and class differences between the groups were so great that conflict often developed, even when it was in the interest of both groups to compromise.

The central issue in the coalitional conflicts over the city government and administration was the selection and retention of the city manager. Under the Cambridge system, the city manager was the de facto head of the government, and control of the position was crucial to the distribution of patronage and contracts, on the one hand, and on the implementation of "professional" norms of conduct on the other.

During the periods of intense coalitional conflict in the 1960's, the battle to control the city manager's position was one of the key issues in Cambridge politics. Ironically, the city manager form of government was designed to minimize partisan political conflicts, and thus this competiton severely undermined the ability of the city manager to carry out his functions and duties. In general, city manager governments operate best in homogeneous, middle-class communities where political issues are secondary to the delivery of goods and services to the public. However, in Cambridge during this period, political considerations outweighed efficiency in government, and thus the "apolitical" figure of the city manager became highly politicized.

From 1952 until 1965, the city manager's position was held by John Curry, former headmaster of the Hagerty School. Curry emphasized the managerial aspects of his job and avoided overt "political" positions, such as advocacy of potentially divisive policies. By confining his activities to defined administrative chores, Curry avoided controversy and maintained a long and relatively stable term in office. Curry was an ally of powerful city councilor Edward Crane, and this further entrenched his position. Curry perceived that the Cambridge City Council was sharply divided by ideology and that his best approach was to avoid strong or controversial positions which would encourage criticism. In effect, the

theme of his tenure was "let sleeping dogs lie."

Following the 1965 elections, however, a "coup" was staged by five members of the city council, with the goal of denying Curry his city manager's position and Crane his mayoral position. This rebellion cut across coalitional lines and involved the five "newest" members of the council. The basis of the rebellion was the fact that the older councilors, notably Crane, Vellucci, and Sullivan, controlled much of the city patronage through their long-time presence in city government. Thus, by a bitterly disputed 5-4 vote, a group, comprised of Hayes, Goldberg, Coates, Wheeler, and Maher, managed to remove Curry from the city manager's position and replace him with Joseph DeGuglielmo.

In the ensuing election, the removal of Curry and the selection of DeGuglielmo was one of the central issues of the campaign. Private political ads were placed in the Cambridge Chronicle, listing the councilors who had voted to oust Curry and encouraging the voters to "repudiate" these officials. Although the connection between these campaign efforts and the ensuing electoral results is difficult to document with certainty, it appears that the five DeGuglielmo supporters were hurt by their positions. In particular, four of the five did worse in 1967 than they did in 1965, and two of them -- Coates and Maher -- failed in their bid for re-election. Maher was especially damaged by his stance on the issue and

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dropped from 3195 #1 votes (3rd best) in 1965, to 1158 #1 votes (11th best) in 1967.

With the changes wrought by the 1967 election, control of the city council swung to an anti-DeGuglielmo group, which again cut across standard coalitional boundaries. This new majority group -- composed of Walter Sullivan and Alfred Vellucci from the Independents, and Edward Crane, Barbara Ackermann, and Thomas H.D. Mahoney from the CCA -- had few common ideological positions and, instead, was united by idiosyncratic factors, most notably their personal opposition to both DeGuglielmo and the members of the 1965 majority group. Shortly after the new council assumed office, DeGuglielmo was forced to resign in another bitterly contested proceeding.

While the council was split into pro- and anti-DeGuglielmo factions at the outset, following DeGuglielmo's firing, the alliances crumbled and the council fell into political confusion over the appointment of a successor. For six months, the city manager's position was filled temporarily by John Dunphy while the council quarreled over a variety of potential appointees. Finally, a five member majority was formed to select James Sullivan as the new permanent city manager. Significantly, the Sullivan supporters represented a curious alliance of councilors from both the CCA and the Independents and from both the anti-

DeGuglielmo and pro-DeGuglielmo factions of the earlier vote.

The final tally in the voting was as follows:

James Sullivan (5)   John Corcoran (3)   Edward McCann (1)

Ackerman (CCA)   Crane (CCA)   Walter Sullivan
Goldberg   Dahehy
Hayes   Vellucci
Mahoney (CCA)
Wheeler (CCA)

The CCA with the exception of Crane, voted in favor of Sullivan, while three of the five Independent councilors backed non-Sullivan candidates. However, the 1967 vote still represented a substantial amount of cross-coalitional allegiance, at least on this issue.

In the 1969 elections the city manager issue was overshadowed by rent control, and the CCA gained a five-person majority in the city council for the first time in 18 years. However, the turnover was disastrous for James Sullivan, because he lost his two Independent supporters (Goldberg and Hayes) and one of his CCA supporters (Cornelia Wheeler). In their stead were added Daniel Clinton, Robert Moncrieff (CCA), and Thomas Coates (CCA). Thus, while the CCA controlled the city council by a nominal 5-4 majority, the city manager found himself vulnerable to attack for personal reasons.

James Sullivan had the support of Ackermann, Moncrieff and Mahoney on policy grounds and needed two more votes to retain his seat. However, the two remaining CCA councilors -- Crane and Coates -- refused to give him that support. Crane,

though a long time CCA councilor, was relatively conservative, and he did not agree with Sullivan on most issues. At the same time, he stood to gain leverage in the council by supplying the fifth vote to unseat the incumbent city manager. As for Coates, it was widely believed that he had a personal vendetta against Sullivan, and he refused to back Sullivan despite agreement in most areas of policy. In June, 1970, James Sullivan was ousted by a 5-4 vote.

In the ensuing election, the CCA campaigned on a platform that included the firing of John Corcoran as city manager. By this time, Crane had retired from politics, and so the CCA ran a slate that was ideologically unified around what might be termed a broad liberal agenda. The CCA charged that Corcoran lacked the vision to institute necessary reforms and that he was appointing mediocre individuals to fill key city positions. Due primarily to the heated issue of rent control, the CCA won a 5-4 majority in the city council for the second consecutive time.

With an apparently unified five-vote majority, it seemed certain that the CCA would follow its campaign pledge and make John Corcoran the fourth city manager to be fired in four elections. Ironically, the CCA was so certain of this eventuality that they began to search for a replacement, which led to divisions within the coalition. Four of the CCA councilors favored Howard Peterson as a successor to Corcoran,

but the crucial fifth vote -- black councilor Henry Owens --
demanded that a black candidate be included in the
considerations. When the four other CCA councilors refused to
back Owens' choice, he threw his vote with the Independents to
block the removal of Corcoran. In effect, the Council was
split on a 4-4-1 basis, with Owens joining whichever side
offered him the most advantageous alignment. The other four
CCA councilors did not want Johnson (Owen's candidate for city
manager) and, while the Independents did not want him either,
they threatened to vote for Johnson if the CCA removed
Corcoran. This led to a very complex stalemate, and Corcoran
retained his job.

Although Corcoran remained in office, the vote trading
and conflict over his position increased the emnity between
the two coalitions. Shouting matches and viscious personal
exchanges erupted in the city council meetings, and the
council was nicknamed the "Cambridge Circus" by the press.
Even as this conflict made a mockery of Cambridge city
government, the city faced some serious urban problems that
called for strong and unified leadership.

In 1973 the city manager was again an issue in a city
council campaign that saw the Independents regain a 5-4
majority. Ironically, where John Corcoran had survived a
hostile 5-4 CCA majority in 1971, he now came under renewed
attack from the erstwhile favorable council. The Independents

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fell into divisive conflict over the election of the mayor, with Walter Sullivan and Thomas Danehy both seeking the post. After thirty unsuccessful ballots, Walter Sullivan worked out a compromise with the four CCA councilors, voting to replace Corcoran with James Sullivan (a CCA favorite) in exchange for the mayor's office.

The implementation of this arrangement was carried out in a shrewd manner. To "buy off" Corcoran, the Sullivan-CCA faction agreed to raise the salary of the city manager, which gave Corcoran a better retirement annuity. Before the crucial city council meeting, Corcoran gave CCA councilor Frank Duehay a sealed envelope. The council voted to raise the salary of the city manager, after which Duehay opened the letter and "discovered" that it contained Corcoran's resignation. This device ensured that everyone fulfilled their obligations, and, in the end, all were satisfied except for the Independent opposition. James Sullivan was then quickly appointed to fill the vacated city manager's post.

Following his return, a wiser James Sullivan moved effectively to insulate himself from political attack. Sullivan was already familiar with the Cambridge budget, and so he knew exactly where he could afford to cut expenditures. (Indeed, some charged that he had deliberately padded the budget before leaving in 1970, anticipating his eventual return.) By budget reductions, Sullivan stabilized the tax

rate in a period when substantial jumps were being registered by surrounding communities.   Thus, by the 1975 elections, he was so popular as to be politically invulnerable.

The 1975 city council election was the first in 10 years where the city manager was not a significant issue.   However, the Independents gained another 5-4 majority on the council, and the now cohesive CCA minority decided to switch their mayoral support from Walter Sullivan to Al Vellucci.   This decision was predicated partly on the fact that James Sullivan and Walter Sullivan were at odds, but also by the fact that Vellucci promised to be a much better ally to CCA causes.   In particular, Vellucci was willing to support issues such as rent control and the retention of James Sullivan in exchange for the four CCA votes that ensured his election as mayor.

Urban Renewal and City Development: During the 1960's, Cambridge began to undergo a series of changes that significantly altered the complexion of the local community. The old factories that had been the mainstay of the city's economy for a century began to relocate their operations, thus eliminating a substantial number of blue collar jobs.   At the same time, the number of "white collar" jobs began to increase, and the two universities -- Harvard and MIT -- became the largest combined employer in the city.   This transition from a blue collar to a white collar community was

accompanied by a series of development projects that promised to reshape the city, including the Harvard Expansion, the Kennedy Library, NASA, the Wellington-Harrington Urban Renewal Plan, the Red Line Extension, and the Inner Beltway.

In general, the CCA favored a transition from the former industrial economic base to a high technology and white collar economic base. They envisioned a Cambridge which had a white collar economy, a large commercial tax base, a low tax rate on property, and sufficient city revenues to provide substantial services to the community. However, the CCA placed its highest priorities on providing services and preventing pollution, so that the coalition preferred to pay higher taxes than retain an industrial tax base.

The Independents, by contrast, felt threatened by the changing character of the local economy. The old industrial base had provided well-paid blue collar jobs, and the new jobs in the high technology field often required advanced training that the ethnic population lacked. The Independents were therefore, in favor of retaining the industrial base. In addition, they were less concerned about the nature and quality of the city government and preferred a low tax rate to better services.

One of the most important development projects was the so-called Harvard expansion. During the 1960's, Harvard University expanded its physical plant at a rapid pace to

upgrade the University's facilities. Harvard would usually buy taxable land around the University, thereby shrinking the city's tax base. Much of the expansion was directed into older neighborhoods, and the university threatened to tear down much of the old, low-income housing south of the Charles River and north of Harvard Square. This development scheme was disruptive both to revenue sources and to continuity within the community.

Initially, the CCA was favorably disposed toward Harvard's expansion, which it interpreted as a development that was likely to increase revenues for the city and provide employment opportunities for Cambridge residents. This was consonant with the CCA's general philosophy of replacing the departing manufacturing industries with research and professional organizations. However, as the 1960s progressed, the CCA cooled toward Harvard expansion, especially when it threatened to uproot low-income neighborhoods. Eventually, the CCA reversed itself and strongly opposed further Harvard expansion projects.

The Independents, by contrast, were strongly opposed to Harvard expansion from the very start. Initially, this might be interpreted as a logical extension of the long-standing "town-gown" conflict between Harvard and the ethnic groups in Cambridge. However, the interaction between Harvard and the Independents was intriguing and complex. Harvard was more

than willing to "buy off" Independent discontent with a variety of lower echelon jobs, and thus the more the Independents publicly opposed the university's expansion the greater the number of jobs the university offered to local residents. The result was that the Independents were both more critical of and more cooperative with Harvard than the CCA.

Another development project that produced a substantial rift was the NASA Research Center in Kendall Square. In 1964, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) entered preliminary negotiations with the city of Cambridge for the construction of a $60 million Electronic Research Center, which was to be located in Kendall Square in an area adjacent to MIT. Although the site was then occupied by small industries employing several thousand people, NASA estimated that the center would employ a comparable number of people. Further, it believed that the tax base lost by moving the existing industries would be replaced by private developments and businesses next to the NASA Research Center. Thus, it appeared that Cambridge would lose a substantial number of blue collar jobs, while gaining a prestigious research center, an equal number of white collar jobs, and a thriving electronics industry.

The local community divided over the NASA project along the predictable lines. The CCA, happy to supplant blue collar

industries with white collar professional jobs, was an avid supporter of the project. Among the CCA's local allies were the administration of MIT, the local electronics industry, and the federal government. On the other hand, the Independents were generally opposed to the project, particularly since the site was located in the heart of the East Cambridge ethnic community, the bulk of the industries displaced by the development project were owned by Independent supporters, and most of the 2000 displaced jobs were likewise held by ethnic Cambridge residents.

Ultimately, the NASA project achieved an ambiguous and ironic resolution. Due to the local leadership of the CCA and the behind-the-scenes pressures of MIT, the Kendall Square construction project was undertaken and was completed in late 1969. However, by then NASA itself was coming under severe political attack, and in December, 1969, the Director of NASA announced that the newly-opened Research Center would be closed the following June. This announcement stunned and embittered the local supporters of the project, while elevating the critics to a position of smug self-righteousness. The two groups immediately began to maneuver for control of the facility, with the CCA demanding a comparable replacement to NASA and the Independents demanding that the development be turned into low-income housing. Finally, in March, 1970, the NASA complex was transferred to

the Department of Transportation, for use as a research and development center.

Traffic and Transportation: Another issue that frequently arose in Cambridge politics was the development of a modern transportation system. Cambridge was almost legendary for its strange and antiquated traffic system, and, when the industries began to leave the city in the early 1960's, they often cited inadequate transportation. The main problem was that the city had existed long before modern transportation, and the street system was circuitous, confusing, and bottlenecked. While everyone in the city favored the general concept of "improving" the traffic patterns, the various methods and proposals for remedying the situation often had important political repercussions.

The CCA approach was to solve the transportation problem in a "professional" manner. They wanted a system of one way streets, parking garages, heavy ticketing of parking violators, and the hiring of a city traffic manager to plan traffic patterns. In effect, the CCA addressed the problem from the perspective of a business school case study: How could the city force traffic to behave in the most efficient manner?

The Independents saw the transportation problem from a different perspective. While they agreed that the

efficiency was desirable in the abstract, they feared that the enforcement of traffic laws would cripple the small shop owners, whose stores were located in areas that lacked adequate parking. Thus, while the CCA approach might produce a more efficient traffic pattern it might also divert the traffic to the larger shopping malls where adequate parking was available. In effect, the Independents and their supporters had a vested interest in maintaining the existing traffic system, and thus they were frequently opposed to the "rational" traffic plans proposed by the CCA.

While the coalitions differed dramatically on the questions of local transportation policy, they tended to agree on the issues involving regional transportation, most notably the Inner Beltway and the Red Line Extension. The Inner Beltway was designed as a major traffic artery running through Cambridge and connecting downtown Boston with the outlying suburbs. The advantages of the project inured to Cambridge to some extent; however, the Beltway benefitted all the communities beyond Cambridge, without forcing them to bear the disruption. The Beltway would pass through many of the older neighborhoods in Cambridge, and the impact of its construction would be felt by many residents, including several thousand who would be forced to move from their homes.

The CCA initially favored the Beltway project as a progressive effort to improve the area's transportation

system. However, as the impact of the project on low-income residents became more clearly understood, the CCA altered its position. Ultimately, the CCA came to view the Beltway as a flawed project, disrupting residents and producing more noise and pollution in Cambridge, while primarily benefitting the residents of the wealthy outer suburbs.

The Independents, on the other hand, were opposed to the project from the start. They were concerned because the Beltway was scheduled to pass through some of their most stable neighborhoods. Thus, while the Beltway might produce a more industrial economic base for Cambridge, the Independents found that the disadvantages of the plan outweighed its advantages. Ultimately, the CCA and the Independents provided sufficient local opposition to defeat the Inner Beltway construction.

The Red Line Extension project produced a similar kind of community response. This project was designed to extend the Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority "Red Line" from Harvard Square to Porter Square, and then to Davis Square. The advantages of the project were that it would provide better transportation to the neighborhoods in North Cambridge and Medford. However, the project also entailed considerable disruption of the traffic patterns in Harvard Square and along Massachusetts Avenue, a major business throughfare in the city.

The CCA was divided over the Red Line proposal, with some members opposing it as disruptive to the community, and others supporting it as a rational and economic transportation system. Similarly, the Independent supporters in the disrupted neighborhoods largely opposed the project, while the Independent supporters in East Cambridge were largely apathetic. Ultimately, the community failed to present a united opposition to the project, as it had to the Inner Beltway, and thus pressures from the state government prevailed and the Red Line Extension was undertaken.

Housing and Rent Control: The two major issues in the housing area were rent control and housing for elderly. Of these, rent control was by far the more important, and indeed it was probably the single most important issue in Cambridge politics during the period studied. In the late 1960's, the rental prices of Cambridge apartments began to skyrocket, reflecting the combined effects of limited space, increasing demand, and inflation. As the local landlords began raising rents, the situation erupted into political conflict.

The CCA was concerned about the impact of rent increases on the poor and the elderly. The Independents, on the other hand, were generally opposed to rent control, often to a vehement degree. Ironically, many of the natural Independent voters were renters, and it would seem that they would benefit

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from rent stabilization. However, the Independents included most of the landlords in the city, ranging from the few large landlords to a substantial number of small landlords who owned one or two additional properties. Thus, the most influential members of the Independent coalition were strongly opposed to rent control.

In the 1971 elections, the Independents mounted a massive effort to repeal the rent control ordinance enacted the previous year. The election was characterized by acrimonious feelings, with the CCA eventually retaining its 5-4 majority. Then, in 1973, the Independents won control of the City Council by a 5-4 margin. However, a new factor emerged when Al Vellucci, an Independent stalwart, refused to back the effort to repeal rent control. Vellucci's reasons were personal: In 1942, after he entered the armed forces, his wife and children were evicted by a landlord who wanted to raise the rent. His anti-landlord bias remained almost 40 years later. Thus, with the support of Vellucci, the CCA defeated all attempts to repeal rent control.

The other important housing issue was providing low-cost housing to the poor and elderly. The CCA was generally in favor of increasing the public housing available in Cambridge. The Independents, on the other hand, tended to oppose such projects, despite the fact that many of its constituents would benefit from such housing. In general, the Independents were

opposed to spending money, and public housing involved not only the actual construction costs, but also an immigration of the poor and the elderly, who would require further public expenditures. Furthermore, the ethnics feared (with much justification) that the projects would be located in their neighborhoods and that their own supporters would be displaced as a result.

A central issue in the housing debate was the Cambridge Housing Authority, which managed the city's housing projects. Long dominated by the Independents, the CHA was characterized by corruption and incompetence, and in the early 1970's was placed in receivership. The Independents used and ultimately abused the CHA, giving sinecures in the CHA bureaucracy while granting friends and supporters unfair priorities for the available housing. Naturally, the Independents wanted to retain control of the CHA, while the CCA fought to put the agency under "professional management."

Municipal Services: Another key political issue was control of municipal services. In the late 1950's, the Independents dominated the municipal departments, including the police department, the fire department, the public works department, and the sanitation department.

The Independents treated these municipal departments as an employment office, a place where friends and supporters

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could obtain respectable jobs.   Thus, control over the hiring of city workers was a cornerstone of their political coalition.

The CCA, by contrast, had little interest in the employment aspects of these municipal agencies. Instead, they were concerned with the reasonable and efficient allocation of government services.   As the 1960's progressed,   the CCA grew increasingly critical of these services and proposed a series of "reforms" that were aimed at upgrading the quality of services and ensuring a more equitable distribution.   However, since these reforms generally involved a reorganization of the existing departments, the Independents saw them as a threat to their patronage prerogatives.

The conflict over municipal services can be divided into two discrete periods: The conflicts in the early 1960's, particularly over the Cambridge Hospital; and the conflicts in the later '60's and early '70's, focusing especially on the police department.

The first conflict was triggered by an external agent: A 1960 television news expose on the quality of care offered in the Cambridge City Hospital.* Although the television show

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*The theme of the show was to demonstrate that Cambridge Hospital offered poor quality medical services, despite the fact that it was in a city known for academic excellence and was located right in "Harvard's back yard."

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merely demonstrating a national problem, the local fallout was enormous. The CCA quickly proposed an upgrading of hospital facilities and procedures, and this proposal was supported by Harvard University, which had been stung by criticism of its minimal role in the city's medical programs.

Since the city hospital was at that time dominated by the Independents, there was an inevitable political division over the reform efforts. The CCA blamed the problems on the incompetence of Independent-backed managers and sought to replace the staff with more "professional" administrators. The Independents, by contrast, viewed this effort as a thinly-veiled attack on their patronage prerogatives and resisted the reform efforts. The issue therefore came down to a contest of political muscle; in the end, the coalitions compromised, with the CCA gaining significant concessions.

The final compromise was based on the nature and function of a hospital administration. The Independents were concerned with the control over the lower echelon hospital jobs -- orderlies, maintenance people, security, and so forth. The CCA, by contrast, was more concerned with the higher administrative positions that controlled policy. Although many doctors at the hospital were local physicians with Independent ties, the CCA marshalled support from the majority of the medical staff on most issues. At the same time, the CCA drew support from Harvard University, which had recently

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affiliated its medical school with the hospital. (Harvard was
normally a liability in city political battles, but in this
context its support carried substantial weight and authority.)
The CCA won significant organizational reforms as well as a
major capital construction project to modernize the city
hospital facilities.

The second period of conflict occurred in the late
1960's, during a period of general political unrest. Public
scrutiny of municipal services was high especially in the
liberal, student-oriented city of Cambridge, with the focus of
complaints in Cambridge -- as elsewhere -- on the police
department, which was accused of racism and brutality directed
against the black community. These accusations received
substantial press coverage and became a significant political
issue between the coalitions. The CCA advocated reforms that
would integrate and "professionalize" the police department,
including improved training programs, more equitable hiring
policies, and a civilian review board to hear community
complaints against the police department.

The Independents, by contrast, resisted these reforms.
Like other areas of city government, the police department had
long been dominated by their coalition, and almost all the
officers and employees were Independent supporters. The force
was predominantly Irish but also included significant segments
of other ethnic groups. Minority representation, on the other

hand, was almost non-existent. The Independents saw the criticism as politically motivated, attacking their people and threatening their control over the hiring policies of the police department.

The ensuing political maneuvers produced a compromise that left both coalitions partly satisfied. Although the CCA achieved an increase in the hiring of minority patrolmen, and an upgrading in the standards and behavior of the police force, it was far from a victory. The civilian review board was voted down, and the Independents retained a significant, albeit more circumscribed, control over the department. Thus, the two coalitions made their usual division, with the CCA winning policy and management concessions and the Independents retaining control over patronage.

Electoral Impacts of Issue Differences

As the preceding section demonstrates the two dominant Cambridge coalitions presented sharp differences on many local political issues. Indeed, the only areas where the two coalitions were in substantial agreement was over the Red Line Extension, the Harvard Expansion, the Inner Belt and other projects where the total community was aligned against some "external" power, either the state government, the federal government, or Harvard University. This frequency of policy conflict between the coalitions can be attributed to the

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following factors: (1) the local coalitions represented clearly defined socio-economic divisions, (2) local political issues tended to be the kind in which socio-economic values would contribute heavily toward policy preferences.

Given the dramatically different positions taken by the coalitions on many issues, the obvious question is whether and how these issue differences affected the Cambridge municipal elections. In general, the evidence indicates that issue differences did not cause great swings in the electoral balance over time, or even in any given election. Rather, the groups that traditionally supported the CCA continued to support the CCA regardless of the issues presented in any election, while the groups that traditionally backed the Independent coalition remained loyal to the candidates of that coalition, again without regard to the issues. This might initially lead one to conclude that issue differences were of minimal impact on the outcomes of Cambridge municipal elections.

On closer investigation, however, the Cambridge voting pattern suggests that the coalitions tailored their positions to the needs and requirements of their respective constituencies. In particular, the issue positions taken by the coalitions were designed to attract precisely the voters who in fact voted for the coalitions. Thus, the strong coalitional allegiance shown by community groups over time may

not disprove the significance of issues in voting but, quite to the contrary, may show that the coalitions adopt issue positions that will maintain the solidarity of their coalitional bases.

To verify the accuracy of these observations, one can look at the voting patterns of the Cambridge electorate in school committee and city council elections for the years 1959-75. This data is summarized in Exhibits IV-1 and IV-2. This data shows that there were very few swings in the voting behavior of the Cambridge electorate from the years 1959-75. The CCA drew approximately the same percentage of #1 votes in the school committee and the city council elections regardless of the year or the issues involved. This data is further underscored by the data in Chapter III, which demonstrates that, over time, the same neighborhoods gave more than 60 percent of their votes to one of the two competing coalitions. Overtime, the coalitions drew approximately the same percentage of the total votes and derived the bulk of their support from the same neighborhoods. Thus, we find that neither coalition was successful at broadening its coalitional base through issue positions.

Since the CCA generally polled about 40 percent of the #1 votes cast in a municipal election, its success in electing three members to the school committee and four members to the

EXHIBIT IV-1A: DISTRIBUTION OF TRANSFER VOTES, CAMBRIDGE
SCHOOL COMMITTEE ELECTIONS, 1949 TO 1975

A. Distribution of Losing Candidates' Votes
   (As Percent of Total Transfers)

Year	CCA to CCA*	Independents to Independents*
1949	62.7	68.9
1951	57.1	83.0
1959	46.9	74.0
1961	56.3	80.8
1963	38.2	66.2
1965	85.7	77.0
1967	54.1	91.3
1969	100.0	46.4
1971	94.2	70.8
1973	91.3	77.3
1975	80.8	77.9

Mean: 69.8   73.9
Range: (38.2-100.0)   (46.4-91.3)

(*Note: Remainder of votes, as percent, distributed to
candidates outside transferee's coalition.)

B. Source of Winning Candidates' Transfer Votes

Year	To CCA from Independents**	To Independents from CCA**
1949	56.6	14.0
1951	33.2	26.5
1959	59.7	19.0
1961	23.2	27.5
1963	60.8	24.6
1965	30.5	7.1
1967	15.8	38.6
1969	66.3	16.6
1971	24.4	15.6
1973	19.9	14.4
1975	11.1	30.7

Mean: 37.5   21.3
Range: (11.1-66.3)   (7.1-38.6)

(*Note: Remainder of votes, as percent, obtained from
recipient's coalition.)

EXHIBIT IV-1B: DISTRIBUTIONS OF TRANSFER VOTES
CAMBRIDGE CITY COUNCIL ELECTIONS, 1949 TO 1975

A.   Distribution of Losing Candidates' Votes (As Percent of
      Total Transfers)

Year	CCA to CCA*	Independents to Independents*
1949	56.9	66.8
1951	64.3	74.3
1959	60.3	69.8
1961	64.6	76.6
1963	57.9	86.3
1965	76.9	82.0
1967	60.9	81.5
1969	86.6	48.9
1971	84.1	60.4
1973	74.4	73.8
1975	92.9	78.6

	Mean:	70.9	72.6
	Range:	(56.9-92.9)	(48.9-86.3)

(*Note: Remainder of votes, as percent, distributed to
candidates outside transfer's coalition.)

B.   Source of Winning Candidates' Transfer Votes

Year	To CCA from Independents*	To Independents from CCA*
1949	40.2	25.0
1957	45.7	19.6
1959	44.4	20.0
1961	40.4	17.2
1963	15.9	21.4
1965	24.8	13.0
1967	59.4	15.7
1969	76.0	2.7
1971	52.8	12.4
1973	38.9	14.7
1975	22.8	8.5

	Mean:	41.9	15.5
	Range:	(15.9-76.0)	(8.5-25.0)

(Note: Remainder of votes, as percent, obtained from
          recipient's coalition.)

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EXHIBIT IV-2: VOTER TURNOUT, CANDIDATE ENDORSEMENTS AND
COALITIONAL SHARE OF NUMBER ONE VOTES, CAMBRIDGE MUNICIPAL
ELECTIONS, 1941 TO 1975

A. School Committee Elections:

Year	Total Candidates	Number of CCA Candidates		Voter Turnout	#1 Votes
		Endorsed	Elected	(Percent) CCA	(Percent)
1941	28	6	2	68.1	34.4
1949	16	5	3	70.8	39.9
1951	15	5	2	67.3	39.9
1959	21	6	3	70.5	30.4
1961	16	6	2	67.1	40.9
1963	17	5	3	67.6	44.8
1965	13	4	3	71.6	42.3
1967	18	9	3	53.9	52.2
1969	15	5	4	60.2	48.7
1971	22	6	3	68.1	44.2
1973	26	7	3	55.2	41.6
1975	18	7	3	61.7	46.4
Median:	18.8	5.9	2.8	65.2	42.9
Range:	(13-28)	(4-9)	(2-4)	(53.9-71.6)	(34.3-52.2)

B. City Council Elections:

Year	Total Candidates	Number of CCA Candidates		Voter Turnout	#1 Votes
		Endorsed	Elected	(Percent) CCA	(Percent)
1941	83	11	4	68.1	37.2
1949	40	9	5	70.8	47.3
1951	27	9	5	67.3	47.0
1959	31	9	4	70.5	46.5
1961	23	6	4	67.1	43.4
1963	22	6	4	67.6	39.2
1965	24	6	4	71.6	38.6
1967	20	5	4	53.9	39.3
1969	26	6	5	60.2	36.6
1971	36	11	5	68.1	39.2
1973	35	6	3+1(*)	55.2	(**)38.1
1975	27	8	4	61.7	
Median:	32.8	7.7	4.3(***)	65.2	(***)37.7
Range:	(20-83)	(5-11)	(3-5)	(53.9-71.6)	(36.6-47.3)

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EXHIBIT IV-2: VOTER TURNOUT, CANDIDATE ENDORSEMENTS AND
COALITIONAL SHARE OF NUMBER ONE VOTES, CAMBRIDGE MUNICIPAL
ELECTIONS, 1941 TO 1975

NOTES:

(*)In the 1973 City Council elections, Saundra Graham
campaigned as a member of the Grass Roots Organization (GRO).
Once re-elected, she tended to vote with the CCA, the
coalition which had originally endorsed her candidacy and
continued to do so in subsequent elections.
(**)Saundra Graham's votes (11.9% of total #1 votes cast) GRO
total and 8.9% of the total votes cast.
(***)Including Saundra Graham and the total #1 votes for her.

city council was due to its success in drawing transfer votes. In general, the transfer votes from losing CCA candidates went strongly to other CCA candidates, while the transfer votes from losing Independent candidates were less likely to remain within the coalition. Thus, the CCA showed a marked ability to promote cohesiveness, and to retain a large percentage of the #1 votes. The Independents, on the other hand, lacked this cohesiveness, and thus saw their initial advantage in #1 votes neutralized by their failure to retain the transfer votes within their coalition.

In effect, therefore, the coalitions were in a fifty-fifty equilibrium. Naturally, both coalitions sought to gain decisive control of the government in the next election. Typically, the coalitions devised campaign strategies that were based on their perception of the issues, and thus the issue-impact was felt not only in the outcomes of the elections but also in the planning and implementation of campaign strategies.

In the election campaigns through 1975, the two coalitions -- and especially the CCA -- tended to present strong platforms that would maximize the support from their natural constituent groups. This ensured the continuing durability and cohesiveness of the coalitions but at the same time ensured a static political position for each coalition. In 1967, the CCA decided to broaden its electoral base by

including the so-called "marginal ethnic candidates" in their endorsements. The CCA strategy was to seek ethnic candidates with upwardly mobile aspirations, siphon off a greater percentage of the traditional Independent votes, and perhaps obtain a working majority in the city government.

The marginal ethnic strategy was not particularly successful. Although the CCA endorsed marginal ethnic candidates such as Fantini and Bulter and thus managed to win a nominal majority in the city legislative forums, this majority was more illusory than real. To begin with, the marginal ethnic candidates did not draw their followers into the CCA coalition; instead, the voters gave the marginal ethnic candidate the #1 vote, but then returned the transfer vote to the Independents. (This was especially pronounced in the 1969 election.) Thus, the expected benefits in terms of transfer votes were not realized. More importantly, the marginal ethnic candidates still saw themselves as representing an ethnic constituency, and thus they voted with the Independents on a number of key issues. The CCA had broadened its base in name only; the differences between the marginal ethnic candidates and other CCA members remained crucial.

After the defection of the marginal ethnic candidates on the Frisoli vote in 1971, the CCA responded by abandoning the marginal ethnic strategy and turning to the political left.

This strategy was mandated partly by the leftward drift of national politics, but also by the CCA's disillusionment with its attempts to gain support among the more moderate ethnic voters. In effect, the CCA found that there was no political center in which to expand its political support. Instead, the CCA began to use the issues of rent control and the Frisoli appointment to mobilize members of the community who were often apathetic to the political process. Thus, the CCA pursued a strategy of increasing the turnout of its natural ideological supporters -- notably students and transient professionals -- rather than trying to attract ethnic votes.

The 1971 election was a watershed for CCA strategies. As the data shows, the CCA won a majority in the city council (5-4) and a majority on the school committee (3 plus the Mayor). Although the percentage of #1 votes was down from the previous two elections, this reflected the abandonment of the marginal ethnic strategy; in fact, the number of #1 votes was relatively high compared to the typical election years. Also important was the voter turnout, which was an exceptionally high 68 percent. (This despite the fact that national turnouts were steadily dropping, and voter drives had frequently registered people who did not vote on election day.) The CCA success stemmed from the fact that it drew strong support from students and transient persons who did not normally vote in local elections, but who came out for the

rent control and Frisoli issues. In addition, the large number of Independent candidates fragmented the Independent transfer patterns, while the CCA retained a high degree of intracoalitional transfers.

In the 1973 elections, the Independents recaptured city government. However, the CCA reverted to what might be called a variation on the "marginal ethnic strategy," backing Al Vellucci for mayor in exchange for his support on certain key issues, notably the retention of William Lannon as superintendent of schools and the continuation of rent control. Like the "marginal ethnic" strategy, this approach enabled the CCA to gain certain critical elements of support from ethnic candidates, and thus maintain their roughly equal political power base in the city government. Again, however, this strategy does not involve a substantive shift in CCA issue positions, nor does it mark a real expansion in the coalition base.

In reviewing the CCA electoral strategies, it is easy to see in retrospect that the "marginal ethnic" approach was doomed to failure. Although the CCA tried to find people who were both "ethnic" and sympathetic to CCA positions, an elected official could not be true to both the CCA and the ethnic interests. The upwardly mobile ethnics might be personally sympathetic to CCA policies, but when push came to shove they invariably took the ethnic position: That is, the

position that their constituents were most likely to reward. (Indeed, the data shows that, in the case of Fantini, he received more votes by voting against CCA interests than he received with CCA endorsement. The crucial problem with the marginal ethnic strategy was that the CCA tried to appeal to the candidates but not the candidates' supporters: The CCA made no effort to accommodate its policies to ethnic interests and thus could not attract significant new following.

Neither coalition seemed able to develop positions that could both retain the allegiance of its own base and yet make significant inroads on the support of the opposing coalition. The reason appears to lie in the nature of Cambridge political issues rather than in the failure of Cambridge voters to reward or punish candidates according to issue positions. The two coalitions represented groups from different socioeconomic backgrounds, and the issues tended to cause political divisions along attitudes and ideologies closely linked to socioeconomic factors. Thus, the ideological differences between the supporters of the two coalitions were truly profound, and it was difficult to find an issue that could bridge them.

In summary, the consistent political divisions within the community were as easily explained by rational issue voting as by "knee-jerk" allegiance to a political party. For a town like Cambridge, the difference between the competing political

groups -- upper-middle class white collar on the one hand, and working class blue collar ethnics on the other -- was so great that the political coalitions representing the two groups would naturally be expected to differ on most issues and take positions that were consistently appealing to their natural constituencies. Quite simply, the average Cambridge voter was not likely to "straddle" the political positions between the two coalitions: Either he would find the whole CCA package or the whole Independent issue package more appealing.

This conclusion leads to some observations into the nature of local political parties. First, the two competing Cambridge coalitions were both overwhelmingly "Democratic" in terms of their national party affiliation. Thus, in terms of national issues and priorities, they were in significant and perhaps substantial agreement. However, at the local levels, they disagreed on many issues, for reasons that were quite "rational" given their differing goals and interests.

Second, local political units are smaller and it is easier for the local coalitions or parties to develop a strong consensus among their supporters and produce attractive issue positions. For example, the national Democratic party must develop issue positions that attract both CCA and Independent supporters, and presumably the inherent socio-economic differences in those two groups will mean that some positions

dissatisfy one group or the other. (An issue like abortion, for example, could produce such a fracture.) By contrast, local issues are more specific and local groupings more homogeneous, so that issues generally do not split in either the CCA or the Independent coalition.

Third, local political coalitions tend to mirror closely the interests of their electorates. Unlike the congressman in Washington or the state representative in Boston, the local representative continues to live and work within his constituents' environment. The Cambridge coalitions are sufficiently small and informal so that they do not develop bureaucratic or institutional norms which are independent of the voters. Thus, the Cambridge coalitions show a strong responsiveness to the needs and interests of their respective constituents.

Fourth, Cambridge elections are characterized by a well-informed electorate. While national and state elections have been reduced to the level of competitive advertising, with all information about a candidate filtered through the media, local elections are still characterized by substantial personal contact between the candidates and the voters. In general, the voters are likely to know the candidates on a personal basis and are likely to identify the candidates' positions with greater accuracy. In Cambridge, this is underscored by the fact that the majority of people who

actually vote are long-term residents, while the students and transients participate at much lower turnout levels.

Models of Voter Responsiveness to Campaign Issues: The following models describe possible differences between voter responsiveness to issues at the local and national levels.

Model 1 (National)

issues ——————→|←—————— issues

Democrat ——————→|←—————— Republican

Model 2 (Local)

issues issues

issues ————————————————————————— issues

CCA Independents

In the model of national voting patterns, the large circle represents the voting electorate, and the vertical dotted line represents the boundary between the two parties in their efforts to attract voters through issue positions. In effect, the vertical dotted line represents the sum of the issue differences -- both real and perceived -- between the

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two competing political parties. Voters on the left of the dotted line are those who will support the Democrats in a given election, while those on the right will support the Republicans. This dotted line can be moved either left or right according to the issue positions adopted by candidates representing the competing parties.

To the left and right of the dotted vertical line are two solid vertical lines. These represent voters who will not switch parties regardless of the issues involved. The voters to the left of the Democratic solid line, and to the right of the Republican solid line, may belong in these classifications for a variety of reasons, including an extreme political viewpoint, a sense of loyalty that transcends the issues, or a feeling that party label is sufficient without learning the issues in a particular election. Between the two vertical solid lines are the people (this model presumes that there are at least some people who vote according to the issues) whose vote in a particular election is determined by issues (vertical dotted line).

In Model 2 of Cambridge voting patterns, we again have the circle representing the pool of voters, the dotted vertical line representing issue positions, and the solid vertical lines representing the barriers of party/coalition loyalty. In this second model, however, the distance between the two solid lines -- i.e., representing the voters who will

switch parties according to issue positions -- is theorized to be much narrower than at the national level. The reason for this is that the two coalitions are more precise in defining issues to retain the allegiance of their voters, and the issue differences are strongly rooted in socioeconomic differences. Thus, the pool of voters in the political center who can be attracted by alternative issue positions is theoretically smaller than in the national elections.

At the same time, Model 2 has a solid horizontal line (which also exists in the national model, but has been omitted) representing the number of voters who actually exercise the right to vote in a given election.   This horizontal line moves upward or downward, depending on the degree of interest that the election issues arouse in the average voter.   In hotly contested elections, the vertical line will tend to move upward, increasing voter participation. When the election involves less salient issues, the vertical line will move in a downward direction.

Using these models as descriptive aids, one can make generalizations about the comparative strategies that should be used in national versus local elections. At the national level, the traditional electoral strategy has been to "move to the center," which involves pushing the dotted vertical line in a direction that will maximize the voters attracted to the political party. However, at the local level, the Cambridge

experience indicates that this is not a successful strategy. As the model of local electoral behavior indicates, the area between the vertical lines -- the swing voters -- is relatively small, and thus attempts by a coalition to expand into the center will offer very little return. This might still be an acceptable strategy, except that moving to the center can affect the horizontal line, which represents voter turnout within the coalition's natural constituency. In effect, pushing the dotted vertical line in an expanding direction may lower the turnout of staunch coalitional supporters.

The problems of trying to move to the center in local elections were demonstrated by the CCA when they implemented their marginal ethnic strategy. Although the CCA genuinely wanted to expand into the center, they were unwilling to make policy accommodations that would make their coalition realistically attractive to moderate ethnic voters. This was a direct result of the fact that the CCA depended on tight coherence and unity for coalitional definition. Thus, to make horizontal gains in voter support the CCA would have had to become less ideological in their political definition -- something that was an anathema to their local political group.

While issue positions in Cambridge elections did not always involve a fight for the political center, they did play a crucial role in the _vertical_ gains registered by a

particular party. Specifically, the elections where the issues were most hotly contested illustrated two critical components in the voting behavior: (1) very tight allegiance to the coalitions, and (2) higher turnouts of the voters. For example, in 1971, where the salient issues were rent control and Frisoli, the turnout was an exceptional 68.1%. Moreover, the CCA won that election by abandoning the "marginal ethnic" strategy and instead working to consolidate its turnout from among the people naturally disposed to support its positions. By successfully appealing to students and transients, the CCA more than offset a high Independent turnout and managed to register one of its few outright electoral victories.

Of course vertical gains in electoral support are a function of political salience and it is unusual for an issue to excite the supporters of one coalition significantly more than the supporters of the other. However, this may have been the case in Cambridge with rent control. While rent control did not fracture the Independent coalition, neither did it draw an enormous turnout for the Independent position. By contrast, rent control was a major concern to students and other Cambridge residents who normally take little interest in the local political process. Thus, by emphasizing the rent control issue, the CCA drew exceptionally strong support from among its natural constituents, thereby winning the election. Thus, in Cambridge it appears that issue-voting exists, but in

the "vertical" sense of increasing turnout rather than in the traditional "horizontal" sense of attracting "swing" voters from the political center.

Summary and Conclusions

The Cambridge experience shows that the two coalitions regard issues as a central organizing component of their respective political groupings. The coalitions are especially concerned about defining their issue allegiances at election time, partly as a means of building support, but also to mobilize the core supporters who are crucial to an effective political apparatus. Thus, issues serve two functions: (1) attracting voters in the general electorate, and (2) attracting participants and supporters who fill necessary positions within the political organization.

The importance of issues in coalition politics is evidenced by the meticulous care with which the Cambridge coalitions define their political positions on the issues facing the community. As documented above, the coalitions map out very precise policy positions on all major issues, and, in almost every case, there is a substantial difference between the stated objectives of the CCA and the stated objectives of the Independents. Both coalitions define their political stances to correspond with the perceived needs of their respective supporters.

Given that the two coalitions carefully tailor their policy positions to the perceived needs of their constituents, the question is whether this issue shaping function has a positive impact on the coalitions' performance in the electoral arena. In general, the Cambridge experience showed that issue differences did not, over time, produce voting swings of any major significance. Rather, the coalitions seemed to attract their "natural" constituents in each election, while showing little capacity to erode the support of the opposing coalition. However, this stable voting pattern seemed to come from the coalitions' success at addressing the needs of their constituents, rather than from "knee-jerk" voting on the part of the electorate. Indeed, it was the importance of issues, rather than their unimportance, that explained the highly-cohesive nature of the coalitions' electoral support over time.

It should be noted that the behavior of local coalitions is different from state or national parties. Moreover, the division of Cambridge into roughly equal groupings of socio-economic opposites also played a special role in the coalitional behavior. However, it can be said that, at least in Cambridge, the coalitions show neither an ability nor an interest in attracting members of the opposite coalitions's electoral base via issue positions. Rather, they concentrated on strengthening their own coalitional bases, and, in this

effort, they relied heavily on issue-positions to recruit and motivate their supporters.

FOOTNOTES

[1]For a clear presentation of this position by one of the nation's leading political pollsters see Louis Harris, The Anguish of Change, New York: W.W. Norton, 1973.

[1]Angus, Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, The American Voter, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960, p. 543.

[2]See Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, Jerrold G. Rusk, and Arthur C. Wolfe, "Continuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election," American Political Science Review 65 (1969), pp. 1,083-1,105 for a commentary on prior research. A major discussion of issue voting is presented in a symposium in the June 1972 issue of the American Political Science Review. In addition to an excellent bibliography prepared by John Dessel, the following articles were assembled: Gerald M. Pomper, "From Confusion to Clarity: Issues and American Voter"; Richard M. Boyd, "Popular Control of Public Policy: A Normal Vote Analysis of the 1968 Election"; Richard A. Brody and Benjamin I. Page, "Comment: The Assessment of Policy Voting"; John H. Kessel, "Comment: The Issues in Issue Voting"; Gerald M. Pomper, "Rejoinder to 'Comments' by Richard A. Brody, Benjamin I. Page, and John H. Kessel"; and, Richard W. Boyd, "Rejoinder to 'Comments' by Richard A. Brody, Benjamin I. Page, and John H. Kessel."

[3]The most important past works are, chronologically: Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Helen Gaudet, The People's Choice, second edition, New York: Columbia University Press, 1948; Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld, and William McPhee, Voting, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954; Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren Miller, The Voter Decides, Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson, 1954; Eugene Burdick and Arthur Brodeck, eds., American Voting Behavior, New York: The Free Press, 1959; Campbell, et. al., The American Voter; Ithich de Sola Pool, Robert Abelson and Samuel Popkin, Candidates: Issues and Strategies, Cambridge, Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press, 1964; Philip Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in David Apter, ed., Ideology and Discontent, New York: The Free Press, 1964; and, Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald E.

Stokes, _Elections and the Political Order_, New York: Wiley, 1966. Important recent works are cited elsewhere.

[4]V.O. Key, Jr., _Public Opinion and American Democracy_, New York: Knopf, 1961, Chapter 4; Campbell, _et. al._, _The American Voter_, p. 174.

[5]Campbell, _et. al._, _The American Voter_, p. 249.

[6]_Ibid._, Chapter 9.

[7]Herbert McClosky, Paul J. Hoffman, and Rosemary O'Hara, "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers," _American Political Science Review_, 54 (June 1960), p. 419. Among party leaders, by contrast, differences existed on 23 of 24 issues.

[8]Campbell, _et. al._, _The American Voter_, pp. 182-84.

[9]Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Party Government and the Saliency of Congress," _Public Opinion Quarterly_, (Winter, 1962).

[10]Philip E. Converse, "Attitudes and Nonattitudes: Continuation of a Dialogue," _Quantitative Analysis of Social Problems_, ed. Edward R. Tufte, Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1970. See also the _American Political Science Review_ discussion of the subject by John C. Pierce and Douglas S. Rose, "Nonattitudes and American Public Opinion: The Examination of a Thesis," and Converse's comment, _American Political Science Review_, 68 (June 1974), pp. 626-666.

[11]Arthur Goldbery, "Discerning a Causal Pattern Among Data on Voting Behavior," _American Political Science Review_, 60 (December 1966), 913-922; "Social Determinism and Rationality as Bases of Party Identification," _American Political Science Review_, 63 (March 1969), pp. 5-25.

[12]V.O. Key, Jr., _The Responsible Electorate_, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1966, pp. 7-8.

[13]Norman Luttbeg, "The Structure of Beliefs Among Leaders and the Public," Public Opinion Quarterly, 32 (Fall 1968), pp. 398-409.

[14]Steven R. Brown, "Consistency and the Persistence of Ideology," Public Opinion Quarterly, 34 (Spring 1970), pp. 60-68.

[15]Robert Lane, Political Ideology, New York: The Free Press, 1960.

[16]See John Plamenatz, "Electoral Studies and Democratic Theory: I.A. British View," Political Studies, 6 (February 1958), p. 9.

> "A choice is reasonable, not because the chooser, when challenged, can give a satisfactory explanation of why he made it but because, if he could give an explanation, it would be satisfactory. The reasoning that lies behind the choice is often made in private language which the chooser never learns to translate into words intelligible to others because there is ordinarily no need for him to do so."

[17]Key, The Responsible Electorate, p. 2.

[18]Ibid, p. 7.

[19]J.O. Field and R.E. Anderson, "Ideology in the Public's Conceptualization of the 1964 Election" Public Opinion Quarterly, 33 (Fall 1969), pp. 380-398.

[20]John G. Pierce, "Party Identification and the Changing Role of Ideology in American Politics," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 14 (February 1970), pp. 25-42.

[21]David E. RePass, "Issue Salience and Party Choice," American Political Science Review, 65 (June 1971), pp. 389-400.

[22]Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, Jerrold G. Rusk, and Arthur C. Wolfe, "Continuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election," American Political Science Review, 63 (December 1969), pp. 1,083-1,105.

[23]Arthur H. Miller, Warren E. Miller, Alden S. Raine, and Thad A. Brown, "A Majority Party in Disarray: Policy Polarization in the 1972 Election," American Political Science Review, 70 (September 1976), pp. 753-778.

[24]Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba, and John R. Petrocik, The Changing American Voter, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1976 and Warren E. Miller and Teresa E. Levitin, Leadership and Change: The New Politics and the American Electorate, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Winthrop Publishers, 1976.

[25]Note the criticisms of Kenneth Prewitt and Norman Nie, in "Revisiting the Election Studies of the Survey Research Center," a paper prepared for delivery at the 1970 meeting of the American Political Science Association, p. 18.

> "The SRC group has written persuasively regarding the implications for American politics of the findings about citizen information and awareness. They have less critically discussed the implications for voter rationality of their findings about election processes and alternatives."

[26]The recent work of the Survey Research Center has given more emphasis to dynamic elements. See Donald Stokes, "Some Dynamic Elements of Contests for the Presidency," American Political Science Review, 60 (March 1966), pp. 19-28; Converse, et. al., "Continuity and Change in American Politics," Miller, et. al., "A Majority Party in Disarray: Policy Polarization in the 1972 Election"; and, Miller and Levitin, Leadership and Change: The New Politics and the American Electorate.

[27]Frank J. Sorauf, "Political Parties and Political Analysis," in The American Party Systems, ed. by William Nisbet Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham, New York: Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 53.

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CHAPTER V

LEGISLATIVE COALITIONS IN THE CITY OF CAMBRIDGE

Introduction

Democratic theorists have frequently investigated the mechanism by which elected representatives translated electoral preferences into public policy. Initially, researchers studied the impact of partisan allegiance and organizational processes on legislative behavior. More recently attention has shifted to how constituent pressures affect the voting behavior of elected representatives. However, the link between campaign platforms, constituent preferences and the voting behavior of elected officials is neither simple nor direct. Acknowledging this complexity, the late V.O. Key, Jr. warned:

> "When one approaches systematically the broad question of the interaction between government and opinion, he soon recognizes that the phenomena cannot be broken into neat pieces nicely tabulated to produce two-way tables indicative of the inter- connections between mass opinion and public decision."[1]

Particularly complex is the relationship between party

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identification and constituent preferences. Party labels provide cues for both voters and legislators across a range of issues over time. However, this poses interesting questions in local communities, such as Cambridge, where municipal elections are non-partisan, or at least nominally so.

In the preceding chapters, we have seen that the CCA and the Independents performed two essential partisan functions: (1) articulating coalitional positions compatible with members' needs and preferences and (2) aggregating support for these stances on key issues. Implicit in the campaign activities of both groups was the notion that, once candidates were elected to the school committee or the city council, they would work for the adoption of legislation compatible with their campaign platforms. However, one might ask: What roles do the CCA and the Independents play in securing legislation favorable to the attainment of group goals? What would happen if an elected official were forced to choose between allegiance to coalition, allegiance to self, or allegiance to constituents? And, having made the choice, how would he or she fare in subsequent elections? Similarly, just how effective are the two coalitions in establishing and maintaining group unity and cohesiveness between elections, perhaps their most critical partisan functions?

The present chapter will examine constituent-legislative linkages in local political arenas. It will try to assess the

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impact of coalitional membership on voting behavior in the school committee and city council during the years 1960-1975. To accomplish its task, this study employs a multi-faceted research strategy, combining in-depth interviews with elected officials and the analysis of their roll call votes, with inferences of constituent's needs derived from demographic data. However, before examining material specific to the Cambridge experience, a brief review of the literature on legislative decision-making might be helpful.

Legislative Decision-Making: A Review of the Literature:

The question of why legislators vote as they do has always intrigued political scientists. However, researchers have only recently begun to examine the impact of constituent attitudes on elected officials' votes. These efforts have typically focused on the organizational and informational constraints inherent in the decision making and usually involved national and state rather than local representative forums. Studies on the voting behavior of elected representatives can be grouped into one of three categories: (1) the internal or organizational descriptions, (2) the representational or constituency theories, and (3) the individual or trusteeship explanations. The first stresses the power of the specific individuals, the influence of formal and informal leaders, and the importance of specialized

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committees and individual expertise; the second emphasizes the importance of individual constituencies and district interest groups; and the third focuses on the views and attitudes of the individual legislators themselves.

The organizational model has been advocated by people who take an institutional view of Congress and are concerned with how information and influence affect individual decisions. The methodology of these studies is based largely on participant observations and statistical analyses showing the similarities in the voting patterns of different legislators. There are several variants of this internal model, each emphasizing the importance of different legislators or political leaders in the decisions of Senators and Congressmen.

The first, or organizational model, stresses the importance of the formal leaders. These leaders are the elected party floor leaders and their whips and the chairmen and ranking minority members of each committee -- the seniority leaders.[2] These studies start by describing the powers of the various leadership positions and the capabilities of the individuals occupying them. The leaders' sources of influence and their general persuasive abilities are derived from their control over internal resources -- committee assignment, office space, campaign funds, favors, the scheduling of legislation, and access to the president.[3]

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In his discussion of the formal leadership of both parties in Congress, Truman observes:

> Each Floor Leader has a more than casual connection with the filling of committee vacancies,... Each is able to grant or to facilitate the granting and withholding of favors ranging from the allocation of space in the Senate Office Building to the expeditious handling of a pet bill. Such favors and others, including, for example, personal assistance and useful advice in connection with a particularly difficult constituency problem or in an election campaign, create obligations which an adroit and determined leader can attempt to "cash in" for a supporting vote or an abstention on a closely contested bill.[4]

Continuing, he adds:

> Control or predominant influence over the schedule provides a base for negotiations...Unlike his ability to influence committee assignments, it is a continuous authority and, while not a prerogative of shattering power, it is not trivial.[5]

The party floor leader can use these resources to obtain a particular vote at a crucial time or to obtain the allegiance of individual legislators who hope to receive favorable treatment on personally important matters. Similarly, individual committee chairmen and minority leaders have influence because they can influence legislation

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considered by their committees.[6] Because legislators not members of a committee may have a strong interest in its decisions and deliberations, the committee leaders can trade their influence over committee decisions for support on other legislation. For example, the chairman of the committee dealing with housing may get a representative from an urban area to support the chairman's position on various bills in return for a particular piece of housing legislation. Truman observed though that in most cases of conflict between floor leaders and seniority leaders, it is the floor leaders who are more influential.[7]

A variation on the organizational approach emphasizes the importance of informal leaders. These people are important because of their personal expertise, experience, seniority, or because they are members of some inner club or clique which strongly influences the body as a whole. William White's description of the U.S. Senate as a club, with an inner elite group of members, and Senator Clark's description of this same group as the "Senate Establishment" are the best illustrations of this concept.[8] The membership of this establishment is described as bipartisan, based largely on seniority and on being elected from a one-party state. The establishment gains influence from its ability to control committees and the important party positions. These positions are then used to thwart attempts by the president and the congressional

majority to pass legislation distasteful to the club members,
who are generally more conservative than the rest of Congress.
Access to the club is based in part on willingness to go along
with the existing establishment and to support them on various
issues. Clark, for example, points out that the likelihood of
receiving a preferred committee assignment was substantially
correlated with opposition to changes in the closure rule
being advocated by liberals as a way to reduce the power of
southern Democrats.[9] The positions taken by club members can
also be influential in how votes are cast on substantive
legislation.[10]

In an attempt to reconcile these two variants, Donald R.
Matthews undertook a study of Senate voting behavior,
combining personal observations and relatively simple voting
statistics.[11] He concluded that, in most cases, Senate voting
is influenced by the efforts of particular key individuals --
most especially, party leaders, the President, and senior
members of the Senate. Matthews' assessment of the influence
of the formal leaders and the sources of this influence
largely parallels Truman's. He cites the scheduling
prerogative,[12] influence on committee assignments,[13] and the
ability to do small favors as means by which the party leaders
are able to obtain the cooperation of party members. However,
in his discussion of the Senate and the behavior patterns
expected of individual members, Matthews makes several

comments which are quite similar to White's:

> The Senators believe, either rightly
> or wrongly, that without the respect
> and confidence of their colleagues
> they can have little influence in the
> Senate. "You can't be effective,"
> they said over and over again, "unless
> you are respected on both sides of the
> aisle." The safest way to obtain this
> respect is to conform to the folkways,
> to become a "real Senate man."[14]

In addition, Matthews emphasizes the role of experts and specialists in the voting behavior of most Senators. As legislation becomes more complex and technical, members of Congress are forced to spend more time understanding their speciality. This leaves less time for other areas which are also more complex. Thus, experts on one area look to the experts in another area for information on how to vote. Fulfilling his role as a specialist in one or two areas and voting the way another specialist or leader does immensely simplifies the decision process for individual legislators. Speaking of the nonspecialist, Matthews notes: "He is more susceptible to 'pressure' from party leaders, lobbyists, and constituents. Lacking other clearcut cues, he will very often fall back on the advice of one or more of his specialist colleagues."[15] Matthews summarizes the situation:

> The Senate should not be visualized as
> a homogeneous body, but as a cluster
> of specialists, each with his own
> following. Within their areas of

competence these specialists possess
considerable influence, but the area
of competence of most senators is
limited to one or a few policy areas.
In most areas of policy, the senators
can choose between several competing
specialists with somewhat different
points of view.[16]

While analytically distinct these varying approaches all

view the impact of constituent attitudes on elected officials'

behavior as minimal. For example, White concludes: "Speaking

generally, constituent pressure is rarely the <u>cause</u> of any

senator's action,..."[17] Exceptions arise when issues are

"unarguably fundamental to its (the state's)

welfare...or...arises from the deepest moral or spiritual or

social convictions and impulsions of the State, its whole way

of life."[18] One such instance would be the South and civil

rights issues. Matthew, too, tends to minimize the impact of

constituent attitudes. After plotting Conservative-Liberal

scores for different Senators as a function of party, region,

urbanness, and previous occupation, he concludes: "At any

rate, this analysis shows that the senators' personal

backgrounds are related to their over-all position on issues,

independent of the effects of party affiliation and

constituency pressure."[19] In addition, Matthews argues that a

Senator's attention to party leaders (and presumably this is

inversely related to the responsiveness of their

constituency), "hits its peak the last two years before re-

election,..."[20]   Thus the Senator is becoming less constituency sensitive as he nears election and gives more weight to the organizational influences.

The representational models accept that public policies should reflect the preferences of individual citizens. However, supporters of the representational model argue that a very different process is required to obtain this reflection accurately.   In their simplest expression, the social choice or representational models posit that the legislator or other elected official is an agent or representative of his or her constituency.   As such, the elected representative's vote will reflect the majority view of his or her constituency on any given issue.   If elections are held frequently enough and if the representative's desires to remain in office, then, so the argument goes, his voting behavior will coincide with the views of the majority of his constituency.[21]

The social choice model, however, fails to recognize that neither re-election nor the desired set of public policies are automatic outcomes if the elected official votes consistently with the attitudes of a majority of his constituents.   Rather, a more sophisticated model must satisfactorily account for both the elected official's and the voters' behavior in various situations.   One such model was developed by Duncan MacRae.[22]   For MacRae, the legislator's decision process was complicated not only by his desire to be re-elected but also

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by his own preferences regarding the issues under consideration. Thus, when an elected representative's personal preferences differ from those of his constituency, he must weigh his personal preferences versus his desire to remain in office.

In an attempt to expand the predictive capability of the social choice model, its proponents have sought to incorporate elements of the exchange theory of political behavior into their models, especially aspects of coalition formation, log-rolling, and vote trading. One of the more sophisticated expositions of the social choice model was presented by Jerome Rothenberg in his essay, "A Model of Economic and Political Decision-Making."[23] Rothenberg defines the "utility functions" of each representative as a necessary prerequisite to the formation of different coalitions. Rothenberg's utility function is comparable to MacRae's in that it includes both the representative's personal preferences and those of his constituency. As in MacRae's exposition, Rothenberg weights the probability of being reelected against the representative's desire to remain in office.

However, Rothenberg's description of legislative decision-making is almost exclusively based on vote trading and log-rolling, and he does not explicitly state the criteria by which legislators trade and vote so as to maximize their utility functions. Rather, he states that:

pay-offs to... coalitions derive from three sources: (a) the extent of differences in relative evaluation of the importance of different issues; (b) the size of the...impact on voting outcomes which vote trades have; (c) the extent of dovetailing of externalities deriving from vote trading agreements.[24]

Thus, Rothenberg relates vote trading and the composition of coalitions to the importance of issues to individual representatives and their constituency. Generally, the stronger the congruence between an individual representative's preferences and those of his constituents and the greater the desire for re-election on the part of the representative, the greater the degree of influence exerted by the constituency on the representative's decisions. On issues of lesser importance to his constituency, a legislator's vote will depend on (1) the positions of other representatives with whom prior vote trading agreements have been negotiated and (2) the individual representative's own personal preferences regarding the issues.

Despite the relative complexity of the social choice models elaborated thus far, much is still omitted. Constituent attitudes, the intensity of constituent concern on various issues, and representatives' perceptions of these attitudes have not been included in any of the models discussed. Although the measurement of constituent support

for issues and the intensity of their support are important components of any model, both areas have been underdeveloped in the social choice models save at the level of individual or composite utility functions.

An essential issue is how the elected official perceives the attitudes and intensities of his constituents. One study was undertaken by Warren Miller and Donald Stokes who interviewed 116 representatives and a sample of the constituents in each district prior to the start of the 1958 session of Congress.[25] Using a Guttman scale, they measured the perceptions and attitudes for each legislator and his district on issues of social welfare, foreign policy, and civil rights. These variables were then related to the representatives' voting behavior in these three fields. Ignoring the relative importance of the issue areas to both constituents and representatives and omitting the impact of vote trading and coalition formation on legislative voting behavior, Miller and Stokes came up with the following model of the impact of constituent attitudes on representative's voting behavior.[26]

Most significant in the multiple correlations reported were those relating representative's attitude and the representative's perception of his constituency's attitudes to the representative's roll call behavior. On issues involving civil rights, these multiple correlations were 0.9; for social

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welfare issues, 0.7; and for foreign policy issues, 0.6. This led Miller and Stokes to conclude that "although the conditions of constituency influence are not equally satisfied, they are met well enough to give the local constituency a measure of control over the actions of its Representatives."[27] Cnudde and McCrone in their work have gone even further, claiming that the double arrow in the Stokes-Miller model is not a parity interaction but rather a hierarchical interaction with perceptions of district attitudes shaping legislator's attitudes.[28]

FIGURE 1:

In his study of constituent influence on the legislative decision-making process, Lewis Anthony Dexter notes: "We talk frequently of a Representative or Senator 'representing' or 'failing to represent' his constituents. This is shorthand. The fact is the Congressman represents his image of the

district or of his constituents...."[29] This observation highlights the complex connections between the opinions and interest of constituents and the behavior of elected officials. Further, it suggests that, to unravel at least some of these complexities, it may be useful to think of the legislative-constituency relationship in terms of two analytically distinct but related processes: The first involves the flow of communications between representative and constituency, while the second concerns the psychological and attitudinal linkages between the legislator and constituency that exists apart from direct constituency-legislator communications.

Unfortunately, studies of communications from constituents to their representatives indicate that these communications do not give a reliable picture of opinion in the district as a whole.[30] Thus, on most issues, the legislator is "without any systematic guide to constituency opinion, and in most of his work even the most intensive polling would not turn up constituency opinion relevant to the decisions he has to make."[31] At the same time, however, the information received via the mails and the polls may have some bearing on how accurately the legislator perceives the moods and sentiments of the voters. These mental images or "hunches" concerning constituency preferences may in turn influence his own beliefs and actions.[32]

These relationships remain to be tested. They do, however, shift the focus of social choice models away from an exclusive or primary emphasis on legislator's preferences and intensity of preferences to a more balanced inclusion of the perception and impact of constituent's preferences on representatives' voting behavior. In most formulations of the social choice models, little or no effort is made to assess the social, economic, and psychological factors which contribute to decisions regarding voter preferences. Most of the evidence compiled thus far indicates that issue preferences are more related to a person's social, economic, and geographic circumstances than to party identification.[33]

The final approach to legislative decision-making, the individual or trusteeship model, differs significantly from the other models in its assumptions about the role of the elected officials in the policy process. According to the individual or trusteeship model the legislature is a forum where the merits of different policy proposals are debated, their consequences considered, and the important issues identified and resolved. The legislators cast their votes based on their own perceptions of the problem being considered and their assessment of what is "best" for the country. These perceptions and assessments are very dependent upon the experiences and philosophies of the individual legislators. Justifications for this model run from statements by

legislators that they feel their job is to act as trustees or statesmen to observations that this is the only way they can behave given the complexity of most issues and the conflicting or nonexistent demands of party leaders and constituencies.[34] This model requires fairly detailed knowledge of legislator's personal preferences, beliefs, and the consequences of the bills being considered to predict their voting behavior. A simplified version of this model has been called an ideological model by Matthews and Stimpson.[35] The difference between the ideological model and the larger trusteeship model is that the legislators' beliefs and preferences are assumed to follow some predetermined ideological pattern.

As the literature review thus far reveals, there are a variety of influences that affect an elected official while making legislative choices. (The most important of these factors are summarized in Exhibit V-1). Although this review presents only some of the more salient influences affecting a legislative decision, it serves to illustrate that the representative is confronted with the problem of following either his own policy preferences, those of specialized elites, or what he regards as the preferences of his constituents. Moreover, whatever direct influence constituencies have over their representatives is affected by the attitudinal and especially the perceptual linkages between them. As a result, the extent of constituency influence

EXHIBIT V-1: PARADIGM FOR EXPLICATIONS OF LEGISLATOR'S POLICY-MAKING
              (VOTING) BEHAVIOR

Recommendation of Congressional Committee

Administration's Preference

Congressional Leader's Preference

Preference of State Congressional Delegation

| Constituency Attitudes | → | Legislators's Own Attitudes and Preferences | → | Roll Call Behavior |

Perceived Preference of District Party

Perceived Preference of Major Campaign Contributor(s)

Perceived Constituency Preference

appears to vary according to the policy domain and the representational role orientation adopted by the legislator. The variability in constituency influence and mode of representation associated with different kinds of policy issues and different political arenas makes evident the need for a better understanding of how policy questions are addressed in legislative systems.

In response to this mandate, the present chapter seeks to explore the nature of legislative-constituent linkages in local political arenas. Specifically, does the comparatively smaller size of the electoral base and the closer proximity of voters to their representatives have an impact on representatives' voting behavior?

The Cambridge School Committee

The Cambridge School Committee has formal responsibility for developing educational policy for the city's public schools. The school committee utilizes its charter powers to select and promote administrative, teaching and support personnel and to approve the annual budget prepared and submitted by the superintendent and his staff. In the 1974-75 fiscal year, the school department employed more than 1200 persons to staff fourteen elementary and two secondary schools and to service its more than 9,800 students. Its $20.6 million budget, approximately $2,100 per pupil, ranked

Cambridge with such communities as Newton and Brookline in per-pupil education expenditures and placed Cambridge in the upper 20 percent of cities and towns in Massachusetts.

The school committee delegates day-to-day responsibility for the school department to the superintendent of schools. The superintendent, the school department's chief executive officer, is charged with implementation of school committee policies, the oversight of day-to-day management of the school system, and the appropriate expenditure of funds allocated by the school committee. Thus, one of the school committee's most important tasks, and certainly the one with the farthest reaching consequences, is the recruitment and selection of the superintendent of schools.

The school committee meets twice-monthly, on the first and third Tuesdays of the month. The meetings, open to the public, are extremely formal. A complicated set of rules govern the conduct of meetings, and the school committee members sit at individual desks grouped in a large "U", each desk equipped with a microphone. The public sits at one end of the large open room, which reminds one of a Congressional hearing room. Members read prepared statements (usually meant for the public and the press rather than for their colleagues), conduct formal hearings, and pay little attention to the droning of the secretary as he reads correspondence into the official records. Rarely does the superintendent

speak until near the end of the meeting when new business is introduced. Most important items moved by committee members have been discussed in advance. The superintendent makes it a point to speak in advance to board members concerning items on which he strongly desires action. Thus, much of the business is conducted perfunctorily. Debate or extended questioning arise only when members are about to be outvoted on an issue in which they are particularly interested. Contracts, bids and other business matters occupy much of the committee's time.

Contrary to the experiences of other communities, the social make-up of the Cambridge School Committee has been quite diverse in terms of the occupation, level of educational attainment, ethnicity, race and sex of its members. For the most part, these differences parallel the socio-economic cleavages and attachments of the community and its political coalitions, enhanced and reinforced by the electoral process and its outcomes. As such, it would appear that the Cambridge School Committee was indeed representative of the key social groups in the community, a situation more typical of appointed school boards than of non-partisan elected committees. Largely as the result of the city's proportional representation (PR) method of election and the campaign activities and the electoral strength of its two coalitions, both coalitions were consistently able to elect three members

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each to the school committee.

Although a majority of the Independents elected to the school committee were working class and ethnic, a smaller number were proprietors of small businesses located in Cambridge or first generation professionals and managers. As such, they were among the city's more aggressive and ambitious Irish and Italian residents. By contrast, the typical CCA-endorsed members of the school committee not only had more formal education than their Independent counterparts, but were also educated at the nation's more prestigious colleges and universities. Perhaps more importantly, CCA members of the school committee included college-educated women and blacks, a move consistent with the CCA's egalitarian and reform-oriented endorsement policies. Thanks to the electoral strength of the Independents, the endorsement policies of the CCA and the PR form of voting, blacks, women and working class ethnics occupied at least four of the six elected positions on the Cambridge School Committee for ten of the fifteen years from 1960 through 1975. Thus, the campaign strategies and electoral strength of the two coalitions, aided by the PR form of voting, were most effective in achieving a school committee truly representative of the varied and diverse socio-economic groups in the community. This prevented dominance by the city's upper middle class, white male professional and business leaders -- a pattern commonly observed in other

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communities.

Influencing the make-up of the school committee was member turnover. For both coalitions, election to the school committee was viewed as a stepping stone to higher elective office. However, the career paths for the two coalitions differed markedly. During the period from 1960 to 1975, the average term in office on the city council was 7.8 years for Independents and 5.0 years for their CCA counterparts. In addition, six of the eleven Independents elected to the city council during this period, compared with only three of the fourteen CCA members, served four or more terms in office.

For Independents on the school committee, then, access to the city council was considerably reduced. For the CCA, on the contrary, the career path to the city council was more viable because of higher turnover rate and shorter terms in office of CCA-endorsed councillors. As a result, the turnover among CCA-members of the school committee was greater, and the average term in office significantly less, than that of their Independent counterparts. The comparatively shorter terms of CCA-endorsed school committee members and city councillors had considerable impact on the roles of the legislative bodies in the initiation and implementation of public policy. In particular, executive personnel recruited from outside the city by the CCA-members of the city council and school committee frequently found themselves bereft of sponsorship

and support in carrying forth the mandate of the policy-making bodies.

These differences are inherent in the role and composition of the two coalitions, their campaign activities and the PR method of voting. In addition to concentrating the voting power of particular sub-groups in the community, the PR method enabled the CCA supporters to maximize their electoral strength through slate voting. Indeed, the electoral strength of the two coalitions remained evenly matched throughout this period, with the CCA polling 45 percent of the number one votes cast on the average and the Independents, 55 percent.

Member turnover was also influenced by the varying degrees of importance that elected representatives attached to their positions. For the working class Independents, election to, and service on, the school committee and city council is often the focal point of their lives. Deriving considerable personal satisfaction and social status from elective offices, the Independents campaigned almost continuously for re-election: Walter Sullivan never missed a wake or funeral and Al Vellucci held office hours every morning in an East Cambridge bakery.

For the most part, CCA members on the city council and school committee demonstrated no similar passion for elective office. The CCA candidates made a commitment to community service for a limited period, after which an individual

returned to the pursuit of his or her career. Then, as now,
career development and professional allegiances were generally
of greater importance to the predominantly professional CCA-
endorsed members of the city council and school committee than
holding elective office per se. This reduced the amount of
time and energy that CCA representatives were willing to spend
in their re-election efforts. As a result, their campaign
activities frequently failed to achieve their desired goals.

    Analysis of more than 6500 roll call votes, attendance at
numerous school committee meetings and in-depth interviews
with members of the school committee provide considerable
insight into the role and activities of the school committee.
As Exhibit V-2 demonstrates, members of the school committee
devoted the vast majority of their formal meeting time to
relatively trivial "housekeeping details;" they rarely debated
the merits of alternative educational policies and programs.
Specifically, more than 90 percent of the total votes cast
were in the areas of personnel appointments, salaries,
contracts, budgets, staff development, plant maintenance and
renovation, and procedural motions. For the most part, the
school committee's votes reflected the recommendations
submitted by the superintendent and his staff for approval, as
required by law, and involved such matters as: the
appropriation of $75 for a curriculum director to attend a
conference; the appointment of two part-time cafeteria

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EXHIBIT V-2:   DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL CAMBRIDGE SCHOOL COMMITTEE VOTES BY ISSUE AREA, 1960 TO 1975
(CONTESTED AND UNCONTESTED).

<u>TERM IN OFFICE</u>

ISSUE AREA	1/60-12/61		1/62-12/63		1/64-12/65		1/66-12/67		1/68-12/69		1/70-12/71		1/72-12/73		1/74-12/75		TOTALS	
	(n)	(%)	(n)	(%)	(n)	(%)	(n)	(%)	(n)	(%)	(n)	(%)	(n)	(%)	(n)	(%)	(n)	(%)
Personnel	50	27.5	85	28.0	119	31.3	89	28.1	94	39.5	94	27.8	119	31.9	152	33.0	802	25.9
Salaries	24	13.2	35	11.5	27	7.1	24	7.6	15	6.3	31	9.2	26	7.0	42	9.1	224	8.6
Contracts	30	16.5	38	12.5	28	7.4	29	9.1	20	8.4	12	3.6	23	6.2	61	13.3	241	9.3
Plant & Equipment	14	7.7	18	5.9	24	6.3	24	7.6	12	5.0	21	6.2	11	3.0	27	5.9	151	5.8
Program/Staff Development	15	8.2	34	11.2	57	15.0	26	8.2	29	12.2	42	12.4	55	14.7	47	10.2	305	11.8
Budget	19	10.4	24	7.9	26	6.8	29	9.1	30	12.6	40	11.8	45	12.1	55	12.0	268	10.3
Procedure	26	14.3	62	20.4	93	24.5	92	29.0	30	12.6	78	23.1	82	21.9	45	9.8	508	19.6
Miscellaneous	4	2.1	8	2.7	6	1.6	4	1.3	8	3.4	20	6.0	12	3.2	31	6.7	65	2.5
Totals	182	100.0	304	100.0	380	100.1	317	100.0	238	100.0	338	100.0	373	100.0	460	100.0	2592	100.0

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workers; and the declaration of a school holiday on March 17th, St. Patrick's Day. Individually, these votes were relatively unimportant; in sum, however, they helped the superintendent "set the tone" for his administration.

It should also be noted that many of these votes, though nominally of a housekeeping nature served, when aggregated, to influence the direction and purpose of educational policy. This was especially true in the area of personnel appointments, since the easiest way to affect educational programming was to choose the person who would define, lead and administer the programs. Since each school department position was also a potential patronage appointment, it was impossible to divorce the appointment process from the broader political goals of the coalitions.

Personnel: Controlling personnel appointments was the quickest and surest method for school committee members to influence school department policies and programs. In general, the two coalitions presented opposing educational philosophies, and many of the candidate ratification votes amounted to an exercise of the majority coalition installing its personnel choices -- and hence its policy positions -- over the objections of the minority coalition.

In personnel votes, the school committee exhibited two general modes of behavior. In some cases, where the candidate

was particularly objectionable to one coalition, or clearly identified with the policies of the other coalition, the members of the minority coalition would vote against the appointment in the final ratification vote even though they had no chance of successfully opposing the appointment. This happened, for example, when the CCA school committee members voted on the appointment of Frank Frisoli.

In such cases, the minority coalition felt that there was a political value in voicing disapproval of the appointment and that the value of publicly stating their opposition was greater than the costs of such opposition.

In many and perhaps most cases, however, the minority coalition chose to support the candidate on the final ratification vote -- or at least abstained from voting -- even though it found the candidate objectionable. This behavior was predicated on the fact that the person was going to be appointed anyway and that there was little value in antagonizing someone who would soon be a member of the school department. This stemmed partly from the need to work with that person in the future, partly from a desire to minimize conflict "for the good of the children in the school system" and partly from a hope that the individual might become a future ally. This last factor was especially important to the Independents, who had occasional success in wooing "outsiders", initially supported by the CCA, into their

coalition.

Although control of the appointment process was understood by all school committee insiders as the key to control over policy, there were often attempts to avoid explicit recognition of this fact. For example, Independent George Olesen sponsored a recommendation that all new appointments and promotions be made exclusively from among existing school department personnel and current residents of the city of Cambridge. This motion was defeated 6-1, despite the fact that it embodied the unofficial Independent policy on appointments and was privately supported by the other Independent school committeemen. However, other members of the Independent coalition chose not to antagonize the CCA members of the school committee and the more moderate among the Independent supporters. Instead, the other Independents committeemen preferred to operate more circumspectly and to achieve their goals within a framework developed by the two coalitions to minimize conflict.

An example of how this worked was in the appointment of the school department's curriculum directors. The positions were created in 1966, through the initiative of the CCA, in an effort to improve the overall quality of education. The Independents opposed the new program, but the real issue at stake was not the creation of the positions per se, but rather the selection of personnel to fill the offices. The CCA

wanted to fill the positions through a nation-wide search, while the Independents preferred to promote people "within the system" -- a political shorthand that really read "Independent supporters." The political background to these appointments was rife with complications and intrigues, and the coalitions eventually compromised, splitting the appointments in half. Not surprisingly, most of the ratification votes were unanimous or near-unanimous -- which reflected the fact that political differences were rarely embodied in the formal school committee voting.

In general, however, the two coalitions remained true to their avowed political positions -- albeit the positions were not always visible in personnel votes. The CCA regularly sought to bring professional educators into the system, frequently through the mechanism of a nationwide search. Superintendent Alflorence Cheatham was a typical example of this policy. The Independents, on the other hand, wanted to promote people from within, and they regularly pressed for internal recruitment and opposed external search committees. This was carried to the extreme with the appointment of Frank Frisoli, when the Independents sabotaged a citizens committee that had been set up with CCA backing to help in the selection process.

Educational Programs: Issues pertaining to specific

educational programs rarely came before the school committee except in indirect terms, such as debates over funding and personnel. In general, both the school committee and the superintendent of schools seemed to accept that the school committee was not competent to address the detailed aspects of educational programming. Rather, the school committee was expected to debate and approve the superintendent's personnel and budgetary recommendations while leaving specific program planning to the school department. Since most school committee members seemed to accept this division of labors, it became the de facto if not the de jure demarcation of institutional roles.

The CCA's general position on educational programs was to favor new and innovative methods of teaching. During most of the period under study, the CCA campaigned on a platform of educational reform. Although the CCA could not implement new programs without the support of the superintendent of schools, the CCA found like-minded superintendents in Conley, Cheatham, and Lannon, and it gave strong encouragement of the innovations introduced during the administrations of those three superintendents. Among the programs instituted with CCA support and CCA input were the Pilot School, the CAPS, and the guidance, Black Studies, and vocational education programs.

The Independents generally opposed the programmic initiatives suggested by the CCA, and their institutional role

was much easier to play. Although the CCA school committee members could not create or implement a new program without the strong support of the superintendent, the Independents could oppose such a program through their power to control the budget. This was especially true after the CCA introduced budgeting reform -- ironically over the opposition of the Independent coalition. However, even this method of control had limitations, the Independents exercised little effective control over educational programming except by exercising an "all-or-nothing" veto.

A case in point was the Pilot School program, a progressive educational experiment within the Cambridge public school system. Initiated in 1970 at the behest of the CCA and backed by then Superintendent Conley, the Pilot School became a political football primarily because of strong opposition from Independent school committeemember James Fitzgerald. Fitzgerald was personally offended by the liberal nature of the class instruction, and he tried to mobilize public sentiment against the Pilot School in order to kill the program. Eventually, he succeeded in holding a hearing to investigate the Pilot School, and after parents, teachers, and students testified on behalf of the program it was reaffirmed by votes of 5-1 and 6-1, with Fitzgerald the lone opponent.

This unusual event underscored the problems that arise when the school committee members attempt to influence the

day-to-day programming of the school department. Although it exercises budgetary control, the school committee does not have precise instruments for shaping educational programming, and committee members are usually unwilling to cut a program's funding simply because they are dissastisfied with its direction or course. Part of this is an institutional consideration: Committee members lack the day-to-day experience in the classroom, and thus feel vulnerable to attack on grounds that they are "meddling" in areas where they have little expertise. Moreover, even if a school committee majority is opposed to a current program, it is difficult to mold that majority into a concensus favoring an alternative program structure. Thus, direct intervention through school committee votes was not a successful technique for shaping specific program content.

Instead, to influence educational policy the school committee members often worked with the superintendent on specific projects. For example, Frank Duehay devoted considerable time to the Pilot School; David Wylie to program budgeting; and Alice Wolf to more individualized instruction. In each of these cases, the committee member became involved in the implementation process, thereby augmenting his or her power to influence program content. Although the CCA members tended to follow this course of action more frequently than Independents -- the CCA members were usually the ones most

interested in promoting a new program -- certain Independent committee members also used this approach. For example, Joseph Maynard generally supported funding requests for educational programs designed to meet the special needs of handicapped and retarded students.

As in other areas, therefore the two coalitions tended to work toward educational programming goals that were consistent with the positions advocated by their respective coalitions. However, this support often took a variety of indirect or informal methods of influencing outcomes and did not always translate into easily measured voting behavior. A typical example of tactical voting arose during a vote on salary increases for the CAPS program personnel. In general, the Independents were disenchanted with the CAPS program, and Fitzgerald was openly opposed to it. However, the School Committee voted 6-0, with Fitzgerald abstaining, to increase salaries to CAPS teachers. The Independents voted to support the pay hike because to oppose it would establish a bad precedent for salary increases for other teachers. (The Independents liked to "take care" of their people employed by the school department.) Thus, the 6-0 vote was deceptively united; if the Independents had had one more vote at the time, they might easily have voted 4-3 to abolish the entire CAPS program.

Building and Plant Maintenance: Issues of building and plant maintenance arose frequently in the matters considered by the school committee.   It was not, however, an area where the coalitions showed consistent unity in either their ideology or their political behavior.   In general, building issues -- especially those involving the location of new school facilities -- cut across coalitional lines, and committee members tended to vote according to whether the people in their "home neighborhoods" supported or opposed the measure. In effect, the voting demonstrated that the committee members had a strong sense of who their constituents and supporters were, and they tended to place this loyalty above loyalty to coalitional goals.   The most visible issues in this area was the proposal for a new high school facility to be located in North Cambridge.

Citizen Participation: There were few ways in which the school committee could vote directly on the issue of citizen participation.   Nonetheless, it was a common if submerged issue in school committee politics, because the parents of Cambridge school children are a concerned and active group. Citizen participation became extremely common in all areas of Cambridge politics during the mid- to late-1960's, but even during the more quiescent periods it was an important part of the political environment in the Cambridge public schools.

Because citizen participation is consonant with the CCA coalition's ideology -- and also because citizen activists tend to support the CCA in disproportionate numbers -- the CCA has been a staunch advocate of citizen participaton in school issues. The Independents, by contrast, have consistently opposed -- albeit discreetly -- the kind of citizen participation embodied in an ad hoc citizen's committee. The Independent coalition likes to satisfy the needs of the supporters in a quiet, personal fashion, and it is uncomfortable with the open and often vociferous behavior of the ad hoc groups. Its opposition to such methods was further sharpened by the fact that most of the vocal citizens groups were either supporters of the CCA or else politically to the left of the liberal CCA, and thus were viewed as opponents.

The most visible difference toward citizen participation occurred in 1971, during the effort to find a permanent superintendent of schools to replace interim superintendent Frank Frisoli. The CCA had a majority on the school committee, and it made a citizens advisory group a formal part of the screening process to select the new superintendent. However, the Independents co-opted two of the CCA's school committee members, and the new majority quickly appointed Frisoli as permanent superintendent, thereby circumventing a citizen's screening group that worked for months on this task.

Budgetary and Management Issues: In the school committee, control of the budget was the most direct way for committee members to exercise authority over the direction and policies of the school department. During the earlier years of this study, the superintendent of schools submitted a line item budget, so that the entire budget was submitted as an aggregate amount with no breakdown of the individual areas of expenditure. This meant that the school committee members had little or no authority to determine specific policies inherent in the allocation of budgetary resources. The CCA strongly opposed this method, and in 1970, after the departure of Tobin, the CCA won a change in the budgeting process which required the superintendent to submit a program budget.

Interestingly, the Independent coalition voted with the CCA in favor of program budgeting, even though they privately opposed it. The reason was that they did not want to take a public stand opposing it, since it contrasted with their public position of budgetary restraint. Instead, they gave the proposal unanimous support -- and then worked to oppose it at the implementation level. With the help of Frank Frisoli, they managed to delay the formal use of the program budgeting method until after Frisoli was forcibly removed from office in 1972.

In the area of management practices, both coalitions advocated reforms that would reduce the cost and increase the

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efficiency of the school department. However, the coalitions differed on their approaches to these problems. The CCA regularly proposed new positions that it thought would "professionalize" the school department. Although the Independents initially opposed these reforms, they soon found it more effective to concentrate on filling the new positions, thus increasing both control and patronage. Ironically, in 1970 the CCA found itself opposing a plan to decentralize secondary school administration while the Independents supported it. Although decentralization had long been a CCA goal, the proposed reorganization was intended to increase patronage rather than reform the school department administration, and thus the two coalitions took positions that seemed to contradict their long-standing beliefs.

As in other areas, many of these efforts did not translate into legislative voting positions. Instead, the most practical way to achieve coalitional ends was to pursue avenues outside the formal voting process, particularly by enlisting the support of the superintendent of schools. If an issue came down to a test of coalitional voting power, the legislative results reflected strong coalitional unity; however, the majority of the votes were not in this category. In general, the issues were often decided in arenas other than the school committee chambers and at times other than the Monday night meetings.

City Council

The Cambridge city council has nine representatives elected on an at large basis according to proportional representation. The top nine vote getters under the proportional representation system become the councilors, and the mayor is elected from among the nine successful candidates by the nine candidates. All nine officeholders serve two-year terms, and the mayor's vote on the council remains equal to that of all others. The mayor has few formal powers or functions, but does receive certain useful prerogatives, including a full-time staff, and the position of chairperson of the school committee.

The administrative duties of city government are handled by a city manager, who is appointed by a simple majority of the city council. The city manager serves at the pleasure of the council and can be removed at any time, although he may require that charges against him be put into writing and that a public hearing be held prior to his discharge. The city manager is the "chief administrative officer of the city, and shall be responsible for the administration of departments, commissions, boards and offices of the city -- except that of the city clerk, city auditor, any official appointed by the governor, or anybody elected by the voters of the city."[60]

By law, the city council is vested with "all the

legislative powers of the city" and thus has the formal responsibility for addressing the city's political and social problems. The city council allocates city resources and hires and fires all department heads upon the recommendation of the city manager. Lesser public employees are protected by civil service, and their jobs offer security and tenure.

While formal power is vested in the city council, much of the budgetary decision-making is determined by the information presented to the council by the city manager. In general, the city manager possesses both professional stature and a day-to-day familiarity with the problems of city government that the part-time city councilors usually lack. Therefore, on issues that are "administrative" rather than "political" the influence of the city manager is substantial. However, when the issue is one of significant political salience, then the city councilors are likely to take a more active role in resolving the question.

The Cambridge City Council meets every other Monday night at the Cambridge City Hall in Central Square to discuss the issues on the council agenda. These meetings are open to the public and are extremely formal in nature. Meetings are brought to order by the mayor, and matters are discussed according to an agenda prepared by the city manager.

In addition to the biweekly meetings, the councilors also meet in sub-committees which discuss particular issues and

make reports to the full council.   These sub-committees are composed of either the committee as a whole or two or three members and usually include at least one member from each coalition.   However, throughout the 1960-75 period, the CCA tended to have more representation on these sub-committees than the Independents, and sometimes occupied all the positions on a sub-committee.   In theory, the sub-committee reviews and studies a particular issue or group of issues which are of concern to the city government; in practice, this work rarely goes beyond a review of reports which are prepared by the city manager or one of the city's administrative departments.   The sub-committees do not have a paid staff and thus cannot gather information themselves.   This dependence on the city manager for information sharply curtails the independence of the sub-committees, since the information presented inevitably limits their possible choices and decisions.

As with the school committee, the city council is almost equally divided between the CCA and the Independents.   Indeed, during the period studied the two coalitions regularly split the nine city council positions on a 5-4 basis.   Since the electoral composition of the city throughout this period was approximately 60% pro-Independent, this shows that the CCA used proportional representation and coalitional cohesiveness to expand its political power.

In the electoral arena, the candidates regularly took positions on certain key issues confronting the community, and when the issues were sufficiently salient they generally carried out their campaign promises. However, most city government issues are relatively prosaic, and these decisions were left to the city manager. Often, the city manager formed an alliance with the mayor -- the only other official with a permanent, paid staff -- and between them they used the staff resources to dominate the less visible issues of city government.

Because the mayor was a highly visible, albeit relatively weak, titular head of city government, there was often rivalry among council members for the position. This was especially true of the Independent candidates, who sought to enhance their image and self-esteem by becoming the leading citizen of Cambridge. In the vote to select the mayor, the lines were often drawn for personal reasons, and the divisions became acrimonious. In some years, the city council would go through 1300 votes before a compromise was reached on the mayoral position.

This bitter rivalry may seem curious given the lack of substantive power, but it illuminates the dynamic between the coalitions. Invariably, when the Independents had a majority on the council, there were at least two people with ambitions for the mayor's office. This enabled the CCA to exploit its

cohesiveness and to arrange a compromise with one of the Independents, offering support in the mayoral contest in exchange for key political favors. Thus, despite holding a majority on the city council, the Independents lacked the cohesion to pick their own mayoral candidate, and instead allowed the CCA to act as "kingmakers."

If one considers the mayoral election a unique issue -- and it rightfully should be considered as such -- the coalitions exhibited relatively strong coalitional behavior on the city council. As Exhibit V-3 illustrates, the city council voted an average of some 1800 times each year. The majority of these votes were unanimous and a substantial number of the contested votes were of a procedural nature -- whether to adjourn or table a motion. In those cases where it was possible to identify a specific coalitional position, both the CCA and the Independents showed a cohesiveness of approximately 80% (Exhibit V-4). However, it should be further noted that in several cases the coalitional voting percentage was extremely high, and some councilors joined their coalition 90-95% of the time. In effect, it was the fifth, "swing" seat that broke most often with the coalition that claimed it, and thus the coalitional alliances were relatively durable in contested situations. Perhaps the most crucial statistic, however, is the fact that some 95% of the votes were unanimous, including many that one might expect to

EXHIBIT V-3: DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL CAMBRIDGE CITY COUNCIL VOTES BY ISSUE AREA, 1960 TO 1975

TERM IN OFFICE

ISSUE AREA	1/60-12/61		1/62-12/63		1/64-12/65		1/66-12/67		1/68-12/69		1/70-12/71		1/72-12/73		1/74-12/75		TOTALS	
	(n)	(%)	(n)	(%)	(n)	(%)	(n)	(%)	(n)	(%)	(n)	(%)	(n)	(%)	(n)	(%)	(n)	(%)
Personnel	13	0.8	8	0.6	19	1.2	12	0.8	18	1.0	14	0.7	39	1.9	43	2.2	183	1.3
Procedural	297	20.4	266	22.4	334	20.7	306	19.5	458	25.4	381	17.9	337	16.1	425	21.9	2804	20.3
Services	39	2.7	26	2.2	43	2.7	97	6.2	11	0.6	69	3.2	132	6.3	153	7.9	570	4.1
Budget	323	22.2	244	20.6	391	24.2	402	25.7	292	16.2	439	20.7	546	26.1	369	19.0	3006	21.8
Administration	422	29.1	315	26.5	454	28.1	381	24.3	610	33.8	686	32.3	579	27.8	548	28.2	3995	29.0
Traffic/ Signs/Streets	315	21.7	262	22.1	306	18.9	298	19.0	203	11.2	343	16.1	292	14.0	224	11.5	2243	16.3
Miscellaneous	43	3.0	64	5.4	68	4.2	70	4.5	205	11.4	192	9.0	165	7.9	181	9.3	988	7.2
Totals	1452	100.0	1187	100.0	1615	100.0	1566	100.0	1804	100.0	2124	100.0	2089	100.0	1943	100.0	13,789	100.0

EXHIBIT V-4: DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES BY COALITIONAL IDENTIFICATION,
CAMBRIDGE CITY COUNCIL, 1960 TO 1975

MEAN INDEX OF COALITIONAL COHESIVENESS

Term in Office	CCA	Independent	Mayor
1960-1961	.789	.748	.836 (Crane-CCA)
1962-1963	.812	.838	.759 (Crane-CCA)
1964-1965	.786	.792	.784 (Crane-CCA)
1966-1967	.835	.817	.852 (Hayes-Indep.)
1968-1969	.846	.806	.954 (Sullivan-Indep.)
1970-1971	.734	.780	.831 (Vellucci-Indep.)
1972-1973	.852	.793	.897 (Ackerman-CCA)
1974-1975	.895	.778	.818 (Sullivan-Indep.)
Mean	.819	.794	.842
Range	(.734-.895)	(.748-.834)	(.759-.954)**

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Expressed as decimal percent.

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For CCA affiliated city councilors serving as Mayors, the values of their
indices of coalitional cohesiveness as members of the city council:
.819 (mean); and .759 to .897 (range). Similarly, for the city councils
allied with the Independents, the values of their indices of coalitional
cohesiveness as members of the council are: .864 (mean); and .818-.954
(range).

be contested. This raises a suspicion that city council voting is not necessarily a reflection of political policy or opinion, but instead may reflect a mere ratification of political compromises made outside the visible legislative debate.

Although the city council sometimes votes on an issue of high visibility -- notably the selection of the city manager, the selection of the mayor, and the enactment of rent control legislation -- the majority of its votes were of a general "housekeeping" nature, aimed at maintaining the day-to-day machinery of city government rather than at establishing any broad policy initiatives. Frequently, the votes were little more than an affirmation of a proposal that had been initiated by the city manager and then submitted by one of the city council members. Individually these votes were relatively unimportant; in the aggregate, however, they determined much of the substance of the Cambridge city government.

The following is a survey of how the two dominant coalitions voted on the key issues of city government, as outlined in Chapter IV.

City Administration: Control of the administrative bureaucracies was key to both coalitions. In general, the two coalitions saw city government as serving profoundly different purposes, and these differences naturally translated into

differences of administrative structure and function. Issues of considerable political sensitivity included personnel choices, equipment purchases, administrative decisions, and other authorization choices that were either mandated by the nature and function of city government or were a logical consequence of existing programs.

In voting on administrative issues, the tendency was for the coalitions to "fight" the battle over policy before it ever came to an actual city council vote. This policy process included the work by the sub-committees, the intra-coalitional agreements, the inter-coalitional compromises and the subtle "nose-counting" at meetings which combined to give the coalitions a relatively clear picture of how a vote would turn out before it was decided. Thus, it was common to see a long series of unanimous votes in a city council meeting. This reflected the fact that most of the policy debates and ultimately the policy decisions took place outside the formal voting mechanism of the city council.

This cooperative voting dynamic resulted from a number of factors. The city council had a relatively long agenda of issues to address, and management of its work load required a certain degree of curtesy and cooperation. Failure to serve the minimum needs of the city was perceived as harmful to <u>all</u> incumbents, and so there was an incentive to "give in order to get." Although politically important, the issues facing the

city council tended to be prosaic, and thus had neither the visibility nor the emotion associated with issues in the school committee. To avoid mutually harmful impasses, the city council members developed a "norm of reciprocity" in many of the smaller areas of government, swapping favors in order to achieve the goals most important to them. Policy disagreements -- though important and enduring -- were resolved by a mechanism other than direct legislative voting.

Although most city council issues did not produce direct voting confrontations, there were a small number of key issues that did result in direct coalitional conflict. These included the mayoral vote, the selection of the city manager, and the approval of rent control. Each of these issues was characterized by voting that split along coalitional lines and by a willingness to assert a minority position on the issue even though there was no realistic chance of prevailing in the vote. In effect, these key issues were of such central importance to the coalitions that a more competitive norm of behavior was deemed appropriate by all participants.

Because of this situation, one might initially assume that the majority coalition at each election would use its power to either ratify the city manager or else replace him with a more suitable candidate. However, during the years 1960-75 a second factor also influenced the city manager selections. This factor might be called the "cohesiveness of

the minority" syndrome, wherein the coalition that was not in the majority often behaved in a more cohesive — and hence successful — manner than the majority coalition. In particular, both the CCA and the Independents had difficulty holding a majority coalition together on the city manager issue, and thus the minority coalition regularly "struck a deal" with the fifth member of the majority coalition to determine the city manager choice.

For example, in 1969, the CCA won a majority in the city council for the first time in 18 years and promptly fired James Sullivan, a city manager who was considered by most observers to be sympathetic to CCA policies. In the vote to replace him the CCA coalition fragmented, and the Independents succeeded in electing John Corcoran. In the next election, 1971, the CCA won a majority and became so fragmented over choosing Corcoran's successor that they eventually left him in office. Then, in 1973, the Independents won a majority, whereupon the CCA agreed to support Walter Sullivan for mayor in exchange for his support for rent control and the replacement of Corcoran with James Sullivan.

What this voting behavior illustrates is the paradoxical problem of trying to form a majority coalition when neither political coalition has a strong electoral majority. In particular, since the CCA and the Independents both needed to

stretch their coalitional boundaries to win the fifth, crucial seat, they often had difficulty keeping the coalitional majority unified, particularly when faced with issues that irritated internal divisions of the coalition. These problems were most apparent in the city manager and mayoral voting, where the issues created interests that transcended coalitional allegiance for the fifth and deciding member.

Urban Development: Urban and city development issues became increasingly important during the 1960's, and both coalitions initially favored development, although for different reasons. The CCA envisioned Cambridge as a model for urban liberal reform and promoted development projects consonant with their views of economic revitalization. The Independents saw development as an economic opportunity to be exploited for the benefit of local residents. Later, both coalitions turned partially against development projects, the CCA because some types of development were adverse to the interests of poor, elderly, and minority residents, and the Independents because the harms of neighborhood disruptions were greater than the benefits.

At all times during the urban development debate, however, the city council was characterized by fractionalized and idiosyncratic voting. Unlike the city administration issues, which usually went to the core of socio-economic

differences between the coalitions, the urban development issues often divided the electorate along non-coalition lines. In general, development projects tended to benefit all parties except those in the immediate area of the development, who were forced to bear significant burdens. The result was that a seemingly "liberal" development project might be strenuously opposed by a liberal CCA representative, who correctly read that his electoral base was opposed to a development project located in its neighborhood.

An example of these idiosyncratic city council votes came during the vote on the NASA project. In 1963, when the issue of whether to proceed with the NASA building was put to a formal vote, the city council approved the development project by a vote of 6-3. The project promised to bring a $40 million building to Cambridge, create new jobs, and generally upgrade the type of work opportunities available in the community. However, three councilors were opposed to this project: Vellucci and Sullivan of the Independent coalition and Coates of the CCA. Vellucci and Sullivan were opposed because the development would disrupt a major portion of East Cambridge, where their constituents worked and lived. Coates, a black CCA councilor, was opposed to the project because it would change the employment structure in Cambridge, eliminating the entry-level and less skilled positions that blacks occupied, while offering white collar jobs that were realistically

closed to the black work force. Thus, the voting was determined by whether each city councilor thought that his narrow and explicitly defined core of support would be positively or negatively affected by the project.

Traffic and Transportation: Although traffic and transportation issues were similar to urban development issues, the coalitions were significantly more cohesive in their voting. In general, traffic and transportation were major problems for Cambridge, and everyone agreed that action was imperative. In choosing the appropriate action, however, the council was divided by the attempts of various groups to push the burden of traffic improvements onto someone else. The coalitions developed distinct policies on the traffic/transportation questions, and within the coalitions the adherence to these policies was relatively strong, primarily because the impact of the transportation proposals divided neatly along the economic cleavages that defined the coalitions.

The CCA favored traffic reforms designed to relieve the congestion in the business districts of Cambridge. Their proposals included the founding of a traffic board, hiring a traffic director, aggressive ticketing for parking violations, and a system of one-way streets to maximize traffic flow. Although the Independents generally agreed with the CCA's

goals in traffic planning, they strenuously objected to these reforms. In particular, the Independents feared that the CCA proposals would drive shoppers and business away from the existing business districts, thereby harming the small shopkeepers that were a core group in the Independent coalition.

The interaction of the two coalitions in this area was illustrated by the founding of the Cambridge Traffic Commission. In 1961, the city council passed a resolution to establish the commission -- which included the paid traffic engineer and an unpaid three-member citizen's board -- by a vote of 7-2. The two dissenting votes were Independents John Lynch and Walter Sullivan. In effect, the vote represented an alliance between the CCA and half the Independent members on the city council. Shortly thereafter, a national search, the CCA-favored approach, produced a traffic engineer from Baltimore named Robert Rudolph, who was hired for the position.

Once Rudolph was in office, he began to implement a series of changes that included one-way streets, controlled traffic flow, and a new parking fine schedule. This quickly provoked the ire of the Independents, and they began to exert political pressure to prevent Rudolph from enacting his innovative reforms. In a curious, non-binding, city council vote Al Vellucci pressed the council into "disapproving" the

new parking fines, despite the fact that the council did not have the power to repeal the fines. The votes were 5-4 and 6-3 against the fines, with the five Independent councilors joining the majority on both occasions and three CCA councilors joining the opposition on both occasions. In effect, the Independents decided that the existing parking practices, however chaotic they might be, were better than a streamlined traffic system that benefitted suburban shopping malls at the expense of the small Cambridge shopkeepers.

In other areas of traffic and transportation -- especially the Red Line and the Inner Belt projects -- the coalitional behavior was similar to that in the more general urban development area. Again, these projects tended to be opposed by the councilors whose constituents would be disrupted by the development and favored by those whose constituents would benefit. In the case of the Inner Belt, the disruption to Cambridge would have been so massive that a majority of the city councilors opposed it. In the case of the Red Line, the city council approved the project, with dissent from the councilors whose constituents lived in the construction area.

Housing and Rent Control: Rent control was probably the single most important issue in Cambridge politics during the period studied. Rent control became an important issue in the

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mid-1960's and was the dominant issue difference between the two coalitions in every election after 1969. However, the CCA has managed to keep rent control in effect since 1971 despite losing its majority on the city council. This has been achieved by its cohesiveness on the issue and by its ability to award the mayoral position to the Independent candidate who offered the most advantageous compromise.

For example, in the 1973 elections, the Independents regained their 5-4 majority on the city council, and there was an initial expectation that they might repeal rent control. However, Independent councilor Al Vellucci had a personal dislike for landlords that could be traced to 1942, when he was in the Army and his wife and children were evicted from their apartment. Knowing this, the CCA counted on Vellucci's vote to retain rent control. In addition, to fortify their position, the CCA gave Walter Sullivan the four additional votes that he needed to become mayor, a position that he was known to covet, in exchange for his support on rent control and a few other key issues. Thus, on this most coalitional of issues, the CCA's unity and its ability to co-opt Independent support enabled it to retain rent control even though it had lost nominal control of the city council to the Independents.

Municipal Services: The allocation of municipal services is a central function of Cambridge city government, and both

coalitions wanted to control the distribution of these resources. During this time period, the coalitions did not seriously disagree on the amount of resources that should be devoted to municipal services, but rather battled over the nature and form that the services would take. As a result, the actual votes on municipal service issues in the city council were deceptively united: Both coalitions would support the expenditures necessary to initiate a new program, and then would fight to control implementation of the program, usually by attempting to place its own supporters in key positions within the city bureaucracy.

In the case of the Cambridge City Hospital, for example, the debate was not over the level of support given to the hospital -- both coalitions favored improving the facility -- but rather which medical areas and services the hospital would emphasize. The CCA favored an overall improvement in all medical services, with significant support being given to psychiatry, emergency medicine and pediatrics. The Independents likewise favored an overall improvement in services, but emphasized services that its constituents used most frequently, such as obstetrics. Another difference was over affiliation with Harvard Medical School, which the CCA favored and which the Independents opposed. All of these issues depended on the management of the hospital, and consequently coalitional conflict usually occurred over the

city council's appointment of personnel to key hospital positions, and not in the debates over funding.

Another key area of dispute was the police department. In general, the CCA and the Independents saw the police serving fundamentally different roles within the community, which reflected the kinds of police services that each group required. The Independents wanted a police force that was oriented toward street disturbance, such as drunkenness and bar fights on a Saturday night. The CCA, by contrast, envisioned a police force that cruised the quiet suburban streets of West Cambridge. As one would expect, the key issue for both coalitions was the appointment of personnel, particularly the appointment of the chief of police, and it was in this area that political energies were focused.

Comparative Analysis

In the two preceding sections, we examined the behavior of the coalitions in the two legislative arenas, the school committee and the city council. As demonstrated, the two coalitions generally attempt to implement the policy positions advocated in the city elections.

It is also evident that while the coalitions consistently pursue their different policy objectives, these differences do not regularly translate into antagonistic legislative voting patterns. The formal voting mechanism showed that in a vast

majority of occasions the coalitions voted unanimously, especially on "housekeeping" issues of relatively minor importance. Furthermore, even in areas where there were strong policy differences, these differences did not necessarily produce a voting split along coalitional lines. Instead, it was common for the coalitions to compete strenuously over the outcome of a policy decision and to do so in ways that preceeded or otherwise circumvented the formal voting procedure.

In a small number of important cases, however, the coalitions did split along coalitional lines, and the nature of these issues is revealing. The most frequent issue that produced straight coalitional voting was a personnel appointment, an issue that accurately reflected coalitional differences. Beyond this, the issues that tended to produce straight coalitional voting were those that both clearly and profoundly reflected the fundamental ideological differences in the coalitions. For example, rent control was an issue that divided the city council on coalitional lines, with the CCA in favor of rent control and the Independents (with the prominent exception of Al Vellucci) opposed to rent control.

This leads to the interesting conclusion that, while both coalitions had clear policy differences, and each coaliton tried to achieve its policy ends, the voting measurements do not present an accurate indication of coalitional attitudes.

Instead, one must recognize that each coalition often voted in ways that on the surface were inconsistent with its ideology, but which as a practical matter made political sense in advancing aggregate coalitional goals. Thus, rather than look at how frequently the coalitions opposed each other on votes, one might place greater emphasis on the frequency with which the coalitional members joined together behind a defined coalitional position.

The conclusion one can draw at this point is that the coalitions' influence often had little to do with voting on the issues. Rather, the coalitions, through the offices of individual members, can assert their influence in a number of informal ways, particularly when a member forms an effective working relationship with the superintendent schools or the city manager. Generally, the coalitional policies developed in the electoral arena, and expressed in the legislative arena, are often most effectively translated to the bureaucratic arena through the informal mechanism of personal contact rather than through the more formal mechanism of legislative voting.

Although personal contact is an important -- and perhaps the most important -- method of achieving coalitional goals, there remain a number of important issues that are shaped, defined, and resolved through legislative voting. In voting on these issues, legislative members were influenced by a

number of factors. First, members voted according to their personal preferences and those of their constituents. In general, the preferences of elected officials and their supporters were compatible with, and often mirrored, coalitional positions. There were, however, marked differences in the style and orientation of the two coalitions.

Another observation is the greater coalitional unity evident in the school board compared to the city council (See Exhibits V-2 and V-5). In general, both coalitions on the school committee exhibited greater coalitional unity than their counterparts on the city council. Indeed, where the school committee showed frequent coalitional splits on the 'litmus issues' that tested coalitional policy differences, the city council showed strong coalitional differences only on rent control and personnel appointments. The explanation posited here is that the level of coalitional unity differed between the two arenas because of political and structural differences between the school committee and city council.

To begin with, the school committee deals with a single issue area -- education -- and this means that the range of issues presented to it are necessarily more narrow than those considered by the city council. Similarly, the ideological connection between a policy position in one area of education and policy positions in other areas of education is strong, so

that it is natural for the members of both coalitions to have

consistent policy positions across the full spectrum of school

EXHIBIT V-5: DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES BY COALITIONAL IDENTIFICATION,
CAMBRIDGE SCHOOL COMMITTEE, 1960 TO 1975

MEAN INDEX OF COALITIONAL COHESIVENESS*

Term in Office	CCA	Independent	Mayor/Chairperson
1960-1961	.794	.855	.560 (Crane-CCA)
1962-1963	.816	.735	.855 (Crane-CCA)
1964-1965	.876	.705	.846 (Crane-CCA)
1966-1967	.897	.815	.650 (Hayes-Indep.)
1968-1969	.910	.881	.931 (Sullivan-Indep.)
1970-1971	.769	.754	.744 (Vellucci-Indep.)
1972-1973	.928	.775	.953 (Ackerman-CCA)
1974-1975	.913	.736	.905 (Sullivan-Indep.)
Mean	.863	.782	.806
Range	(.769-.928)	(.705-.881)	(.560-.953)**

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   Expressed as decimal equivalent.

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   For the CCA affiliated city councilors serving as Mayors and chairpersons
of the school committee, the values of their indices of coalitional
cohesiveness are: .804 (mean); and .560 to .953 (range). Similarly, for
the city concilors serving as Mayors and chairpersons of the school committee
and allied with the Independents, the values of their indices of coalitional
cohesiveness are: .808 (mean); and .650 to .931 (range).

department issues. Finally, the school committee was significantly smaller than the city council (six elected members versus nine), and this meant that successful candidates for office had to appeal to a larger and broader segment of the Cambridge voting public in order to win a seat. All of these factors encouraged a more uniform policy outlook on the part of school committee members.

This observation leads one to examine how coalitional behavior is influenced by the nature and structure of the legislative environment. This is particularly germaine because the two legislative bodies in question are drawn from the same geographic area and population, are elected on the same day every other year, and serve for the same two year period. Furthermore, the candidates are nominated by the same political coalitions, and (as demonstrated in Chapters III and IV) Cambridge voters will tend to support candidates from the same coalition for both legislative bodies. In effect, most electoral factors are identical for both legislative bodies, and so we can evaluate coalitional behavior in terms of two prominent variables: (1) the political function and purpose of the legislative body, and (2) the size and structural dynamic of the legislative body.

It should be noted that this type of comparison has unique characteristics. For example, one cannot compare a state legislature to the national legislature, since there is

not always a strongly perceived unity between the party candidates for state office and the party candidates for federal office. In addition, there are important differences in terms of key issues, voting patterns, and political units. However, Cambridge contains two legislatures whose members are elected under almost identical conditions. Indeed, the coalitions emphasize the ties between the two elections, and the voters tend to respond by giving a roughly comparable division of votes between each of the two legislative elections.

The tie between the two legislative bodies is enhanced by two factors. First, in the school committee elections, the electoral balance between the Cambridge coalitions is such that the six available seats invariably split between the coalitions by a ratio of 3-3. Because of the structure of city government, this means that the balance of power in the school committee depends on the choice of mayor, and thus the city council majority is the key to control of the school committee. This situation reinforced the coalitional strategy of treating the school committee and city council elections as an integrated event.

Complementing this was a "promotion" trend in the Cambridge elections, whereby a new candidate typically ran first for a school committee position and then later for a city council seat. In the 1960-75 period, no successful city

council candidate ever returned to the school committee, while a majority of the city council members had formerly served one or more terms on the school committee. This encouraged the view that the two legislative bodies were part of a simultaneous and closely-related electoral competition.

Given that the two legislatures are elected under highly similar conditions, the obvious question is how the coalitions compare in their legislative behavior. In particular, we can examine the following characteristics: (1) degree of coalitional unity on issues, (2) degree of unanimity on the legislature.

Exhibits V-2, V-3 and V-6 demonstrate some interesting differences between the two legislative arenas. A compilation of voting behavior shows that approximately 60% of the school committee votes were unanimous, while almost 95% of the city council votes were unanimous. At the same time, as noted earlier, on contested votes, where it was possible to identify competing coalitional positions, the degree of coalitional unity on the school committee was 80% for the Independent and 90% for the CCA, while on the city council the degree of unity was 80% for both coalitions.

These statistics give rise to a number of tentative observations. First, in the school committee the coalitions tended to be relatively stable, and strict coalitional voting was a relatively common phenomenon. The city council, by

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EXHIBIT V-6: UNCONTESTED VOTES AS PERCENT OF TOTAL VOTES CAST,
CAMBRIDGE CITY COUNCIL AND CAMBRIDGE SCHOOL COMMITTEE,
1960 TO 1975

A. CITY COUNCIL

Term in Office		Percent
1960-1961		94.8
1962-1963		96.0
1964-1965		92.9
1966-1967		95.2
1968-1969		97.2
1970-1971		93.1
1972-1973		92.5
1974-1975		96.2
	Mean	95.2
	Range	92.5-96.2

B. SCHOOL COMMITTEE   Percent

Term in Office		Percent
1960-1961		52.7
1962-1963		55.3
1964-1965		58.2
1966-1967		57.2
1968-1969		74.8
1970-1971		57.6
1972-1973		43.4
1974-1975		56.3
	Mean	56.9
	Range	43.4-74.8

contrast, showed a greater tendency for individuals to break on coalitional votes. Indeed, each year, there were fewer than 10 votes out of 1800 where the city council voted on strictly coalitional lines. In effect, the city council tended to show voting behavior that was more idiosyncratic, less unified, and less cohesive from a coalitional standpoint.

Beyond the statistics, however, it is important to leaven the numbers with observations. The school committee -- even in periods of radicalism and political activism -- tended to have fewer outbreaks of factionalism or paralyzing political impasses. By contrast, the city council often suffered fractionalizing political pressures, and here the coalitions had less ability to shape and limit political issues. Thus, while the school committee had a far higher percentage of contested votes, its ability to produce coherent policy from these disputes was better. On the other hand, the city council, though less fractious as a percentage of total votes, was more likely to find itself deadlocked on a key contested issue.

These observed differences between the two legislative bodies, and more particularly between the roles played by the coalitions in shaping policy outcomes, can be attributed to the following factors: electoral base, issue scope, small group dynamics, legislative structure and behavior, issue salience, norm of reciprocity and professionalism.

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Electoral Base: The school committee members were elected on

an at-large basis to fill six seats, which meant that they

needed a relatively broad base of support to compete

successfully for a position.   Because of proportional

representation, this generally meant that the candidates were

more dependent on coalitional support to obtain the necessary

majority.

The city council members, by contrast, were elected on an

at-large basis to fill nine seats, and thus needed one-third

fewer votes to achieve success.   This substantially narrower

electoral   base   allowed for a more specific   group of

supporters, which enabled the candidate to be less dependent

on the coalitions and at the same time more dependent on

serving the particular constituency.   In this context, it is

not surprising that the city council tended to be less unified

in terms of coalitional voting, particularly on issues such as

city development that had a highly specific impact on diverse

segments of the electorate.

Issue Scope: The school committee by its nature focused on a

single issue area: education.   There is often a strong

ideological link between the key issues of education, and thus

on most issues the two coalitions had well-defined ideological

positions.   One might note that policy views on education tend

to be related to socio-economic background, and thus a particular voter was likely to have an attitude toward education that was shared with most other members of his or her socio-economic group.

The city council, by contrast, addressed more diverse political areas, some of which called into question fundamental issues of ideology. Consequently, the socio-economic basis of the coalitions gave the members a solid intra-coalitional unity. On the other hand, there were many issues which had a more selective, localized impact, and did not emphasize the common socio-economic background. Such issues arose far more regularly in the city council, and thus city council members more often faced issues where their personal and/or constituent viewpoint differed from the coalitional position.

Small Group Dynamics: The number of members in each legislative body (seven for the school committee and nine for the city council) also contributed to the distinctive dynamic. Because it was smaller, the school committee could enjoy an easier, more manageable coalitional majority. The city council, by contrast, had a numerically greater probability of introducing personality clashes or ideological conflicts between members of each coalition.

<u>Legislative Structure and Function</u>: The school committee served in an area where the number of issues was small and relatively concise. In a given year, the school committee voted on an average of 200 issues. Moreover, the school committee had no sub-committees to review and present issues and so the formal meeting was the main forum for discussion and compromise. Naturally, an open and often-publicized debate can be an ineffective mechanism for achieving concensus, because once politicians adopt a position then political "face-saving" considerations can hamper the ability to reach compromises.

The city council, by contrast, addresses approximately 1800 votes in the average year. To handle this number of issues, the city council used sub-committees, which were typically private meetings where the councilors could express their views, argue, and reach a concensus without being locked into politically visible positions. In turn, the sub-committee system encouraged the larger political body to defer to the work of sub-committees and to ratify the compromises that it produced. This helped account for the larger percentage of unanimous votes in the city council compared to the school committee.

<u>Issue Salience</u>: The school committee often dealt in issues that were more "emotional" than the political problems

addressed by the city council. Subjects such as homosexual teachers, sex education, bussing, and school integration had a visceral impact on the electorate and produced conflict-oriented politics in the school committee.

By contrast, the city council dealt in the more mundane issues of municipal governance. City councilors tended to be more professional in their political skills, and they played by unwritten rules to keep the political stakes low on everyday issues. The city councilors also had a wider range of issues where they deferred to the sub-committees, or where the mechanism of compromise was almost automatic.

<u>Norm of Reciprocity</u>: There are key issues that define the competition between the two Cambridge coalitions. In the school committee, issue differences are highly visible, and by their nature are resolved by school committee voting power. Thus, for example, sex education policies almost guaranteed a voting conflict in the school committee.

The city council, by contrast, had many issues of policy that were resolved by personnel appointments. Consequently voting decisions were not on issues central to the coalitional differences. Instead, a typical city council vote was on a street sign, and here an unwritten code came into play. If one councilor challenged the necessity of a street sign, it could open a pandora's box of destructive conflicts and

recriminations. Afterall, delivering such mundane goods is a key function of the councilor, and if the goods are not delivered the constituents become angry. Thus, what might be called a "norm of reciprocity" developed, whereby the councilors would support basic decisions on resource allocation that favored one councilor, knowing that it would produce a return favor on a similar vote later. Although issues occasionally arose that produced political conflict, the norm of reciprocity was both useful and necessary to complete all the decisions required from the city council in the course of the year.

Professionalism: Although the norm of reciprocity was a necessary condition for successful functioning of the city council, the nature of Cambridge politics ensured that the city councilors were of a more "professional" caliber than the school committee members. In general, the councilors were political "pros" who wanted results, and who did not want to argue except when necessary. The city councilors had been socialized into norms of compromise that are necessary to accomplish substantial numbers of tasks.

The school committee members, by contrast, were younger, less experienced, and more ideologically committed. They tended to enjoy the confrontation and publicity attendant to a heated political debate. Since their work load was

substantially lower than the city councilors, they had enough time to "waste" on debates. Ultimately, they lacked the experience of the city councilor, and thus took more time and energy to reach their resolutions simply because they were less adept at settling their differences in a quiet manner.

In summary, we can draw the following conclusions about the role of the Cambridge coalitions and their function in each of the two legislative arenas. The smaller number of positions meant that each candidate needed a larger base of support, which under the proportional representation system increased their dependence on the coalitional apparatus. School committee candidates thus had a greater basis for unity and cooperation. This tendency was further encouraged by the nature of the educational issues, which tended to conform to the natural division in the competing ideologies between the two coalitions. Thus, all factors emphasized greater coalitional unity in the school committee.

The city council by contrast, had a larger number of positions chosen from the same electoral base, and so the councilors tended to be identified with a more specific electorate. In turn, the candidates paid greater attention to their constituents, and thus were less likely to join in a coalitional concensus on a particular issue, especially if it was politically volatile among their supporters. This was especially true of the fifth seat -- the marginal ethnic

candidate -- but also applied in a lesser degree to all city council members. In addition, issues with the potential to cleave the coalition occurred rather frequently on the city council as a result of its broader political functions.

Notwithstanding these differences, the coalitions played similar roles in each legislative arena. The CCA organized a concensus on many of the issues where the CCA candidates did have ideological unity, and this enabled them to maximize the political dividends of this unity. The CCA, for example, could orchestrate relatively sophisticated intra-coalitional agreements so that political policies could be advanced and implemented. In effect, the two coalitions kept the city council from becoming even more fractionalized than it already was. Thus, while the city council members felt both free and compelled to dissent from the coalition on certain issues, they saw the benefit of forming a coalitional concensus on all but the most volatile of issues. Thus, while the city council was less rigid than the school committee in its coalitional loyalties, the coalitions still played an important and effective organizing function.

Summary and Conclusions

The behavior of the Cambridge coalitions in the two legislative arenas indicates that the coalitions did attempt to translate issue preferences of the electorate into

concrete public policy. Indeed, in some issue areas the
ability of the respective coalitions to win in the electoral
arena determined the public policy enacted in the legislative
arena. On such issues the position of each coalition was
clearly defined, publicly recognized, and consistently
implemented.

Beyond this, however, the evidence presented in this
chapter suggests that policy implementation at the local
government level differs from that of the state and federal
levels. In particular, local governmental policy decisions
are frequently determined at the implementation level rather
than by the actions of the legislative bodies, and thus in
many cases the coalitions cannot implement policy preferences
merely by unified coalitional voting behavior. Rather, the
coalitional members can achieve their policy goals most
effectively through indirect mechanisms, including control
over the appointment of key bureaucratic personnel, personal
relationships with the city manager or superintendent of
schools, and active participation in the implementation of
policy programs. In effect, the practical limitations on
local legislative bodies -- including lack of time, lack of
expertise, and lack of staff resources -- makes legislative
voting a relatively limited method for achieving concrete
policy objectives. Thus, except in areas like rent control,
budgetary allocation, or personnel appointments the

legislative members must turn to other, non-voting methods in order to influence policy content.

Another aspect of local governmental behavior described in this chapter is the extent to which local political representatives pursue the narrow interests of their constituent base, even when those interests clash with those of the larger coalition. In general, school committee members and city councilors know who their constituents are, and they are consistent in representing the interests of that specific group. Thus, for example, "marginal ethnic" candidates like David Fantini and Elaine Butler, who were elected as part of the CCA coalition, broke with the CCA freely when the interests of their constituents differed from the dominant CCA position. In general the elected representatives at the local government level seem extremely conscious of representing the policy preferences of their constituents, and the need to represent constituent preferences on a consistent basis takes precedence over loyalty to the coalition. This behavior reflects the fact that the benefits of coalitional support -- primarily in the form of transfer votes during elections -- is regarded as less valuable than the benefits of serving constituent needs or preferences.

One might posit that this behavior is especially true in the arena of local politics. In state or national elections, the endorsement of the major political party brings with it a

number of important advantages, including recognition, legitimacy, valuable support from other members of the same party, and financial resources funnelled through the parties to individual candidates. By contrast, the Cambridge coalitions operate in an environment where recognition is likely to be strong, and where the coalition can offer little in the way of financial or electoral support beyond the benefits of transfer voting. Thus, if the goal of a rational candidate is to get himself or herself re-elected, then it makes sense to break with the coalition on key issues where the coalitional position varies from that of core supporters.

In the end, however, the coalitions played an important role in both legislative arenas. The fact that two main groupings existed in the city council created a strong impetus towards establishing two competing answers to each policy question. In effect, the coalitions served to focus the policy debate, avoiding situations where multiple splinter groups might prevent the legislature from reaching any position on important policy issues. Although members of one coalition might join the other coalition on a particular vote, this did not prevent each coalition from developing consistent policy positions and from winning its share of policy victories.

FOOTNOTES

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[5]Ibid., p. 105.

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[7]Ibid., pp. 144 and 285.

[8]William S. White, Citadel: The Story of the U.S. Senate, New York: Harper, 1957; and, Joseph S. Clark, et. al., The Senate Establishment, New York: Hill and Want, 1963. See also James MacGregor Burns, The Deadlock of Democracy, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963.

[9]Clark, Senate Establishment, pp. 99-103.

[10]See White, Citadel, p. 87, for a description of how "bleak and languid frowns" from the Senate patriarchs killed a piece of legislation on which "they felt they had been inadequately consulted."

[11]Matthews, op. cit.

[12]Ibid., p. 121.

[13]Ibid., pp. 123 and 127.

[14]Ibid., p. 144.

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[28]Ibid., p. 50.

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CHAPTER VI

THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL COALITIONS ON THE SUPERINTENDENT

OF SCHOOLS IN THE CITY OF CAMBRIDGE

Introduction

In their analysis of the EDA's failure to provide new jobs for minorities in Oakland, Pressman and Wildavsky defined implementation as the "ability to carry out, accomplish, fulfill, produce, complete (governmental policies)."[1] From this definition, one would expect the executive branch of government to be most directly involved in administering the policies and programs mandated by the legislature. For most Federal and state governmental agencies and actors, this has, indeed, been the case. In local municipalities, however, a different pattern has been observed, and one which is derived primarily from constraints inherent in the institutional arrangements of the local governments. Serving part-time and lacking specialized expertise and staff assistance, the representatives elected to local legislative forums are more likely to become dependent upon the paid professionals whom they had hired to manage the city and its public agencies. Thus, the executive branch tends to expand its activities until it has substantial impact on both the initiation and the implementation of public policy.

In view of the school committee's inability to play a dominant role in the policy process, one might ask: Who, if anyone, assumed responsibility for the formulation of educational policy for the city's schools? As the school department's chief executive officer and its principal liaison agent, the superintendent was vulnerable to pressures from organized interests both in the community and on the school committee. As such, were he to expand his role in the policy process by assuming responsibility for the formulation of educational policy, it is highly probable that his vulnerability to these pressures would increase. However, it remains to be seen under what conditions his vulnerability would be most pronounced and to which groups would he be most responsive and accessible. Similarly, one might question the impact of the various factions within the school department. Mirroring the basic liberal-conservative cleavages in the community, would these groups be more likely to support or oppose the programmatic and policy initiatives of the superintendent and his staff? And, if so, how much and in what manner would their activities influence the policy process and its outcomes in the Cambridge public schools?

Previous studies have shown that a number of factors--political, environmental and organizational--influence the decision-making process in public sector agencies, particularly those engaged in the delivery of educational

services to the community. These include: widespread dissatisfaction with the status quo; effective, timely and compatible leadership; consensus regarding the organization's goals and the means of attaining them; sufficient resources, human and financial, to accomplish the proposed tasks; and, perhaps most important, widespread support for, and committment to, the proposed policies and programs, particularly by those actively involved in their initiation and implementation. Furthermore, the ability to translate community dissatisfaction with existing educational policies into effective responses by the school committee and the superintendent of schools varied with differences in the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the communities and school districts involved, the types of issues raised, and the personal attributes and ideological orientations of the school superintendents and other community leaders.

For the city of Cambridge and its public schools the partisan activities of the community's dominant coalitions were central to the policy process and its outcomes, particularly in their ability: to define group needs and goals; to aggregate support, electoral and otherwise, for their positions on issues; and to establish and maintain intra-group cohesiveness between elections among both their elected representatives and their supporters in the community.

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In view of their successful efforts in the community's electoral and legislative political arenas, it will be interesting to see how effective the two coalitions are in organizing and sustaining pressure on the superintendent and the school committee and thus facilitating the initiation and implementation of policies compatible with their goals and the needs and preferences of their supporters.

Implicit in the preceding discussion of the decision-making process has been the notion that policy guidelines and their programmatic responses are generally innovative in form, content and impact. If, as one suspects, the superintendent of schools were the principal agent in the initiation and implementation of educational policy, it is highly probable that he or she would also be key to the introduction of innovations, or "alterations in the behavior patterns of people, in the organization's technology, or in its structure,"[2] into the community's public schools. As such, in the following analysis, the superintendent's involvement in the decision-making process will be viewed from the perspective of his role as a facilitator or an inhibitor of change. Further, an attempt will be made to assess the impact of previously mentioned factors, most especially the activities of the two coalitions, on the adoption and implementation of new policies in the city's schools.

Accordingly, this chapter will examine the opportunities

available to, and the constraints operating on, the superintendent, particularly as he seeks to initiate and to implement educational policies that are new or innovative. To provide a focal point for this discussion, we will begin with a review of the literature on the decision-making process in educational bureaucracies. Second, we will examine the policy-making process as it operates in the Cambridge public school system, with special emphasis on developing models to describe the political process. Third, we will review the administrations of the people who occupied the superintendent's position in the Cambridge public system between 1960 and 1975, focusing on the application of the models developed in the preceding section. We will present a summary of the chapter, analyzing the nature of the Cambridge political dynamic and the role played by the political coalitions shaping and defining key policy decisions.

The Superintendent of Schools: A Review of the Literature:

Much of the criticism directed at American public schools in recent years has revolved around the charge that, instead of the general public--or even powerful segments of it-- determining educational policy, professional educators themselves have gained an upper hand in policy making while at the same time enjoying substantial insulation from public opinion and accountability.[3] According to the critics, this

state of affairs is not only undemocratic but, because it favors the status quo and the vested interests of educators, is also a leading reason for the failure of public education to response adequately to the diverse and changing needs of the many publics that it is supposed to serve.[4] Yet, as widespread as this view has come to be, there still remain some notable dissenters, who maintain that far from dominating the local educational policy-making process, educators are more likely to be struggling with a variety of interest groups and forces that not infrequently threaten to neutralize their ability to provide any kind of effective leadership.[5] Thus, McCarty and Ramsey conclude that, as a result of the increasing politicization of education, one can hardly avoid the view that today's educational administrator is engulfed in a pressure-packed set of constraints."[6]

The focus of the debate about who controls local educational policy making has centered mainly upon the role of the school superintendent and his supporting administrative bureaucracy. On the one hand, the superintendent is presented as an educational expert who typically dominates educational policy making by virtue of his key strategic advantages over a school board composed of laypeople. The advantages include claims of technical expertise, a command of the jargon of a specialized policy making area, the ability to control the flow of information about the school system, a full-time

supporting administrative staff--as compared to the part-time board members who lack independent staff support--and the widespread acceptance of the view that educational policy-making should be nonpartisan and nonpolitical. On the other hand, as the comment by McCarty and Ramsy suggests, the superintendent is pictured as a beleaguered public official, typically beset from all sides, constantly facing conflictual situations and being forced to seek support and build coalitions in order to obtain the acceptance of even part of his preferred educational program. Amidst this whirlpool of forces, both internal andexternal to the school system, all but the most skilled political strategist is likely to be rendered ineffective.

According to the dominant school of thought, the ascendancy of the superintendent of schools came about largely as a result of the reform movement at the turn of the twentieth century. Because of the public reaction against widespread corruption in government and alleged inefficiency in industrial management, reformers succeeded in transforming not only the governance of American municipalities but also that of American school systems. The new model of educational governance sought to insulate the schools from the seaminess of politics and to promote efficiency in management through the application of professional administrative expertise.[7] The main components of this new model were: the separation of

educational government from municipal government; the election of school board members on a nonpartisan, at-large basis; the selection and promotion of teachers according to a strict merit system rather than by patronage and favoritism; and the employment of professionally trained educational experts to preside over and administer the school system. Thesestructural changes were reinforced by the promulgation and general acceptance of a set of normative propositions which emphasized that a wide range of educational questions were essentially technical matters beyond the capacity of the public to decide, and that, in any case, "politics had no proper place in education."[8] Thus, the corporate board rather than the political forum was advanced as the correct model for school boards to emulate.

According to this view, there was only one legitimate interest, the public interest. It followed, therefore, that educational programs ought not to be differentiated according to the parochial and, hence, the illegitimate desires of various classes, ethnic groups and subcommunities.[9] On the strength of their claims to expertise as professionally trained administrators, school superintendents were viewed as better qualified than their school board members to make what were held to be the essentially technical judgments necessary to develop a general andefficient educational program. Thus, in this fashion was developed the role of the chief school

officer as a statesperson-like educational expert, a professional administrator who exerted extraordinary leadership and influence in policy making primarily as a result of the weight that he or her recommendations carried with nonpartisan lay boards.[10]

In more recent years, some studies have concluded that school boards are frequently transformed into "rubber stamps" for the approval and legitimation of policies developed by the superintendent and his or her staff.[11] In an analysis of two suburban school districts, Norman Kerr persuasively documents an array of factors that promote the likelihood that school board members will have an attenuated relationship with their constituents and will be socialized and co-opted into adopting the school administration's point of view.[12] Using data from their national survey of more than eighty school boards, Zeigler and Jennings support Kerr's conclusions that, for the most part, school boards do not govern but merely legitimate the policy recommendations of school superintendents.[13] Moreover, rather than being representatives of the public, "boards are likely to become spokesmen for the superintendent to the community."[14]

This picture of the dominating school superintendent is a far cry from that depicted by school administrators themselves, or by observers sympathetic to them. The politicization of education during the 1960's transformed the

role of the superintendent—so much so that many superintendents began to view their job as essentially impossible.[15] Maeroff has summarized these sentiments voiced at the recent meeting of the American Association of School Administrators as follows:

> "The American school superintendent, long the benevolent ruler whose word was law, has become a harried embattled figure of waning authority for whom the ledger book has grown as vital as the textbook. Squeezed by financial constraints, facing directives from courts and legislatures, brow-beaten by once-subservient boards of education, teachers associations and parents, the superintendent can scarcely be blamed if he feels he has lost control of his destiny—much less the destiny of the schools.[16]

Similarly, Erickson has noted that:

> "Administrative powerlessness of becoming one of the most pervasive realities of organizational life. Financial constraints, teacher bargaining, community protests, and disagreements about educational ends and means prevent most superintendents from acting like the 'movers and shakers' they once may have hoped to become. Almost everywhere, school principals say their perogatives are being eroded by militant teachers, students, and parents.[17]

From these remarks, it is evident that many of the forces which now constrain school superintendents emanate from

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outside the local community. Thus, one might argue that superintendents tend to dominate their school boards but are nontheless frequently handcuffed by a variety of other, largely extra-community, forces.[18] Still, this argument does not deal with the persistent contention that community forces, such as vocal parents, powerful elites, and quarrelsome school boards, are complicating factors in the lives of educators.

Indeed, research purporting to show that community influences tend to shape and define the role the superintendent of schools has continued to accumulate since the early work of Counts, Warner, and Hollingshead.[19] Much of this research has been conducted within the tradition of the "community power structure" approach pioneered by Floyd Hunter,[20] and most of it is flawed by the same conceptual and methodological problems which plagued Hunter's work.[21] A well-known example is Kimbrough's study of rural southern school districts.[22] As Kirst has noted, despite questionable methodological procedures, Kimbrough may have been correct in concluding that a small informal elite wielded decision influence in school policy making in these districts.[23] This is because research suggests that "power elite" is most likely to exist in small and stable rural communities.[24] However, Kirst concludes, from his review of the educational politics literature, that neither power elites nor other community forces (for example, community organizations) are likely to

control educational policy in urban and suburban communities. Instead, influence in urban and suburban communities is most often concentrated in the hands of persons who "hold (now or in the past) official positions in educational institutions or public affairs."[25]

However, the issue seemed to have been reopened by the publication of a study by McCarty and Ramsey of fifty-one communities (sixteen rural, ten suburban, fourteen small urban and eleven large urban) in the northeastern and midwestern United States.[26] In contrast to studies of school politics which argue that power is usually controlled by a small group of powerful citizens, McCarty and Ramsey recognized from the outset, and were able to document, that power structures vary from community to community. They found that there was a consistent association between the type of power structure present in the community and the structure of power on the school board and that the latter tended to determine the kind of role that the superintendent would or could play. In communities dominated by monolithic power structures, the school board was usually also dominated, which reduced the superintendent to the role of a functionary. Where two approximately equal factions contended for power in the community, the school board typically was factional and the superintendent was forced to adopt the role of a political strategist. In pluralistic communities, school board members

tended to be relatively independent and, as no one interest was dominant on the board, were inclined to discuss problems thoroughly, look to the superintendent for advice and act on the merits of the case. In this situation, the superintendent was expected to perform as a professional advisor. Finally, some communities were found to be characterized by inert power structures, that is, situations in which power relations were essentially amorphous and no consistent patterns of leadership could be discerned. School boards in such communities were inclined to be passive and simply to endorse the policies proposed by their superintendent. In such situations, the superintendents played the role of the decision maker.

As already suggested by Kirst and more recently in a review of the literature by Peterson,[27] the difficulty with McCarty and Ramsey's study, is that the bulk of research on American educational politics presents findings which are inconsistent with their central thesis that decision-making will usually be controlled by the most powerful group or groups of citizens in the locality. Thus, most research indicates that instead of being dominated by a powerful elite or being influenced by coalitions which shift with the issue (the pluralist contention), local educational policy making is generally dominated by the influence of the top school administrators. While certain types of issues constitute exceptions to this generalization, partly because they involve

matters for which school superintendents can claim little special expertise to bolster their influence, the overall pattern has been widely confirmed. Unfortunately, it is at this point that analyses of the control of educational policy making typically stop.

As Charters observed in his penetrating critique, studies which examine the social control of public education must take account of both community-derived and school system-professional forces.[28] To examine the ways in which community and professional influences vie and interact, Iannaccone and Lutz undertook an in-depth analysis of a single case study, augmented by statistical analyses of 117 California school districts, in which they found that communities undergoing substantial social and economic change ultimately tend to experience a significant shift in the balance of community power which decisively affects educational policymaking.[29] While they found that the school authorities, the school board and the superintendent typically tend to become autonomous and isolated from the community, they discovered that a significant socioeconomic change in the community will usually lead in a few years to electoral conflict, then to the defeat of an incumbent school board member, and finally to a change in the control of the board followed by the involuntary separation of the superintendent, and his replacement by a new superintendent in accord with the values of the new school

board.   By this series of developments, communities reassert their   control   of school policy-making structures which   have failed   to   respond   adequately to the desires   of   a   changed constituency. As Peterson has observed, Iannaccone and Lutz's analysis suggests that:

> "At any given point in time school
> board decision-making can appear to be
> closed and autonomous, but over time a
> school   system   may   nonetheless   be
> responsive   to   the   wants   and
> aspirations of a particular community.
> No   matter   how   powerful   a
> superintendent may appear, he is still
> selected   by   the   community   whose
> schools he administers."[30]

If the community exerts itself only occasionally and the professional   educators   are   dominant   and   otherwise unresponsive, then   the   school board can   do   little   except alternate   between a legitimating and a safety valve function. But, as important as the latter function is, there is reason to believe that in most school districts the community and school board's influences are felt in significant ways other than just at key points in time.   Thus, to the concept of episodic community control of school policy making arising from periodic political crises, one should add the notion of continuing, but variable, community influence manifested in both direct and indirect forms.   There is evidence to suggest that this ongoing community influence is such that in many,

perhaps even most, school districts the superintendents (and their school boards as well) usually attempt to act in harmony with what they perceive as the predominant community expectations concerning the community's public schools. Within what Charters called the "margin of tolerance"[31] and McGivney and Moynihan have more recently called the "zone of tolerance" (that is, "the lattitude or area of manueverability granted [or yielded] to the leadership of the schools by the local community"), school officials are free to run the school system according to their professional desires and beliefs.[32] However, when the authorities exceed the boundaries of the zone of tolerance (which may be broad or narrow and clearly or poorly defined), they come into conflict with values dear to the particular community and face the likelihood of controversy and opposition. Since for pragmatic political reasons, school administrators usually seek to avoid conflict, it is unlikely that they will very often attempt to give the community other than what the community "wants."

To the extent that the public is poorly informed or indifferent about educational services, the vagueness of what the community "wants" may contribute to the breadth of the zone of tolerance. But even uninformed and relatively apathetic communities will respond if educators act in ways that threaten important community values. Moreover, the latitute educators gain from the low levels of information

possessed by lower status groups is partially offset by the reluctance of such groups, and their elected officials, to defer to professional expertise. Conversely (and paradoxically), the closer scrutiny of educational policy by higher status groups if partially offset by the propensity of such groups, and their representatives, to defer to expertise.[33]

Moreover, to the extent that educators are persuasive and skillful in the use of public relations techniques, they may be able to modify the community zone of tolerance to some degree and reduce the extent to which it constrains them. Below the grossest level of generalization, however, what the community "wants" may be quite unclear and, even more important, significant groups within the community may have conflicting desires. Furthermore, it seems clear that in some school districts, especially large urban districts, the school authorities are able to ignore community opinion and desires and then "ride out" the ensuing community controversy. Thus, the extent to which ongoing community influence is sufficient to constrain the autonomy of educators clearly varies significantly according to the circumstances.

Broadly speaking, it would appear that the extent of ongoing community influence vis-a-vis the professional educators will vary primarily with the type of school district and the type of issue of policy question faced. First, the

effects of size, degree of urbanism and heterogeneity of school districts should be considered. As Peterson has noted, Iannaccone and Lutz's analysis points to a significant difference between big city and suburban school politics:

> "If relatively small, relatively homogeneous suburban districts can periodically force school boards and administrators to respond to a changing community, this process is far more difficult in a large central city. Major changes in a large city as a whole occur much more slowly, no matter how much certain neighborhoods may be changing. And boards and administrators are quite free from electoral reprisals when considering demands emanating from any particular neighborhood. Moreover, the bureaucratic structure of a large city school system is so complex that a change in a school superintendent cannot have the same consequences it might have in a smaller community."[34]

It would appear that professional dominance of educational policy making is at its greatest in large city school systems. However, this picture of professional dominance gives way to a more differentiated pattern in suburban, small town and rural school districts, where professional influence, though substantial, often is significantly circumscribed. Indeed, Zeigler and Jennings found that although public demands and the level of school board activity increased with the degree of urbanism, the probability of a board victory over the superintendent (that

is, the presumed potency of opposition) decreased at the same time.[35] Further, they suggest that smaller, less urban communities use informal networks to communicate political information and that, as a result, the board can dominate its superintendent when necessary. By contrast, larger, more urban communities require formal channels for demand-articulation and the like. In this context, the superintendent, who has expertise and privileged information that can be exploited in a formalistic setting, can more effectively thwart board control.[36]

Contrasting the impact of reform structures and urbanism, Zeigler and Jennings contend that reform measures, such as the replacement of partisan, by-wards elections with nonpartisan, at-large elections, have substantially reduced the public control of education by insulating school boards from their constituencies, and by enhancing the power of school superintendents.[37] However, their data show that it is the degree of urbanism, rather than whether districts are reformed, that essentially defines both the quantity of group activity and the attitude of board members toward that activity. Thus, districts in metropolitan areas are higher on group activity than those outside metropolitan areas; and boards in metropolitan areas are more responsive to group demands, while boards in non-metropolitan areas are more responsive to individualized sources of preferences and

cues.[38]   By contrast, electoral structures (reformed vs.
unreformed), simply mediate the more profound effects
established by the degree of urbanism.[39]

Thus, it is difficult to sustain the popular argument
that "reform" has greatly altered the character of school
politics.   In this regard, Peterson observed that "there is
little research that demonstrates that strong, competitive
political parties in school politics (or local politics, in
general, for that matter) reduce the autonomy of
administrators or compel policy makers to be more responsive
to various segments of the community."[40]   Consequently, it
seems reasonable to inquire further into the impact of
environmental variables.

The size and social complexity of suburbs, small towns
and rural communities tends to be conducive to powerful
informal networks of influence not only because such
communities are smaller but also because they are more
homogeneous than cities.[41]   Drawing upon his research in urban
and suburban school districts, Lyke has argued that community
homogeneity promotes the likelihood that school officials will
try to anticipate the demands of community groups while
formulating educational policy.[42]   They will be inclined to do
this, Lyke's research suggests, because although

> "citizen participation (in educational
> affairs) is low ... it is not absent
> and educators worry a great deal about

being threatened by it. Major defeats
of educators have occurred just often
enough--if not in (their) communities,
then in neighboring ones--for
educators consciously to frame
policies and programs that will be
acceptable to an overwhelming majority
of the potentially active".[43]

Thus, according to this analysis, the periodic crises of
school politics, which activate the "safety valve" function of
the school board, ought not to be treated as merely exceptions
to the rule, but should be seen as events which significantly
influence the balance of power between the professionals and
the public in the ongoing school policy making process.

However, the consequences of the periodic crises in
school politics are not the same in all communities. If these
crises sensitize school officials to the threat of opposition
and defeat, and promote their desire to avoid conflict, it is
nevertheless true that in heterogeneous communities it is
difficultg for school officials to anticipate and satisfy
community demands. To accede to the demands of one group is
to invite the demands and complaints of another group.
Because of the problems and pressures that this situation
introduces into school policy making, Lyke argues that the
school authorities in heterogeneous communities are inclined
to encapsulate themselves and become unresponsive to public
demands in general.[44]

If one were to phrase the above in terms of the "zone of

tolerance", one would see that, in markedly heterogenous communities(as, for example, the case of Levittown, New York) what falls within the zone of tolerance for one sub-community falls outside the zone for another sub-community, leaving school authorities in a quandry.[45] Similarly, the authorities face problems in rapidly changing communities, where the zone of tolerance is in flux. Typically, the superintendent and school board are associated with and sensitive to the old values and find it difficult to make the political adjustments needed to come to terms with the emerging values.[46]

That superintendents--and their school boards--typically attempt to anticipate community demands is suggested not only by Lyke's research but also by the outcomes of school tax and bond referenda. Noting that, "taxpayers' revolts" notwithstanding, most school tax and bond referenda "have secured a sizeable majority of votes in the last two decades for which data exist,"[47] Wirt and Kirst suggest that this may be because school administrators, anticipating community reactions, "would call for (referenda) only when and in the form that could guarantee victory."[48] Wirt and Kirst reason that escalating conflict threatens school officials and that they therefore attempt to anticipate community demands to forestall this threat. The result "is an output reflective of both public and professional needs and wants."[49]

These points are further illustrated by James' findings

regarding school districts with unusually high and low per-pupil expenditures.[50] Initially, James found that much of the variance in expenditure patterns was associated with the leadership styles of the superintendents, with high-expenditure districts having young, ambitious, "live-wire" superintendents and low-expenditure districts older, "play-it-safe" superintendents. However, subsequent investigation revealed that these leadership patterns were not accidental. Rather, they reflected expectations in the community that defined not only the role of the superintendent, but shaped the board's selection of the incumbent as well."[51]

In sum, then, there is considerable evidence that under certain circumstances public officials are inclined to anticipate community demands, or, because they and their constituents are like-minded, to reflect them in their own policy preferences. Since school boards typically select superintendents whose values are in accord with the members of the board, and not far removed from the predominant values of the community, it is probable that in homogeneous communities superintendents will both anticipate and reflect community preferences in their policy proposals, thereby providing "administrative representation" for the community to supplement the representation furnished by the elected school board.[52]

Although school districts' size and heterogeneity are

usually positively associated, size alone has independent effects on the responsiveness of school officials.[53] As the size of the school system increases, the visibility of lay opposition groups tends to decrease, and the ability of the system to maintain "business as usual" in the face of lay opposition tend to increase. Thus, a handful of citizens (perhaps ten to twenty) can form an ad hoc opposition group in a small community and create enough controversy to defeat a school referendum or force the school authorities to spend a great deal of time attending to their demands.[54] However, it is usually much more difficult for small groups of citizens to have the same impact in a large school system. As a result one would expect the school authorities to be more responsive to the public in small school districts than in large ones even when, as is sometimes the case, the small districts are relatively heterogeneous instead of homogeneous.

Comparisons of school districts in relatively homogeneous communities of higher and lower socioeconomic status reveal significant variations not only in expectations for educational services and the ability to pay for them, but also in the amount of deference to professional expertise and the degree of congruence between community and professional values. These differences produce conflicts over school policy which go beyond those arising from varying community fiscal capacity. Thus, all-white working class suburban

school districts may not only reject cosmopolitan educational innovations (for example, the "open" classroom, sex education and the like) but, out of devotion to their neighborhood (K-8) schools, may even successfully resist the introduction of the junior high school organizational scheme, which is scarcely a new concept.[56]

The divergence between the values of professional educators and those of lower status communities is often an important source of conflict.[57] Although working class suburbs may try to select superintendents who "understand" or share their values, they are not always able to do so. Thus, such communities tend to provide an exception to our general proposition that in homogeneous communities educators will tend to anticipate community demands. The important point here, however, is that when the educators do act in conflict with community values there is evidence that working class suburbs possess the capacity to restrain them.[58]

While lower status communities frequently have need to restrain their educators, the same is seldom true in higher status school districts. This is not surprising, since it was the upper middle class which led the municipal and educational reform movement, and propagated the non-partisan administrative expert system to promote its interests, which its leaders believed were synonymous with the public interest.[59] Since school administrators are overwhelmingly of

the white middle class and, more importantly, belong to a profession which was shaped by upper middle class reformers,[60] it is not surprising that the people of "typical" (that is, "moderately liberal") middle and upper middle class communities, generally have relatively little desire or need to restrain their school administrators.

The "good government" political culture of higher status communities often provides an ideal setting for professional administrative expertise.[61] Because community interests are so often anticipated by their school authorities, middle and upper middle class communities are frequently content to delegate most of the tasks of governance to these authorities, who then seem to act with great autonomy—a state of affairs that seems undemocratic. Yet, why should such communities not grant this autonomy for "if the job is being done, the citizens would just as soon not be bothered."[62] Put another way, why should the community oppose, and the school board not "rubber stamp," the proposals of educators as long as the community is getting what it wants?[63]

The balance of power between educators on the one hand and their school boards and communities on the other does not just vary according to community type; it also varies according to the type of issue or policy question faced. To begin with, one can divide educational policy questions into "routine" and "strategic" decisions, routine decisions being

managerial in nature and strategic decisions being heavily political. In his analysis of the power and functions of boards of directors, Zald calls attention to the significance of the different phases of organizational development and activity for the power of governing boards.[64] He advances the general proposition that "it is during the handling of major phase problems, or strategic decision points, that board power is most likely to be asserted. It is at such times, too, that basic conflicts and divisions both within the board and between the managers and the board are likely to be pronounced."[65] Zald discusses three types of broad-phased strategic problems: life-cycle problems (that is, "organization genesis," "character crisis and transformation," and "identity crisis"); the problem of choosing a chief executive successor, and fund-raising and facilities expansion problems.

The implications of Zald's analysis are obvious for those factors promoting the episodic community control of school policy making. When strategic decisions in the life of a school district are faced, not only school board but also community power is likely to be mobilized. This proposition is borne out by numerous studies of school finance and expansion issues, school district consolidation issues, and the like. But the ebb and flow of influence between communities and their school boards is best documented by the

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Iannaccone and Lutz studies discussed earlier. Interestingly, the balance of power in school districts seems to vary not only with the phasing and severity of strategic problems in the life of districts, but also with the level of public conflict, which although generally influenced by this phasing and severity, in some cases varies surprisingly as a result of certain structural features of the communities.[66] Thus, there is evidence that high levels of public conflict over school affairs--which are most likely in certain kinds of districts, even between strategic decision points--tend to reduce the scope of autonomy and discretion enjoyed by school superintendents except in large city school districts.[67]

The mobilization of community and school board power is also significantly affected by the allocative characteristics of policy questions. Theodore Lowi has argued that the basic functions of government are expressed through three major kinds of public policies, each of which generates its own distinctive politics.[68] Briefly, distributive policies involve the dispensing of values and resources (e.g., public works and "pork barrel" programs) which can be parcelled out in such a way that "the indulged and the deprived, the loser and the recipient, need never come into direct confrontation."[69] Regulative policies, on the other hand, involve a "direct choice as to who will be indulged and who deprived," as in the assignment of television channels,

overseas air routes, and the like.[70] Finally, redistributive

policies as, for example, the progressive income tax,

> ...are like regulatory policies in the
> sense that relations among broad
> categories of private individuals are
> involved ... (but) there are great
> differences in the nature of impact.
> The categories of impact are much
> broader, approaching social classes.
> They are, crudely speaking, haves and
> have-nots, bigness and smallness,
> bourgeoisie and proletariat."[71]

Clearly, of the three types of policies, redistributive

issues are most likely to produce widespread and acrimonious

conflict, which in turn may tend to immobilize public

officials. Significantly, as Weeres has noted, the

heterogeneity and cleavages of large city school systems tend

to generate redistributive policy issues while homogeneous

districts (for example, the "typical" suburb) usually are able

to confine policy making primarily to distributive issues.[72]

Because the perceived type of policy can so greatly affect

policy conflict and the applicability and effectiveness of the

political resources of participants, an important part of

politics revolves around attempts to define issues in terms

favorable to the interests of particular participants.[73] Yet,

Zeigler and Jennings contend that their data indicate that

school superintendents are likely to be the most influential

actors even in the redistributive and conflictual issues, such

as school desegration.[73]

The final policy distinction is between internal and external policy issues. Internal issues involve decisions on such matters as the school curriculum and personnel policy, the consequences of which are generally perceived (however correctly) to be largely confined to the school system itself, at least in the short run. They also involve the kinds of matters for which the expertise of professional educators is thought most relevant in decision making. External issues on the other hand, involve matters such as decisions on school construction and facilities and school finances, which have immediate visible and tangible effects on the ecology of the community as well as on the school system itself. Here, the opinion of the public tends to carry as much, and often more, weight than the expertise of the professionals.[74] In fact, most studies of school politics provide abundant evidence that external, rather than internal, issues most often excite citizen concern and activity in school affairs. For example, Weeres found that most of the community groups and organizations active in Chicago school politics were only peripherally interested in education, but were centrally concerned about the consequences of school policy for the ecology of neighborhoods.[75]

To summarize briefly, if school systems are not merely the "mirror images" of the communities they serve, neither are they institutions dominated by unresponsive educators.

Instead, while educators tend to dominate local educational policy making, they usually operate within significant constraints imposed by the local community and school board--not to mention those imposed by state and national forces. These constraints (or, put another way, the influence of the community and the board) are likely to vary primarily with the type of school district and type of issue that is faced. The local citizenry and the board will tend to have more influence where external, redistributive and strategic policy decisions and in smaller and more homogeneous communities where the professionals tend to anticipate or reflect (especially in middle and upper class communities) community demands. The professionals, on the other hand, will tend to have more influence on internal and routine policy decisions, and in large and more heterogeneous communities.[76]

As this review of the literature suggests, the superintendent of schools typically enjoyed a disproportionate role in the policy making process. However, the community, via its elected representatives on the school committee, could, and in many circumstances did, place definite constraints on the superintendent and his staff. In the subsequent analysis, an attempt will be made to explore those factors, both internal and external to the Cambridge school department, which limit or enhance the role of the superintendent in the initiation and implementation of

educational policy. A medium sized, heterogeneous urban community with two stable, cohesive coalitions, the city of Cambridge provides an ideal setting in which to assess the effectiveness of the superintendent in a highly volatile political environment. More specifically, it permits an examination of the impact of internal and external cleavages and attachments on the superintendent's ability to implement innovative policies and programs. The fact that five men occupied this position during the fifteen-year period under study facilitates an assessment of the interplay between variations in the superintendent's leadership style and values and changes in the organizational and political environment of the Cambridge school department.

The Decision-Making Process in the Cambridge Public Schools: An Overview

The formal structure of the Cambridge public school system is defined by the Cambridge City Charter (Plan E). Under the charter, education is implemented by the Cambridge School Department, subject to supervision and control by the Cambridge School Committee. The school committee is accorded official powers that include control over budgetary appropriations, selection and approval of the Superintendent, approval of secondary appointments in the school bureaucracy, and formulation of general school policies. Under the city

charter, the superintendent is designated as the chief executive officer of the school department, and is charged with the responsibility of implementing the policies that are approved by the school committee. However, as the literature review indicated, it is unusual for a part-time school board to play an active role in setting school policy, and the Cambridge experience conforms to this observation.

The Cambridge School Committee is composed of seven members, six of whom are elected at large by proportional representation, with the seventh being the mayor. The mayor is chosen by the nine city councilors from among their own number and serves ex officio as chairperson of the school committee. School committee members are elected for two year terms and while some serve many consecutive terms, others either voluntarily relinquish their positions or else fail to win re-election after serving just one or two terms. As a rule, the Independents tend to serve the longer terms, while the CCA members -- many of whom are serving out of a sense of "civic obligation" -- are likely to be on the school committee for shorter periods.

The superintendent of schools is selected and approved by the school committee on a majority vote. The superintendent can be removed by the committee at any time during his or her first three years in office, at which time a tenure decision is made. If the superintendent is granted tenure, he or she

can be removed only for illegal or immoral behavior, and only after a full public hearing by the school committee. Obviously, the superintendent is in a much stronger position vis-a-vis the School Committee after tenure has been granted. The tenure of the superintendent is for life, or until he or she reaches the mandatory retirement age.

Because of its part-time status and lack of personal experience in the day to day school issues, the school committee is generally forced to delegate policy planning to the superintendent and his staff, while exercising the equivalent of a "veto." The superintendent has the advantage of controlling the flow of information, since the school committee does not have paid staff and thus cannot generate its own reports. In general, a politically astute superintendent will eventually "capture" the school committee and thus limit the committee's exercise of its formal powers.

One example of the superintendent's power to control an issue and thus co-opt the school committee was the preparation of the school budget. Until 1973, the budget was presented in a line item format. This format was almost impossible to intepret, and consequently the school committee members were forced to approve the budget with little understanding of how and where the money was being spent. By contrast, the superintendent and his assistants, through their daily contact with the operation and control of the budgetary process, had a

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much clearer grasp of how money was being allocated. Thus, for much of the period under study, the superintendent was freed from the kind of budgetary scrutiny that the school committee was supposed to exercise.

Because of practical limits on the exercise of its formal powers, the school committee is often drawn away from the central issues of school policy, and instead devotes much of its time and energy to tangential issues. For example, during the period of this study a lengthy debate was generated over whether S. Patrick's Day should be a holiday. This tendency to focus on the trivial is partially attributable to the fact that the school committee is not composed of professional educators, and thus is attracted to less substantive issues precisely because it does not require professional expertise to understand or evaluate them.

On the other hand, although the school committee often bogged down in trivial issues, it readily focuses its attention to the central educational issues and policies when it has a need or an interest in doing so. Indeed, during the periods of high political turmoil and inter-coalitional conflict, the school committee showed a marked willingness to exercise its perogatives to formulate and review school policies. While one might expect the "aura of professionalism" to serve as a buffer between the part-time school committee and the professional superintendent, this

appears to be _less_ significant in education -- where everyone considers himself to be an "expert" -- than in other professional areas. For example, a lay hospital board is far more reluctant to interfere with the professional judgment of doctors than a local school board is in challenging the judgment of its hired professional. As such, the Cambridge School Committee was not reticent about imposing its judgments when it felt a compelling need to do so.

Given the nature of Cambridge politics, the school committee is most likely to be mobilized into becoming a key political actor in three circumstances: the selection and approval of the superintendent; the approval of secondary officials in the school bureaucracy; and emotion or value-laden issues and events. This last is a catch-all category for the general social and educational issues that tend to polarize the community. During the relevant period, the major precipitants included racial disturbances in the schools. Significantly, these issues were tied to broader national issues, such as Civil Rights and the Viet Nam War.

Probably the most important political decision that the school committee makes is in the appointment of the superintendent. The recurring theme of school committee politics is not "what" or "how", but rather "who". Obviously, controlling who occupies the key bureaucratic offices is the most effective way to control both the formulation of

educational policy and the allocation of patronage benefits. Even when the school committee is politically mobilized and is determined to shape school policy, it must rely on the superintendent and his assistants to accept and implement its policy decisions. Thus, the fact that the superintendent has great natural advantages vis-a-vis the school committee in terms of power and leerage makes the school committee extremely wary in its selection of who will fill the office.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the selection of the superintendent of schools and also the decision to grant him tenure, are the two most critical political issues confronting the Cambridge School Committee. When the political stakes are high and he political climate is mobilized, the superintendent's first three years in office are often marked by constant and internicine skirmishing between the two political coalitions on the school committee. Only after the superintendent obtains tenure does the balance of power swing decisively toward the superintendent and away from the school committee

Role of Coalitions

The role of the two coalitions in Cambridge School Committee politics is to represent and reflect the competition within the community over important educational issues. In the arena of public education, the differences between the two

coalitions reflect the predictable divergence in orientation between the typically upper-middle class, professional, and better educated members of the CCA, and the predominantly lower-middle class or working class, non-professional, and less educated supporters of the Independents. The CCA generally advocates a strong college preparatory program in the City's public schools, with a special emphasis on creativity, self-motivation, and self-expression. As such, the CCA often expresses an interest in innovative programs, particularly those that are likely to enhance "creative" thinking. By contrast, the Independents tend to emphasize job skills in education, including a special focus on the "3 R's~, discipline, and vocational training. They are usually opposed to innovative programs, especially those that originate with the CCA.

Although the policy goals of the two coalitions often appear to be diametrically opposed, this is sometimes deceiving. While the coalitions are in direct conflict over such highly politicized issues as the appointment of a superintendent, at other times the dynamic of interaction is more oblique, and might be described as being at "right angles." The CCA is usually most interested in setting policy and advancing certain projects that it believes will enhance the learning environment for students. The Independents, on the other hand, often see control of the school department as

an end in itself, a repository of jobs and contracts for their supporters. Since control of central office means control of both policy and patronage, the CCA and Independents are in direct political conflict over appointments to these key positions in the educational bureaucracy. However, the coalitions' primary goals are very different, and thus may be amenable to reconciliation.

In a quiescent political period, when the dialogue between the two coalitions is reasonably open and amicable, it is possible to engineer compromises that give both coalitions the objectives that they deem most important. The CCA's focus is on policy, and thus it seeks to control top and middle positions in the school bureaucracy. The Independents, on the other hand, are usually most concerned with the top and bottom positions in the bureaucracy. Thus, there is a frequent tendency toward compromise, with the CCA gaining certain concessions on policy in exchange for giving the Independents control over low level patronage appointments and also over the allocation of certain school contracts.

In tumultuous political periods, this capacity to compromise is reduced, as both coalitions find themselves competing over fundamental issues of educational policy. In these periods, the competition is genuinely head-to-head, and thus the room for negotiation and compromise is substantially reduced. For the most part, the two coalitions compete

through the electoral process, with the winner enforcing its gains and the loser doing its best to delay the implementation of unpalatable policies. In these cases, and especially if he is untenured, the superintendent becomes literally a "political football".

In both quiescent and tumultous periods, the coalitions play an important role in defining and stabilizing the policies of the Cambridge school department. Instead of dealing with a multitude of competing interest groups, the superintendent is faced with two coalitions who can clearly shape the alternative positions on an issue. Thus, while the political competition can become bitter, it is at least conducted in an organized and manageable form. Without this organizing function played by the coalitions, the job of a superintendent would be infinitely more difficult.

Although the coalitions are the dominant political forces in Cambridge School Committee politics, there are other external factors that have significant influence in defining the political parameters within which the Superintendent must operate. The most important of these external factors are : (1) the media; (2) the ad hoc interest groups; (3) the general political climate; (4) and the State and Federal mandates.

The media is important because it is the major -- and in some cases the only -- effective way to mobilize the community over certain issues. In general, there is a synergistic

effect between the media coverage and the salience of an issue: the greater the press coverage, the greater the public concern and the greater the press coverage. The media for Cambridge includes the _Cambridge Chronicle_ and the various Boston newspapers and television stations. The _Cambridge Chronicle_ is an exceptionally effective medium for signalling local political messages -- almost a local grapevine -- and astute local political observers can read the announcements and coverage in the _Chronicle_ almost as if it were written in a code. The general Boston media has a less frequent, but substantially greater impact, since television or newspaper coverage by one of the Boston mediums provides an exceptionally bright illumination of the issue at hand.

The media was a major factor in the racial strife that wracked and ultimately closed the Cambridge public high schools several times in 1968-70. In that case, media attention not only influenced the events themselves, but it also mobilized the concerns of the citizens and brought extraordinary pressure on the school bureaucracy. Ultimately, it forced the resignation of Superintendent Edward Conley and paved the way for the appointment of Frank Fisoli. The tension-charged atmosphere then encouraged Frisoli to take extremely rigid stances on many issues, including some that had very little to do with the racial tensions that precipitated the closing of the high schools.

The second major factor in Cambridge politics is the formation of <u>ad</u> <u>hoc</u> <u>groups</u> around certain issues. These constituencies frequently coalesce around a single issue, and they are especially effective during non-politicized periods because they are particularly effective at mobilizing their supporters. In many cases, the ad hoc group originates outside the formal coalitions, and then presses for the incorporation of its goals by one of the dominant camps. Lacking the formal structure and thus the ability to fight prolonged battles on major issues, the ad hoc groups rely on cooperation for ultimate success in attaining their goals. Thus, for most ad hoc groups, incorporation into one of the coalitions -- usually the CCA -- enables them to use the coalitional structure to promote their ends.

An example of an ad hoc group in action occurred in 1969 in response to the appointments of Frank Frisoli, Edmond Murphy and John Balfe to the three Assistant Superintendent positions. All three were perceived by segments of the community as being political appointees who lacked necessary qualifications for the jobs they were assuming. Thus, Save Our Schools (SOS) was formed among concerned parents throughout the community. After exerting independent oppositions to the appointments without success, the SOS worked with the CCA in the next elections and helped to elect a 4-3 CCA majority on the school committee. Because of

subsequent political manuevering by the coalitions, the SOS was not able to achieve its goal of denying the three men their appointments. However, SOS was effective in mobilizing public concern on the issue that it represented, and it helped the CCA to elect a majority to the School Committee.

The third factor that affects the political balance on the school committee is the broader national political climate. Often national issues color or even define the nature of local educational issues, so that the local political interaction is significantly altered. For example, during the late 1960's there were a number of civil rights activities and demonstrations taking place in the city's public high schools, eliciting sympathy and support from the more liberal CCA and strongly negative reactions from the more conservative Independents. At stake was an issue of direct importance to the management of schools -- namely, how to respond to disruptive conduct by the students -- but the protests were also rooted in the larger sentiments attached to national political events. Thus, the protests took on the trappings of an issue larger than the disruption of classroom teaching, and were dealt with in a far different manner.

The fourth factor that affects the political balance on the school committee is the state and federal mandates in education. In general, state and federal laws on education are absorbing an increasing percentage of local school

budgets, so that the discretionary functions of the Superintendent and the School Committee are being reduced. In effect, the various antagonists in local school board decisions are being squeezed into an ever-narrowing arena. Sometimes the mandates -- as, for example, forced busing -- becomes a major issue and preoccupation of the local school politics but, even when they are not the center of contention, the mandates reduce the resources available for discretionary use. Thus, it is more difficult to settle or compromise disputes over issues of resource allocation simply because there are fewer resources to allocate between the competing groups.

One example of how mandates affect decision-making is State Law 766, which required all Massachusetts school districts to provide adequate programs and facilities for youngsters with physical or emotional disabilities. The state law also mandated that schools integrate students with special educational needs into regular classes "whenever possible." However, at the same time that it was establishing these requirements, the state legislature failed to provide funds to implement the law, and consequently local school boards were forced to pay for the new or expanded programs themselves. Further, State Law 766 was enacted in 1975, at a time when declining tax bases and shrinking budgets were rapidly becoming a fact of life in public education. Although

Cambridge was better prepared to respond to this mandate than most school districts, it was nonetheless compelled to devote a larger portion of its budget to meet these new state requirements.

## The Role of Superintendent of Schools

As noted in the literature review, the key to internal decision-making in a school bureaucracy generally rests with the superintendent of schools. The Cambridge experience conforms with this observation and suggests than an appropriate model for decision-making would have the Superintendent in the center of the political process bounded by internal constraints, -- those generated within the school bureaucracy -- and external constraints -- those generated outside the school department, primarily by the political coalitions.

The truism that the dynamics of a school bureaucracy are dictated by the people within it was particularly applicable to the Cambridge Public Schools during the period from 1960-1975. With the retirement of Tobin in 1968, many of the "old guard" in the school system also reached retirement age, so that in quick succession the other administrative positions in the school bureaucracy became vacant. As discussed above, the appointment of the Superintendent and his senior staff are perhaps the most important decisions made by the School committee, and consequently such appointments have major

political overtones. Thus, as each new superintendent was appointed, he found himself with a highly polarized and politicized school bureaucracy that reflected the conflicts in the school committee and the community at large. As a result, the superintendents often found it difficult to obtain the loyalty and cooperation of the School Department that they ostensibly headed.

In his study on The Functions of the Executive, Chester Barnard formulated the concept of a "Zone of Indifference" or "Compliance" to describe the discretionary areas in which the subordinates in an organization will follow the leadership in the implementation policy. Outside this zone, there will be foot dragging, deliberate sabotage, and other efforts to block or delay implementation.[77] Normally, a long-tenured Superintendent will install a staff that shares his philosophy and follows his directives with predictable loyalty. However, in the volatile period in question, when the tendency to dissent was already encouraged by the high degree of politicization and polarization, the Superintendent was further hampered by his own lack of tenure and by divided loyalties among key members of his staff. Thus, the Superintendent's discretion was directly challenged and impeded by his own bureaucracy.

The following diagram is a model of the interactive forces that define the Zone of Compliance. (Figure 1)

FIGURE 1   <u>Zone of Compliance</u>

```
                         ┌────────────────────────┐
         ←→              │ Superintendent         │            ←→
Loyalty ←──────→         │                        │         ←→Loyalty
                         │ - Political skills     │
                         │                        │
                         │ - Tenure               │
Ideological ←─→          │                        │          ←→ Ideological
Compatibility            │ - Reputation           │             Compatibility
(CSD)                    │              ←→        │             (CSD)
                         │ - Ideological          │
                         │   Compatibility        │
Political ←──→           └────────────────────────┘          ←→ Political
Climate                                                         Climate

         [CCA]                                      [Independents]
```

In the above model, the Zone of Compliance is the area between the two vertical lines, and this represents the situations in which the Superintendent will be granted discretionary power without substantial opposition by members of the school bureaucracy. The location of the boundary lines is <u>approximately equal</u> to the political limitations placed on the Superintendent by the political coalitions and the community at large. This approximate equality is attributable to the fact that the appointment process in the Cambridge school system is highly political, and that most of the appointees have loyalties to one of the two coalitions. Although the boundaries on the Zone of Compliance are

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initially defined by the positions of the political coalitions, the boundaries are subjected to a number of forces over time that may tend to depoliticize the school department dynamics. In particular, the Superintendent can reduce his internal opposition by appointing people who are either personally loyal to him, or who share a similar philosophical outlook on the major educational issues.

To understand the dynamics of the Cambridge school department and the development of staff loyalty to the superintendent, one has to review the mechanism of appointment. Generally, appointments to positions within the school department are nominated by the Superintendent and approved by the School Committee. Thus, a long term Superintendent will have the opportunity to fill the vacated positions with people who are personally loyal and/or ideologically compatible. However, in the short term the Superintendent is blocked from removing people because of the tenure system. Hence, the ability of the Superintendent to widen the Zone of Compliance through appointments and other loyalty-building techniques does not become a major factor until he has been in office for a significant period of time.

One of the key factors in defining the Zone of Compliance in the long term is the personal qualities of the Superintendent. These can be divided into four categories: his "political" skills, meaning his ability to make tactical

and strategic judgments that maximize his chances of success; his status in terms of tenure; his reputation, which is interrelated with the other factors, but which has distinguishable characteristics; his ideological compatibility, which measures the degree to which his basic values are shared by the other players in the political arena.

The Zone of Compliance is maximized by the superintendent with strong political skills, tenure, a good reputation, and reasonable ideological compatibility. On the other hand, weak political skills, lack of tenure, lack of a solid reputation, or significant ideological conflicts will narrow the area of discretion accorded the superintendent by his own bureaucracy. Over the passage of time, a politically skillful superintendent will gain tenure and will probably develop an ideological compatibility with the other members of the system, if only through mutual interaction or through the appointment of personnel who share his values and educational philosophy. Reputation is perhaps the most interesting parameter of all, because it is a measurement of the public's perception of the superintendent's competence. However, it is an important category because a good reputation is sometimes the most valuable asset the superintendent has: it can intimidate opponents and allow him to win victories that would be costly or unobtainable in the face of serious opposition.

The personal qualities of the superintendent have a

direct effect on the confidence and strength of his internal opposition. Since all positions in the Cambridge School System are tenured, opponents cannot be removed except by attrition. However, as Oscar Hirschmann notes, a member of an organization who opposes the leadership has three options: exit, voice, or loyalty.[78] When the superintendent is untenured, weak, or lacks respect, opposition (voice) is a practical choice. But where the superintendent is strong and entrenched, the opponents are left with the option of either leaving or conforming.

One point that bears additional explanation is the distinction drawn in the model between the ideology of the Superintendent and the ideology of his subordinates in the school department. The two components are substantively similar, but they represent different dynamic processes. The ideology of the subordinate's is meant to measure the Superintendent's power to appoint ideologically compatible people to staff the bureaucracy. The ideology of the Superintendent, by contrast, is the ongoing measurement of his ideological compatibility with the other political actors. In essence, the first component measures the Superintendent's ability to alter the political orientation of the bureaucracy; the second component measures his ability to alter his own political orientation in order to maximize his political gains.

An example of the Zone of Compliance and its operation is found during the term of Alflorence Cheatham. Cheatham was a CCA appointee, and he was recruited from the Chicago school system. Cheatham was a CCA choice, an outsider, a black and a liberal entering a school system that was predominantly Independent, insider, ethnic, and conservative. Naturally, his policy initiatives were met with substantial internal opposition. However, early in his administration, Cheatham began to operate in a skillful and effective manner, appointing people who were personally loyal or ideologically compatible. At the same time, he began to alter his personal ideological stance, assimilating goals and values that drew him away from his CCA sponsors and toward a more neutral position between the CCA and the Independents. Ultimately, the grinding pressures of the job took its toll on Cheatham, and he resigned for reasons of personal health after three years. However, his term in office demonstrated that a superintendent can gradually widen the Zone of Compliance by appointing compatible staff members and by moderating his personal ideology to mesh with that of the organization.

In summary, the Zone of Compliance is a conceptual model that attempts to explain the interaction between the Superintendent and his subordinates. The Zone of Compliance is defined by boundaries that depend on personal loyalty, ideological compatibility, and political climate. Internally,

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the superintendent can expand the Zone of Compliance with his political skills, his tenured status, his reputation and his ideological orientation. These factors interact to form a discrete boundary that defines the areas of policy formulation where the Superintendent will be given broad discretion by and can be assured of compliance from his subordinates. The optimum Zone of compliance occurs in politically quiescent times, and with a Superintendent who has both positive personal qualities and a long enough term in office to shape the loyalty and philosophy of his organization. The minimum Zone of Compliance occurs in politically tumultuous periods when a new Superintendent is appointed, especially if the Superintendent is in ideological conflict with the majority of his subordinates, as was the case with Alflorence Cheatham.

In dealing with the school committee and the community at large, the Superintendent will be given a certain amount of freedom to exercise discretionary choices without facing significant opposition. This area of freedom has been defined by McGivney and Moynihan as the "Zone of Tolerance."[79] In general, the Zone of Tolerance for the superintendent of schools in the Cambridge school system is defined by three general factors: the personal characteristics of the Superintendent; the political coalitions; and external factors, including ad hoc groups, the media, and state and federal mandates.

Below is a model that represents the dynamic interaction of these factors, and the areas of policy formulation where the Superintendent will be given relative autonomy. This model assumes that the Superintendent is the initiator of policy, which is generally the case. As noted in the literature review, the Cambridge superintendent is a combination of the three most common types of superintendents, i.e., the "political strategist," the "professional advisor," and the "functionary." As such, the Cambridge superintendent has to make both "political" and "managerial" decisions, and the Zone of Tolerance is in part a reflection of this dichotomy. Almost be definition, "managerial" decisions are within the Zone of Tolerance, while political decisions generally -- but not always -- exceed the boundaries of the Zone. Thus, the Zone of Tolerance is a measure of the degree of autonomy given to the Superintendent to make "political" decisions that affect school policy.

This distinction between "political" and "managerial" decisions is frequently found in the literature on decision-making autonomy. For example, it has been described by various observers as "strategic versus routine," "external versus internal," and "redistributive versus distributive." Again, "political" decisions are those that have the potential to exceed the Zone of Tolerance, while "managerial" decisions are those that are so fundamental to the job of the

superintendent that he is usually accorded absolute discretion. Categorizing particular decisions as being political or managerial is often a difficult and inexact business, but perhaps an inductive definition is best: "managerial" decisions are those that do not produce strife, and "political", those that do.

In a basic sense, the Zone of Tolerance is defined by the positions of the two coalitions, the CCA and the Independents. In the diagram below (Figure 2), the vertical line on the (political) left represents the tolerance threshold of the CCA, and the vertical line on the right represents the tolerance threshold of the Independents. This representation has two components: first, it says that there is a discrete boundary that defines the autonomous powers of the Superintendent, and second, it says that the coalitions are the arbiters and definers of that boundary. These conclusions are derived from empirical observation of the interaction between the Superintendent and the larger community, the latter of whom have their political views formulated and articulated by the two coalitions. Defining a clear and cognizable boundary around the Superintendent's powers is in essence the very purpose of the two coalitions in Cambridge school politics.

FIGURE 2   Zone of Tolerance

```
                          ┌─────────────────────────┐
 Ad Hoc Groups ◄───►    ◄►│ Superintendent       '  │◄►  Ad Hoc Groups
 Media                    │ - Political skills ◄───►│►   Media
                          │ - Tenure                │
 Political      ◄───────► ◄►│ - Reputation          │◄  Political
 Climate                  │                         │►  Climate
 Federal & State ◄─────►  ◄►│ - Ideological         │◄─► Federal & State
 Mandates                 │   Compatibility         │►  Mandates
                          └─────────────────────────┘
              CCA                          Independents
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It should be noted that the Zone of Tolerance is a
residual compilation of the attitudes and interactions between
the superintendent and the political coalitions as represented
on the school committee. Thus, one would not say that the
Zone of Tolerance is "wide" or "narrow" on any particular
issue, but rather that it is a description of the overall
interaction between the superintendent and the school
committee. A wide Zone of Tolerance exists when there is
faith and confidence in the Superintendent, and also where the
political climate is indifferent or apathetic. A narrow zone
of Tolerance occurs in periods where there is a weak
Superintendent, or when the political climate is highly
activist.

Although the coalitions are the ultimate arbiter of the

boundaries that define the Zone of Tolerance, the positions of the coalitions are directly affected by four external factors. As noted earlier, these are: ad hoc groups; media coverage; state and federal mandates; and political climate.

With the Zone of Tolerance, the Superintendent can affect boundary constraints on his autonomous powers through this personal skills and characteristics. Again, the four operative factors are: political skills, meaning his ability to choose the appropriate tactical and strategic techniques to maximize his successes; his tenure status; his reputation, meaning his perceived strength and competence; and his ideological orientation.

Looking at the aggregate model, the maximum Zone of Tolerance is enjoyed when the following conditions exist: the Superintendent has tenure, which means that he can fight as long and hard as he wants for an issue; the Superintendent's other personal characteristics, such as his political skills, reputation and ideological compatibiilty, are moderate or strong; the political climate is moderate or apathetic, so that interventionist sentiment is minimized; and the issue is not one that triggers intervention by an external factor, that is, ad hoc groups, media coverage, or state or Federal mandate. These conditions existed under Tobin, and later under Lannon. On the other hand, the Zone of Tolerance decreases when one or more of the following conditions exist:

The Superintendent lacks tenure; his personal characteristics are moderate or weak; the political climate is highly activist; or the issue is one that triggers intervention by an external factor. A narrow Zone of Tolerance existed under Frisoli and, to some extent, under Conley and Cheatham.

In summary, the Zone of Tolerance posits a dynamic interaction between the superintendent as initiator of policy decisions, and the school committee as ratifier of such decisions. Because of the interaction between the professional superintendent and the part-time school committee, certain decisions are left to the discretion of the superintendent, while others are subject to challenge or opposition. Challenge can also come from the community at large, although the challenge almost always becomes focused on the school committee through the actions of the political coalitions. Certain types of decisions fall into the Zone of Tolerance, meaning that the superintendent will be accorded substantial decision-making autonomy, while others fall outside the Zone and are subject to challenge. Decisions falling within the Zone of Tolerance include all "managerial" decisions, plus certain "political" decisions. The ability of the Superintendent to obtain autonomous decision-making power over "political" decisions depends on the interaction of the various factors that define the boundaries of the Zone of Tolerance. Ultimately, the Zone of Tolerance measures the

extent to which the School Committee has delegated its
political policy-making functions to the Superintendent.

A Composite Model

From the above discussions, we can now construct a full
model of the political dynamic in the Cambridge school
department. As we have seen, the superintendent is the
dominant actor, generating and initiating policy decisions,
while the other political actors play what is effectively a
"veto" role. The internal constraints on decision-making
is described by the Zone of Compliance; the external
constraints on decision-making are described by the Zone of
Tolerance. Taken together, it means that the superintendent
must simultaneously deal with two institutions with similar
political values that are in a position to block or impede his
policy initiatives: the School Committee through its formal
powers of ratification and the School Department through its
ability to impede or sabotage the implementation of policy
decisions.

In general, the interaction between the Zone of
Compliance and the Zone of Tolerance is often substantial.
This is because the appointment process for positions in the
school bureaucracy is highly political, and thus the school
department tends to mirror the political divisions of the
larger community. When a new superintendent is appointed, and

especially if his position is relatively weak, the school
department can operate as a forum for expressing community
values and preferences. However, the longer the
Superintendent is in office the more effectively he will be
able to reshape the school department into an organization
compatible with his goals and ideological orientation. Thus,
in the long run, the Zone of Compliance will tend to expand,
and will probably be broader than the Zone of Tolerance.
(Figure 3)

FIGURE 3

Composite Model

Zone of Tolerance

Zone of Compliance

At this point it is possible to introduce the concept of
issue "salience," meaning an abstract measurement of the
political importance of a particular issue to the community.
If an origin is drawn in the center of the Zones of Tolerance
and Compliance, then the salience of an issue is a vector of a
specified length measured along the horizontal axis in both
directions. (Figure 4). If the importance or salience of the
issue is small enough, it will remain in the Zones, and thus
will be left to the discretionary judgment of the
Superintendent. However, if the salience of the issue exceeds

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the Zones, then the issue will become "politicized" and will be resolved by the large political dynamic.

FIGURE 4.

Issue Salience

Low Salience

High Salience

Zone of Compliance

Zone of Tolerance

With the concept of issue salience in mind, it becomes clear that the Zones of Tolerance and Compliance are aggregate boundaries, and that in the short term they are relatively static. Stated another way, the Zones are the summation of the attitudes by the two relevant institutions—the School Committee and the School Department—toward the policy decisons of the Superintendent. If a particular issue is highly emotional or highly political in character, one would say that the salience of the issue is large, rather than that the Zone of Tolerance is narrow. However, in the long term the salience of the Tolerance is narrow. However, in the long term the salience of the various issues _does_ affect the breadth of the Zones. Thus, in a highly politicized period, an increase in the salience of most or all issues is

equivalent to a narrowing in the Zones of the Superintendent's decision-making autonomy.

Ultimately, the Zones of Tolerance and Compliance are a de facto definition of the areas of school policy in which there is a community consensus. Interestingly, the superintendent plays an important role in defining the boundaries of that consensus, so that through effective leadership he can define the political values of the community rather than waiting for the community to impose its political values on him. However, there is an ongoing conflict over how much of this political power the community -- as represented in both the school department and the school committee -- is willing to delegate. Thus, the Cambridge school system presents an interesting model of episodic community control, where the community is attempting to balance the desire to delegate "managerial" decisions to a competent professional while still retaining control over fundamental "political" decisions.

Case Study:

The Cambridge Superintendents: To demonstrate the interaction of the forces described in the preceding section, it is useful to study the recent Superintendents of School for the Cambridge School Department. In general, the political models used in this study assume that the superintendent is the

initiator of policy, and that the other political actors in the system define how and when the Superintendent's policy choices are constrained. Since the superintendent's office is the central focus of Cambridge School Department politics, a review of the recent administrations will provide a substantive understanding of the analytic models posited in the previous section.

As the Cambridge School Department's chief executive officer, the Superintendent is formally charged with three basic functions: reporting to the school committee; carrying out the committee's instructions; and overseeing the daily operations of the school system. The Superintendent provides the general administrative direction for the school system -- either directly or through subordinates -- and he has supervision over all personnel in the system, including teachers, support personnel, custodians, and clerical staff. As chief executive officer, the Superintendent is the final arbiter of decisions in such diverse areas as the selection of textbooks, the direction of course instruction, the use of school buildings, and the maintenance of discipline.

In view of the Superintendent's wide range of responsibility and influence, it is not surprising that the Cambridge School System bears the clear imprimatur of its leader. For this reason, we will now examine the different Superintendents who held office between 1960 and 1975,

focusing their ability to shape educational policy and examining the various political restraints that each encountered. The five Superintendents to be discussed will be John Tobin (superintendent from 1945-1968); Edward Conley (1968-70); Frank Frisoli (1970-72); Alflorence Cheatham (1972-75); and Robert Lannon (1975-end of study).

John Tobin was the Superintendent of the Cambridge School System from 1945 to 1968. Perhaps the most important factor in the period of 1960-1968 was his lengthy and stable tenure, which made him relatively immune to political pressures. In general, Tobin had long since staffed the Cambridge School Department with friends and allies, most of whom shared Tobin's interest and views on education. Tobin either drove out or co-opted opponents to his policies, and he experienced almost no internal resistance. Similarly, his tenure gave him the reputation, experience, and stature to effectively "capture" the school committee, making it difficult to dominate him to any meaningful extent. Under the tenure system Tobin could not be fired, and in the event of extreme conflicts with the school committee (infrequent occurrences), Tobin could simply wait for the composition of the school committee to change in the next election.

Tobin's years in office were notable for the autocratic and highly centralized nature of his administration. By his own admission, Tobin "ruled with an iron hand", and even years

later members of the school system who had worked under Tobin would recall him with awe and a trace of fear. One teacher said: "Tobin's word was law. He know every single thing that happened in the school system, and God help you if you happened to displease him in some way."

During the middle and late 1960's, Tobin's autocratic educational philosophy began to collide with the increasingly progressive social norms and with the policies espoused by his liberal critics, the CCA. As a result, five major areas of policy confrontation emerged between the two political coalitions and between the school committee and the superintendent. These issue areas were (1) the hiring of personnel, (2) educational programming, (3) building and plant maintenance, (4) citizen participation, and (5) management practices. The following are the specific policy initiatives debated during the Tobin administration.

In keeping with his predilection for autocratic control, Tobin insisted on controlling the appointment of the personnel in the school department. In general, Tobin exercised powerful dominion over the bureaucracy, and no one lasted very long unless he pledged his first allegiance to the superintendent of schools. Although they sometimes chaffed at Tobin's power, the Independents generally supported Tobin in his appointments, and he in turn made sure that a substantial number of the employment opportunities were given to members

of the Independent coalition. The CCA, by contrast, wanted to improve the overall quality of the personnel employed by the school system, and were more receptive to going outside the Cambridge system to attract qualified people. Although Tobin agreed on the need for quality, he preferred to promote people within the school system, a tactic that enhanced his power and fostered loyalty to him personally.

As the 1960's progressed, the CCA began to push for reforms in programming, including the introduction of a black studies curriculum, "relevant" vocational education, and some innovative teaching concepts that emphasized creativity and de-emphasized discipline and the "3 R's". Tobin resolutely opposed almost all of these policy initiatives. Tobin found strong intuitive support from the Independents on these issues, and thus with the support of the Independent School Committee members Tobin was able to forestall the efforts to implement these policies.

Tobin's administration marked a time at which the older buildings of the Cambridge school system were beginning to deteriorate, even as the post-war baby boom placed unprecedented demands on the school facilities. Thus, there was a very strong need for renovation and expansion in the capital base of the school system. Tobin recognized this need, and thus advocated and implemented an aggressive renovation and building program. To the extent that there was

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a political dispute in this agreement, it focused on which schools to renovate and where to build new facilities. Tobin shrewdly avoided these controversies, merely emphasizing that new schools had to be built while outside consultants were hired to advise the school committee on where to locate the new schools. In this way, Tobin managed to get credit for the building program while avoiding blame for the location of the school sites.

Tobin was by nature an autocrat, and he distrusted the efforts of the citizenry to encroach on what he considered his territory. The CCA, however, was interested in encouraging citizen participation in school decisions, and as the 1960's wore on they began to press for greater citizen input. This CCA policy was based partly on liberal ideology and partly on the fact that the citizen participants would probably be overwhelmingly upper-middle class in their orientation. Although Tobin was very solicitous towards the PTA and other groups, he worked actively to prevent them from gaining a significant voice in school matters. This position was strongly supported by the Independents, who generally regarded citizen participation as a wedge for the CCA.

With regard to management practices, the CCA advocated a restructuring of the school department along modern managerial lines, with a decentralization and expansion of the central office staff. Since these reforms threatened to weaken

Tobin's powerful position, he naturally opposed them. In this area he was generally supported by the Independents, who saw the reforms as being aimed at their cozy relationship with Tobin in the area of personnel hiring. By virtue of his entrenched power, Tobin was the dominant force in shaping the discussion of managerial reforms, and as a result he forestalled significant changes in the administration until after his retirement.

During the middle and late 1960's, Tobin's autocratic educational philosophy began to clash with the increasingly progressive social norms, especially those espoused by his political opponents, the CCA. However, Tobin was too entrenched to attack openly, and efforts to promote educational reform were summarily quashed. Again, Tobin identified change as an attack on himself by political opponents, and so he reacted against innovative proposals at an almost visceral level. Significantly, Tobin's autocratic methods succeeded in maintaining school discipline up until the time of his retirement in 1968. As such, he left office just before the national protest generated by the civil rights movement and the Vietnam War began to appear in the Cambridge high schools. The epitath of Tobin's administration seemed to be, "He ran a tight ship, but he ran a damned good one."

In terms of the Zone of Compliance, Tobin was an "insider," a local resident who had come up through the system

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and who was closely aligned with the prevailing systemic values. His long tenure gave him the opportunity to punish internal opponents, and his natural combativeness ensured that he did exactly that: "Nobody opposed John Tobin and got away with it!" Although protected by tenure, staff members found it very unpleasant to work under a Tobin who had it "in for them." The result was that personal conflicts invariably ended with the opponent either leaving the school department or else retreating from his position. Thus, overtime, Tobin insured that the Zone of Compliance was maximized, and that his policy positions were implemented with fealty and promptness.

In terms of the Zone of Tolerance, Tobin likewise experienced a relatively unfettered reign. He was almost always on good terms with the Independents, and he had the knack of winning them over through shared values, personal friendship, and established reputation. Even when the Independents lost control of the school committee, Tobin could usually obtain an actual majority to support his policies by cultivating swing votes, most notably that of Mayor Edward A. Crane. Tobin was a master at controlling the school committee through his intimate knowledge of the school department operations and through his power to control the information upon which decisions were based. Ultimately, Tobin's administration was the prototype of how a superintendent with

tenure could use his powers to insulate himself from direct regulation by the school committee.

At the conclusion of Tobin's administration, he was replaced by Edward Conley, the former deputy superintendent of schools and Tobin's hand-picked successor. Conley was an "insider," but he did not have Tobin's viceral opposition to change and he soon gained a reputation as a moderate receptive to innovation. Because of his shared friendship and background with the school bureaucracy, his innovative proposals were received with less opposition than might have been expected. However, Conley lacked Tobin's force of will, and he did not pressure his internal critics into submission as Tobin would have. Considered a gentle and sensitive man, Conley was personally and politically damaged by the student disorders that occurred in 1970. Rather than fight the painful social and educational conflicts of that period, Conley decided to retire, and in a surprise move he submitted his resignation in June of 1970.

Perhaps the most impressive aspect of Conley's tenure is the number of innovations that he introduced during his short administration. Indeed, the innovations that later reached fruition under Cheatham and Lannon were almost all begun during the Conley administration. Unlike Tobin, Conley was receptive to new ideas, and thus the school committee representatives who favored policy initiatives (usually the

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CCA) now found the superintendent a potential ally instead of a stalwart opponent. The fact that so many programs were initiated in this short period after years of lethargy and inactivity attested to the importance of the Superintendent in initiating and implementing policy changes.

During the Conley administration, the CCA continued its push to increase the level of ability within the school department, especially in the ranks of the teachers and administrators. Conley was generally receptive to this initiative, and he began to emphasize a more open and creative approach to the hiring of personnel. The Independents generally expressed disappointment and opposition whenever an "outsider" was hired to an important position within the Cambridge School System. However, Conley was careful to give the Independents a reasonable share of the job openings, and he thus managed to diffuse most of their opposition. This was particularly evident in his recommendations for Curriculum Directors. Under Conley, half these newly created positions were filled by promotion from within the system and half by appointments from the outside.

Conley was generally receptive to innovations in the school programming, and thus with his tacit approval the CCA began to push for dramatic and often radical changes in the existing educational programs and formats. The CCA was particularly interested in changing the rigid, autocratic

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teaching methods favored by Tobin, and instead promoting a more flexible and creative learning environment. With federal funds and grants from the Harvard Graduate School of Education, the CCA introduced such wide-ranging programs as the Pilot School, expanded guidance programs, bi-lingual education, special education, and a black studies program. Although the Independents were largely opposed to these programs, the combination of a reformist political period, the CCA pressure, and Conley's support was sufficient to bring the programs to fruition.

During Conley's short administration the building and plant maintenance issues were not significant, primarily because most of the attention was being focused in the long-neglected area of educational programming. Also, building and plant maintenance was Tobin's most active area, so that the needs in this area were not pressing. Conley did oversee completion of building projects begun under Tobin.

Conley was superintendent at a time when public protests and actions were cresting, and his administration was rocked and ultimately destroyed by public demonstrations. Thus, in a very literal sense, Conley was forced out of office by "public participation." Although Conley himself was sympathetic to a more channeled dialogue with the citizens of Cambridge, many citizens were unfortunately past the point of public discussion.

Conley was receptive to reforms in management practices, and with his approval the CCA pushed the theme of "professionalism" with relative success. The changes wrought under Conley included increases in the number of Curriculum Directors and an expansion of their roles, reorganization of the administrative staff, and the addition of Assistant Superintendents for Elementary and Secondary Education. Although the Independents were initially opposed to administrative reform, they soon learned that the more effective response was to accept the changes and then concentrate on filling the positions with their own supporters.

Perhaps the most impressive thing about Conley's tenure is the numbr of innovations he introduced during his short administration. Indeed, the innovations that later reached fruition under Cheatham and Lannon were almost all begun during the Conley administration. Conley's achievements included starting the Pilot School Program, reorganizing the administrative staff, expanding the role and increasing the number of curriculum directors, expanding the guidance program, expanding the bi-lingual education program, expanding the special education programs, and founding a black studies program.

Unfortunately, Conley arrived at the wrong time for someone with his personal qualities and skills. He followed

Tobin, the harsh autocrat, and thus was a target for both the pent-up frustration that liberals felt under Tobin and the uneasiness the conservatives felt when he failed to exhibit Tobin's strength and power. Furthermore, the social and political conflicts of the 1960's were surfacing, and the disruptive influences on the nearby Harvard campus began to filter three blocks down Cambridge Street to the city's high schools. Racial conflicts erupted, political protests multiplied, and discipline in the high schools became one of the dominant issues of the day. Conservatives blamed the problems on Conley's failure to apply the firm discipline of Tobin's Administration, while liberals often felt sympathy with the protestors and reacted negatively to strong disciplinary measures.

One other internal factor that complicated Conley's situation was the ingrained racism of the Cambridge School Department. The School Department's teachers and administrators were of predominantly working class descent and they had a record of racial insensitivity. At the same time, Cambridge in the 1960's went from 2% black to 10% black, with an ever greater increase in the black population of the schools. Racial antagonisms between the pupils and staff became a serious issue as the civil rights movement evoked black militancy. Eventually, this spilled over into racial incidents at the high schools, and still later (under Frank

Fisoli) forced the closing of the high schools and the institution of martial law.

In terms of the Zone of Compliance, Conley found that the school system did not fear him as it had Tobin. Furthermore, his willingness to embrace innovative programs tended to alienate many of the conservative teachers and administrators. However, the tradition of submissiveness to the superintendent established during Tobin's administration was carried over, and opponents were at first reluctant to take positions of open dissent. In addition, the staff generally liked and respected Conley as a person, and this, along with his Insider/Independent ties, kept internal conflicts on a reasonably cordial plane. Thus while Conley's departure from the policies of the Tobin administration generated significant internal disagreements, these did not produce the amount of sabotage and foot-dragging that one might normally expect.

In terms of external constraints, Conley had a reasonably wide Zone of Tolerance at the outset, which began to collapse as events flared out of control and political divisions widened and hardened. Because he was an Insider who had risen through the ranks, Conley had the allegiance of the Independents. Because he was receptive to innovation, he was acceptable to the CCA, especially after the disasterous years of Tobin. However, when faced with the essentially insoluble problems of the student-led disruptions, Conley found himself

in a personally intolerable situation. The disruptions
highlighted the long-standing flaws and grievances that had
not been addressed under Tobin, and Conley found himself being
asked to do too many things by too many people. He finally
concluded that his mental health was worth more than his job,
and he tendered his resignation in June of 1970.

To fill the opening left by Conley's abrupt departure,
the School Committee appointed Frank Frisoli to the position
of Acting Superintendent of Schools. At that time, Frisoli
had already been embroiled in a school department controversy
which stemmed from the appointment of himself, John Balfe, and
Edmond Murphy to the three Assistant Superintendents positions
in 1969. The appointment of these three long-time insiders to
such key positions was a political coup by the Independents,
and it was strongly opposed by many community people, who
believed, with some justification that the appointments were
political and that the appointees were not sufficiently
qualified for their positions. To protest the appointments,
an ad hoc group called Save Our Schools (SOS) was formed, and
it campaigned against the appointments. In the ensuing
elections of 1969, SOS actively supported CCA-endorsed
candidates and helped elect a CCA majority to the School
Committee, an infrequent occurrence.

Frisoli's appointment to the position of Action
Superintendent was seen as necessary, since the school year

started in three months and it was important to fill the position while a search was made for a permanent successor. However, many of the people who opposed Frisoli's appointment to Assistant Superintendent were even more opposed to his assumption of the Superintendent's job. The CCA wanted to mount a national search for a successor, and a committee of local citizens and professional educators was appointed by the School Committee to screen candidates and report on the possible selections. Frisoli was permitted to apply for the permanent position, but he was not expected to have an inside track.

However, despite the nominal CCA majority on the School Committee, a curious deal was struck that enabled Frisoli to assume the Superintendent's position on a permanent basis. The CCA then had a 4-3 majority, but through various political machinations, the Independents managed to "win" two of the votes and thus a 5-2 majority approving Frisoli's appointment. Ironically, one of the two swing votes was a woman who had been a leader of SOS, and who had been specifically elected because of her opposition to the appointments of Frisoli, Balfe, and Murphy. With the help of the two CCA votes, Frisoli became the permanent Superintendent in March of 1971.

In terms of political and philosophical orientation, Frisoli was much closer to Tobin than to Conley, and he reacted to the school discipline problems with a hard-line

approach that alienated many people. Although he had been appointed to the acting (later permanent) Superintendent's position because of his restraint in handling the discipline issues during Conley's administration, Frisoli rapidly swung to a more conservative and rigid stance. The black community was especially offended by what was alleged to be Frisoli's "racist terminology," and eventually the confrontations became so severe that the Cambridge schools were closed and martial law was instituted.

Frisoli's conservative bent applied in general policy areas as well, and he strongly opposed many of the innovative programs that were initiated by Conley. However, Frisoli was forced to spend so much of his time fighting for his political survival that he did not have the opportunity to dismantle the Conley reforms. Although Frisoli had built up a reputation as a tough but fair administrator in his years in the Cambridge School Department, this image was virtually destroyed by his conduct as Superintendent. The pressures of the job made him increasingly suspicious, defensive and distrustful, and ultimately led to his downfall.

Frisoli was the classic "insider," and he wanted to secure his position in the bureaucratic arena by filling vacancies with people who were members of the Independent coalitions. Naturally, this favoritism alienated the CCA, who wanted a more neutral and "professional" hiring policy. Since

the CCA appointment choices were regarded as "political" in their own right, the result was that the hiring decisions in the school department were often characterized by political manuevering and school committee intrigue. The appointment conflicts occurred with the regularity of staff attrition, and the resulting battles and recriminations were destructive to the morale of the entire school department.

Frisoli was temperamentally opposed to the innovations begun under the Conley administration, and his long term goal was to join the Independents in engineering their abolition. Sensing this, the CCA began to exert enormous pressure to remove Frisoli from office, and in the resulting furor Frisoli was too busy fighting for survival to dismantle the Conley reforms. In effect, the CCA determined that a hostile Superintendent was such a major impediment to their coalitional goals that it was necessary to oppose him entirely rather than seek some kind of accomodation. Although the short term ramifications of this move were negative -- the Independents and Frisoli became even more closely aligned -- the long term strategy proved effective from the CCA point of view.

The CCA's pressure for his removal distracted Frisoli from making significant decisions in the area of building and plant maintenance, and thus little was accomplished during the Frisoli administration.

Frisoli was obviously hostile to citizen participation, primarily because the most active citizen groups were those formed expressly to bloc his appointment as permanent Superintendent. However, these groups were very effective at applying pressure on Frisoli, and in keeping him too occupied to dismantle key school department programs initiated under Conley. Thus citizen participation was a key component in the CCA's effort to oust Frisoli from the office.

Frisoli was a reasonably shrewd manager, and his apparent goal was to operate the school department much in the manner of Tobin, with strong autocratic authority that was relatively independent of the School Committee. Therefore, Frisoli sought to fill the key management positions with his loyal supporters, and resisted efforts to change management practices. However, the school committee was leery of granting Frisoli Tobin-like powers and so they attempted to force a change in the reporting of the budget from a line-item format to a programmatic format. The change was ultimately adopted with bi-partisan support, with the CCA strongly advocating the programmatic format while the Independents backed it primarily because it was a difficult position to oppose. However, despite this mandate from the school committee, Frisoli managed to procrastinate in the implementation of the new budget format until he was finally ousted from office.

In terms of the Zone of Compliance, Fisoli was an insider, but his term was so controversial that the school department was soon rent with factions. The long-term staff who had admired Tobin tended to support Frisoli, while the newer people brought in by Conley were more likely to oppose him. Factions cleaved along multiple lines, including conservative-liberal, insider-outsider, and parochial-cosmopolitan, and these divisions seriously disrupted the morale and coherence of the school department. Although Frisoli supporters far out numbered his opponents, the dissenting minority was strong and bitter, and for the first time since 1945 it became acceptable for the school department employees to challenge openly the Superintendent and his policies. In the end, the divisions were so deep and acrimonious that Frisoli lost effective control of the School Department.

In terms of the Zone of Tolerance, Frisoli was at constant odds with the liberal and militant groups in the community. Interestingly, the dynamic interaction during this period indicated that the School Committee had substantial power to influence a Superintendent who lacked tenure. At the ame time, however, the Superintendent remained the implementor of programs, and attempts by the School Committee to develop policies against the wishes of the Superintendent were unsuccessful. Thus, the powers of each position tended to

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negate each other, and the school system, lacking a coherent policy or direction, began to lurch from crisis to crisis.

In the 1971 municipal elections Frisoli was the major issue, and the CCA defeated him by capturing 3 seats plus the mayoral position on the School Committee. When the revamped Committee convened in January 1972, their first order of business was to dismiss Frisoli, effective September, 1972. At the time, the issue was so politically sensitive that the School Committee meeting was televised locally. Frisoli attempted to fight the dismissal in the courts, and the ensuing conflict produced an open rupture in the school system with anti-Frisoli and pro-Frisoli camps developing everywhere from the top-level administrators to the janitorial staff.

Following the dismissal of Frisoli, the CCA-dominated School Committee began a national search for a replacement. They eventually selected Alflorence Cheatham, an area superintendent in the Chicago school system. Cheatham was the first black Superintendent of Schools in Massachusetts, and the second in the entire nation. He was known to be a progressive and innovative education, and in almost every sense he was the antithesis of Frank Frisoli, the conservative, ethnic, insider. At the time of his appointment, Cheatham was clearly identified with the people who had comprised the anti-Frisoli coalition, and thus had the automatic enmity of the pro-Frisoli people.

The Cambridge School System that Cheatham inherited was suffering from the cumulative effects of factionalism, poor morale, and overly conservative management. Many of the problems noted by the 1947 Simpson Report remained unresolved and unaddressed, and reforms were desperately needed. The School Department was in disarray, with deep and bitter divisions over the Frisoli issue. Taking this job would have been imposing enough for anyone, but Cheatham had the further disadvantage of being black, an outsider, and a progressive on educational issues. Further still, Cheatham was in the process of a divorce, and so he was moving into the new job without the security of a stable home life. From his perspective, the task ahead was truly daunting.

Despite these barriers, Cheatham quickly proved himself to be a competent and skillful administrator, with a remarkable facility for getting along with people. Indeed, his first and most enduring success was his ability to reach out and build a bridge with the people who were initially most hostile to his appointment. Many of the conservative Independents in the School Department found themselves liking him, and they began to assert that being pro-Frisoli was not necessarily being anti-Cheatham. Cheatham also established a close rapport with many of the ethnic parents in Cambridge, most of whom were strongly Independent in their orientation. In general, Cheatham expressed a deep and abiding concern

about the future of the educational system, and his sincerity evoked a strongly favorable response in most quarters.

More specifically, Cheatham quickly sided with the CCA on the position of hiring personnel, and enacted measures to ensure that the appointments were consonant with the criterion of "professionalism." In practice, Cheatham made a concerted effort to attract and recruit people who were from outside the traditional Cambridge community. Although this brought the initial enmity of the Independents, Cheatham gradually won their respect and, in turn, they won his confidence. Thus, toward the end of his administration, Cheatham was trying to achieve a rough parity between "CCA" appointments and "Independent" appointments.

Cheatham was an innovator, and he was strongly committed to a program of change that would bring the Cambridge school system not only up to date, but into the forefront of educational progress. During his term in office, Cheatham expanded many of the programs begun by Conley, including the Pilot School, the Cambridge Alternative Public Schools (CAPS), the bi-lingual education, special education, vocational education, and guidance counselling. Although the Independents were largely opposed to these measures Cheatham had the luxury of a sympathetic CCA majority in his early years, and by the time the Independents took over the School Committee they found the momentum of these programs difficult

to stop, especially with the Superintendent firmly behind them.

One of the key issues in Cheatham's administration -- and one whose debate eventually caused Cheatham severe political and personal damage -- was the debate over the high school. Cheatham felt that the current facilities were antiquated, and pushed hard for a new high school complex that was to be built in the Fresh Pond area. However, the local community was opposed to the plan because it would mean farther travel for many students, and would create construction problems and later "student" problems in an area that did not want to be the site of the new high school. Despite intensive personal lobbying by the Superintendent, the plan was defeated.

Cheatham was generally in favor of citizen participation, so much so that he often made effort to reach out to the community as a solution to the intense agony and conflict that characterized the school system in his early years. Through his personal charm and amiability, Cheatham managed to win the grudging respect of almost all segments of the community, and eventually forged this into a reasonably solid consensus behind his administration, if not necessarily behind all of his programs.

In keeping with his reformist tendencies, Cheatham sought to improve the management practices of the Cambridge school department. He worked hard to improve the efficiency and

responsiveness of the central administration and achieved significant results for his efforts. Cheatham also succeeded in carrying out the implementation of a Program-Planning-Budgeting System (PPBS) which replaced the old line item budget system, and thus made the school system more rational and more open to public scrutiny.

For Cheatham, the Zone of Compliance in the school department began at an extremely narrow point. The majority of the school department was ethnic, insider, and conservative, and they resented having a black, outsider, liberal imposed upon them by the CCA. However, Cheatham's personal skills won over many staff members, and his pattern of appointments insured that the key positions in the school department were occupied by individuals with a compatible ideological orientation. On the whole, Cheatham's appointments were extremely competent and dedicated people, and many of them proved to be valuable subordinates to Cheatham's successor, Robert Lannon.

In terms of the Zone of Tolerance, Cheatham likewise began with a narrow zone and slowly widened it, although he found the process incredibly frustrating because of the factionalism and instability of the School Committee. Originally appointed by the CCA, Cheatham developed increasingly close ties with many of the Independents, and he began to sway from the CCA camp toward a more neutral position

on various political issues. This, in turn, produced a distinct coolness on the part of the CCA, and Cheatham found himself in an increasingly isolated and vulnerable position, with neither coalition providing strong support for his policies. When the CCA lost its majority in the 1973 elections, Cheatham found himself without the School Committee majority necessary to implement his ambitious educational policies.

The frustration caused by his unstable political support began to take a severe personal toll on Cheatham, and it eventually overwhelmed him. Cheatham had overcome the enormous hostility of the School Department and the community toward his appointment, but the effort left him exhausted. Once his political support began to erode, he began to compound his problems with mistakes, especially on political issues, such as backing the proposed construction of a new high school in the Fresh Pond area. Finally, in February of 1974, Cheatham tendered a surprise resignation, citing reasons of ill-health. Ironically, Cheatham had done what seemed almost impossible, which was to win the respect of the school system and begin to put it in order, only to resign when it appeared that he was in an increasingly secure and advantageous position. Cheatham left the school system in much better shape than he found it, and his successor was able to capitalize on this ground work.

In contrast to Cheatham's difficult introduction to the Cambridge school system, Lannon's assumption of office went rather smoothly. For one thing, political activism was waning, and the problems and disagreements between the competing coalitions were less bitter than before. The CCA and the Independents were again more open to compromise, and there were fewer ad hoc groups or other single-interest groups forming in the community. Lannon also benefited from the work done by Cheatham, which included a capable staff with a strongly progressive orientation in the school policies. In general, the fact that Cheatham had preceded him in pressing reformist issues made Lannon's job substantially easier.

In terms of the Zone of Compliance, Lannon found a school department that was already quite compatible with his educational philosophies. Cheatham's appointments had brought the school department to a more even split between liberals and conservatives, and all members were considerably more moderate than in the earlier periods of turmoil and conflict. Thus, Lannon did not experience the sharp clashes with his subordinates that characterized the administrations of the two previous Superintendents. During Lannon's administration, the divisiveness caused by the Frisoli affair finally disappeared, and Lannon was able to unify the department behind his policies and goals.

In terms of the Zone of Tolerance, Lannon quickly

impressed the various factions with his competence, and he was able to obtain a working majority on the School Committee in support of his programs. With the general decrease in political intensity, the CCA and the Independents began to compromise again on issues of policy versus patronage, and Lannon was given enough support to formulate a reasonably coherent policy. The CCA was more practical in backing Lannon than it had been with Cheatham, and Lannon began to forge increasingly durable support on the school committee among the CCA members and the more moderate Independents. At the time this study ended, Lannon was heading for tenure as Superintendent of the Cambridge Public Schools -- the first since John Tobin had resigned in 1968.

To summarize the observations made in this case study, the dynamic factors that comprise the models of the Zone of Compliance and the Zone of Tolerance are highly interactive. For example, the reputation of the suprintendent is affected by his skills, tenure, and ideological orientation. However, each of these factors is distinguishable in some critical dimension, and thus should be considered as a separate component in the overall political process. The following summaries of the Superintendents' administrations will specifically address the components of the two models and will attempt to demonstrate the role that each can play in determining the policy outcomes of the Cambridge School

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System.

During John Tobin's administration, the political climate was generally quiescent, and the Zones of Compliance and Tolerance were wide. Tobin had excellent political skills, tenure, an ideology that was compatible with the continuing majorities on the School Committee and school department, and above all a reputation for toughness that made everyone reluctant to tangle with him. In a period of political quiescence, factors such as the media and ad hoc groups are less important, and thus they did not play a major role during Tobin's administration.

During Conley's administration, the political climate turned highly activist. Conley had good political skills, and he had a reasonably strong reputation (though not so fearsome as Tobin). However, he lacked tenure, and was frequently in ideological conflict with members of the School Department. Because of his Insider/Independent connections and his personal support, his Zone of Tolerance was reasonably wide, as was his Zone of Compliance. His reason for leaving office were mainly personal and did not result from political opposition in the school system.

Frisoli's administration marked the height of political activism, and the political climate alone was sufficient to narrow considerably the Zones of Tolerance and Compliance. However, Frisoli's other characteristics further abetted this

trend. Frisoli had mediocre political skills, and a good but rapidly declining reputation. He lacked tenure, and his ideology was violently at odds with the CCA and other key groups. At the same time, the media heightened political salience of many issues, as did ad hoc groups. Frisoli was literally squeezed out of office by the narrowed Zones of Tolerance and Compliance.

Cheatham took over with both the Zones of Tolerance and Compliance at their narrowest points. This was attributable to the political climate, which was poisoned by the acrimonious feelings generated by and over Frisoli. However, Cheatham had excellent personal skills, and he gained a very solid reputation. He lacked tenure, and his ideology was never quite compatible with either coalition, primarily because of the fractured political climate. However, he did make a significant effort to moderate his views so as to draw support from both sides of the coalitional battle lines. Cheatham eventually succumbed to the pressures of trying to fit his pragmatic/progressive ideology into a job where his supporters were excessively ideological, and his opponents anti-progressive. These ideological problems were, along with personal problems, Cheatham's downfall. However, he successfully widened the Zones of Tolerance and Compliance during his administration and might well have received tenure had he stuck with the job.

Lannon took over during a time of increasing political quiescence. He had excellent political skills, a good reputation, and a compatible ideology. Interestingly, his ideological values were close to Cheatham's, and the real change was in the external system, with the CCA becoming more pragmatic, and the Independent's less opposed to change. Lannon pushed the Zones as wide as they had been since Tobin, and eventually gained tenure, which in turn widened the Zones still further.

Summary and Conclusions: The Cambridge Public School System demonstrates in a very clear manner two important structural characteristics of local/municipal governments: that part-time representatives to a local legislative forum are generally dependent on the professionals who work in the executive branch to formulate policy; and that despite this seeming abdication of their legislative role, the part-time legislators do play a significant role in shaping and defining the types of policies that the executive branch generates.

In the period of 1960 to 1975, the Cambridge Public School Committee went from being dominated by the strong-willed John Tobin, to exerting substantial influence over the intervening three Superintendents, and finally back to a relatively quiescent role under Robert Lannon. In all of these administrations, even at the height of school committee

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activism, the Committee members were essentially dependent on the superintendent to initiate and formulate school politics. Lacking the specialized expertise, the staff, and the time to fulfill the comprehensive legislative role themselves, the School Committee members were simply unable to discharge the functions mandated to the Committee under the Cambridge City Charter. Instead, they influenced policy indirectly by: appointing superintendents with acceptable ideologies; and threatening or actually exercising a veto over policy initiatives that it found objectionable. Thus, it is reasonable to characterize the School Committee's role as "reactive" rather than "active" in terms of initiating educational policy.

To illustrate the decision-making process in the Cambridge Public Schools, this chapter has introduced schematic diagrams that define the policy generating functions of the Superintendent in terms of the Zone of Tolerance and the Zone of Compliance. In essence, these models incorporate the observed phenomenon that the superintendent is given de facto control over the initiation of school politics but is subject to political control imposed by the community through the formal mechanism of the school committee, on the one hand, and through the representative composition of the school department on the other. These constaints very in significance depending on the personal qualities of the

superintendent, the political climate of the time, and the functioning of the two political coalitions. When the political importance of an issue -- as defined by the term "salience" -- is within the boundaries of the two zones, the Superintendent will have virtually unfettered power to dispose of the issue as he chooses. However, where the salience of the issue exceeds the boundaries of one or both zones, then the issue will be resolved by the operation of a larger political dynamic. This dichotomy also reflects a general distinctions between the "type" of issues involved, such as whether it is "managerial" (routine, internal, distributive), or "political" (strategic, external, redistributive).

Although the external constraints on policy-making imposed by the school committee are traditionally seen as the most important, it is essential to note that there is also what amounts to a "legislative" or "representative" dynamic within the school department itself. In particular, the staff of the Cambridge school department is demographically and politically similar to members of the school committee and to the population of Cambridge at large. As such, their attitudes toward a particular policy initiative will often correspond with the attitudes of the community, so that serious political discord will be mirrored in the school department itself. Since the school department is charged with the implementation of policy, dissent within the school

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department will often produce a voiced objection to a particular decision, and in some cases even stalling or sabotage in its implementation. Thus, the school department itself serves as a second forum for expressing and even to some degree exerting popular opposition to the policies of a Superintendent.

In effect, then, the informal function of the Cambridge school system finds the superintendent as the prime initiator of educational policy, while having to fight two potential "legislative battles", one in the school committee and the other in the school department. Of course, the superintendent has a number of important attributes that assist him in his political conflicts, including his reputation, his expertise in the daily operations of the school department, and his control over the reports and information that form the basis of a policy debate. In general, the superintendent's skills will be used to expand the Zones of Tolerance and Compliance to the widest possible extent, while the political climate and the political coalitions will act as restraining forces on his freedom of decision.

Dynamically, the two politically coalitions are very similar to political parties, channelling and shaping the consensus of the community on particular issues, then presenting those positions in the central political arena. The success of the coalitions in performing these functions if

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evidenced by their durability and also by their capacity to respond to and mobilize the public. As a general rule, the coalitions are very effective at absorbing and institutionalizing the interests of ad hoc or single interest groups that spring up from time to time. Thus, while they lack the more formal structure of political parties, the two coalitions perform most of the functions that V.O. Key and others attribute to political parties.

It should be explicitly noted that the vertical lines representing the coalitional boundaries to the Zones of Tolerance and Compliance have a dual character. First, they assume that the coalitions are in fact the forces that represent and define the boundaries, an assumption that appears to be borne out in the empirical observations. Secondly, it represents the fact that the boundaries are clearly delineated by the coalitions, which is perhaps the coalitions' most important function. During the late '60's and early '70's when ad hoc groups and single-interest groups were proliferating, the two coalitions operated to define and channel the conflict into relatively specific positions on each issue. Thus, while the divisions on the issues were real and enduring, the superintendent could at least deal with two dominant opposing positions rather than twenty. Large and somewhat flexible in their composition, the coalitions function in a manner that unifies the diverse interest into

coherent policy positions. Thus, the superintendent is confronted with a defined boundary that indicates to him what decisions are likely to be disrupted by the coalitions and what decisions are within his sphere of autonomous decision-making.

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CHAPTER VII

THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL COALITIONS ON THE CITY MANAGER

IN THE CITY OF CAMBRIDGE

Introduction:

The preceding chapter examined how the superintendent of schools interacts with the coalitions to formulate and implement educational policy. We observed that school committee members lack both the time and expertise to exercise the formal policy initiation powers granted them by the city charter, and thus the school committee tends to look to the superintendent for leadership and guidance. This chapter will examine the interaction between the city council and the city manager. As with the superintendent, one can expect the city manager to have an important role in the formulation of public policy. However, while the city manager strives to assert policy-making authority in many key areas, the city council is more active and independent than the school committee.

Under the Cambridge city charter, the city council is responsible for the formulation of policy for the city's public bureaucracies. This is a role that the city councilors exercise more frequently than their school committee counterparts, for a variety of reasons. Unlike the superintendent of schools, the city manager is not the head of

a single, unified bureaucracy. Instead, he is in charge of a number of large and disparate organizations, each with specific professional norms that lie outside his recognized area of expertise. Thus, while the superintendent could use his stature and authority as an educator to fight for his educational policies, the city manager cannot claim such authority on the diverse issues that arise in city government. In effect, the city manager must necessarily be less of a professional expert and more of a political actor than the superintendent of schools.

This is not to say that the city manager is not an important or effective force in the determination of public policy. Indeed, as we will shortly see, the city manager is probably the dominant factor in the majority of public policy decisions, particularly the large number of "housekeeping" details that do not draw political attention. It is when the issue involves major political interest and controversy that one sees the city manager subordinate to the city council. Thus, at times, the city manager has the strong policy-making authority that characterizes the superintendent; at other times, he becomes the mere executor of the council's will.

The role played by the city manager in the formulation of public policy is usually determined by default: The city council confers policy-making authority by abdicating its responsibility to make the decision. This happens under

differing circumstances. In some cases, the city council defers to the city manager because the problem is minor or because the manager's expertise is necessary for a successful solution. In other cases, the council's deference to the manager is a deliberate policy decision -- the council agrees to adopt the city manager's position on an issue. These situations are affected by the political complexion of the city council, particularly the relationship of the coalitions to each other and to the city manager.

Although political scientists commonly regard the formulation of public policy as a contest between the city council and the city manager, this chapter premises that the coalitions are a key ingredient in the overall political equation. The city council's behavior is predicated on its political composition, the policy objectives of the council majority, and the political considerations in the larger community. The coalitions serve as spokesmen for community political interests, and the relationship between the city manager and the city council necessarily is colored by politics.

The partisan activities of the city's two dominant coalitions are a central component of the policy-making process. They help define and implement the goals of various interest groups and then take the steps necessary to implement these objectives. Thus, it is not sufficient to depict the

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policy dynamic merely as a struggle between the city council and the city manager. Rather, it is a question of determining whether, given the goals of the dominant coalitions, they succeed in achieving the implementation of those goals.

It is also important to evaluate the city manager as an independent factor in policy decisions and to determine how frequently the city manager: (1) introduces and implements policies that one or both coalitions oppose; (2) introduces and converts the coalitions to a new policy; or (3) merely introduces and implements policies that are already endorsed by the majority coalition.

The purpose of this chapter, then, is to define the complex role that the city manager plays, not only in his relationships to the city council, but also in his relationship with the coalitions. To provide a context for this discussion, we will begin with a review of the literature on the role of the city manager in city government. Second, we will examine the policy-making process of Cambridge city government, with emphasis on developing models that help describe the nature and content of that process. Third, we will examine the administrations of the people who held the city manager's position from 1960 to 1975, focusing on the application of the models developed in the preceding sections.

The City Manager: A Review of the Literature:

The impact of political coalitions on the executive branch of government has been largely overlooked by research in urban politics. In general, the literature has tended to focus on the interaction between the city manager and the city council in the formulation and implementation of specific policy choices, and few scholars have explored the influence that coalitions have in shaping, defining and resolving this dynamic conflict. The purpose of this review is to explore the traditional literature on the city manager and to illustrate the evolution in political analysis of the city manager's role.

The city manager form of government was first established in the early twentieth century as a more progressive alternative to the ethnic-dominated politics of the nineteenth-century cities. The driving force behind the city manager form of government was a desire to break down "machine" politics and inject a more democratic control of local government. Corresponding with this goal was a desire to bring greater management expertise into government.[1] This naturally pointed toward strengthening the executive position and hiring an independent, professional manager to fill the position.

A key feature of the city manager form of government was that it tried to distinguish between the functions of the city manager and the functions of the city council:

> "The division of labors between
> manager and council is formally
> premised on the dichotomy between
> administration and politics. The city
> manager was to be the administrator,
> the council the policy maker. This
> dichotomy was embraced by many early
> political scientists as sound causal
> and normative theory.[2]

The basic assumption behind the city manager form of government was that political factionalism would give way to a more reasoned consensus politics.[3] It was believed that people living together in the same area had, by and large, common goals for their community and that ideological issues in municipal elections were contrived and artificial. The only division of interest was between 'good and bad' and the majority of citizens wanted the same results -- adequate services honestly provided.[4]

One of the first commentators to recognize that the normative theory underlying the city manager form of government differed from the reality was Leonard White. Writing in 1927, White noted that, while the council-manager charters attempted to make a sharp division between policy and administration, it was important to inquire into what has been the actual working relationship arising out of these charter provisions. White concluded that the legal terms of city charters were often far from describing the patterns of behavior that actually developed.[5]

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However, most political scientists in this period remained committed to the concept of the city manager as executor of policy. In their study of The City Manager Profession, published in 1934, Ridley and Nolting summarized the prevailing views:

> "The city manager is an executive and administrative officer of the first rank. He is appointed by the council on the basis of his executive ability, training, and experience, and is directly responsible to the council for the proper and effective administration of municipal activities. This also implies a certain amount of leadership on the part of the manager, as a professional executive, in informing the council and public of the broad purposes and significance of city government in general, of the best methods of solving particular problems, and advising the council on matters of policy. In assuming leadership, however, the manager is careful not to determine in general municipal policy or to place himself before the people as taking a stand for or against matters of policy. The council assumes full responsibility and credit for policy determination. For a manager to take the lead in policy results in making the manager's position a political office, thus sacrificing confidence in his professional outlook and greatly limiting his usefulness as an executive."[6]

In 1940, Stone, Price and Stone presented the first thorough empirical study of how the city manager form of

government actually operated. One of their most important findings was that the city manager was not a passive administrator who merely followed the dictates of the city council. Instead, they found that it was "generally impossible for the city manager to escape being a leader in matters of policy, for it is an essential part of his administrative job to make recommendations."[7]

After World War II, the concepts of scientific management known as "Taylorism" went into eclipse, and political scientists began to take a more critical view of the assumptions underlying the city manager form of government. Many of the original assumptions failed in practice, and no assumption was more frequently debunked that the dichotomy between administration and politics.[8] For the most part, these studies criticized the normative assumptions that had been advanced by the early advocates of the city manager form of government.[9] By 1958, Clarence Ridley, who had identified scientific management as the basic norm of the city manager government in 1934, was ready to adknowledge that "the city manager by the very nature of his job acts as a policy formulator."[10]

As political scholarship increasingly demonstrated that the normative dichotomy between administration and politics did not hold up in the real world of city manager government, political scientists began to investigate what actually did

happen in practice. It soon became apparent that the city
manager was not only a participant but often a leader in
policy decisions and political choices. In a study of 21
North Carolina cities, B. James Kweder found:

> "The perceptions of managers, mayors
> and councilmen of the policy-making
> process in their cities clearly refute
> the idea that policy making is
> something performed exclusively by the
> council. Not only do the managers
> participate actively in the process,
> they participate actively in every one
> of the six phases in which the policy-
> making process has been divided for
> this study. Moreover, in many cities
> the manager clearly emerges as the
> person who has the greatest influence
> over what is happening at every stage
> of the policy-making process."[11]

The literature on community politics and power casts
further light on the city manager as a policy initiator.
Although most of the major studies on community power focused
on cities that did not have a city manager, two important
studies detailed the role of the city manager in community
politics: Aaron Wildavsky's Leadership in a Small Town and
Oliver Williams and Charles Adrian's Four Cities.

In his study of Oberlin, Ohio, Wildavsky found that the
city manager was one of two community leaders that he singled
out for special analysis. In assessing the city manager's
influence, Wildavsky wrote:

> "The City Manager is interested,

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active, and has the resources of his
office with which to influence the
course of decision-making. He is,
after all, the only individual in town
whose full-time job it is to help make
decisions over a wide range of
community affairs. Other city
employees are specialized to the
particular area in which they work and
they lack his formal powers and broad
contacts... . As a matter of course,
therefore, we would expect a city
manager who takes a broad view of his
responsibilities, in a town without
full-time elected officials, to be the
most general activist and to appear in
more decision areas than anyone
else."[12]

Wildavsky went on to note that the city manager is
selective about which decisions he tries to influence and
that he avoids controversial decisions that have not achieved
community concensus and that are outside the effective scope
of his office. Wildavsky attributed the city manager's
success to his skill at coalition building, supplemented by
his ability to recruit personnel to promote certain policies,
to provide a rationale for those who chose to agree, and to
modify opposition when necessary without giving up essential
elements of his program.

In their study of four cities, Williams and Adrian found
no consistent pattern in the role of the city manager.[13] In
two cities, they found the city manager a key leadership
figure and policy innovator; in one city, they found that the
city manager shared policy-making with the city council; and

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in the fourth city, they found that the city manager was neither a leader nor an innovator, but largely subservient to the council. However, they noted that as a general rule the nature of the city manager form of government gave significant policy-making powers to the city manager. They commented, "Rule by amateurs is likely to mean that under most conditions, persons outside the legislative body must be depended upon to make the essential policy decisions in all but a formal sense."[14]

As the city manager's policy-making role became increasingly evident, efforts were made to identify the mechanisms by which the city manager could influence policy. One method was control of the city council agenda. For example, Wright found that more than two-thirds of the city managers that he surveyed said they set the agendas of the city council. This task helps them to control the kinds of questions that are raised and the policy options that are considered. The same proportion of city managers reported that more items considered by the council were on the agendas at the behest of managers. Wright concluded that the city manager is the major source of information for any city council, and that he bears most of the responsibility for creating the "menu" of policy alternatives to be considered. The council will not accept everything on the menu, but the menu does set forth the policies likely to be considered

seriously.[15]

Another mechanism by which the city manager could influence policy decisions was his control over the budgetary process. City managers were found to have established considerable autonomy in preparing budgets, and in many cases the city manager and his staff prepared the budget without direct consultation with council members.[16] In practice, this generally meant that the city council had little opportunity to challenge or even seriously evaluate the policy choices inherent in the budgetary decisions. The budget often represents the most important aspects of municipal policy, but it also involves a number of modest but nonetheless important allocation decisions. Although many of the budgetary decisions can be regarded as minor in and of themselves, when totalled they can have a profound impact on the distribution of public resources in a community.[17]

A third tool that the city manager can use to influence policy decisions is his professional expertise. A key factor is his virtual monopoly of technical and other detailed information. While the councilors are part-time amateurs, he is a full-time professional, and he sits in a position where all communication lines converge. In most situations, the councilors must depend on the city manager for their information, which gives him a large measure of control over them.[18]

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Elaborating further, Bollens and Reis observed two areas where the manager's expertise is his greatest asset. First, he knows the rules of government procedure. He is conversant with provisions of the city charter, court decisions affecting local government, department and agency operating procedures, provisions and requirements of county ordinances, state and federal laws and administrative rules. Second, through both experience and training, a manager knows more about city services and functions of all kinds than do most other local political actors.[19]

Thus, the manager can manipulate the information on which the council bases its decisions. In her study of ten Florida-based city-managers, Gladys Kammerer noted:

> "The critics of the council-manager system suspect, however, that managers do not, in fact, present to the council all the alternatives they know to exist. And the critics believe that the managers similarly do not always describe the disadvantages of their own recommendations as fully as the possible advantages .... Furthermore, because not all problems are as visible to the council as to the manager, the manager's choosing not to call some matter to the council's attention almost insures that the council will not deal with it at all."[20]

Although the primary focus of political scientists during the 1960s was describing how city managers influence policy, an important secondary issue was whether this policy role had

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a positive effect on city government. Most observers who saw the city manager as a competent professional approved of the practical consequences of his unintended policy role. After all, the underlying goal of Model Charter was to bring professional judgment into city government, and in many cases this was precisely what city managers did. Banfield and Wilson studied city managers in larger cities and concluded that they have a common professional "code of ethics" which helps define their attitudes and policy values.[21] Loveridge observed that city manager's policy decisions reflected their personal characteristics, views, backgrounds, and attitudes.[21] In each case, there was implicit sympathy for the middle-class, professional orientation of the city manager, whose values were seen as more beneficial than the overtly political purposes of the city council.

Up to this point -- roughly the early 1970's -- the literature had focused primarily on the city manager, paying little attention to the city council except as a counterpoint to the manager's policy-making efforts. This approach was understandable because it was important to examine how the city manager's real powers differed from his formal powers. However, as the city manager's policy role became more clearly defined, political scientists began to examine the role of the city council more closely. They addressed such questions as: Why does the council yield to the city manager on policy

issues? How does it shape or control his policy initiatives?
Does it in fact agree with the policies that he initiates?

One of the early observations was that city council
members generally do not perceive themselves as surrendering
any of their prerogatives in policy formulation. Instead,
city council members see their role as conforming to the Model
Charter. They describe themselves as the initiators of
policy, and they view the city manager as merely an
administrator who executes their decisions.[23]

In his study of city council/city managers in Oakland,
California, Ronald Loveridge found that city council members
generally define the proper policy activities of the city
manager in terms of his formal duties and powers.[24] He also
observed that city councilors regarded the city manager, not
as a political executive, but rather as one "who should be
very cautious to obtain the consent of the majority of the
councilmen before changing or deciding anything of any
magnitude."[25] Not surprisingly, he concludes: "Among city
councilmen, claims for policy advocacy and leadership by city
managers find few adherents and many foes."[26]

Despite these claims of policy leadership, the fact
remains that the city manager does have considerable policy
input. As noted above, this is partly because the city
manager has the resources, professional expertise and control
of information to influence policy without the city council's

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approval. Another explanation, advanced by Cortus Koehler, is that most city councilors do not want to exercise such authority:

> "(I)t appears that there are sufficient heterogeneous sources of information available to the council member to enable him to make independent judgments regarding his legislative oversight responsibilities. It does take some effort, but if the desire exists, the job can be done. However, the reality of the matter is that the public elects few council members with such a desire."[27]

Perhaps the most realistic explanation of why the city council permits the city manager to exercise policy-making functions is that it is in the councilors' interest to do so. Many city councilors recognize that the reputation of city hall and even the city council depends on the political skills of the city manager. More generally, city councilors expect the manager to be a composite spokesman, salesman, and representative for the council. In the eyes of councilors, the city manager should "do whatever is necessary to make the council look good."[28]

Seen from this perspective, the city manager operates with relative autonomy in some policy areas, but ultimately finds these areas defined and controlled by the city council. Although the manager occasionally has sufficient powers to

"put one over" on the council, the council's power to hire and fire the manager remains a potent, ultimate weapon. These sanctions ensure that the pleasure of the council will largely determine a city manager's personal discretion and policy activities. Council acceptance -- or at least acquiescence -- becomes the base line for policy innovations and leadership by the city manager.[29]

To be effective, most observers agree that the city manager must stay in close contact and on relatively good terms with a majority of the city council. In council meetings, informal work sessions, private meetings, or individual conversations, the city manager is subject to the continuous face-to-face influence of the council. The success or failure of a city manager depends on the personal rapport he develops and sustains with the members of his council. In addition, the city manager spends an estimated 30 to 40 percent of his time in meetings, carrying out instructions, and preparing reports for the council.[30] In no obvious way can he establish much distance between himself and councilmen; and at the minimum, he must have their informed approval of any major policy action.[31]

The city manager is also constrained by community politics: He cannot advance policies that lack citizens' support. Clarence Ridley notes that while the manager occasionally finds it advisable to take a forward position in

recommending a policy, he cannot afford to get too far ahead of the council or the citizens. Particularly on the highly controversial questions, the manager hopes that members of the council will take the initiative.[32]

This hope, however, is often vain, because city councils are as loath as the city manager to tackle a contentious issue. In their insightful analysis of City Politics, Banfield and Wilson state:

> "(I)t is normally 'good politics' for councilmen to maneuver the manager into taking, or seeming to take, responsibility for risky or controversial measures. Having been elected at large on a nonpartisan ballot, they are much more likely to be turned out of office by a vote against them than by one for their opponents. Their strategy, consequently, is to avoid rocking the boat. If the boat must be rocked, they want the public to think that the city manager's hand is on the tiller. If all goes well, they can take credit later with the electorate. If not, then they can blame him and perhaps even make "political capital" by firing him."[33]

Hence, the conundrum of city manager government: Who will be the leader? The city manager is the obvious person, but when issues have neither a consensus nor a clear solution it is difficult for the manager to play a leadership role. John Baker argues:

> "This leadership failure in

> heterogeneous communities is the
> single most important reason why
> council-manager government has not
> successfully penetrated many of our
> major cities. Nearly all such cities
> are heterogeneous and are
> characterized by conflict politics....
> Managerial leadership is most
> effective in homogeneous communities
> characterized by consensus politics.
> It is even more helpful if the city is
> middle or upper class in social and
> economic orientation so that the
> values of the community -- economical,
> efficient, business-like government --
> are likely to coincide with those of
> the manager."[34]

The result is that, in communities divided by political strife, the city manager's job is very precarious. Every controversial decision of a council based on the city manager's recommendation creates political enemies for him in the electorate and on the council. The city manager has to weigh the political costs of each controversial recommendation to which he commits his prestige. Pressing an unpopular issue risks the development of a council alliance committed to replacing him.[35]

Thus, to survive and function in such an environment, the city manager must cultivate workable relationships with the city council as a whole and also with its individual members. These relationships are not limited to formal exchanges on policy; they are complicated by a full spectrum of interpersonal and political problems.[36] In view of the complexities of these relationships, Jeptha Carrell identifies

six sources of conflict between city managers and city council members: (1) power prerogatives, (2) personality clashes, (3) political setting (4) policy expediency differences, (5) manager's inflexibility and rectitude, and (6) communications and cognition difficulties.[37]

Policy decisions of any significance often must be camouflaged or carried out in an informal and private manner. Thus, the city manager, indirectly and behind the scenes, strives to build, utilize, and husband his personal and political resources to influence public policy decisions. To be successful, he must literally become the best politician in town, making skillful use of expert, referent, and indirect influence techniques.[38]

The city manager is unlikely to push hard for a policy initiative unless he feels that a majority of the city council will back him. He is an innovator and leader primarily in safe areas. However, on controversial policy problems, the council expects him to act as staff adviser. In many ways, therefore, the city manager should be a consensus politican par excellence, avoiding friction, criticism or opposition.[39]

It is not unusual, therefore, to find the city manager described more for his political skills than for his administrative or professional expertise. Duane Lockard writes:

"The city manager is among other
things, chief administrator, chief
legislator, political chief, symbolic
and ceremonial head of the community,
chief of public safety, and chief
negotiator with other governments.
And to be successful in these roles he
must be an effective persuader,
constantly using his various wiles to
get his points across and action
taken. He may have to bargain, accept
compromises, plead for what he can get
when he can't get what he wants, defer
action until the time is ripe, and
choose well which role to play
when."[40]

Through his interaction with the council, the city

manager learns when he can take the initiative and when he

must maintain a low profile. In his 1958 study, Ridley found

that:

"Managers were in substantial
agreement on the area where they
should push hard for managerial
policies and the areas where they
should remain neutral or stay out
altogether. They agreed that they
should assert themselves strongly on
technical questions where the best
policy is strongly or entirely
dependent on factual data. They also
strongly defended the responsibility
of managers in fields of internal
management."[41]

On the other hand, Ridley found that managers felt they should

play a more limited role -- or avoid areas such as: partisan

political issues; moral and regulatory issues; public versus

private ownership; the internal operations of the city

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council; relations with independent boards and commissions and other government, except as guided by council instructions; and issues where the council is divided within itself."[42]

Although all city managers have the same basic functions, they do not necessarily pursue their jobs in the same way. Karl Bosworth identifies three leadership styles among city managers: (1) community leader; (2) the good government manager, and (3) the status quo administrator. The community leaders advocate major policy proposals and exercise community leadership; good government managers strive to improve city services and so realize the twin goals of efficiency and effectiveness; and status quo administrators work hard to keep city hall running smoothly, focusing on administrative procedure rather than the problems of the city.[43]

Elaborating further on this scheme, Loveridge defines four strategies commonly used by city managers when trying to introduce and implement policy initiatives: (1) a sense of timing on presenting and pressing issues; (2) a private method of persuasion accomplished through informal and primarily face-to-face meetings; (3) an attitude that the key goal of the city manager is to educate the city councilors on issues, and (4) an effort to secure the confidence of the city council.[44]

In using these strategies, the city manager needs support and guidance from the political coalitions that make up the

council. Literature on the city manager tends to treat the council as a single, unified entity that exists in opposition to the city manager. In fact, however, the city council is at least bipolar in the vast majority of cities and in many cases is divided into more than two factions. Thus, in dealing with the city council, the city manager faces a complex and often volatile combination of political views and pressures.

The literature on city manager government has evolved in roughly three stages. First was an assessment of the formal dichotomy between administrative and policy functions; then came recognition of the fact that the city manager exercises considerable policy-making functions. The third stage was the recognition that the city manager's policy-making functions are strongly influenced by the city council.

This chapter will move to a fourth stage: an assessment of how the city manager interacts with the coalitions -- both within the community and on the council -- to define the boundaries of municipal policy. This chapter will demonstrate that the city council is not a unified body, but rather a group of individuals, often with sharply conflicting concerns and goals. Although the city manager can play an important role in solidifying support behind some policies, his inherently vulnerable role makes it unlikely that he will survive for long periods of time if he is the central organizer of policy alliances. Instead, it is the coalitions

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that identify the policy consensus and show the manager the boundaries within which he can operate. In effect, coalitions reduce the randomness and entropy in city council politics that are the greatest enemy of a strong, capable city manager.

The Implementation Process in the Cambridge City Government

The formal structure of Cambridge city government is defined by the Cambridge City Charter (Plan E). The system calls for the city council to set policy and for the city manager to act as the executive officer for the city in the implementation of policy. The municipal charter defines the city manager's role as follows:

> Section 104. "Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter, it shall be the duty of the city manager to act as chief conservator of the peace within the city; to supervise the administration of the affairs of the city; to see that within the city the laws of the commonwealth and the ordinances, resolutions, and regulations of the city council are faithfully executed; and to make such recommendations to the city council concerning the affairs of the city as may to him seem desirable; to make reports to the city council from time to time upon the affairs of the city; and to keep the city council fully advised of the city's financial condition and its future needs. He shall prepare and submit to the city council budgets as required of the mayor by section thirty-two of Chapter 44 (i.e., Municipal Finance Act) and, in connection therewith, may, to the

> extent provided by said section
> thirty-two in the case of a mayor,
> require the submission to him, by all
> departments, commissions boards, and
> offices of the city, of estimates of
> the amounts necessary for their
> expenses. He shall make all
> appointments and removals in the
> departments commissions, boards, and
> offices of the city for whose
> administration he is responsible,
> except as otherwise provided in this
> chapter, and shall perform such other
> duties as may be prescribed by this
> chapter or required of him by
> ordinance or resolution of the city
> council."[45]

The city manager's power to appoint members to departments and boards gives him control over personnel and patronage, a key prerogative in Cambridge politics. The Cambridge charter also specifically prohibits any attempt by the city council or its members to influence appointments or dismissals under the city manager's jurisdiction or to give orders to any subordinate of the city manager either publicly or privately. This latter provision is one that has not fared well over the years.

The goal of Plan E was efficient, impartial, professional administration of the city's departments. As a professional, the city manager was supposed to be immune from petty politics, a quality that would ensure long-term tenure, and he was supposed to preside over a fair and equitable distribution of the city's services to the community. He was to be appointed to the position "on the basis of his administrative

and executive qualifications only." In addition to his important powers of appointment, the city manager plans the city budget, which the city council has only the power to cut. He can grant a number of temporary positions, and even with civil service positions, he can choose from among those with the top two or three scores on the civil service exam. The city manager also has control over the smaller contracts let by the city.

Although his statutory powers seem impressive on paper, they do not necessarily translate into real power. The city manager tends to dominate the minor and routine activities of city government. In political situations, however, he must be careful not to antagonize his city council supporters. Although charter language emphasizes the city manager's independence, the council has the power to remove him from office, and, throughout the recent history of Cambridge politics, this has been a lever to keep the city manager from neglecting political considerations. Thus, the statutory scheme has evolved into a more complex structure of interlocking and balancing forces, under which the city manager must be independent in some areas and quite dependent in others.

The definition of administrative versus political issues is determined by the city manager's overseer, the city council. In contrast to the school committee, which abdicates

substantially its policy-setting role to the superintendent of schools, the city council often takes a more active role in many areas of public policy. Although the city manager is a critical ally for either coalition, the city councilors are less apt to be captured by or become dependent on the city manager for policy direction.

Rent control is the clearest example of an issue that is seen as "political" rather than "administrative". As such, the city council has a strong incentive to exercise it's policy-making powers, and indeed the councilors insist on determining the outcome on this issue. By the same token, the rent control issue is a particularly devisive one: To support one side would necessarily alienate the advocates of the other. On this issue, it is logical for the city manager to adopt a low profile and let the city council take the "political heat" for the decision. In effect, the city manager has the option to duck emotion-laden political issues that could damage his neutrality and independence.

Taking this tack, City Manager James Sullivan avoided any public position on rent control. After his rehiring in 1974, Sullivan, who was known privately to support rent control, told the Cambridge Chronicle:

> "It is not a question of my point of view. Rent control has been adopted by the city council and my position as chief administrator of the city is

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that I will administer it as well as I
can.   It is a situation in which the
policy has been decided by the
council.   The Rent Control Board
exists and should try to represent the
city as well as it possibly can."[46]

In issues of lesser political salience, the city manager
exercises more direct control over the outcome, especially if
the issues involve the day-to-day control of the city
government.   For example, the city council may approve or
disapprove of certain decisions relating to street
maintenance, but the city manager is the one who oversees the
implementation of those policies.   It is not unusual for the
city manager to use bureaucratic techniques to delay measures
that he opposed, while strenuously advocating policies that he
supports.

An example of how the city manager can use his powers and
position to determine policy outcomes occurred in 1966 during
the administration of Joseph DeGuglielmo.   The charter gives
the council the power to set salaries for police and fire
department employees, and the city council wanted to give the
500 policemen and firemen a 16 percent raise.   However,
DeGuglielmo opposed the raise stating that the city budget
allowed only $900,000 for pay raises and that a 16 percent
raise for fire and police would leave only a two to four
percent raise for the 2,500 other city employees.   The city
council ignored the city manager's warnings and voted 8-1 to

give the 16 percent raise.

The next week, DeGuglielmo exercised the first executive veto in the city's history, which required a 6-3 majority to override. Since it appeared that DeGuglielmo could muster the necessary four votes to block an override, the supporters of the police and fire departments closeted themselves with the city manager and worked out a compromise, whereby the police and fire employees received a 16 percent raise on June 1 instead of January 1, while all other municipal employees received a ten percent raise on January 1. The Cambridge Chronicle noted, "The city councilors were put in a tight squeeze by the city manager's determination to hold to his (position)."[47]

The battle over pay raises illustrated the powers available to a strong and willful city manager. Although several city councilors, particularly Edward Crane, argued that the city manager's estimate of $900,000 was unreasonably low, they lacked the inside knowledge of the budget to substantiate this argument. DeGuglielmo insisted that budgetary constraints "forced" him to veto the raise, and it left the city council in the uncomfortable position of advocating a seemingly "irresponsible" pay raise. In general, the city manager was able to play the police and fire department pay raises against those of other city workers, until he finally "boxed" the city council "into a corner."

Of course, maneuvers like this risk city council retaliation. In general, the city manager's ability to use bureaucratic methods to achieve his ends is directly related to the cohesiveness of the city council. Compared with the superintendent of schools, the city manager holds a more overtly political position, and the greater his political activity, the more likely he is to be a victim of political changes. Stated somewhat simplistically, the superintendent is a professional manager; the city manager, a political manager. Both positions are intended to bring professional management skills to the execution and implementation of public policies. However, the city manager must also play a more political role and is less insulated by the norms of his profession. He cannot rely on professional training for his policy positions except in clearly administrative situations.

When the policy decision pertains to administrative or minor political issues, the superintendent and the city manager behave in similar ways. Both have the "hands-on" experience of running a bureaucracy, and the respective legislative bodies defer to their judgment, out of respect and necessity. On major political issues, however, the dynamic is markedly different. The superintendent of schools will have an ideological position on virtually any issue pertaining to education, including such volatile topics as sex education and busing; while his position has a political component, he can

also claim that professional expertise plays a major role. In contrast, the city manager cannot assert himself as readily on "political" issues such as rent control.

This dichotomy is probably based on perceptions of their expertise. The superintendent heads a bureaucracy with a single concern -- education. On any topic pertaining to education, the superintendent can credibly claim an expertise and insight not available to the layman. In contrast, the city manager is a generalist -- someone who presides over numerous bureaucracies with distinct and divergent tasks. The city manager cannot claim expertise in police work, sewers, building maintenance and traffic flow at the same time. Thus, outside of administrative issues, where his expertise is acknowledged, the city manager cannot as easily summon his professional knowledge to bolster his policy positions.

Significantly, because the city manager has a more overtly political position he is more vulnerable to removal for political reasons. Although the superintendent of schools may be forced into tight political situations, his professionalism is a buffer against an arbitrary or purely political dismissal. Thus, while a change in the city council majority may be regarded as a sufficient justification for removing the city manager, the school committee realizes that constant changes in the superintendent's position is disruptive of learning, destructive to morale, and against the

best interests of the children in the public schools. Thus, it is appropriate to remove the city manager for political reasons; it is less appropriate to replace the superintendent simply because the political balance on the school committee has changed.

In summary, one can conclude that the formal mechanisms laid out by the City Charter are modified by an informal process that reflects the realities of day-to-day management of the city of Cambridge. Although the city manager is supposed to be a professional manager aloof from partisan politics, it is inevitable that he plays an important role in the political life of the city. His ability to allocate jobs, control day-to-day decisions, and influence even major policies makes him a force to be reckoned with. However, while the charter gives him a theoretical independence in many areas, much of this formal authority is vitiated by the fact that the city councilors have the right to hire and fire the city manager. The Plan E charter contains anomalies in definition and scope, some of which work to the city manager's benefit, some of which work to his detriment, and all of which contribute to the inherently political quality of his job.

Role of the Coalitions: The Zone of Tolerance

The preceding section examined the structural characteristics of the city manager's position and contrasted

this with the role of the superintendent of schools. In this section, we will examine the role of the coalitions in shaping the policy decisions that the city manager must implement. In Chapter VI, we saw that the coalitions reflected, defined, and consolidated community views into two competing alternatives, which constrained and influenced the superintendent in policy-making. We also noted that the superintendent, like the chief executive in many systems, was the most important initiator of educational policy and that the coalitions served more to define than to initiate educational policy.

In the case of the city manager, the role of the coalitions is more complex. The political dynamic in administrative issues is comparable to that of educational issues. The city manager has tight control over the formulation of policy, while the coalitions play a defining role, telling the manager what he cannot do rather than spelling out what he should do.

However, compared with the superintendent, the city manager is more frequently expected to defer to the formal policy-making authority of the city council. In these areas, the coalitions take a more direct, active role in determining the content of policy decisions, and the city manager becomes a third force in the policy process. His policy-initiating functions do not disappear: Indeed, conflict between the two

coalitions may actually strengthen the city manager by encouraging him to develop a compromise position that mediates the coalitions' differences. Rarely do the coalitions take such a strong interest in the policy that the city manager effectively plays no role. Often the city manager's role is limited not because he lacks power but because he chooses not to exercise it.

Models of the Zone of Tolerance and Zone of Compliance developed in the previous chapter are useful tools in understanding the role of the coalitions vis-a-vis the city manager. In general, the city manager remains the initiator of public policy in the large majority of cases. And, when the city council chooses to exercise overt power, he often remains an important factor in shaping and implementing these decisions. The city councilors can never simply ignore the city manager: Instead, the implicit assumption of the Zone of Tolerance model is that they act to constrain his policy choices. Therefore, the basic model of policy initiation in Cambridge city government places the city manager at the center, with the coalitions acting to constrain his decision-making and, in specific areas, actively stepping in to determine particular policies.

In proposing this model, we are again making two assumptions: That a specific boundary defines the autonomous power of the city manager and that the coalitions are the

arbiters of this boundary.   These assumptions appear correct.
The coalitions set boundaries according to political
considerations, granting the city manager broad discretion n
administrative matters and giving him less leeway -- and
occasionally no leeway -- in determining more politically
charged policies.

The Zone of Tolerance for the city manager is composed of
the same basic elements found in the model for the
superintendent of schools.   The city manager is the central
figure in the development of policy, while the coalitions
determine the boundaries within which the city manager will be
given autonomy.   The boundaries are in turn affected by
several external factors, including: (1) ad hoc groups, (2)
media coverage, (3) the general political climate, and (4)
state and federal laws.   The city manager can also influence
these boundaries through his personal characteristics,
including his: (1) political skills, (2) professional
reputation, and (3) ideological compatibility.

Unlike the Zone of Tolerance for the superintendent,
which showed a strong interrelation between the tolerance
granted the superintendent on one issue and the tolerance
granted on all issues, the Zone of Tolerance for the city
manager is more flexible and dynamic.   The city manager may
have a wide Zone of Tolerance in the aggregate, but have
little or no latitude on a specific issue.   Thus, like an

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accordian, the Zone of Tolerance would appear to narrow or widen, depending on the issue.

Although the coalitions determine the boundaries of the Zone of Tolerance, the boundary positions are influenced by the external factors described below. These forces tend to operate directly on the coalitions and indirectly on the city manager. The city manager will naturally fill whatever political role is allocated to him by the coalitions, so that external events and forces are important because of how they influence the boundary-setting process.

Ad Hoc Groups: Although the coalitions are generally the medium for local political activities, it is not unusual for an hoc group to form around a key or controversial issue, particularly if the issue affects a specific sub-group in a very powerful way. Because they are very potent at mobilizing their supporters, the ad hoc groups' typically one-issue orientation makes them a particularly effective force, especially in times of relative political apathy. Usually an ad hoc group forms outside the dominant coalitions and then presses one of the coalitions to accept its views. The ad hoc group thus uses the coalition system as the best avenue for long-term political influence.

Media Coverage: Heavy media coverage of issues such as rent control, police brutality, or key political appointments often encourages the community (and, in turn, the coalitions) to

take a more active interest in the formulation and implementation of city policy on those issues. Media coverage also magnifies the city council's interest in an issue. The greater the media coverage, the greater the political salience of an issue and the more likely the city councilors are to take an active role in policy formulation. The media also give ad hoc groups attention and exposure throughout the community.

Political Climate: The role of city government is to provide municipal services. And, when their distribution are the sole issues at stake in city politics, then the city manager's control of the administration and the budget gives him control over city government. However, when more political issues -- such as racial unrest -- are at stake, then the city manager's power is minimized. Thus, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the highly partisan political environment of Cambridge placed exceptional pressures on the city manager, and there was a rapid turnover in the city manager's position. In essence, the larger political climate tended to determine whether decisions were "political" or "managerial".

State and Federal Laws: The state and federal governments have a potent impact on the city government, both through the direct process of legislation and the indirect process of resource allocation. In recent years, state and federal actions have limited the resources allocated to local projects

while increasing the requirements placed on city governments. Consequently, the city manager often finds himself in a political cross-fire, forced to comply with state or federal laws that are unpopular with both the public and the city council and hence hardly likely help his position.

Although boundary positions are heavily influenced by coalition politics and by the external factors described above, the city manager can have a strong impact on the boundary constraints through his personal characteristics and skills. The city manager's political skills are probably the most important attributes for his job -- even more so than his professional competence. Because of the curious nature of his position -- simultaneously a chief executive officer and an employee of the city council -- the city manager needs almost Machiavellian talents to handle his job successfully, appearing as both a leader and a servant to this frequently shifting political body. His ability to play effective politics can gain him important leverage and latitude in his effort to implement specific policy positions. Ultimately, the city manager holds an inherently political job, and his ability to adapt to the boundaries imposed by the coalitions, to shape those boundaries to his liking, and to produce results that are effective and politically viable is the sine qua non of a good city manager.

Professional reputation, which can be defined as the

perception of how the city manager carries out his job, is another important factor in shaping the Zone of Tolerance. Reputation is not necessarily the possession of skills or powers, but rather the public's perception of the manager's abilities. In effect, professional reputaton is a tool that can win battles without actually fighting them, including battles that might be lost if it came down to an actual test of strength. For example, James Sullivan earned a reputation as a shrewd financial controller who was able to hold the line on property taxes, and this became a source of public support so that city councilors were less apt to question him on issues of taxation or financing, even when they were otherwise critical of these policies. However, although a city manager has a strong reputation, he must learn to translate this into meaningful authority, which usually depends on his political skills. For example, Atkinson, DeGuglielmo, and Sullivan were all perceived as highly competent city managers, but each was removed for political reasons. Thus, while an important asset, reputation alone cannot protect a city manager who does not "play his political cards" effectively.

The third factor is ideological orientation. Although this is a significant factor in the superintendent's job, it is less so in the city manager's because ideological consistency is not as dominant a characteristic of city council politics. While the school system, and the topic of

education in general, tends to promote a clear, identifiable ideology, the city government -- and especially the city manager's position -- demands a more flexible, pragmatic quality that is the antithesis of dogma. Thus, while the city manager must share fundamental values with a majority of the council, his position is not compatible with an identifiable ideology, and indeed the best city managers are those who avoid ideological labels.

In summary, the Zone of Tolerance defines a dynamic interaction between the city manager, as the central architect of policy decisions and the city council, as the overseer and employer, who, depending on the issue and the relationship, can and will assume the policy-making function. The difference between school committee and city council is that the former tends not to interfere with the executive officer unless it is unhappy, while the latter tends to interfere on any issue that catches its interest.

The Role of Coalitions: The Zone of Compliance

Whereas the Zone of Tolerance model functions similarly for both the superintendent of schools and the city manager, the Zone of Compliance model operates differently for each position. The Zone of Compliance defines the degree to which the city manager can command allegiance and cooperation from his subordinates. However, the nature and form of compliance differs for the city manager.

The superintendent is the titular and functional head of a single-purpose bureaucracy, which contains a unified professional orientation and an identifiable professional goal. Thus, for example, the chain of command in the school department leads directly to the superintendent. In addition, the superintendent is a professional educator, who has experience, knowledge, and familiarity with the issues and problems of the other members of his department. This gives him insight into their problems, experience in assessing nuances of the profession, and an intrinsic basis for respect by the members of the bureaucracy.

By contrast, the city manager is the titular head of a city government comprising a multiplicity of professional purposes. In general, each department represents a distinct professional subgrouping with special problems, norms, and experiences. Thus, the fire department has problems that are distinct and identifiable compared to those of the hospitals or the police or the public works. In addition, the separate departments operate somewhat autonomously, so they perceive themselves as distinct units of the city government. Thus, where the individual teacher will look to the superintendent as his natural superior, the police officer will look to the police commissioner, and the fire fighter to the fire commissioner as thier respective superiors.

While the superintendent exercises control over the

school department by making appointments, the city manager usually relies on the more subtle and attenuated process of budgeting. The city manager sets the budget; the council can only make deletions. Since most, if not all, major policy decisions require money, the city manager can encourage or sabotage a particular policy by his control of the purse strings. Knowing this, the department heads tend to cooperate with him.

In conceptualizing a Zone of Compliance model, therefore, we must allow for the different structure of the municipal bureaucracies and the more attenuated powers of the city manager to command allegiance to his policy positions. Normally, the long-tenured city manager will develop a solid rapport with the department heads and will use this subtle connection to influence the direction and choice of personnel in the departments. However, at different times during the 1960-75 period, the city manager found himself trying to implement policies that were opposed by the bureaucracy charged with their implementation. This resulted in bureaucratic resentments, footdragging, and recriminations, which further undermined the morale of the city government.

As with the superintendent of schools, the Zone of Compliance defines those issue areas in which the city manager will be able to implement policy without substantial opposition by the members of the city bureaucracies. The

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location of its boundaries is approximately equal to the political limitations placed on the city manager by the coalitions and the community at large, since the city bureaucracy tends to reflect the political views and values of the larger populace. Although each new city manager must cope with an existing city bureaucracy, including well-entrenched norms and values, he can, over time, use the appointment and budgetary processes to bring the municipal bureaucracy closer to his own positions and to reduce or control internal opposition.

The city manager probably has less power to control the make-up of the city bureaucracy than the superintendent. While the superintendent has practical control over all levels of appointments, the city manager tends to focus on the appointment of department heads and has less direct control over the promotions within each bureaucracy. His ability to assure loyalty by appointing people personally loyal or otherwise compatible is less complete than the superintendent's, and thus he must use more persuasive or political means to assure consistent implementation of policy choices.

Tenure among the professional departments and unions among the city workers insulate the city bureaucracies from the manager's direct powers. Of course, the city manager can use the power of appointment to his advantage over the long

term, but even here he must address the fact that patronage is a key political issue on the city council, and thus his power faces important restrictions. In effect, the control of appointments becomes an important political issue, and over time, the city departments continue to have a political content that reflects the relative strengths and interests of the coalitions as well as the strengths and interests of the city manager.

The Role of Coalitions: A Composite Model

From the discussion presented above, we can now construct a more complete model of the political dynamic present in the Cambridge city government. The assumption in this study is that the Cambridge city manager is the predominant political actor in the initiation and implemention of public policy and that the city councilors generally play a more reactive role. In key policy areas, city councilors take the initiative in setting and executing policy decisions, and in many cases the city manager defers to, or even encourages, this more active role.

Accordingly, the proposed model places the city manager in the center of the policy making arena, with the city councilors and coalitions playing primarily boundary-setting roles. This model of external constraints on the city manager, which we call the Zone of Tolerance, shows that the

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city manager will be permitted and encouraged to make fundamental policy decisions unless the issue in question falls outside his zone of discretion. The Zone of Tolerance is flexible; it could be relatively broad for an issue like garbage collection, but extremely narrow on an issue like rent control, all in the same time period. While the superintendent of schools was assumed to be intent on maximizing the Zone of Tolerance, the city manager may welcome or even encourage a narrow Zone of Tolerance, particularly on politically volatile issues. Thus, while the Zone of Tolerance for the city manager is generically similar to that for the superintendent of schools, the specific mechanism differs in certain key respects, reflecting the fundamental differences in their jobs.

The Zone of Compliance for the city manager is similar to the zone proposed for the superintendent, yet contains a number of important and distinctive functional features. Because the city manager does not have the direct control over the city bureaucracies that the superintendent exercises over the school department, his Zone of Compliance is inherently more narrow and also more difficult to maintain. Although the city manager can, over time, expand the Zone of Compliance, basic differences in formal position and power make it less likely that the city manager can similarly dominate the city's bureaucracies. In essence, the city manager is at the vortex

of a more active, dynamic, and politically unstable process, and, while he shares with the superintendent certain policy-making prerogatives, his areas of interest are both broader and more heavily contested. Ultimately, it is the difference between directing a smaller, more homogeneous organization (i.e., the superintendent) and managing a larger, more heterogeneous bureaucracy (i.e., the city manager).

In the preceding chapter, we proposed that the superintendent of schools experiences an expanding Zone of Compliance. This is because the superintendent has important control over the selection, retention, and promotion of key individuals in the bureaucracy and thus can, over time, create a personally and ideologically loyal department. Due to the organizational distance between the city manager and his appointees, the city manager finds this loyalty less easy to achieve or maintain, and thus a more narrow Zone of Compliance is likely to be an enduring factor in his policy decisions.

These distinctions were most apparent when contrasting an established school superintendent such as John Tobin with the city managers studied here, all of whom were comparatively short-term in their tenures in office. Further, these differences emerged despite institutional arrangements which favored the opposite. Specifically, the school committee was required under the city's charter to approve almost all of the superintendent's personnel appointments. By contrast, the

city council was only required to approve senior-level appointments made by the city manager.

The Zone of Tolerance, in contrast, is less likely to undergo a gradual expansion with time. In the school committee, there is an inherent respect for the expertise of the superintendent of schools, particularly on key issues of educational policy. Consequently, the longer a superintendent holds his position, the less likely the school committee will be to challenge him on matters that are not clearly political. Moreover, the longer the superintendent exercises his policy prerogative in a particular area, the tougher it becomes for the school committee to recover that decision-making authority.

The city manager, by contrast, seems to experience a less dramatic expansion of his policy prerogatives. He does not earn the respect of the city council as easily, nor does he keep it as long. There is a greater willingness to question the city manager and to challenge his authority, even in areas where it has previously been exercised with little or no complaint. Thus, the Zone of Tolerance for the city manager remains narrow and elastic over time; length of term-in-office does not automatically confer either respect or authority.

At this point it is useful to discuss the concept of issue "salience", meaning an abstract measure of the political importance attributed to a particular issue. As with the

superintendent of schools, issue salience determines whether the particular policy decision is one that the city manager will be given authority to make, or whether it is one that the coalitions will choose to contest.

It is important to remember that the Zones of Tolerance and Compliance are aggregate boundaries and that in the short term they are relatively static. Stated differently, they are the sum of the attitudes of the community, the city council and the municipal bureaucracies toward the policy decisions of the city manager. If a particular issue is highly emotional or highly political in nature, one would say that the salience of the issue is large, rather than that the Zone of Tolerance or Compliance is narrow. However, in the longer term, the salience of issues does affect the width of the zones. Thus, in a highly politicized period, an increase in the salience of most or all issues is equivalent to a narrowing of the zones of decision-making autonomy.

Ultimately, the Zones of Tolerance and Compliance are the areas of public policy where there is a community consensus, or, perhaps more accurately, where there is no significant difference of opinion. The city manager plays an important role in defining the boundaries of this consensus: Through effective leadership, he can shape the political policies of the community rather than wait for the community to impose political values and constraints on him. However, there is a

continuing battle over how much authority the community, as represented by the different factions in both the city council and the city bureaucracies, is willing to delegate. Thus, there is a constant tension between the desire of the community to have "professional" decisions made concerning the allocation and delivery of city services and the desire of the community to exercise democratic control over "political" decisions. The two dominant coalitions are the mechanisms that help define and channel diverse community interests into palpable boundaries of consensus.

The Cambridge City Managers: A Case Study

To demonstrate the interaction of the forces described in the two preceding sections, it is useful to study the history of recent Cambridge city managers and their behavior in office. As a rule, the Cambridge city manager will act unless someone else acts first. The city council tends to react to political pressures rather than to initiate public policies. Thus, the city manager tends to provide long-term vision and coherence in policy, while the city council adjusts, attacks or changes specific proposals according to more immediate political demands.

The following are the city managers during the period of this study:

John Curry became city manager of Cambridge in 1952.

Curry is remembered as a stolid, cautious manager who did not offer dynamic leadership to the city. Instead, he preferred to follow the city council's lead on policy questions, and he gradually formed a strong alliance with Councilor Edward Crane, so that the two of them became a team that effectively "ran" the city. Curry was not a strong leader in terms of setting policy, but he ran the city in a low-key manner that was quite successful during the 1950s and early 1960s. He also earned a reputation as a reasonably effective administrator, and he was praised for raising the city revenues while cutting the tax rate in 1965. Curry was well-suited for a period where there were few divisive political issues and where there was not a great demand for strong policy leadership. However, in 1966, he was abruptly fired in a coup engineered by five newer members of the city council, who wanted a more dynamic leadership for the community.

In terms of the Zone of Tolerance, Curry did not attempt to extend his policy-making functions beyond the limits that the city council allowed. He did, however, manage to keep the Zone of Tolerance fairly wide through his informal alliance with Crane and a majority on the city council. His ideological compatibility with the majority gave him significant discretion in many matters, and indeed one might argue that he had significant autonomy simply because he wanted to do that which the city council was disposed to allow

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him to do. Ultimately, Curry was removed from office for not striving hard enough to satisfy the political climate of the mid-1960s -- in effect for being _too_ compliant with the limitations placed by the city council.

In terms of the Zone of Compliance, Curry had strong support and following in the city bureaucracies. He was part of the quiet majority that ran the city in those years, and the municipal departments were run by people whose values and ideology coincided with his. He was successful in placing many of his own people in positions of authority, and the general social consensus that typified that period meant that there were few issues that increased cleavages between the city manager and his department heads.

Curry was ousted in 1966 in a cross-coalitional battle between the "ins" and the "outs" on the city council. The battle was drawn along age or seniority lines: The five newer members of the council wanted to break the informal monopoly enjoyed by the senior members. Curry had become tightly aligned with the longer-term council members, and his failure to stake a more independent course ultimately led to his removal.

Curry was replaced by Joseph DeGuglielmo. DeGuglielmo was a younger, more aggressive city manager, and he quickly took a more visible stance on policy issues. DeGuglielmo took a number of unpopular stands in which he went against a

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majority of the city council. For example, in late 1966, he refused to accept a 16 percent pay raise for firemen and policemen recommended by the city council because it would not leave sufficient money in the budget to give an equal raise to other city employees. Instead, DeGuglielmo presented a budget that allowed for a 10 percent raise for all employees. This, and other explicit political positions, quickly earned DeGuglielmo a great deal of enmity, and, when his backers lost the majority in the next election, he was promptly removed from office, even though he had performed quite effectively.

In terms of the Zone of Tolerance, DeGuglielmo faced substantial opposition from a minority of the council, and so he was forced by necessity to align with those councilors who had appointed him. He used the powers of his office to wrest control of city government from Daniel Crane and his associates. This he accomplished albeit at the cost of incurring rising opposition both in the city council and in the community. His reputation as an administrator remained intact, but this was vastly overshadowed by his political visibility and controversy. In effect, his powers depended on a very specific group of supporters, and as soon as they lost control of the city council, his removal was inevitable.

In terms of the Zone of Compliance, DeGuglielmo faced significant opposition from within the city bureaucracies. Many of his opponents were philosophically and temperamentally

aligned with Curry, and they resented and resisted DeGuglielmo's reform-oriented policies.

DeGuglielmo was replaced in 1968 by James Sullivan, an "outsider" (i.e., non-resident of Cambridge), who managed to win a majority of supporters on a city council. Sullivan was a professional city manager whose liberal political values were similar to DeGuglielmo's, but who approached his job in a more politically sensitive manner. Sullivan was determined to keep politics out of the administration of city departments, and he tried to win broad city council support through fairness and openness in his contacts both with the council and the public. He hoped that by bringing highly professional values to the city manager's position that he could earn a respect that would help insulate him from the political friction and competition. He repeatedly emphasized that he was "above politics."

Sullivan worked hard during a period when Cambridge was faced with extraordinary pressures and demands. He did a competent and sometimes outstanding job in running the city. However, he could not erase the circumstances of his appointment, which were heavily political. Since the city manager's position had now become a veritable "tug-of-war" in Cambridge politics, there was less willingness on the part of city councilors to recognize independent, professional management skills as an attractive characteristic. The

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different factions increasingly treated the position as if it were a political spoil.

In the 1969 election, Sullivan saw two of his five supporter's on the city council replaced, and he no longer had a solid base of support. Although the CCA now had a nominal majority, the key vote was Thomas Coates, a black who wanted to remove the liberal, reform-minded Sullivan for reasons of personal enmity and distrust. The firing of Sullivan eventually became inevitable, despite the fact that the majority of Cambridge residents viewed Sullivan as a competent city manager. Indeed, after his removal the Cambridge Chronicle wrote: "What we have in Cambridge is a tragedy in human and governmental relations in which there are faults on both sides and for which no sure-fire solution is visible."[48]

In terms of the Zone of Tolerance, Sullivan was a skillful politician who tried to maximize his freedom of action by forming alliances with important segments in both the political coalitions and the larger community. Although he tried to build strong, bipartisan backing for his policy positions, the factious political environment of the time limited his success. However, he was a skillful tactician, and he was willing to risk the anger of the city council to achieve important objectives. He was ideologically closer to the CCA than to the Independents, but he tried to downplay ideology and build a policy consensus along bipartisan lines.

He also attempted, successfully, to encourage citizen participation and to cultivate a broad political base in the community that would indirectly influence the city councilors.

In terms of the Zone of Compliance, Sullivan took office during a period that was characterized by turmoil, and he presided over bureaucracies that were divided by internal cleavages and in-fighting. He tried to introduce norms of professionalism into the various departments, and, while he might have gained a better foothold in the long term, in the short term his actions created resentment and suspicion that increased the political pressures on him.

Sullivan was removed from office in a bitterly contested 5-4 city council vote in late May 1970. He was replaced by John Corcoran by the same 5-4 majority that had ousted Sullivan. Corcoran was an "insider" to city government whose approach to the city manager's job was closer to that of Curry than of either Sullivan or DeGuglielmo. Corcoran preferred to focus on administration and to duck overtly political policy questions. However, the extreme ill-will raised by Sullivan's removal reflected on Corcoran, and he too was necessarily dependent on the five person majority that had appointed him. His viability depended on their remaining in control, and, when they lost their majority in the next election, his position became vulnerable.

After the 1971 elections, Corcoran appeared to be on the

way out. However, Henry Owens, a black CCA councilor, insisted on replacing Corcoran with a black candidate. The divided city council could not come up with a five-person majority that could agree both to fire Corcoran and select a successor. Under these trying and ultimately absurd circumstances, Corcoran continued as the city manager of Cambridge.

Despite the lack of support on the city council, Corcoran was a reasonably effective city manager, a fact that underscores the power and authority implicit in the city manager's position. Corcoran opposed pay raises to city workers in 1973 because it would raise taxes and eventually convinced the city council not to set police and firemen's salaries (which was in their power) until Corcoran had completed negotiations with the other city workers. He also vigorously opposed a decision by the city council to locate a power station at Fresh Pond. In effect, Corcoran seemed to accept the fact that he would be fired eventually, and this removed the "fear of firing" that is the city council's major weapon for controlling the city manager. Consequently, Corcoran proved tough for the city councilors to challenge on policy issues.

In terms of the Zone of Tolerance, Corcoran was under continued pressure from the city council, and yet he retained a substantial, and perhaps surprising, amount of decision-

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making authority. Interestingly, Corcoran managed to avoid alienating five people on the city council at any one time, but, over a period of several years, at least seven councilors voted to oust him, including Sullivan and Vellucci, Independent stalwarts who became disenchanted with Corcoran's handling of the city's departments.

Corcoran's administration showed that, while the Zone of Tolerance can become narrow and threatening to the city manager, the ultimate curb on his power is the threat to fire. The city council is in fact heavily dependent on the city manager to provide information and advice -- even on issues that the city councilors are actively seeking to control. Thus, if the city council lacks the power or the will to fire the manager, it has little choice but to accept his influence on policy decisions.

In terms of the Zone of Compliance, Corcoran had serious problems commanding the city bureaucracies, especially after it became obvious that there was a substantial effort to remove him from office. Corcoran presided at a time when the city police force and city hospital were both under attack for presumed inefficiency and/or incompetence, and he naturally took some of the blame and much of the heat from both sides. Attempts were made to implement progressive reforms in both institutions, which created resentment among the personnel that was directed toward, among others, the city manager.

Still, Corcoran managed to exercise some control, in part by judicious use of his budgetary powers. For example, Corcoran created a committee of city department heads to divide up the federal block grants, which had replaced the prior (and larger) categorical grants. Thus, he got department heads involved in the process of making tough budgetary decisions, implicitly making them de facto allies because they shared responsibility for the ultimate allocation decisions. It was a shrewd political move that deflected some of the criticism from within the city departments and thus helped to expand the Zone of Compliance.

After the 1973 elections, Corcoran was finally fired as city manager -- ironically by a city council that had an Independent majority -- and was replaced by James Sullivan. During his second administration, particularly in his last few years in office, Sullivan had two advantages that were previously lacking: (1) the general political climate was calmer, which reduced issue salience and made the city manager's job less hectic; and (2) he took a more tactful, political approach to the job that expanded the Zones of Tolerance and Compliance. Sullivan was always an effective administrator, and he brought a calm professionalism to the city manager's position that was a welcome relief after years of fractious in-fighting. He also worked hard building his bridges to both coalitions, and he used his skill at ducking

politically volatile issues to consolidate his position. When he managed to hold the line on taxes early in his second term, he established a base of support in the larger community that made it more difficult for city councilors to criticize or attack him. Sullivan's administration continued to the end of this study, and until 1981, when he wisely chose to leave someone else the task of complying with Proposition 2 1/2, a state referendum that mandated a reduction in property taxes.

Sullivan was very successful in expanding the Zone of Tolerance, partly through his political skills and partly through his reputation for competence. Sullivan remained publicaly neutral on the most volatile issues, such as rent control, and thus avoided much of the potential political damage that is an inherent risk of divisive political issues. (Privately, Sullivan favored rent control, and thus his public neutrality on the issue might be suspect, since rent control was consistently upheld by the city council.) It is interesting to speculate how he might have responded if there had been a strong movement to abolish the rent control board. He would have had to weigh the value of retaining rent control versus the potential costs of supporting it.

In terms of the Zone of Compliance, Sullivan sent an early message to the city employees when he fired Robert LeBlanc from the post of acting director of budget and personnel shortly after Sullivan's reappointment. LeBlanc, a

friend of Danehy, was considered a potential opponent to Sullivan, and his firing was timed to be prompt and visible and to project a hard-nosed image. It also gave Sullivan tighter control over the budgeting process by appointing a loyal subordinate to the post, and thus sent the message that department heads had better cooperate or else risk serious penalties. Sullivan then reformed several departments -- notably the police department and the department of health and hospitals -- in a progressive but fair manner, which earned him the grudging respect of the municipal employees. Although civil service or tenure protected most city employees, they soon learned that Sullivan could be a good ally and a tough enemy, and this helped to widen his Zone of Compliance.

Summary and Conclusions

As this chapter demonstrates, the traditional literature on the city manager has failed to address an important aspect of the relationship between the city manager and the city council: The role played by political coalitions. In some cases, it is accurate to portray the city council as a single entity; however, the more frequent situation finds the council as a complex and divided body, whose most important characteristics are those shaped by the coalitions. In turn, the coalitional complexion of that body determines its interaction with the city manager, defining when the manager

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will be allowed policy prerogatives and when the council will act to exercise its policy prerogatives. Only by defining the city council in terms of its coalitional content does the interaction between that body and the city manager become consistent, logical and explicable over time.

As noted in the literature, the city council in most cities looks to the city manager for policy leadership in a number of important areas, while granting him discretionary authority in a number of seemingly modest but nonetheless important allocational decisions. This has generally held true in Cambridge as well. At the same time, the city council in Cambridge does retain a control over key political issues, and in these areas the city manager's policy input is relatively circumscribed. The most important addition presented in this chapter is an understanding of how the coalitions help shape this long-recognized pattern of city council policy abdication interrputed by intermittent policy authority. In particular, issues that trigger coalitional conflict are those that impel the city council to exercise its policy-making prerogatives. As a practical matter, the city manager is often allowed to set policy on major policy questions -- because the city council has reached a policy consensus and the city manager is shrewd enough to present that policy as his recommendation. Thus, the operative question is not whether the city manager sets the policy on a

particular issue, but why and how he was able to set the policy.

To illustrate the decision-making process in the city of Cambridge, this chapter developed a model that defines the policy-generating functions of the city manager in terms of the Zone of Tolerance and the policy-implementation functions in terms of the Zone of Compliance. These models theorize that the city manager is the predominant initiator of public policy but is subject to community control through the formal mechanism of the city council, on the one hand, and the representative composition of the city bureaucracies on the other. The nature and position of the boundaries that constrain the city manager are defined by the political coalitions. In turn, the city manager can influence the zones' boundaries through his personal skills and characteristics and the powers of his office. When the political salience of an issue is within the boundaries of these two zones, the city manager has substantial power and discretion to set public policy. However, where the nature of the issue exceeds the boundaries of one or both zones, then the issue is determined by a larger political dynamic.

In both models presented, the boundaries are defined by vertical lines that represent the political coalitions. This assumes that the coalitions are the mediators and shapers of the community consensus on a particular issue, and hence they

define the range of policy alternatives that are acceptable to the community. In effect, the models propose that the function of the coalitions in city government are, first, to provide a tangible definition of the areas of discretion for the city manager, and, second, to act as a policy-defining mechanism in those areas where the issue at stake has a high political salience, or where the community is so divided that no consensus can be readily achieved. In both of these latter cases, the boundaries move rapidly together, severely narrowing, and perhaps entirely eliminating, the Zones in which the city manager can exercise discretion.

It is important to note that even where an issue is of high political salience, the city manager remains at the center of the policy-making dynamic. After all, evidence in both Cambridge and other cities demonstrates that a city manager has the de facto power to influence and even control issues where the city council has attempted to assert its authority. For example, DeGuglielmo in Cambridge pre-empted the efforts of the city council to grant police and firemen a pay raise through his control of the budgetary process. Thus, the city manager can have substantial input in almost every type of issue commonly presented before a city council; the main constraint on his actions is the fear of being fired, which is the ultimate repository of city council authority over the city manager.

Dynamically, the two dominant coalitions play a role comparable to political parties, channelling and shaping the community's views on particular issues and then presenting those positions in the political arena. In many cases, a particular city councilor may develop a policy or program and play a key role in its implementation. However, in almost every such case, the city councilor will work with the city manager in the formulation and development of such an issue, simply because the city manager has the experience, knowledge, and resources to present the program in its best light. The model does not exclude the possibility of independent policy initiation by members of the city council; rather, it assumes that policy formulation must necessarily recognize the central role played by the city manager in all the functions of city government. Obviously, policy initiatives which do not include the support and backing of the city manager must necessarily overcome a significant systemic presumption against them.

FOOTNOTES

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CHAPTER VIII

THE ROLE OF POLITICAL COALITIONS IN THE INITIATION

AND IMPLEMENTATION OF PUBLIC POLICY IN THE CITY OF CAMBRIDGE:

AN OVERVIEW

Introduction

Thus far, our investigation into the behavior of the
Cambridge coalitions has divided the local political
system into its component parts and examined the coalitions'
role in each subsystem, demonstrating that the coalitions play
key roles in shaping the outcome of the electoral, legislative
and bureaucratic processes. This chapter will study the
coalitions in the context of the total city government,
examining the links among the electoral, legislative and
bureaucratic arenas and describing how the coalitions promote
policy programs. We will develop a composite model showing
how the coalitions act as a bridge between the electorate and
electoral behavior; between the elected representatives and
legislative behavior; and between the chief executive
officers and bureaucratic behavior.

We know that the city politics is dominated by two
competing groups and that the two coalitions promote the
policy preferences of those groups. Elections, as we saw in
Chapters III and IV, are hotly contested most years, and each

coalition advocates positions calculated to draw the support of its constituent group. Each coalition takes a stand on most issues, and its elected representatives usually support its positions on the city council and school committee.

However, as we saw in Chapter V, elected representatives sometimes break with their coalition on issues that create a strong personal, ideological, or political conflict. Each elected official usually relies on a specific subgroup within the community for support during elections, so when the subgroup's position diverges from that of the broader coalition, the representative is apt to back his immediate constituency at the coalition's expense.

Still, the two coalitions function in an important and cohesive manner. Although city councilors and school committee members tend to be loyal to their supporters, they also recognize the need to build majorities if anything is to be accomplished, and so can be drawn back into allegiance to a coalition. This, in turn, is reinforced by the fact that the proportional representation scheme gives the coalitions some -- albeit a comparatively limited amount -- of leverage in the electoral arena. Similarly, commonly held personal and ideological views tend to reinforce the propensity for representatives to advance coalitional solutions to policy questions.

Thus, the coalitions' power can become greater than the

sum of their members' influence; coalitions define the
political debate, limit options, and create an impetus toward
conflict resolution in decision-making. Above all, the
coalitions are important for the less inconspicuous successes
they achieve by avoiding political conflicts. Many issues
that might arise in a more fractious political environment are
muted through concensus building or by summary opposition of
necessary intra-coalition allies. For example, the selection
of a mayor was a problematical and often embarrassing
spectacle on the city council, but even in the most violently
contested situations it was the coalitions that managed to
engineer a final compromise. The coalitions serve as a
vehicle for structuring majority groupings and facilitating
compromise, thus easing the inherent strains and complications
of urban policy-making.

The preceding chapters have demonstrated that while the
coalitions are not overwhelmingly powerful in commanding
allegiance of individual members, all members recognize the
importance of cooperating within the coalition to achieve their
personal policy goals. At the same time, there is a "third
political force" -- either the city manager or the
superintendent of schools -- who must remain distinct from
either of these two groups. For example, the city manager
works at the behest of the city council, and implicitly the
majority coalition, and yet empirical evidence and common

sense indicate that the city manager becomes an independent political factor whose powers can rival -- and on occasion dominate -- those of the city council.

The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to examine the interaction of the two coalitions and this "third political force". We will examine coalition behavior in the various political arenas on specific issues and analyze the roles that the city manager and the superintendent of schools play in achieving the final policy outcomes in their respective areas.

A Systemic View of Policy Implementation: Three Models

Conventionally, American electoral politics has been viewed as a bipartisan struggle for dominance, with each political party acting to maximize its control over the political process. Behavior in local political systems, however, is often more varied.

The Cambridge City Council and the Cambridge School Committee are legislative bodies vested with the power to determine all policy issues and to impose these policies on the respective city bureaucracies. However, the divison of power between the executive and legislative branches is never as sharp in reality as it is in theory. This is especially true when the legislative body is composed of part-time people who have limited resources, limited time, and limited experience, as is the case in the Cambridge School Committee

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and, to a lesser extent, in the Cambridge City Council.

By contrast, the executive branch of city government is often headed by a strong, established professional, who has constant contact with the issues, substantial resources at his disposal, and plenty of time to devote to the work. Inevitably, this chief executive usurps many of the policy-making functions formally assigned to the council and school committee.

The interaction between the chief executive and the legislature carries over into all the political arenas. For example, the superintendent of schools often can select and limit the electoral and legislative issues, ensuring that the issues he deems important are raised and publicly debated. Thus, the traditional model of the electorate electing, the legislature legislating, and the executive executing is simplistic, for each arena influences the others.

The purpose of this section is to examine how the three major political components -- the two coalitions and the chief executive officer -- operate in three arenas -- electoral, legislative, and bureaucratic. How important is the role of each component? How much power does the chief executive officer wield relative to the coalitions? Which component is likely to predominate in each arena, and how does control of that arena affect overall policy objectives?

In Chapters VI and VII, we defined the chief executive

officer as an often dominant factor in the formulation and implementation of public policy. At the same time, however, the two chief executives are vulnerable to pressure from the coalitions, a pressure that is sometimes unified but more often conflicting. Sometimes, the chief executive is caught squarely in the middle of a major conflict between coalitions at which times his power to influence events is quite limited. Other times, the chief executive cooperates with the coalitions to develop public policy. Still other times, the chief executive officer is so strongly entrenched that he plays a dominant role in setting the agenda and direction of public policy.

This study posits that the formulation of public policy in Cambridge can be described by three models: the Strong Legislative Model, the Cooperative Model, and the Strong Executive Model.

Strong Legislative Model: In this model, policy is decided through the formal operations of the city legislative body, with little or no input from the chief executive. Although this might be termed the "classical" model of Plan E government in action, in reality it is rather unusual. The Strong Legislative Model occurs only when the policy issue at stake is of such importance and magnitude that the legislators refuse to recognize the informal authority of the chief executive and instead decide the issue themselves. In these

situations, the issue is one that cleaves the coalitions, so that the two dominant coalitions are locked in a legislative struggle. Then, the prudent chief executive maintains a low profile, since the potential of alienating one or both coalitions is very high, while the likelihood of influencing the outcome is comparatively small.

The issue that most frequently divides the legislature in this manner is the appointment of the chief executive, a special case in which the executive obviously has no input. Another example is an issue such as rent control, whose political stakes are so high that the city councilors refuse to yield any leadership or policy function to the city manager. A third situation in which the strong legislative model prevails occurs when the chief executive personally assumes in a policy position that is opposed by a strong majority of the legislature. For example, Al Cheatham, as superintendent of schools, pushed for the relocation of the city's high school, and John Corcoran, as city manager, pushed for the construction of a new electrical utility facility. In both cases, the legislative bodies were strongly opposed to the developments, and rebuffed the chief executives.

Cooperative Model: A more common dynamic in the formulation of city policy occurs when the coalitions have basic disagreements, and the chief executive acts as a mediator to channel the conflict into a policy resolution. In this model,

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the two dominant coalitions and the chief executive all play
an important role to achieve a constructive resolution.
Usually, the question involves a basic issue of government
function, such as a situation in which the chief executive has
both expertise and direct control. In most such cases, the
legislators either need or want the chief executive's input to
develop and implement a successful policy. For example, if a
city councilor wants to improve or change a municipal
department whose services are deemed inadequate, he will need
the cooperation and input of the city manager.

In many cases, the interaction between the chief
executive and the legislators is bipartisan -- both coalitions
are attempting to find a resolution to a conflict. At other
times, the chief executive will be allied with one coalition.
In the cooperative model, by definition, the chief executive
is inherently involved in the development of an appropriate
strategy, and both he and the legislative majority need to
interact.

Strong Executive Model: This model is the most common dynamic
of Cambridge city government: the chief executive is granted
predominant control over the formulation and implementation of
public policy. In general, this model occurs when the
decision is of a "housekeeping" nature and thus does not
trigger the interest of the legislators.

In most instances, the Strong Executive Model applies to

issues in which the two competing coalitions have relatively little interest, such as small details of city policy (for example, the location of street signs) that need formal city council approval but have minimal political significance. In such cases, the city councilors often have little knowledge and less concern about the underlying issue and are happy to leave its resolution to the city manager.

This model also applies when the chief executive deliberately obscures the nature of an issue through his control over information. For example, almost every city manager and superintendent of schools used to tell the legislatures that there is "no money" to fund specific programs. In this way, the chief executive frames the policy question in a manner that gives the legislature few alternatives. In most cases, the legislators may not even realize the consequences of their decision -- because the chief executive has not articulated the full range of possibilities.

Perhaps the most interesting situation in which the Strong Executive Model applies occurs when the chief executive achieves his goal despite the legislature's opposition. Under the classical theory of Plan E government, this seems improbable, yet it occurs with striking regularity in Cambridge politics. The chief executive can prevail when a decision that has important policy implications also requires

the chief executive's compliance for successful implementation. The most common example is the appointment of people to key bureaucratic positions. For example, the city councilors may want to influence the selection, but in the end it is almost impossible to force a particular choice on a strong, entrenched city manager. There are too many resources available to the city manager to force appointments that he strongly opposes.

The three models presented in this book are arbitrary demarcations on a continuum of different policy interactions. At one extreme, there are the very few decisions in which the legislature sets policy with no input from the chief executive. At the other extreme, there are the many small, "housekeeping" issues that the chief executive dominates and that draw little or no inspection from the legislators. In the middle are the decisions where the legislators from both coalitions and the chief executive interact to develop and implement city policy. The three models should not be viewed as rigid classifications, but rather as an aid to understanding how policy formulation can differ depending on the nature of the event, the political salience of the issue, and the comparative strengths and talents of the political actors. As a broad generalization, we might project that as issue salience increases, so does the tendency for the legislature to exert more and more of its policy-making

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authority.   This   allows   us to develop the   following   chart
regarding issue salience and our three models.

To   illustrate how these three models function,   we   will
now   examine   six political events,   three involving the   city
manager and three the superintendent of schools.

Enactment of Rent Control Legislation: The Strong Legislative Model

During the late 1960's, the city of Cambridge experienced
a housing shortage.   Industrial and institutional uses take up
four of the city's approximately six square miles,   leaving   a
mere   two square miles for residential use.   Since the amount
of   housing   was   virtually static,   and   vacant   land   almost
nonexistent,   any change or expansion in the housing available
to one group came at the expense of housing for another group.
In   the   1960s,   as Harvard,   MIT,   and   new   research   and
development firms expanded, they needed housing to accommodate
students and employees,   largely middle-class professionals or
professionals in training. This forced up prices and rents and
drove   working-class   people out of   many   neighborhoods.   In
effect,   the two socioeconomic groups that are the core of the
two   dominant city coalitions were competing in a   direct   and
measureable   way   for the control of land and housing   in   the
city.

One   of the most controversial elements in   the   housing

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crisis was the increasing demand for housing by Harvard and MIT students. Between 1960 and 1970, Harvard increased enrollment fromn 11,000 to 15,000, while MIT increased enrollment from 5,000 to 7,000. While the student population was growing, the universities were not building dormitories fast enough to keep up with the demand. In fact, changes in universities rules allowed more students to live off campus than ever before.

The college students -- and the large number of college-age people drawn to the area -- placed unprecedented demand on the local housing market. Many of the students at these two universities were from well-to-do families and could afford to pay higher prices than old-time Cambridge residents. Other students could band together into groups or "communal living" arrangements, so that their combined payments were higher than those affordable to working-class families.

The overflow of students went to the areas north and east of Harvard Square, while Boston University (across the Charles River) added an additional 800 residents, most living in the area known as Cambridgeport. In almost every case, the neighborhoods that felt the strongest growth in the student population were those inhabited by long-time working-class residents, nearly all of whom were ethnic voters who supported the Independents.

Although the students were the most visible new

residents, there was also a growing number of middle-class professionals. In 1966, the city had 87,000 city-based jobs, and this number was growing steadily, almost entirely in the white-collar or professional areas. During this period, in fact, the number of manufacturing jobs dropped by more than ten percent and the number of manufacturing firms by more than twelve percent.

As the housing crisis became increasingly severe, pressures began to grow for a "political" solution to this private-sector economic issue. In August 1968, the Cambridge Economic Opportunity Committee, Inc., a federally funded poverty agency, studied the living conditions of the elderly in six areas of the city. The results were highly disturbing. The survey found that many elderly were destitute, paying much more than they could afford for rental. Approximately fifty-seven percent were spending more than half their income on rent and heat and did not have enough left over for food, clothing and medicine.

The report created a furor and led to the formation of a committee composed of CEOC's six neighborhood teams and leaders of senior citizen organizations. This ad hoc group soon became powerful, organizing neighborhood caucuses throughout Cambridge at which neighborhood residents drafted and voted on resolutions to be presented to a city-wide convention. On September 14, 1968, more than 900 people

gathered at Saint Mary's Hall to present their ideas for solutions to the housing problem. The convention approved a series of resolutions, which emphasized keeping Cambridge for its citizens and encouraged a number of new housing policies, one of which was rent control.

As the ad hoc group gathered increasing momentum and political clout, the two coalitions and their principal public officials began to take notice of the underlying issues. As discussed in Chapters IV to VII the ad hoc movements in Cambridge have served to increase the political salience of a particular issue, so that the competing coalitions move to embrace the issue as their own. Although ad hoc groups often intend to maintain their own political viability, once one or both coalitions moved to embrace a political issue, the coalition becomes the most effective vehicle to accomplish a goal. The rent control issue was no exception to this pattern.

The city manager, meanwhile, was likewise trying to address and defuse this potentially dangerous political issue. Around the time of the September Convention of the CEOC group, James Sullivan tried to push through construction of 67 units of low-cost housing for the elderly on Eighth Street. However, it was too little, too late.

On October 15, the Coordinating Committee went before the city council to enlist its support. The council authorized the formation of a special committee to study the problem of

vanishing low-cost housing in Cambridge. Meanwhile, Justin Gray, the city manager's assistant in charge of community development, released a report that he had prepared endorsing rent control as the most effective way to deal with the city's problems.

In the city, meanwhile, the ad hoc movement continued to grow. In November, the Cambridge Peace and Freedom Party, a radical political group, initiated a rent control referendum campaign. This group was critical of even the Housing Convention and attempted to collect enough signatures to take the rent control issue away from the city council and place it on a referendum. Obviously, the salience of the issue was growing.

The organizing of support for rent control within the community carried into 1969. Soon rent control was being advocated by, among other groups, the local Communist Party and the SDS. At the same time the city manager was pushing for construction of housing for the elderly on Eight Street, approval of other low-cost housing projects, and various planning and exchange meetings.

Through the middle of 1969, a great deal of political jockeying took place among the ad hoc groups favoring rent control, the two coalitions, and the city manager. By June, the pressures for a rent control ordinance were intense, particularly after the Cambridge Housing Convention introduced

a model law on rent control. On June 30, the city council considered the ordinance drafted by the Convention and listened to a critique by Justin Gray. The ordinance was defeated 5 to 4, with Sullivan, Danehy, Goldberg, Hayes, and Crane opposed and Ackerman, Mahoney, Vellucci, and Wheeler in favor. The councilors supporting the measure were all CCA members except Vellucci.

A great deal of pressure was brought on the five opponents particularly on Councilor Daniel J. Hayes, but when a second vote was taken July 28 the vote was again 5 to 4 against such an ordinance.

With renewed determination the Housing Convention decided to back the referendum concept originally put forth by the radical Peace and Freedom Party. The referendum question was submitted through the proper procedure, including signatures -- only to be declared "illegal and unconstitutional" by the city solicitor. The same anti-rent control 5-4 majority voted to leave the question up to the city solicitor rather than reconsider it.

By now, the city was up in arms over the rent control issue and deeply divided. The two coalitions had remained curiously reticent on the issue, although the CCA had been leaning toward rent control in the early part of 1969. The issue divided both coalitions, and the CCA was reluctant at the outset to alienate its anti-rent control members,

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particularly those who owned rental property. However, the city solicitor's decision to block the referendum went contrary to the CCA's ideology favoring "power to the people".

After lawsuits failed to force the city to put rent control on the ballot, rent control advocates took a dual approach: they encouraged the state legislature to pass enabling legislation on rent control that cities and towns had the option of adopting, and they pressed the city council to enact rent control.

Meanwhile, the CCA -- albeit somewhat reluctantly -- had become an advocate of the rent control issue, which made the Independents -- again, somewhat reluctantly -- the coalition opposed to the measure. Meanwhile, the city's landlords, fearing rent control, moved to raise rents considerably, thus giving fuel to the rent control movement.

In the 1969 elections, rent control was the most visible and emotional issue. Only three of the five who voted against rent control were returned -- Crane, Danehy, and Walter Sullivan. (Hayes was defeated, and Goldberg chose not to run.) The new councilors included Robert Moncrieff (replacing Mrs. Wheeler), Daniel Clinton, and Thomas Coates, all rent control supporters.

After the state legislature passed rent control enabling legislation in August, 1970, City Councilor Thomas Mahoney introduced an order on September 14 to have the city council

adopt it. The final vote in favor of rent control was 7 to 2,
with only Crane and Danehy in opposition.

As the rent control issue progressed, however, it began
to evolve into a conflict between the coalitions. The CCA
found that the issue attracted a significant following among
the poorer groups, which were the most vulnerable to rent
increases. Thus, rent control appeared to be a way for the
coalition to expand its staunch but chronically smaller base
of core supporters. The Independents, on the other hand,
found that a strong and vocal core of its supporters opposed
rent control, primarily because they were property owners and
landlords who were prevented from earning a greater profit in
an unregulated housing market.

There were, of course, supporters of both coalitions who
opposed the tilt of their respective coalition's policies --
CCA supporters who were anti-rent control and Independent
supporters who were pro-rent control. But each coalition held
firm to its stance, primarily in the interest of elections.
Independent candidates generally believed that they could get
the most votes by opposing rent control, while CCA candidates
believed that supporting it would attract voters to their
side.

Thus, issue salience became so great that the coalitions
gradually became centrally involved in an issue that, at the
outset, neither was particularly keen to address. The work of

the ad hoc groups in stimulating public interest in the issue, which was magnified by the media reporting, forced city council candidates to address the issue.

The exception was Independent councilor Al Vellucci. Although he belonged to a coalition that opposed rent control, Vellucci favored it, primarily for personal, idiosyncratic reasons: During World War II, his family had been forced out of an apartment by a landlord who raised rents during a housing shortage. Vellucci's personal resolve was further strengthened by his ability to work with the CCA councilors, who were willing to support Vellucci for mayor in exchange for his support on the crucial rent control issue.

During 1972 and 1974, the city council voted several times on the rent control issue, and each time the vote was 5-4, with the deciding vote being cast by Councilor Al Vellucci. Naturally, much political pressure was brought by the other Independent councilors to switch Vellucci's position. This put Vellucci in both a visible and powerful position. In late 1974, Vellucci tentatively agreed to support an Independent effort to modify rent control by decontrolling rents for vacant apartments. His public explanation for this position was that a landlord who had been giving a long-term tenant a low "friendship" rent was penalized when the tenant moved out and the landlord could not charge the market rate for the apartment. However, when it became clear that such a move

would effectively vitiate the rent control powers of the city, Vellucci reversed his position.

In summary, the rent control issue became the most important issue difference between the two Cambridge coalitions during the early 1970s. Because of the socioeconomic composition of the supporters of the coalitions, it was generally true that CCA supporters were in favor of rent control and that Independent supporters were either opposed to it (because they were landlords) or else indifferent (because they were homeowners). The issue had a high degree of political salience, which was magnified by the ad hoc groups and by the media into the pre-eminent issue of the period. The CCA and the Independents used the issue to bolster and reinforce their constituent groups.

As for Vellucci, it was probably true that most of his constituents opposed rent control. However, he had a strong personal following in his key neighborhoods in East Cambridge, particularly among the elderly and his personal popularity overcame the unpopularity of his position. Vellucci could vote his personal preferences without risking his council seat -- and at the same time could parlay that rent control vote into support from the CCA for his election as mayor.

It is significant to note that following the 1970 elections, the city manager ceased to play an important role in the rent control debate. Indeed, Corcoran, and later James

Sullivan, learned to keep a low profile on the issue. When Sullivan returned to office in 1974, he announced that his role was to execute the city council's will on rent control and disavowed any personal position. This was a significant, if subtle, statement on the political salience of rent control and on the city manager's diminished role in policy formulation in that area. When political passions are strong and city council seats are at stake, the city manager quickly learns to avoid rather than to confront a policy question.

Reform of the Cambridge Police Department: The Cooperative Model

In the mid-to-late 1960s, the issue of minority hiring in the police department became increasingly visible. During that period of heightened social tensions, there were a number of racial incidents in the city more often than not sparked by confrontations between black citizens and white policemen. Police relations in the black neighborhoods deteriorated to such an extent that in 1970, when interviewed by Arthur D. Little researchers, almost every police officer expressed a feeling of "utter futility" in trying to gather information in the black community. Police said that when they tried to investigate a problem in the black community, the situation became one of "cops versus blacks" and that no black, including the aggrieved individuals, was likely to cooperate.

Even black police officers, the report went on to note, were perceived as "cops first, and blacks second".

Although the Arthur D. Little study suggests that hiring more black police officers alone would not be sufficient to end the tensions, it notes the fact that the police force was overwhelmingly white certainly compounded the problems. Like most other cities in the United States, Cambridge had a history of job discrimination in its police department, which was dominated by European ethnic groups, particularly the Irish. At the time, the city of Cambridge had the third largest black population in the state, and the ratio of black policemen was substantially below the ratio of blacks in the community.

As the problems with the police became increasingly regular and visible, the issue began to attract attention from members of both coalitions. Despite a universal desire for an effective police force, the two coalitions differed radically on how to achieve that goal. The CCA approach was to emphasize professionalism in the department, including training and hiring minorities; The Independents, on the other hand, looked at the city departments as key patronage plums, and wanted to keep the hiring prerogatives within the local community. The entrenched ethnic bases of political power, and especially the Irish constituents, were strongly opposed to any charges that would alter their long-standing

control over police hiring policies.

One of the key mechanisms used to prevent personnel reforms was the Civil Services. Ironically, Civil Service had originally been enacted as a progressive reform to keep the police department from becoming a source of political patronage. However, in Cambridge the actual experience became a case study of how a system can bend to serve the needs of the prevailing powers. Because the civil service relied on standardized testing, the known cultural biases of such testing against blacks made it an extremely effective (and an erstwhile "fair") method for de facto discrimination against minorities.

In the early 1970's, the community's problems with the Cambridge Police Department expanded still further with a number of incidents involving white, ethnic members of East Cambridge. The most controversial of these was the death of Lawrence Largey in a Cambridge police cell. Although the Independent councilors had been generally sympathetic toward the police department up to this point, the increasing evidence of poor morale and lax discipline indicated the need for drastic reform, and the Independent councilors reluctantly began to accept that significant changes were required.

With the appointment of James Sullivan in early 1974, the CCA had a city manager who was willing to cooperate with its goals of police reform. At the same time, the city council

voted 9-0 to increase the number of police officers from 243 to 350. With the backing of the CCA, James Sullivan pushed the reluctant Police Chief James Reagan to appoint a large number of blacks, women, and Spanish-surnamed candidates to the newly created positions. Pressure was placed on the Civil Service Commission to certify a proposed list of thirty-six, which included sixteen minority group members and five women. As a result, the number of minority policemen was proportionate to the city's population.

Meanwhile, in May 1974, City Manager Sullivan commissioned a report on the Cambridge Police Department by the International Association of Chiefs of Police. The report was strongly supported by the CCA and reluctantly agreed to by the Independents. Sullivan's decision to commission the report was shrewd. The integrity of the IACP was unquestioned, and the report was expected to document the known failings of the Cambridge police. This report was an ideal tool with which to press for reforms, since it would presumably criticize the department, and yet would rise above any charges of partisan bias.

By late 1974, the police situation had deteriorated to an unprecedented low. The Cambridge Chronicle, on November 7, 1974, led with an article on police problems in the Donnelly Field-St. Patrick's church area in East Cambridge. A number of angry citizens appeared before the city council to

denounce "young hoodlums" who had been terrorizing the area and to criticize the lack of police protection. Councilor Al Vellucci stated, "I am ready to vote for a civilian policy commissioner who won't be under Civil Service and who will be answerable to us (the city council)".[1]

Councilor Francis Duehay was quoted as saying "There is definitely a police emergency here. It is time for drastic action".[2] In late December, the IACP report was published, and, as expected, it levelled a broadside against the Cambridge Police Department. The report described police morale as low, and documented that the condition of police vehicles and other equipment was the "worst ever seen by several senior members of the IACP staff."[3] The report went on to recommend a variety of reforms, including establishing a police advisory council, which would influence the goals and objectives of the department and would act as a strong advisory board to the city manager; new facilities and equipment; modifications in the civil service laws to give the department more discretion in recruiting and selection; and structural changes within the department.

The release of the IACP report immediately triggered the resignation of Police Chief James Reagan. The city manager replaced him with Francis Pisani, a native of East Cambridge who had worked his way through the ranks of the department. Pisani was an ideal choice: he was extremely popular with the

CCA, and yet had the neighborhood ties and ethnic background to make him acceptable to the Independents as well. Saundra Graham described Pisani as "the best man in the department for the job."[4] David Wylie, a CCA councilor, said, "He was the only person remotely capable of bringing the department up to some professional standards, to stop the excessive force and racial slurs."[5]

In appointing Pisani, the city manager asserted his control over the police department with the council's wholehearted support. Pisani was appointed over five other captains with greater seniority, a departure from the standard Civil Service practice. Sullivan justified the choice by citing a "special need for strong leadership."[6]

Pisani was unquestionably a reformer. He spent most of his first weeks on the job writing a point-by-point reply to the IACP report. His commitment to minority hiring in particular was visible and sincere. "The more cosmopolitan a police force, the better job it will do," he said. "I can sympathize with the problems of minority groups in this city."[7]

Pisani soon developed an effective working relationship with the city manager and the city council. In turn, he received strong and necessary support for implementing a variety of changes within the police department, changes often opposed by the established members of the police force. For

example, Pisani appointed two new police captains and passed over the senior lieutenant in line, a practice that would have been considered improper under the traditional civil service hiring and promotion system that rewarded primarily seniority and high examination scores. Pisani similarly promoted a number of black patrolmen on the police force to the rank of sergeant, even though a number of white officers had higher scores on the civil service examination.

Although the Cambridge Police Association objected to Pisani's hiring and promotion practices, their influence was substantially undercut by the devastating accusations documented in the IACP report. At the same time, many of Pisani's other efforts and reforms were beneficial to all members of the police department. With the help of the city manager and the city council, he upgraded equipment and working conditions and improved morale on the force, developments that tended to dampen dissent within the department.

Pisani's administration also brought a renewed credibility to the Cambridge police department in the eyes of the general public. In a story in the Boston _Phoenix_ in early 1975, Saundra Graham told a reporter, "Last weekend at Corcoran Park (a housing project) there were some drunk white kids threatening a black family. I called Frank Pisani at midnight, at home, and he sent three black cops over

immediately. I don't think (former Chief) Reagan would have lifted a finger."[8]

In summary, the reform of the Cambridge Police Department exemplified the type of issue that requires cooperation between the city manager and the city council. The coalitions had fundamental differences in how they viewed the role of the police, but all city councilors agreed that a problem existed and that "something needed to be done". The CCA offered a more developed and explicit program for police reform, and in turn found in James Sullivan a city manager who was willing and able to assist in the implementation of an appropriate strategy. Between the city manager and the city council, policies were developed that included an expansion of the manpower of the police department, coupled with political pressures to fill a substantial number of the newly created vacancies with women, blacks and other minority groups that had traditionally been excluded from the police force. This approach was highly satisfactory to the CCA, while giving the Independents some consolation by adding to the number of jobs available.

A second, and ultimately more telling strategy, was the decision to commission the IACP study of the police department. The basic substance of the report -- if not the exact details -- was known to the city manager and city councilors from the moment that it was formally commissioned,

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and its intent was to create an independent, factual document that could be used against the entranched opposition of police department members. In effect, the city manager and city councilors planned to use the media attention inevitable in such a report to increase political pressures for change. Significantly, this is a case where the action was aimed, not at the city councilors, but rather at the members of the city's police department. In effect, it was a deliberate effort to expand the Zone of Compliance within the police department.

Once the IACP report came out, and Chief Reagan had resigned, James Sullivan shrewdly chose a new police chief who had genuine bi-partisan support. Pisani was considered the best possible choice by the CCA, while his East Cambridge background and his career in the department made him acceptable to the Independents as well. Pisani's selection was not well-received by the police department itself, not so much because of objection to him personally as general opposition to his elevation over a number of senior officers. However, the cooperation between the city manager and the two coalitions, together with the high visibility created by the IACP report, left the police department little choice but to accept Pisani as a _fait accompli._

Selection of the Planning Director: The Strong Executive Model

One of the key sources of conflict between the two coalitions is the appointment of personnel. Each coalition would like to have substantial input on any significant personnel decision, though typically for different reasons. The CCA recognizes that control over a personnel choice means _de facto_ control over the policy decisions controlled or influenced by that position. The Independents view personnel appointments as a means of both controlling policy and distributing patronage to their supporters.

The city manager can usually maintain tight control over the appointment process, because he nominates candidates for office and supervises all city employees. Thus, despite the need for formal city council approval and despite the obvious interest that the coalitions take in such appointments, the city manager can appoint "his" choices.

One example of how the city manager can dominate such appointments occurred in 1966 during the creation of a new city position called "Community Planning Coordinator." On November 21, 1966, City Manager Joseph DeGuglielmo introduced a proposal for the creation of such a position at the regularly scheduled Monday night city council meeting. The city councilors immediately asked the city manager whom he had in mind to fill the position, and DeGuglielmo wrote the name of his candidate on a piece of paper, which was passed around to

each councilor. DeGuglielmo said he preferred not to make the name public in order to save the man embarrassment in the event the appointment was rejected.

Upon reading the name on the slip of paper, City Councilor Walter Sullivan immediately announced that he could not vote for the proposed candidate, claiming that the candidate had supported the unpopular Inner Belt proposal. The ensuing dialogue between Sullivan and DeGulielmo, as reported by the _Cambridge Chronicle_, is instructive as to the political techniques available to the city manager:

> "'This man has been around quite a while, hasn't he,' Sullivan asked:
>
> "'He's about 45 or 50, so I guess he has,' replied the city manager.
>
> "'How does he stand on the belt route right now?' Sullivan inquired.
>
> "'I don't know,' the manager replied. 'The belt route is not a decision for the city: it's a decision for the State and the Federal Bureau of Roads.'
>
> "'I know something about him,' said Sullivan. "He's mixed up with both universities and I can't vote for him.'
>
> "'You have the veto power over everything he does,' retorted DeGuglielmo."⁹

The above exchange illustrated the relative powers of the city manager and the city council. Nominally, the city

council has the power to approve or veto any appointment made by the city manager to this post. Yet, in reality, the city manager dominated the decision process. The city council was forced to ask for the city manager's proposed candidate, and Sullivan's challenge to the choice was clearly defensive. DeGuglielmo shrewdly used the city council's formal powers against it, noting that they had the right to "veto...everything he does." DeGuglielmo understood that the best technique was to play to the council's formal powers of authority, while effectively limiting the scope of the debate by controlling the nomination process.

At the November 21 meeting, the city council tabled the city manager's request for one week, a tactic designed to give the council more time. However, at the November 28 meeting, the council voted 7 to 2 to approve the proposal, naming DeGuglielmo's candidate, Justin Gray, as the first director. The Chronicle wrote:

> "The vote on the new planning set-up followed unsuccessful attempts by Councilors Mahoney and Alfred Vellucci to postpone action Mahoney sought a two week delay to set-up safeguards against perpetuating a man in the new post, while Vellucci asked for a one week delay to determine exactly what Gray's duties and objectives would be.
>
> DeGuglielmo, opposing any delay, said the new director would be an at-will-appointee, subject to dismissal at any time, and he promised to provide councilors with an outline and

description of the man's duties."[10]

In the final tally, both Mahoney and Vellucci voted in favor of the nomination, which was opposed only by Sullivan and Crane. DeGuglielmo was able to present the proposal and the nomination to the city council and secure its approval within one week largely on the rationale that: (1) it was necessary, and (2) the city council could always change the situation later. In reality, of course, establishing and appointing a particular individual to the post gave that person (as well as the city manager) an opportunity to control short term policies while offering his appointee an opportunity to solidify his position. DeGuglielmo won his desired appointment despite the opposition of two influential councilors and despite reservations from two others concerning the speed of the process.

Reading between the lines in this instance, one can sense the practical power of the city manager vis-a-vis the city council on many basic issues. The city council is at a disadvantage when the city manager takes the initiative in submitting a proposal. On such issues, the city council can only react: opposing the city manager's initiative requires either a viable alternative or, at the very least, a strong opposition to the proposal. Since the city manager has expertise on most of these issues, the city council is likely to accept his proposal unless there are unusual circumstances

that trigger opposition. It takes a significant political effort on the part of city council members to muster the necessary five-person majority to block a proposal. The formal power of city government may reside in the city council, but the inertia of city government often favors the city manager.

The Frisoli Appointment: The Strong Legislative Model

In June of 1970, Edward Conley resigned from his position as the Superintendent of the Cambridge School Department, leaving open the top administrative position in the public school system. Because of the importance of the superintendent's office both in terms of the policy formulation and in terms of the patronage, the two political coalitions began to vie for control of the appointment of Conley's successor. In general, the appointment of a superintendent is such a crucial political decision that the two coalitions will invariably compete for control of the office rather than compromise. This tendency was encouraged by the situation that existed in June, 1970, which included severe racial conflicts in the high school. Thus, the Frisoli appointment occurred at a time when other events had already sharpened the cleavages and antagonisms between the two coalitions.

Immediately following the resignation of Conley, the

school committee was composed of a nominal 4-3 CCA majority, which included Wylie, Butler, Fantini, and Duehay as the CCA representatives. The CCA felt that the superintendent's position should be filled by a candidate who was selected through a national search rather than by one of the candidates from within the Cambridge School System. The Independents, on the other hand, preferred to select one of the senior members of the school department, virtually all of whom were Independent supporters. Thus, the CCA was interested in a nationally recognized professional, while the Independents wanted an insider with strong local ties.

Because of the short time period between Conley's resignation and the start of the next school term, the school committee decided to fill the superintendent's position with a temporary appointment while a national search was begun for a successor. This decision reflected the 4-3 majority enjoyed by the CCA at the time. To fill the acting Superintendent's post, the school committee selected Frank Frisoli, then the Assistant Superintendent for Secondary Education. Frisoli was an Independent with strong social, political and family ties with the Cambridge Italian community. However, he was also considered the best assistant superintendent in the school system at the time, and he had performed impressively during the racial disturbances the year before in the Cambridge high schools. Thus, the CCA majority voted with the Independents

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in the temporary selection of Frisoli. Significantly, Committeeperson Loraine Butler opposed even the temporary appointment of Frisoli.

For the next eight months Frisoli was acting superintendent, during which time the City of Cambridge organized a committee comprised of interested community groups to screen and search for a permanent superintendent. Frisoli was allowed to submit his application for the permanent job, but he was not expected to receive the position. However, Frisoli began to manuever for the appointment, and soon the fragile truce between the two coalitions disintegrated into outright conflict. One aspect of the conflict was the ideological differences between the pro-Frisoli people, who were educational conservatives, and the anti-Frisoli people, who were educational reformers. Another basic line of division was the insider/outsider dichotomy, with the ethnic groups supporting Frisoli as one of their own, while the upper middle class people preferred an outside "expert" for the job. With a few key exceptions, then, the dividing lines over the Frisoli appointment were congruent with the divisions between the Cambridge coalitions.

As this conflict reached a crescendo, Frisoli tendered his resignation, stating that he would not serve as superintendent unless he was given a permanent appointment. At that point, the Independents engaged in some shrewd

political maneuvering, and the 4-3 CCA majority that had favored a national search suddenly turned into a 5-2 majority favoring the appointment of Frisoli. Changing sides in the vote were Butler and Fantini, both of whom had been elected as CCA-endorsed candidates. As a result, Frisoli was appointed to the permanent Superintendent's position in March, 1971.

The motives and mechanism for the vote switch in the School Committee is an instructive example of the differences between the two political coalitions. Fantini was a "marginal ethnic" candidate with strong ties to the Italian community in Cambridge, and the Independents effectively exploited these ties to convince Fantini to switch his support. In the case of Butler, the Independents knew that Butler's husband had been laid off from work in the 1969-70 recession, and so they offered him a job in the city's building and grounds department. Although the ploy was openly executed, Butler felt obliged to sacrifice her ideological values in order to response to the very real needs of her family.

The vote switch by the two CCA representatives created intense acrimony within the CCA coaliton and produced bitter antagonism between the coalitions. Significantly, by circumventing the search committee, the Independents alienated a number of important groups in the community, which had already done considerable amounts of work in the search and screening of potential candidates. Seeking to tap general

discontent over the Independent ploy, the CCA mobilized an election campaign called Common Slate, which promoted a specific slate of candidates committed to a specific platform, including the removal of Frank Frisoli from office. In the 1971 elections, the CCA managed to win three of the six School Committee seats plus the Mayor, giving them a 4-3 majority. At the first meeting convened by the new CCA majority, the school committee denied Frisoli a salary increase, refused to renew his contract, and undertook a search for his successor.

As a general overview of the Frisoli appointment battle, it is significant to note that the appointment of the superintendent of schools is the single most important political decision made by the school committee, and the benefits of filling the position with an ally are sufficiently attractive to spawn almost inevitable political conflict. In Frisoli's case, his enmity with the CCA and the high political emotions of the period encourage the CCA to take the perilous tactic of openly opposing an incumbent Superintendent of Schools. The danger of this action was that it crippled any chance the CCA had of influencing school policies in the short run; moreover, unless the CCA was successful in efforts to unseat Frisoli, it faced the long-term spectre of a hostile Superintendent. However, the CCA determined that the potential danger to its policies was substantial and that this justified their decision to return the political struggle for

power to the electoral arena, where it was possible to win an outright victory over Frisoli. Although a very risky decision, the CCA's strategy was successful in this instance.

As a general observation, however, the coalitions are normally not willing to reduce a policy conflict into an outright electoral battle unless they perceive the situation as highly provocative. The costs of openly opposing a superintendent are high, as are the costs of mobilizing support and opposition to an entrenched political figure. Rarely will an issue have sufficient importance to justify these high political costs. The appointment of a Superintendent is such an issue, but there are precious few others. Thus, the traditional concept of the electoral arena being a place where coalitions compete for policy victories is relatively unusual in practice, because few issues arise in which the coalitions are willing to accept the destabilization inherent in by-passing the role played by the Superintendent of Schools.

Pilot School: The Cooperative Model

In early 1969, the Cambridge School Department and the school committee were approached by the Harvard Graduate School of Education about the possibility of developing an experimental education program for high school students. The Harvard Graduate School of Education wanted to help Cambridge

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found an "alternative" education program that would emphasize creativity and de-emphasize the rigidly authoritarian structure that had characterized Cambridge education up to that time.

The leading proponent of this program was Frank Deuhay, a CCA representative on the School Committee who was also Dean of Admissions at the Harvard Graduate School of Education. The proposed program was generally congruent with the educational philosophy espoused by the CCA but was a radical departure from the traditional educational programs supported by the Independents. Thus, support and opposition to the proposed experimental school tended to cleave the school committee along coalitional lines.

To gain momentum for the proposed school, Duehay began by approaching the superintendent of schools, Edward Conley, seeking his support. A moderate with ties to and good relations with both coalitions, Conley was receptive to the innovation and was willing to back the proposal. Over the next few months, Deuhay and others at the Harvard Graduate School of Education developed a new program that they called the "Pilot School," which was designed to establish a special educational environment within the existing Cambridge public school system. With funding assistance jointly guaranteed by the Harvard Graduate School of Education and by the Federal government, Conley's Deputy Superintendent David Hochman

submitted this proposal to the school committee under his own name and with the tacit backing of Conley. As a result, the proposal received bipartisan support and was eventually approved by a unanimous vote.

In its first year, the Pilot School consisted of 61 students selected from a volunteer group of approximately 130. This group was screened so that the selected students represented a socio-economic cross-section of the community. These students were then enrolled in the Pilot School, which was located within the existing high school complex. The students took a varying number of courses within the Pilot School, with some students taking all their courses except gym under the new format, while other students took only one two-hour English course. The Pilot School courses emphasized freedom and creativity and downplayed the authoritarian structure of the more traditional classroom.

Although the Pilot School was warmly regarded by the staff and students, it was soon the target of political attack, especially from the Independent coalition. Fitzgerald, the old war horse of the Independent coalition, charged that the Pilot School was a hot-bed of radicals and SDSers and that the students were being "duped by the communists." In most respects, these charges were typical of the larger societal split occurring in 1970 between older, conservative Americans and younger, radicalized students. In

a special hearing devoted to the Pilot School program,
Fitzgerald presented evidence that he thought condemned the
school, while parents, teachers and students defended the
program. Afterwards, the program was reaffirmed by a vote of
5-1 (with 1 abstention). However, only the three CCA votes
were firmly committed to the Pilot School, while the
Independent councilors expressed concern that the Pilot School
was not popular with their constituents.

In 1970, Superintendent Conley resigned from his
position, and Frank Frisoli was appointed in his place.
Frisoli, a "traditional" educator, was staunchly opposed to
the Pilot School program and he evinced his dissatisfaction in
a variety of ways. Whenever the administrators overseeing the
Pilot School project needed funding or administrative
assistance from the Superintendent's office, they found that
such assistance was either not forthcoming or else grudgingly
provided. With Frisoli opposing the program and the
Independents massing for another attack, the Pilot School was
in serious jeopardy. This issue, in turn, was one of the
factors that enabled the CCA to mobilize opposition to Frisoli
and ultimately engineer his ouster.

In contrast to Frisoli, Al Cheatham was a strong
supporter of alternative education, and he quickly stepped in
to provide the administrative support that had been neglected
or deliberately withheld during the prior administration.

During this time, the Pilot School recovered and strengthened its program and soon became a very successful model of an unstructured educational environment. In general, once the Pilot School program was instituted, its success or failure depended largely on the level of support that it received from the superintendent of schools. With his day-to-day control over most or all phases of implementation, the Superintendent could either promote or sabotage the program with equal effectiveness, while the School Committee could little to curb this power. Thus, while the CCA majority on the school committee initiated the program and while the school committee retained a right to veto over the key facets of the program, the functional lines of authority and implementation meant that the Superintendent was a key factor in bringing the program to fruition. Hence, the coalition that could win over the Superintendent's support could achieve its objective.

In subsequent years, the political coalitions resolved the ideological conflict over the Pilot School in the interesting exercise in pluralism: they formed a Fundamental School, also located within the existing high school complex, to placate the educational conservatives who wanted greater discipline in the high school. In effect, each group respected the right of the other to obtain the form of education deemed most appropriate for their children. Since the programs were not overly expensive (at least to the

Cambridge taxpayer) and since it was feasible to administer within the existing school system, this proved to be an effective means of establishing and legitimating the Pilot School. Thus, the availability of resources for education in this instance resolved what could have been a serious political encounter between the coalitions.

Tobin's Appointments: The Strong Executive Model

One of the key issues in the ongoing conflict between the Cambridge coalitions is the desire for control over the appointment of personnel. Throughout the period in question, different methods of filling vacant positions were developed, with each approach being a superficially neutral method that in fact disguised a very clear political purpose. In general, since the method of appointment determined the appointment outcomes, the natural consequence was for the coalitions to conflict over the appropriate method. This led to some interesting and often comical results.

In the late 1950's, the Independents tried to fill the school department with relatives and close supporters of the coalition leaders. This effort -- dubbed "Family Night" by the Cambridge Chronicle -- temporarily discredited the Independents and led to a reform of the appointment process. Under the reform, a test was given to all applicants for a position, and the three applicants receiving the highest

scores were then eligible for appointment. Under this rating system, the candidates could receive 60 possible points on a written exam, 25 points from a Board of citizens, and 15 points from the superintendent. The Superintendent could then nominate any of the three highest scorers, and this nominee was submitted to the School Committee for approval.

Although the test method was superficially "neutral", the practical consequences of its implementation was to give exceptional power to a superintendent. The Superintendent could allocate up to 15 points out of the 100 for this rating system, and then he could select any of the three highest applicants. In practice, the scores from the other parts of the exam were sufficiently close that the Superintendent could place anyone that he wanted in the top three, and often at the very top of the list.

This system, which in any case invited usurpation by the Superintendent, was particularly potent in the hands of John Tobin, a tough-minded autocrat who demanded both loyalty and competence from the people who worked under him. The rating system used at this time enabled him to achieve both goals. Invariably, Tobin appointed the person who finished with the highest score, a practice that was unassailable and yet which, given his power to allocate points, enabled him to select the person whom he wanted.

One of the most vivid examples of Tobin's power was the

appointment of Robert Sweeney to the position of Headmaster of the Rindge Technical High School. Sweeney, a long time teacher at the Rindge School and a loyal Tobin subordinate, received the highest score on the examination given for that position. Significantly, seven people took the exam, all of whom were members of the existing school department. When Sweeney's appointment came up for approval, however, the School Committee objected. Members of both coalitions, but especially the CCA, opposed Sweeney's nomination, citing complaints about the scores given by the ad hoc, appointed Board of Examiners. Significantly, the four CCA members voted to ensure that if a retesting was done that it be made available to people who had not taken the first test. In effect, the CCA was looking to attract outside people, while Tobin was insistent on promoting people within the Cambridge School System. Finally, the School Committee voted 5-2 to have the examination administered again.

If this vote by the school committee was a defeat for Tobin, it was not a lasting one. Under the re-examination, Sweeney again topped the list. Significantly, the scores showed that Sweeney won by less than 3 points, so that Tobin could easily have been the decisive factor in this ranking. Again, Tobin placed Sweeney's name in nomination, and he hinted that he would keep nominating him until the school committee approved the appointment. The school committee had

no alternative and thus approved Sweeney.

The Sweeney appointment exemplified the power of a strong Superintendent to prevail in his personnel choices. In this case, Tobin had been given the power to place names in nomination, but his power was presumably limited by the school committee's right of approval. However, Tobin knew that in a battle of will he would prevail, partly because of his power to allocate test points, but mainly because of his entrenched power to weather school committee disapproval. Tobin knew that he could outwait the school committee -- and in end the committee knew it too. Thus, a tenured superintendent has extraordinary power vis-a-vis the school committee in areas where the formal political structure was intended to create a more shared or balanced division of powers.

Summary and Conclusions

As the case studies demonstrate, the formulation and implementation of public policy in Cambridge is a flexible process that depends on both the nature of the issue and the personal attributes of the chief executive. Although it is possible to cast Cambridge city government as a competition between the two dominant coalitions, a more appropriate model sees policy formulation as a triangular relationship involving the two coalitions and the chief executive, with the chief executive's role varying according to the political salience

of the underlying issue. In some cases the political conflict between the two coalitions is the dominant factor in policy formulation; in the majority of instances, however, the chief executive plays an important, and frequently dominant, role in both the formulation and implementation of policy.

The coalitions serve to shape and channel political discourse so that practical outcomes can be reached. Although not truly promulgated by the coalitions in the formal legislative sense, these outcomes are nonetheless consistent with the public's interests and preferences. The coalitions serve as a prism through which the public's interest must pass to gain focus and direction.

In Chapters VI and VII, this study offered models of policy formulation and implementation that placed the chief executive at the center of the policy process, with the coalitions setting boundaries on the possible political alternatives. In the current chapter, we introduced a more general model that explained how the boundaries were developed according to the political salience of a particular policy issue, and how active coalition involvement increased with the political importance of an issue. When taken as an aggregate model of municipal political behavior, these models suggest that legislative and coalition behavior is almost always at the periphery of policy formulation, while the chief executive remains the central focus of policy formulation and

implementation. These models do not underestimate the role or importance of the coalitions in the electoral and legislative contexts: Indeed, as every student of politics understands, the power to define options, and especially the power to block policy alternatives, is often more potent than the nominal power to define the specific policy and its implementation.

At the same time, these models demonstrate the fact that the chief executive officer in two arenas of Cambridge city government is the primary force in formal policy formulation. The power of the legislature to dominate a few key issues -- most frequently the appointment of the city manager and the superintendent of schools -- and the concomitant power to fire the incumbent chief executive should not be construed as the power to set explicit policy. In almost every case, both major and minor, the chief executive determines the mechanics and particulars of policy within the framework defined by the political system and the coalitions.

The basic conclusion, then, is that Cambridge city government does not, and indeed cannot, operate according to the assumptions that underlie the Plan E form of government. The city legislatures are divided into two reasonably powerful coalitions, and yet these two coalitions are strikingly ineffectual in setting policy in any but the most fundamental and controversial areas. The reliance on the chief executive is substantial and grows increasingly so in proportion to the

amount of professional expertise needed to set effective policy. The predominant role of the coalitions, as implemented by the voting behavior of coalitional members in the city legislatures, is to approve policy decisions formulated by the chief executive officer. The real power of the legislature lies not in developing explicit policies, but in its power to veto unacceptable alternatives and to influence, through informal cooperation, the policies developed by the chief executive.

This study suggests that municipal policy decisions can be divided into three broad categories: (1) a small number of issues of high salience, in which the legislature plays a predominant role in policy formulation; (2) a moderate number of issues of medium political salience that invoke a high degree of cooperation between the coalition members and the chief executive officer; and (3) a large number of issues of low political salience that are dominated by the city manager within a relatively wide lattitude allowed by the coalitions. Perhaps a key feature of these models is the suggestion of continuity: thus, the city council's domination of the rent control issue is consistent with a system that allows the city manager substantial policy autonomy in the vast majority of policy areas.

Since the coalitions dominate the formulation of only a comparatively small number of issues, it is significant to

examine what, specifically, those issues are. In general, the coalitions are most interested in the appointment of the chief executive officer, which in effect becomes an explicit electoral and legislative battle over future policy outcomes. Control over the appointment of a chief executive is simultaneously control over policy and patronage, and thus it is a political decision central to the goals of both coalitions. At the same time, the selection of a particular individual to fill the chief executive's position has implicit boundary-setting aspects, most notably the personal, political, and ideological orientation of the individual selected to fill the post. Thus, the battle to control the appointment of the chief executive is also a battle for the future direction and boundaries of Cambridge policy formulation, at least in the near term.

Once a chief executive is appointed, the coalitions' influence over his policy formulation is significant. This includes personal, informal contacts with members of both coalitions; the formal, political contacts in the legislature and other arenas; and ultimately his awareness that failure to retain the support of at least one coalition will almost certainly lead to his removal from office. Thus, while it is accurate to say that the chief executive plays a dominant role in the formulation of most policy issues, it is wrong to overlook the important role played by the coalitions. The

coalitions, through individual legislators, are the link between the chief executive and the people of Cambridge, and thus are the key vehicles for political communications. The coalitions are not always involved in the direct initiation of public policy, but they always play a key role in shaping, communicating, and ultimately accepting or rejecting the policy initiatives introduced by the chief executive.

Just as the coalitions place boundaries on the policy alternatives available to the chief executive, so the larger community places boundaries and limits on the coalitions. The diagram below (Exhibit VIII-1) shows the role the coalitions play in political discourse. The arrows indicate an interactive relationship between events/issues, the media, ad hoc groups, the coalitions, and the legislative bodies, with single arrows representing a weak-moderate influence and double arrows moderate-to-strong influence.

As this diagram indicates, the coalitions are the central institution in Cambridge politics, a "marketplace" where political ideas and forces meet, conflict, and ultimately coalesce. The coalitions are the pervasive organizing force, influencing each of the other institutions in meaningful ways, while providing the bridge between the institutions that can lead to coherent paths for policy formulation and implementation. Although the chief executive is the key

EXHIBIT VIII-I: DECISION-MAKING IN THE CITY OF CAMBRIDGE:
AN EVENT ORIENTED POLITICAL PROCESS

initiator of policy, the coalitions provide functional guidance on the substance of that policy and facilitate its acceptance by the community. Thus, the coalitions serve as brokers between the sovereign but diffuse political needs of the community and the powerful but isolated figure of the chief executive.

In summary, the role of the two coalitions in Cambridge politics is complex. For the most part the coalitions represent social class divisions in the community and, because of the demographics of Cambridge, the two are almost evenly matched. Both groups perceive that they are not in a position to defeat the other permanently, and therefore the political system tends to favor stability and compromise. Given the fact that all actors want an effective city government, the impetus toward stability is quite strong, and the political system generally achieves this stability in either the Shared or Strong Executive Models. However, events occur periodically that upset the existing equilibrium and which trigger harsh, intense conflict. These events are characterized by a broad and inter-related competition that spans the three political arenas and that is most clearly defined and focused in the competition between the coalitions.

One main reason why the political system tends toward equilibrium is that the coalitions' interests can be reconciled. The CCA is primarily concerned with improving the

quality and distribution of services to Cambridge residents. The Independents, on the other hand, are most interested in the distribution of individual benefits, especially patronage. These interests are reconciled when the Independents can distribute jobs and patronage to people who can then perform the jobs so that the services to the community are improved, thereby satisfying the CCA. Of course, this compromise is not always possible to achieve and, when it is not, disputes arise. In most cases, the dispute is resolved through the informal mechanisms described in the Cooperative and Strong Executive Models. Occasionally, however, it erupts into a full-scale bipartisan conflict described in the Strong Legislative Model.

Thus, the coalitions have dual personalities. In stable situations, when there is no major conflict, they have a strong interest in compromise and thus become agents of conciliation. However, when a controversy occurs, the coalitions behave in the opposite manner, mobilizing and escalating the conflict. In the Strong Legislative Model, the coalitions become bitterly divided for both personal and political reasons, and compromise becomes impossible. At such a such a time, the short-term reaction of the coalitions is to exacerbate, rather than mediate, the differences between them.

It is critical to note that even when the two coalitions are promoting conflict, they nonetheless perform an important

stabilizing function. Coalitions tend to fight over issues of high salience, over which conflict is almost inevitable, and in competing sharply they focus the dispute into two dominant positions. Thus, the political system, though fractious, is not fragmented. For example, while the CCA and Independents were competing over whether to appoint Frank Frisoli as superintendent of schools, the CCA was striking an intra-coalition compromise that led to the appointment of Al Cheatham as the first black superintendent of schools. In the absence of coalitional politics, blacks might have represented a third interest group rather than aligning with the CCA. In this way, inter-coalitional conflict breeds intra-coalitional cooperation.

Thus, coalitions can be mediating institutions in either of two ways: (1) by facilitating compromise between the various interest groups, or (2) by promoting conflict. Although conflict may seem like an odd mechanism for achieving stability, it serves to prevent the fragmentation and discord that would severely hamper the ability of the local government to provide services to the community. The evidence presented here suggests that the role of political coalitions is highly important in a nominally nonpartisan city government such as Cambridge, because the system otherwise lacks the formal institutional arrangements to minimize and mediate conflict. In effect, the coalitions become the mediating institutions

that are essential to the maintenance and operation of a democratic form of government.

FOOTNOTES

[1]*Cambridge Chronicle*, November 7, 1974, p. 1.

[2]*Ibid.*, p. 1.

[3]*Cambridge Chronicle*, January 2, 1975, p. 2.

[4]*Boston Phoenix*, March 4, 1975, p. 5.

[5]*Ibid.*, p. 5.

[6]*Ibid.*, p. 5.

[7]*Ibid.*, p. 5.

[8]*Ibid.*, p. 16.

[9]*Cambridge Chronicle*, November 24, 1966, p. 1.

Cambridge Chronicle, December 1, 1966, p. 1.